Inquiries concerning the intellectual powers, and the investigation of truth

fi

•* -I

, V

^

*J

J'

w

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013

http://archive.org/details/inquiriesconcern00aber_1

\ -

I N Q U I 11 1 E S

CONCERNING TH£

[NTELLECTUAL POWERS,

AND THE

INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH.

BY JOHN ABERCROMBIS, M.D. F.R.S.

fellow of ihfi Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh, &c, and First
Physician to His Majesty in Scotland.

"WITH ADDITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS TO ADAPT THE WORK lO THF
USE OF SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES,

BY JACOB ABBOTT,

BOSTON:

OTIS, BROADERS, AND COMPANY.

1845.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1833, by Jacod Abbott,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Massachusetts.

hh'Sl^.O>(l

^1-0

(i5H

PREFACE.

The text of the following work, strictly speaki^ag, is Dr
Abercrombie's treatise on the Human Mind, entire. In
connection with this treatise, however, the original edition
has iwo articles attached to it by the author, for the sole
benefit of the class whom he was addressing, viz. a class of
medical students. The first to which we refer is a history
of the science of Intellectual Philosophy, prefixed to the
ivork ; the second, an admirable set of directions, to guide
medical students in their professional inquiries. These trea-
tises do not of necessity constitute a part of a treatise on
the Philosophy of Mind. They are accordingly omitted in
this edition. What, in the editor's opinion, constitutes the
treatise itself, is published entire, without alterations or
omissions, the editor holding his author's language sacred.
The additions which have been made are intended, not to
supply any supposed deficiencies in the original, but simply
to adapt it to a purpose for which the book is, in the main,
admirably suited ; they are intended as nearly as was pos-
sible to be such additional explanations as the editor con-
ceived the author would himself have made, had he have
had in view, whilst preparing the book, the purpose to
which it is now applied.

The practice of studying such a work as this by formal
questions, the answer to which pupils commit to memory
annot be too severely censured. There seemed, however

4 PREFACE.

to be something necessary as a guide to the contents of the
page, both for the pupil in reviewing the lesson, and for the
teacher at the recitation. That minute and familiar ac-
quaintance, not only with the doctrines taught in the lesson,
but with the particular contents of every page and para-
graph, so essential in enabling the teacher to ask his ques-
tions with fluency, very few teachers have the time to se-
cure. The editor has accordingly added an analysis of the
page in the margin. This analysis is given sometimes in
questions, and sometimes in topics or titles, which can easi-
ly be put by the teacher into the form of questions if he
pleases ; or. what will perhaps be better, they can, at the
recitation, be given to the pupil as topics, on which he is to
stale in substance the sentiments of the author.

In regard to the value of Dr. Abercrombie's treatise, there
is, and there can be, but one opinion. Its useful tendency
is most decided, both in making the pupil acquainted with
his powers, and in guiding him to the most efficient and
successful use of them. The eflect of a proper study of
this work must be highly salutary upon every mind brought
under its influence ; and it is a kind of effect which is ex
actly suited to guard against the peculiar dangers of the
age.

Boston^ September y 183.3.

CONTENT

iNTROrrCTION- ... . .

Design of the Study . . . • .

Qualifications for engaging in it .

1. /\bilit3^ to understand the language of the Bock

2. Ability to appreciate the Thoughts

3. "Willingness to make the proper effort .
Method of pursuing the study ....
Particular directions .....

Page
1

11
1?
13
14
15
t6
21

PART I.

OF THE NATUEE AND EXTENT OF OUR KNOWnLEPGE

OF MIND.

Our Knowledge of Mind limited entirely to Facts . h 25

Ideal Theory of the 01c Philosophy . . , .27

Of Materialism ....... 28

Grounds for considering Materialism as not only unfounded,
but as in its nature opposed to the First Principles of Philo-
sophical Inquiry ...... 21.'

Grounds for believing that the Thinking Principle is in its Es-
sence independent of the Bod}^, and will survive it . , SO
This Belief is entirely independent of our Speculations respect-
ing the Immateriality of the Thinking Principle, and rests on
a species of evidence altogether different . . .3?
1^

CONTExXTS.

PART II.

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS RE
LATING BOTH TO MATTER AND MIND.

SECTION I.

SE^'SATION AND PERCEPTION.

Of the Primary and Secondar}^ Properties of Mitter
Knowledge ot the Properties of IMatter by the Senses .
Of our Knowledge of Distance and Magnitude .
Apparent improvement of some Senses after loss of others
Of our Knowledge of the Nature of Perception .
Remarkable Influence of Attention
Ua.bits of Attention and Inattention
Of False Perceptions .....

Pasre
39
41
42
4o
48
49
50
52

SECTION II.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION.

Of the Knovvdedge which we derive from Consciousness and Ke
flection . . ....

1. The Knowledge of our Mental Processes

2. Compound Notions, — as Time, Cause, IMotion .

3. First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief

57

57
57
58

SECTION III.

TESTIMONY.

^ules by which we estimate the Credibility of Testimony . 59

IJonfiflence in Testimony in regard to statements at variance
with our Personal Observation or Experience . . .02

(.Objections which have been made to the Reception of such State-
ments on the Evidence of Testimony . . . . r>3

Fallacy of these Objections, and Grounds of our Confidence in

Testimony ....... 61

Distinction beiwoen Events which arc marvellous and those
whiih arc miraculous . . . . .67

CONTESTS.

Page.
Moial Probability ol Miracles ..... 68
Miracles not a violation of the established order of Nature, but

referable to an agenc}^ altogether new and peculiar . . 71

Grounds on which we estimate the Credibility of Testimony in

regard to unusual or miraculous events . . .72

PART III.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS.

SECTION II.

ABSTRACTION.

SECTION III.

IMAGINATION,

81
83
86
90
94
95

SECTION I.

MEMORY.

Attention .....

Association ....

1. Natural or Philosophical Association

2. Local or Incidental Association .

3. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association

Artificial IMemory
Important Application of the Principle of Arbitrary
Association in Commemorative Rites . . 96

Conception, or the IMemory of Perceptions . . .98

Of the Culture and Improvement of Attention, Reliection, and

Memory • " • • • • • -102

Of the lux^uence of Disease upon Attention and Memory • 108

Of Extensive Cerebral Disease, without Sensible Derangement
cf the Mental Functions ..... no

Influence of the Facts connected with this subject in
showing the Independent Existence of the Thinking
Princinle ^ . • • • -120

Nature and Application of Abstraction .... 121
Disputes of the Nominalists and Realists • • -127

Nature and Applications of Imagination • • • • 12y

Various Kinds of Arlif!cial Combination to which it is applicable 130

CONTENTa.

Importance of a Proper Application of it in the Formation of
Cliaracter .......

Effects of Fictitious Narrative . . . . ,

Effects of an ill-regulated Imagination . . . .

Page.

131
132
13?

SECTION IV.

REASON OR JUDGMENT.

Analysis of the 3Iental Process of which Keason consists . 134
Applications of Reason in the Investigations cf Science, the

Affairs of Common Life, and the Formation of Opinions . 138

Man's Responsibility for his Belief .... 142
Farther Division of the Subject. — Brief Outline of the System of

Dr. Brown ...... 144

^ I. — OF THE USE OF REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION OF

TRUTH.

Of First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief, as the Founda-
tion of all Reasoning ......

1. A Belief in our o\\ti Existence, and of Mind as some-

thing distinct from the Body . . . .

2. A Confidence in the Information furnished by our

Senses .......

3. A Confidence in our IMental Operations .

4. A Belivjf of our Personal Identity

5. A Conviction that every Event must have a Cause
G. A Confidence in the Uniformity of Nature

Uniformity of Physical Relations
Uniformity of IMoral Relations

Application to the Question of Liberty and Nc
cessity .....
Of the Nature and Importance of First Truths, and Sophisms

connected with attempts to reason against llicm
Laws of Investigation in any Department of Knowledge

1. Of collecting Facts . . . ,

2. Of tracing the Relation of Cause and Effect

3. Of deducing General Principles .
Of Fallacies in Investigation

Fallacies in regard to Facts .

False Induction

False Reasoning
i)f the Nature of Reasoning
)rtho Syllogism and its Uses

145
146

Ur,
147
147
147
148
148
lol

153

150
163
16f)

I.')!)
107
108
I()S
Jt)8
169
IhO
170

CONTENTS.

Ot the Cautions m examining a Process of Reaf.oning or Invcs-
tigation .......

Distinction between a Process of Reasoning and a Process of In
vestigation ......

Of Fallacies in Reasoning ....

Of IMathematical Reasoning . , . .

Difference between the Sound Exercise of Judgment and the

Art of Disputation . . * .

Of the Culture and Regulation of the Judgment .

Influence of Attention ....

Influence of Prejudice ....

Influence of Passion, or State of Moral Feelings
Importance of a well-regulated Judgment .

Page.
i73

175

178
187

189
191
191

192
193
194

^ II. — OF THE USE OF REASON IN CORKECTING THE IMPRESSIONS 0?
THE MIND IN REGARD TO EXTERNA!. THINGS.

Nature and Effects of this Exercise of Reason . . . 195

Peculiar Conditions connected with the Suspension of it . 196

I. Dreaming ....... 198

Peculiar Condition of the Mind in Dreaming . .198

Origin of the various Classes of Dreams.

1. Recent Events ..... 198

2. Old Associations excited by Bodily Sensations . 199

3. Old Associations recalled by a Process of the

Mind itself . . . . .203

4. Mental Emotions imbodied into Dreams . . 207
Dreams consist chiefly of Real Objects of Concep-
tion . . . . . . .213

Operations of an Intellectual Character in Dreams . 214

XI. Somnambulism . . . . • .218

Various degrees of this Aflection.
Remarkable Condition, commonly called Double Con-
sciousness . . . . . .221

III, Insanity ...... 225

Peculiar Condition of the Mind constituting Insanity 226
Various Modifications of it, from Eccentricity to Pda-

nia . . . . . . . 227

Great Activity of the Mental Powers in many Cases 229
Remarkable Loss of Recent Impressions, and sudden

Revival of them on Recovery . . . 230
Hallucination confined to a single Point . . . 232
Probable Origin of the Peculiar Hallucinations. in dif-
ferent cases of Insanity .... 233

10 CONTENTS.

Fa?e.

1. Propensities of Character . . . 233

2. Old Associations . . . • . 234

3. Old Fictions of the Imagination . . 234

4. Bodily Feelings ..... 234

5. Undefined Impression of the new and peculiar

Condition of the IMental Powers . . 235

Melancholia — Propensity to Suicide . . . 236

Origin and Causes of Insanity .... 238

Cautions in deciding on slight or suspected Case. . 241

Liability of the Insane to Punishment . . . 242

Moral Treatment of Insanity .... 244

Of Idiocy — Difference between it and Insanity . 24S

Cretinism ...... 250

IV . Spectral Illusions.

Various Forms and Sources of them . . . 254

r

PART IV.

VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIREMENTS
WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL REGULATED
MIND.

L Habit of Attention . . - .

2. Piegulation of the Succession of Thoughts

3. Activity of Mind .

4. Habits of Association and Reflection

5. Proper Selection of Objects of Pursuit

6. Government of the Imagination .

7. Culture and Regulation of the Judgment

Observing and Inventive Genius
8 Right Condition of the 3l3ral Feelings

267
269
272
272
273
274
27.5
27?
28a

INTRODUCTION.

]\IETHOD OF USING THE BOOK.

TC BE CAREFULLY STUDIED BY THE PUFILS AS TUEIR FIRST LE3S0H

The design of tlie study of Intellectual Philosophy
is not merely, as in the case of most other studies, the
acquisition of knoioledge. Sometliing far more impor-
tant, and far more difficult to attain, is in view. In the
study of Chemistry, History, Geography, and other
similar sciences, the main object is to obtain informa-
tion— to become acquainted with facts. But altliougli
the science of Mind does indeed present to view a most
valuable and interesting class of facts, it is not merely
Avilh reference to these that the study is pursued. This
science aims at a higher object. It is intended to intro-
duce the pupil to a new jangc of thouglit, and to bring
out into action, and consequently into more full deve-
lopment, a new class of faculties. It is its aim to ex-
ercise and strengthen the thinking and reasoning pow-
ers,—to enable the mind to grasp abstruse and perplex-
ing subjects, — to think clearly and to reason correctly,
in re2:ard to truths that lie in those depths Vv^hich tlie
senses cannot explore.

Design ^f ilie sUuly, what? Compgr ' wUb olher studies. What i.-^ its chief

12 INTRODL'CTIOX.

Of course, the study of Intellectual Philosophy is not
mtended to be an easy one. Its very difficulty is one
source of the benefit to be derived from it ; for it is by
encountering and overcoming this difficulty, that intel-
lectual strength is acquired. In Gymnastics, the exer-
tion necessary to perform the feats is the very means
by which the advantage is secured, and it is to require
this exertion that the whole apparatus is contrived.
Now mathematical and metaphysical studies are in-
tended as a sort of intellectual gymnastics, in which the
tasks ought indeed to be brought fairly within the pow-
ers of the pupil, but they ought nearly to equal those
powers, so as to call them into active and vigorous ex-
ercise, or the end will be lost. If, therefore, the writer
of a treatise on such a subject comes down so complete-
ly to the level of the young as to make the study mere
light reading, he fails entirely of accomplishing what
ought to be his highest aim. He destroys the difficul-
ty and the advantage together. It is indeed true that
a very useful book may be written for children, with
the design of merely giving them information on some
subjects connected with the structure of their minds.
It might be entertaining, and to a considerable degree
instructive, but it would answer none of the important
purposes which ought to be in view, in the introduction
of such a study into literary institutions. It would de-
velop no new reasoning or thinking powers. It would
awaken no new intellectual effort.

Such being the nature of this study, it is plain that it
ought not to be commenced by any pupil without a
proper understanding of its object and design. Such an
unclerstanding is essential. That it may come more
distinctly and definitely before the mind, I propose to
enumerate the qualifications which each individual
should see that he possesses, before he commences the
study of this work.

The study dificult. Why ? Gyiunasiics. Difference between rcaJing and study,
on ihia subject.

INTKODUCTION. 13

I. A/Alily io luidcr^lcuid the language of the work.
[t is not a child's book. It was written by a man, and
was intended to be read by men. The editor has made
no effort to alter it in this respect, so that the book stands
on a level, as to its style and language, v/ith the great
mass of books intended to influence and interest the
mature. It ought to be so ; for to be able to understand
such writing is necessary for all, and if the pupil is far
enough advanced in his education to study metaphysics,
it is high time for him to be habituated to it. Let no
pupil therefore, after he is fairly engaged in the study,
complain that he cannot understand the lessons. This
is a point which ought to be settled before he begins.

Take for instance the following passage, Avhich may "^
perhaps be considered as a fair specimen. Let the pu- ^
pil read it attentively, and see whether or not he can ' ^
fully understand it. .^

" There is a class of intellectual habits directly the re-
verse of those now referred to ; namely, habits of inatten-
tion, by which the mind, long unaccustomed to have the at-
tention steadily directed to any important object, becomes
frivolous and absent, or lost amid its own waking dreams.
A mind in this condition becomes incapable of following a
train of reasoning, and even of observing facts with accu-
racy and tracing their relations. Hence nothing is more
opposed to the cultivation of intellectual character ; and
when such a person attempts to reason, or to follow out a
course of investigation, he falls into slight and partial views,
unsound deductions, and frivolous arguments. This state
of mind, therefore, ought to be carefully guarded against in
the young, as, when it is once established, it can be removed
only by a long and laborious effort, and after a certain pe-
riod of life is probably irremediable.

" In rude and savage life remarkable examples occur of
the effect of habits of minute attention to those circumstan-
ces to which the mind is intensely directed by their relation
to the safety or advantage of the observer. The American

k

First qualification — what 1 Language of thabook, BTode of ascertaining tho pupil's
ability to undsriJtand it. Substance of the pacsaige quoted— -"what 'i

2

14 INTRODUCTION.

bimter finds his way in the trackless forests by attention to
minute appearances in the tre:3, which indicate ^'^ t^^rr tiic
points of tiie compass. He traces thu progress of ..: ^ fue-
mies or his friends by the marks of their footsteps; and
judges of their numbers, their hahings, their employments,
by circumstances which v\'ould entirely escape the observa-
tion of persons unaccustomed to a mode of life requiring
such exercises of attention. Numerous examples of this
kind are mentioned by travellers, particularly among the
orifxinal natives of America.*'

Tlie pupil may read as attentively as he pleases. He
may make use of a dictionary, or any other similar lielp.
He may make occasional inquiries of a friend ; but if he
cannot, with such assistance, really understand the train
of thought presented in such a passage, and give a tole^
rable account of it to his teacher, he had better for the
present postpone the study of Intellectual Philosophy -
his mind is too immature.

II. Mental ciiltivaiion eiioiigli to he interested in iJie
subject of the work. The subjects discussed, and tlie
views presented, are of such a nature, that mere chil-
dren can take no intercut in them. They cannot
appreciate them. Unless the mind has made consi-
derable progress in its development, and in its attain-
ments in other branches, aiid unless it has, in some de-
gree, formed habits of patient attention, it must fail in
the attempt to penetrate such a subject as this. The
pnpil, in such a case, after going a little way, will say the
book is dull and drv. He will attribute to the study, or
to the mode in which it is treated, a faihu'e, which really
results from his own incapacity. He ought to reflect
when tempted to make this charge, that it cannot be
possible that the study is, in itself, uninterestii:)g. Tliis
treatise of Dr. Abercrombie's has been bought and^rcad
with avidity by tens of thou.sands in Great Britain and
America, who could have been led to it by no motive

tSecoiii! ']iial.f.cal.:(iiv Conseiiiionce.^ of coauncncmg LUe sLu.ty w.lhoui iL The
really mti^rc^lins: : huw prjvc.1 to oc to.

INTRODUCTION. 15

whatever, but the strong interest which the subject
inspires. They, therefore, who are not interested in it,
after making faithful efforts, fail of being so because
their intellects are yet too feeble to appreciate what they
read ; and by complaining of the dryness or dullness of
the book, they are really exposing their own incompe-
tency to enter into the spirit of it. The teacher ought
to take care that his pupils do not commence the work,
mitil they are capable of feeling the interest which it is
calculated to awaken.

III. A willingness to give to the subject the severe^
patient^ and persevering study which it demands.
Some will wish to take up such a branch merely
for the sake of having something new. Others be-
cause their vanity is flattered by the idea that they are
studying Philosophy. Others still, because they wish
for the honor of being in a class with certain individu-
als known as good scholars. Beginning with such
ideas and motives, will only lead to disappointment and
failure. The pupil ought to approach this subject with
a distinct understanding that though it is full of inte-
rest, it will be full of difficulty ; that it will try, to the
utmost, his powers ; and that the pleasure which he is
to seek in the pursuit of it, is the enjoyment of high
intellectual effort, — the interest of encountering and
overcoming difficulties, — and opening to himself a new
field of knowledge, and a new scope for the exercise of
his powers.

I come now to describe a method of studying and
reciting the lessons in such a work as this. I say a
method, because it is only meant to be proposed for
adoption in cases where another or a better one is not
at hand. Experienced and skilful teachers have their
own modes of conducting such studies, and the recita-
tions connected with them, with Avhich there ought to
■ ' '■ ■ " ' "<

Coraplainla of its dullness show what? Third qualification. Wrong motives for
commencing the study. Proper views of it. Method of studying — why proposed.

16 INTRODrCTIOX.

be no interference. The plan about to be proposed
may, however, be of use m assisting teachers who are,
for the first time, introducing this study to their schools ;
and the principles on which it is based are well worthy
the attention of every pupil who is about to conmience
this study.

'1. When you sit down to the study of a lesson in
^this work, be careful to be free from interruption, and
to have such a period of time before you, to be occu-
pied in the work, as will give you the opportunity
really to enter into it. Then banish other tlioughts
entirely from the mind, and remove yourself as far as
possible from other objects of interest or sources of in-
terruption. The habit into which many young persons
allow themselves to fall, of studying lessons in frag-
4 ments of time, having the book, perhaps, for some time
' ' before them, but allowing their attention to be con-
I >« tinually diverted from their pursuit, will only lead to
superficial and utterly useless attainments. It is de-
structive to all those habits of mind necessary for suc-
cess in any important intellectual pursuit.^^It is espe-
cially injurious in such a study as this. /^Intellectual
Philosophy is emphatically the science of fhoiight^oTiS^
nothing eflfectual can be done in it without patient,
continued, and solitary study.

2. Ascertain before you commence any lesson what
place it occupies in the general plan of the book, with
which, at the outset, you should become very thorough-
ly acquainted. Nothing promotes so much the forma-
tion of logical and systematic habits of mind, and no-
thing so effectually assists the memory, in regard to
what any particular work contains, as the keeping
constantly in view the general plcm of the book ; look-
ing at it as a ichole^ and understanding distinctly, not
merely each truth, or system of truths brought to view,
but the place which it occupies in the general design.

• ■ ■ ^. ■ ■ ■ -^1 ■■■II II ■ -I !■-■ ■■ ■ ■■-■—. — ■■■l^l^.^■ ■ ■ I ^— ^M^^

First direction. A common but faulty mode of studying described. Its elTecla—
^hal ? Second direction. EtTecta of this practice.

INTRODUCTION. 1

»r

3. This preparation being made, you are prepared to
read the lesson, which should he done, the first time,
with great attention and care, and with especial effort
to understand the connection between each sentence
and paragraph, and those which precede and follow it.
It should always be borne in mind, that treatises on
such subjects as these, present trains of thought and
reasoning, not mere detached ideas and sentences.
Every remark, therefore, should be examined, not by
itself, but in its connections. This should be especially
observed in regard to the anecdotes and illustrations,
with which the work abounds. The bearing of each
one on the subject should be very carefully studied.
They are all intended to prove some point, or to illus-
trate some position. After reading such narratives,
then, you should not onh^ take care to understand it as
a story, but should ask yourself such questions as
these: ''Why is the story introduced here? What
does the author mean to prove by it ? What principle
does it illustrate 7"

There is, for example, in the section on Memory, a
story of the author's seeing the wife of one of his pa-
tientS; but he could not think v/ho it was, until he ac-
cidentally passed a cottage where he had attended the
patient, v/hen all tho circumstances came to his mind.
This is a very simple story to read and remember,
merely as a story. But to do that alone is only light
reading; it is not slncly at all, far less the study of the
Philosophy of Mind. But if you inquire what the nar-
rative is designed to illustrate, by looking back a para-
graph or two, you will see that the subject is Memorj^,
as affected by Local Association, and that this incident
is intended to show how events were recalled to the
memory of the author, by his coming in sight of a cot«
tage iintli which they icere strongly associated^ although
all his direct efforts failed to brinsr them to mind.

Third direction. Connections of the passage. Ar.ecdote.s and illustrations, ho'.v to he
BtJidied ? Example. Mode of studyin? it ? Difference between reiding and studv.

18 IXTRODrCTIOV.

Thus it illustvaiGs a principle; and careful effort to dis-
cover and clearly to understand the principles thuh
illustrated, is what constitutes the difference between
merely reading a story book, and studying the Philo-
sophy of Mind.

The pupil, too, should avail himself of collateral helps
in understanding the lesson. Every geographical, or
historical, or personal allusion should be examined with
the help of the proper books. If a distinguished indivi
dual is mentioned, find the account of his life in a bio-
graphical dictionary. If a place is named, seek it on
the map. There is one other direction wliich I am
sorry to say it is absolutely necessary to mention. liOok
out all the words, whose meaning you do not distinctly
and fully understand, in a dictionary. Strange as it
may seem, in nine cases out of ten, a pupil in school
will find in his lesson a sentence containing v/ords lie
does not understand, and, perplexing himself some
minutes with it in vain, he will go to his recitation in
ignorance of its meaning, as if he never had heard of
such a contrivance as a dictionary. Now the habit of
seeking from other books explanations and assistance
in regard to your studies is of incalculable value. It
vv^ill cause you some additional trouble, but it will mul-
tiply, many fold, your interest and success.

4. After having thus read, with minute and critical
attention, the portion assigned, the pupil should next
take a cursory review of it, by glancing the eye over the
paragraphs, noticing the heads, and the questions or
topics in the margin, for the pvu'pose of taking in, as it
were, a view of the passage as a whole. The order of
discussion which the author adopts, and the regulai
manner in which tlic several steps of an argimient, or
the several applications of a principle, succeed one an-
other, should be carefully observed. There are the
same reasons for doing this, in regard to any particular
chapter, as in regard to the v/liole V\^ork. The connec-

C'»llaleral help;?. Kxamp'ea of this. Vrc of dictionary . Fourth direction. Rerievf
of llift !e.s.=;oii.

INTRODUCTION. 19

tion, toOj between tlie passage wliicli constitutes the
lesson, and the rest of the book, i. e. the place which it
occupies in tiie plan of the author, should be brought to
mind again. You thus classify and arrange, m your
own mind, wdiat is learned, and not only fix it more
iirnily, but you are acquiring logical habits of mind,
which will be of lasting and incalculable value.

5. You will thus have acquired a thorough know-
ledge of the lesson, but this is by no means all that is
necessary. You must learn to recite it. That is, you
must learn to express, in your own language, the ideas
you have thus acquired. This is a distinct and an
important point. Nothing is more common than for
pupils to say, when they attempt to recite in such a
study as this, ''I know the answer, but I cannot ex-
press it:'' as if the power to express was not as impor-
tant as the ability to understand.

The pupil then must make special preparation for this
part of his duty, that is, for expressing in his own lan-
guage the thoughts and principles of the author. The
best way, perhaps, of making this preparation, is to go
over the lesson, looking only at the topics in the margin,
and repeating aloud, or in a whisper, or in thought, the
substance of what is stated under each. Be careful
that what you say makes complete and perfect sense of
itself, that it is expressed in clear and natural language,
and that it is a full exposition of the author's meaning.

Such a study as this ought not to be recited by mere
question and answer. Whenever the subject will allow,
it is better for the teacher to give out a subject or topic,
on which the pupil may express the sentiments of the
writer. This is altogether the pleasantest, as well as
the most useful mode of recitation. Those unaccus-
tomed to it will, of course, find a little difficulty at first.
But the very effort to surmount this difficulty will be as
useful in developing and strengthening the intellectual
powers, as any other effort which the study requires.

^11 -■ .■.■v>-.. ..I .1 ■ ..^ —, — ■■■„■■,—■■ ■ — ■„ , — ■ — ■, .,,- I .1 ■-.,.— — ■ ■ ...^ ,^ ■■■—_. »■■■■■■ ■ ■ ■III*

Connections of the lesson. Fifth direction. Learning to recite. Wliat implied iu
i\m. Common cxrr.se. Preparation — how lo be made. Mode of questioning.

20 INTRODUCTION.

You should go over the lesson, then, for the purpose
of reciting it by yourself as it were, by looking at the
marginal titles, one by one, and distinctly stating to
yourself the substance of the author's views upon each.
If this preparation is made, and if the recitation is con-
ducted on the same principles, the pupils will soon find
themselves making very perceptible and rapid progress
hi that most important art, viz. expressing their senti-
ments with fluency, distinctness, and promptitude.

It will be evident, from what is said above, that the
pupil ought not to commit to memory the language of
the author. This practice may indeed be useful in
strengthening the memory, and in some other ways,
but very far higher objects ought to be in view in stu-
dying such a work as this, which will be far better at-
tained by the pupils depending entirely on themselves
for the language in which they express their ideas.
To illustrate distinctly the mode of recitation intended.
I will give a specimen. The following passage will
serve as text.

" Memory is very much influenced by Attention, or ri
full and distinct perception of the fact or object, with a view
to its being remembered; and by the perception being kept
before the mind, in this distinct manner, for a certain time.
The distinct recollection of the fact, in such cases, is gene-
rally in proportion to the intensity Avith which it has been
contemplated ; and this is also very much strengthened hy
its being repeatedly brought before the mind. Most peo
pie, accordingly, have experienced that a statement is more
strongly impressed upon the memory by being several times
repeated to others. It is on the same principle that memo-
ry is greatly assisted by writing down the objf^ct of our
knowledge, especially if this be done in a distinct and sys-
tematic manner. A subject also is more distinctly conceiv-
ed, and more correctly remembered, after we have instructed
another person in it. Such exercises are not strictlv to
be considered as helps to the memory, but as excitements
to attention : and as thus leadinsf to that clear and full cjm-

Advantage of ibis -node. Coni'iiilling to memory.

INTRODUCTION. 21

prehension of the subject which is required for the distinct
remembrance of it.

" It is familiar to every one that there are great diffe-
rences in memory, both in respect to the facility of acquire-
ment and the power of retention. In the former, there ap-
pear to be original differences, but a great deal also de-
pends upon habit. In the power of retention much de-
pends, as we sliall afterwards see, upon the habit of correct
association ; but, besides this, there are facts which seem
to show a singular connection with the manner in which the
acquisition was made. The following fact was communi-
cated to me by an able and intelligent friend, who heard it
from the individual to whom it relates. A distinguished
theatrical performer, in consequence of the sudden illness
of another actor, had occasion to prepare himself, on very
short notice, for a part which was entirely new to him ; and
the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired it in
a very short time, and went through it with perfect accura-
cy, but immediately after the performance forgot every
word of it."

The titles or topics in the margin, attached to this
passage, are the following: Attention — Means of se-
curing it — Differences in rnemory — Illustration. Now
in hearing a recitation from it, the teacher will ordina-
rily be guided by, but not confined to them, as you will
see exemplified in the following dialogue. The pupil,
too, will use his own language, which will vary very
considerably from that of the author, as will be per-
ceived by a comparison.

Teacher. The first topic is attention.

First Pupil. The author says that it consists in
keeping the object distinctly before the mind, for a cer-
tain time, so that it may make a strong impression. It
assists very much in enabling us to remember it after-
wards.

Teacher. The best means of confining the atten-
tion to any object 7

The marginal titles how to ba used ? Language of the pupil in recitation.

22 INTRODUCTION.

Second Pupil There are several modes; one \9
by repeating the thing several times to other persons ;
another is, by writing an account of it. especially if it ib
done systematically : a third, endeavoring to crqilain it
to others.

Teacher, How is it these methods produce the ef-
fect?

Secojid Pupil. They help us to obtain clear and
distinct idjas, and they fix the attention for some lime
on the subject.

Teacher, What does he say of differences in memo-
ry?

Third Pupil. There is a great difference in diffe-
rent individuals; in some cases it is natural, and in
others acquired.

Teacher. A story is told here to illustrate this sub-
ject.

Fourth Pvpil. An actor was obliged to learn a part
once at a very sliort notice, and by making a great ef-
fort he succeeded, and went throiiah it once, but he
forgot it immediately afterwards.

Teacher. What is the precise point which this fact
is intended to illustrate?

Fourth Pupil. I did not clearly luiderstand.

6. After the class has, in this thorough manner, gone
through v^qth one of the divisions of the boolc, they
should pause, to review it ; and the best, as well as the
pleasantest mode of conducting a review, is to assign to
the class some written exercises on the portion to be
thns re-examined. These exercises may be of various:
kinds : I shall, however, mention only two.

(1.) An abstract of the chapter to be reviewed; that
IS. a brief exposition, in writing, of the plan of the chap-
ter, with tne substance of the writer's views on each
head. Such an abstract, though it will require some
labor at first, will be, witii a little practice, a pleasant

Sixth direction. Review — how to be conducteJ. First method— whoi? In
uses.

0'>

INTRODUCTION. 2'

exercise ; and perhaps there is nothing which so effectu-
ally assists in digesting the knowledge which the pupil
has Obtained, and in fixing it indelibly upon the mind,
and nothing is so conducive to accurate logical habits
of thought, as this writing an analysis of a scientific
vv'-ork. It may be very brief, and elliptical in its style ;
its logical accuracy is the main point to be secured.
By devoting a single exercise at the end of each section
to such an exercise, a class can go on regularly through
(he book, and, with very little delay, make an abstract
vif the whole.

(2.) Writing additional illustrations of the principles
brought to view, — illustrations furnished either by the
^ experience or observation of the pupil, or by what he has
read in books. For example, in the chapter on dream-
ing, the author enumerates four or five sources of the
ideas vvdiich come to the mind in dreams. Now the
teacher might, after finishing that chapter, require
each one of the class, for the next exercise, to write an
account of a ch'eam, and to state at the end of it to
which of the classes it is to be referred. Nothing could
more efiectually familiarize the mind of the pupil with
the principles Avhich the chapter contains tlian such an
exercise. In many" cases, perhaps in nearly all, the
dreauis would be complex, and mAist be analyzed, and
the several parts separately assigned. The eflect of
such aneflbrt is obvious.

There are multitudes of other subjects discussed in
the Vv^ork, equally suitable for this purpose. Wherever
anecdotes are told, illustrating the laws of the human
mind, the pupil can add others ; for these laws are the
same in all minds, and are constantly in operation.
Writing these additional illustrations, especially if they
are derived from your ox^n experience, w^iil have anoth-
er most powerful effect. They will turn your attention
within, and accustom you to v^^atch the operations, and

Style and manner. Second mode. Example. Advantages of it. Commoii midUQ*
Ssrstundins in regard to thfe nature cf this study.

24 INTRODUCTION.

study the laws of your own minds. Many pupils do
not seem to understand that it is the powers and move-
ments of the immaterial principle withiii their own bo-
soms, which are the objects of investigation in such a
science. Because illustrations are drawn from the his-
tories of men with strange names, who lived in other
countries, and a half a century ago, they seem insensi-
bly to imbibe the idea, that it is the philosophy of these
metis minds which they are studying, not their own.
Now the fact is, that appeals are made to the history
and experience of these individuals, simply because they
are more accessible to the writers of books. A perfect
system of Intellectual Philosophy might be written, with
all its illustrations drawn from the thoughts and feelings
of any single pupil in the class. The mind is in its es-
sential laws everywhere the same ; and of course you
can find the evidence of the existence and operation of
all these laws in your own breasts, if you will look
there. AVhat you cannot, by proper research, find con-
firmed by your own experience, or your observations
upon those around you, is not a law of mind.

Such is substantially thecoiu'se which is recommend-
ed to those who shall commence the study of this work.
It will be perceived that the object of it is to make the
study of it, if possible, not what it too often is, the mere
mechanical repetition of answers marked and conmiit-
ted to memory, but an intellectual and thorough investi-
gation of a science. If the book is studied in this way,
it must have a most powerful influence in cultivating
accurate and discriminating habits, in developing intel-
lectual power, and in storing the mind with facts of
the most direct and practical importance, in all the con-
nections of society, and in all the business of life.

^ ■ —^ -^— ■» . .. — — ■— ■ -- ■ — P^i^^. ■ 1 -■ ■! ^— Wi^— —

lis true design. General object of this Intraduclion.

INaUIRIES

CONCERNING THE

INTELLECTUAL POWERS, &c

PART I.

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND.

The mind is that part of our being which thinks and wills,
remembers and reasons : we know nothing of it except
from these functions. By means of the corporeal senses it
holds intercourse with the things of the external world, and
receives impressions from them. But of this connection al-
so we know nothing but the facts ; when we attempt to spe-
culate upon its nature and cause, w^e wander at once from
the path of philosophical inquiry into conjectures which are
as far beyond the proper sphere as they are beyond the
reach of the human faculties. The object of true science
on such a subject, therefore, is simply to investigate the
facts, or the relations of phenomena, respecting the opera-
tions of mind itself, and the intercourse which it carries on
with the things of the external world.

This important rule in the philosophy of mind has been
fully recognised in very modern times only, so that the sci-
ence, as a faithful interpretation of nature, may be consider-
ed as of recent origin. Before the period now referred to,
the investigation was encumbered by the most fruitless
speculations respecting the essence of mind, and other dis-
cussions which led to no discovery of truth. It was con-
tended, for example, that the mind cannot act where it is

The mind— what ? Its connection W}ih. the material world ? Object of trae scienoc '
ifl whal sense is the science recent ? Nature of former speculations.

3

26 EXTENT OF OVE KNOWLEDGE OF MiND. [PART 1.

not present, and that conr-equently it cannot be said to per-
ceive external objects themselves, but only their images,
forms, or sensible species, which were said to be conveyed
through the senses, and represented to the mind in the same
manner in which images are formed in a camera obscura.
By the internal functions of mind these sensible species were
then supposed to be refined into phantasms, the objects of
memory and imagination ; and these, after undergoing a
further process, became intelligible species, the objects of
pure intellect. By a very natural application of this doc
trine, it was maintained by bishop Berkeley and the philoso-
phers of his school, that as the mind can perceive nothing
but its own impressions or images, we can derive no evi-
dence from our senses of the existence of the external world;
and Mr. Hum>e carried the argument a little further, by
maintaining that we have as little proof of the existence of
mind, and that nothing exists in the universe except impres-
sions and ideas. Of another sect of philosophers who arose
out of the same system, each individual professed to believe
his own existence, but would not admit the existence of any
other being; hence they received the appropriate name of
Egotists.

The various eminent individuals by whom the fallacy of
these speculations was exposed, combated them upon the
principle that the doctrine of ideas is entirely a fiction of
philosophers ; and that a confidence in the information con-
veyed to lis by our senses must be considered as a first
truth, or a fundamental law of our nature, susceptible of no
explanation, and admitting of no other evidence than that
which is derived from the universal conviction of mankind.
Nor does it, to common minds, appear a slight indication of
the validity of this mode of reasoning, that the philosophers
who supported this tlieory do not appear to have acted up-
on their own system ; but in every thing which concerned
their personal accommodation or personal safety, showed
the same confidence in the evidence of their senses as other
men.

The deductions made from the ideal theory by Berkeley
and Hume seem to have been applications of it which its for-

Suppf>se(l procc'^ by which we liecorne ac<]uaiutcd wiih external object'?. Krrorsj re-
sulting. Berkeley's opinion 7 Humc's opinion J How refuted. Did ihc6 3 phiioo
phera really believe their o'-vn system ?

SEO. 1.] SPECULA.TIOXS OF THE SCHOOLS. 27

mer advocates had not contemplated. But it is a singular
fact, as stated by Dr. Reid, that nearly all philosophers,
from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in maintaining that the
mind does not perceive external things themselves, but only
their ideas, images, or species. This doctrine was founded
upon the maxim that mind cannot act where it is not pre-
sent ; and we find one writer only, who, admitting the max-
im, called in question the application of it so far as to main-
tain that the mxind, in perceiving external things, leaves the
body, and comes into contact with the objects of its percep-
tion.

Such speculations ought to be entirely banished from the
science of mind, as not only useless and unprofitable, but as
referring to things entirely beyond the reach of the human
faculties, and therefore contrary to the first principles of
philosophical investigation. To the same class we are to
refer all speculations in regard to the essence of mind, the
manner in which thought is produced, and the means by
which the intercourse is carried on between the mind and
external objects. These remarkable functions were at one
tim.e explained by an imaginary essence called the animal
spirits, v/hich were supposed to be in constant motion, per-
forming the office of messengers between the brain and the
organs of sense. By another class of philosophers, of no
very ancient date, thinking was ascribed to vibrations in
the particles of the brain. The communication of percep-
tions from the senses to the mind has been accounted for in
the same manner by the motions of the nervous fluid, by vi-
brations of the nerves, or by a subtile essence, resembling
electricity or galvanism. The mind, again, has been com-
pared to a camera obscura, to a mirror, and to a storehouse.
In opposition, however, to all such hypotheses, which are
equally incapable either of proof or of refutation, our duty
is to keep steadily in view, that the objects of true science
are facts alone, and the relations of these facts to each oth-
er. The mind can be compared to nothing in nature ; it
has been endowed by its Creator with a power of perceiving
external things ; but the manner in which it does so is en-
tirely beyond our comprehension. All attempts, therefore,

Dr Reid's statement? Foundation of this doctrine. Author's opinion of such
epeculationg ? Theory of animal siirits. Theory of vibrations. Various other the-
wnes.

2S EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. [PAKT 1/

to explain or illustrate its operations by a reference to any
thing else, can be considered only as vain and futile. They
are endeavors to establish a resemblance where there is
not a vestige of an analogy ; and consequently they can
lead to no useful result. It is only by a rigid adherence to
this course of investigation that we can expect to make any
progress in true knowledge, or to impart to our inquiries in
any department of science the characters either of truth or
utility.

The ideal theory, with all the doctrines founded upon it,
may now be considered as gone by. But certain specula-
tions are still occasionally brought out by writers of a par-
ticular order, which are referable to the same class, name-
ly, hypotheses which are to be treated, not merely as un-
sound, but as being, by their very nature, directly opposed
to the first principles of philosophical inquiry. Among
these, the most prominent is the doctrine of materialism, of
which it may be advisable to take a slight view in the com-
mencement of this essay. On the principles which have
been referred to, the following considerations may be sub-
mitted as bearing upon the subject.

The term matter is a name which we apply to a certain
combination of properties, or to certain substances which
are solid, extended, and divisible, and which are known to
us only by these properties. The term mind, in the same
manner, is a name which we apply to a certain combina-
tion of functions, or to a certain power which we feel with-
in, which thinks, and wills, and reasons ; and is known to
us only by these functions. The former we know only by
our senses, the latter only by our consciousness. In regard
to their essence or occult qualities, we know quite as little
about matter as we do about mind ; and in as far as our ut-
most conception of them extends, we have no ground for
believing that they have any thing in common.

It is highly important that the pupil should entertain clear ideas
of the distinction between the essence and the properties of bodies.
Take, for an example to illustrate this, an orange. It has a peculiar
color. This color is oue of its properties. Imagine this to be taken
away. It has taste, which is another property. Kemove this also.

Proper view of the nature of mind ? Doctrine of n aterialism. Roason for alluding
lo It. Proi)er api)licaiions of the terms matter and mind? Disiinciion between e»-
Bence and properties ? Illustration.

SEC. I.] MATERIALISM. 29

It h\ii s^'dity ; that is, it can be felt. Imagine, though it is diffi
nil, to (io so, this property to be removed, so that tlie hand would
pass ti.iough it without meeting with any resistance, as if it were a
snadow, or an optical deception. Suppose that, in the same wa}", all
other properties are removed, yIz. form, smell ivei^ht, &c. What would
at last be left ? Is lliere an unknown somethmg, around which all
these properties cluster ? To this something, the term essence is applied.
Now all of which we have, or can have any real knovvledge, is the
wvpertics, both in the case of matter and mind.

The true object of philosophy is simply to investigate the
facts in regard to both ; and materialism is not to be view-
ed only as unsound reasoning, but as a logical absurdity,
ond a total misconception of the first principles of philoso-
phical inquiry. Does the materialist tell us that the princi-
ple which thinks is material, or the result of organization,
we have only to ask him what light he expects to throw
upon the subject by such an assertion? For the principle
which thinks is known to us onlj^ by thinking; and the sub-
stances which are solid and extended are known to us only
by their solidity and extension. When we say of the for-
mer that it is immaterial, we simply express the fact that it
is known to us by properties altogether distinct from the
properties to which we have given the name of matter, and,
as far as we know, has nothing in common with them. Be-
yond these properties, we know as little about matter as
we do about mind ; so that materialism is scarcely less ex-
travagant than would be the attempt to explain any phe-
nomenon by referring it to some other altogether distinct
and dissimilar : to say, for example, that color is a modifi-
cation of sound, or gravity a species of fermentation. The
assertion, indeed, Vv'ould be fully as plausible, and calculat-
ed to throw as much light upon the subject, were a person
anxious to explain the nature of matter, to tell us that it is
the result of a particular manifestation of mind. Something
analoo^ous to this, in fact, seems to be the foundation of the
theory of Boscovich, who conceives all bodies to consist of
unrxtended atoms or mathematical points endowed with a
certain power of repulsion, and consequently makes the es-
sence of matter to consist merely in the property of resist-
ance. We have, in truth, the same kind of evidence for

True philosophy — what ? Its principles violated by materialists — ho^' 5 Theory 0/
Boscovich. Nature of the evi*lonr.e of the existence both of matter and muA

30 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MINP. fPART 2.

the existence of mind that we have for the existence of mat-
ter, namely, from its properties ; and of the two, the former
appears to be the least liable to deception. " Of all the
truths we know," says Mr. Stewart, " the existence of mind
is the most certain. Even the system of Berkeley concern-
ing the non-existence of matter is far more conceivable than
that nothing but matter exists in the universe."

A similar mode of reasoning may be applied to the modi-
fication of materialism more prevalent in modern times, by
which mind is considered as a result of organization, or, in
other words, a function of the brain ; and upon which has
been founded the conclusion, that, like our bodily senses, it
will cease to be when the bodily frame is dissolv'ed. The
brain, it is true, is the centre of that influence on which de-
pend sensation and motion. There is a remarkable con-
nection between this organ and the manifestations of mind ;
and by various diseases of the brain these manifestations
are often modified, impaired, or suspended. We shall af-
terward see that these results are very far from being uni-
form ; but even if they were uniform, the facts would war-
rant no such conclusion respecting the nature of mind ; for
they accord equally with the supposition that the brain is
the organ of communication between the mind and the ex-
ternal world. When the materialist advances a single step
beyond this, he plunges at once into conclusions which are
entirely gratuitous and unwarranted. We rest nothing
more upon this argument than that these conclusions are
unwarranted; but we might go further than this, and con-
tend that the presumption is clearly on the otlier side, when
we consider the broad and obvious distinction which exists
between the peculiar phenomena of mind and those func-
tions which are exercised through the mean?; of bodily or-
ganization. They do not admit of being brought into com-
parison, and have nothing in common. The most exquis-
ite of our bodily senses are entirely dependent for their ex-
ercise upon impressions from external things. We see not
without the presence both of light and a body reflecting it ;
and if we could suppose light to be annihilated, though the
eye were to retain its perfect condition, sight would be ex-

Modern material ism 7 ConrocUon of th3 miii'J with tlir; !)rAiii. Dependence of iha
•eases on external objocla.

SEC. l] MATERIALISiM. 31

tinguished. But mind owns no such dependence on exter-
nal things, except in the origin of its knowledge in regard
to them. When this knowledge has once been acquired it
is retained and recalled at pleasure ; and mind exercises
its various functions without any dependence upon impres-
sions from the external world. That which has long ceas-
ed to exist is still distinctly before it, or is recalled after
havinof been ionsf forsrotten, in a manner even still more
wonderful ; and scenes, deeds, or beings, which never ex-
isted, are called up in long and harmonious succession, in-
vested with all the characters of truth, and all the vividness
of present existence. The mind remembers, conceives,
combines, and reasons ; it loves, and fears, and hopes, ia
the total absence of any impression from without that can
influence in the smallest deo^ree these emotions : and we
have the fullest conviction that it w^ould continue to exer-
cise the same functions in undiminished activity, though all
material things were at once annihilated.

This argument, indeed, may be considered as only nega-
tive, but this is all that the subject admits of. For when we
endeavor to speculate directly on the essence of mind, we
are immediately lost in perplexity, in consequence of our
total ignorance of the subject, and the use of terms borrow-
ed from analoofies with material thinofs. Hence the unsa-
tisfactory nature of ever}^ physiological or metaphysical ar-
gument respecting the essence of mind, arising entirely from
the attempt to reason on the subject in a manner of which
it is not susceptible. It admits not of any ordinary pro-
cess of logic, for the facts on which it rests are the objects
of consciousness only ; and the argument must consist in an
appeal to the consciousness of every man, that he feels a
power within totally distinct from any function of the body.
What other conception than this can he form of that pow-
er by which he recalls the past, and provides for the fu-
ture ; by which he ranges uncontrolled from world to world,
and from system to system ; surveys the works of all-creat-
mg power, and rises to the contemplation of the eternal
Cause ? To what function of matter shall he liken that
principle by which he loves and fears, and joys and sor-

Tndepenilence of the niiml. Examples. Inference from this. Essence of minci.
Worih of reasoning about it. Real foundatioii of our belief that the soul is distiav.
<rom the *>o(ly )

32 EXTENT OF OUK KXOV/LF.DGE OF MIND. [PART I.

rows ; by ^vhich he is elevated with hope, excited by en-
thusiasm, or sunk into the horrors of despair ? These chan-
ges also he feels, ill many instances, to be equally indepen-
dent of impressions from without, and of the condition of
his bodily frame. In the most peaceful state of everj^ cor-
poreal function, passion, remorse, or anguish may rage
w^ithin ; and while the body is racked by the most friohtful
diseases, the mind may repose in tranquillity and hope. He
is tausfht by physiolo^'y that every part of his body is in a
constant state of change, and that within a certain period
every particle of it is renewed. But, amid these changes,
he feels that the being whom he calls himself, remains es-
sentially the same. hi. particular, his remembrance of the
occurrences of his early days he feels to be totally incon-
sistent with the idea of an impression made upon a niaterial
organ, unless he has recourse to the absurditj- of suppos-ing
that one series of particles, as they departed, transferred the
picture to those which came to occupy their room.

If the being, then, which we call mind or soul be, to the
utm.ost extent of our knowledge, thus dissimilar to, and dis-
tinct from, any thing that we knovv' to he a result of bodily
organization, what reason have we to believe that it should
be affected by any change in the arrans^emicnt of materia]
organs, except in so far as relates to its intercourse vrith this
external world? The effects of that change which we call
ihe death of an animal bod}' are nothing more than a change
in the arranoem.ent of its constituent elements ; for it can
be demonstrated, on the strictest principles of chemistry,
that not one particle of these elen^iCnts ceases to exist.
We have, in fact, no conception of annihilation : and otir
ivhole experience is opposed to the belief that one atom
ivhich ever existed has ceased to exist. There is, there-
ibre, as Dr. Brown has well remarked, in the very decay
)f the body, an analogy which would seem to indicate the
continued existence of the tliinking principle, since that
which we term decay is itself only another name for con-

ft */

tinued existence. To conceive, then, that anj^ thing men-
tal ceases to exist after death, when we know that every
thing corporeal continues to exist, is a gratuitous assump-

Evklence of consciousness?. The reelings o( the mInJ in many cases indeppntJ»ni ol
bodilv chan^eq. T.fkci of d<»a!h on the soul ? Pr. Brown's reuiarJc.

SEC. 1.] MATERIALISM. 33

tion, contrary to every rule of philosophical inquiry, and in
direct opposition, not only to all the facts relating to mind
itself, but even to the analogy which is furnished by the
dissolution of the bodily frame.

To this mode of reasoning it has been objected, that it
would go to establish an immaterial principle in the lower
animals, which in them exhibits many of the phenomena of
mind. I have only to answer, be it so. There are in the
lower animals many of the phenomena of mind ; and, with
regard to these, we also contend, that they are entirely
distinct from any thing we know as the properties of mat-
ter,— which is all that we mean, or can mean, by being im-
material. There are other principles superadded to mate-
rial things, of the nature of which we are equally ignorant ;
such, for example, as the principle of vegetable life, and
that of animal life. To say that these are properties of
matter is merely arguing about a term; for what we mean
by matter is something which is solid, extended, and divisi-
ble. That these properties are, in certain individuals, com-
bined with simple or vegetable life, — in others, with animal
life, that is, life and the powers of sensation and motion, —
and in others with animal life, and certain of those proper-
ties which we call mind, — are all facts equally beyond our
comprehension. For any thing we know, they may all
be immortal principles ; and for any thing we know, mat-
ter itself may be immortal. The simple truth is, that we
know nothing on the subject ; and while, on the one hand,
we have no title to assume an essence to be mortal because
it possesses only the properties of matter ; neither, on the
other hand, have we any right to infer an essence to be im-
mortal, because it possesses properties different from those
of matter. We talk, indeed, about matter, and we talk
about mind; we speculate concerning materiality and im-
materiality, until we argue ourselves into a kind of belief
that we really understand something of the subject. The
truth is that we understand nothing. Matter and mind are
known to us by certain properties ; these properties are
quite distinct from each other ; but in regard to both, it is
entirely out of the reach of our faculties to advance a
single step beyond the facts which are before us. Whether

-^- I , II - - . _ _ - ■

Objection to this reasoning ? Answer ? Ment<il phenomena in the lower animal*
Other principles. Our knowledge limited to what ?

34 EXTKNT OF OUR IIXOWLICr.GE OF MIND. [PART 1.

in their substratum or ultimate essence they are the same,
or whether they are different, we know not, and never can
know in our present state of being. Let us, then, be satis-
fied with the facts, w^hen our utmost faculties can carry us
no farther ; let us cease to push our feeble speculations,
when our duty is only to wonder and adore.

These considerations, while they are directly opposed to
the crude conclusions of the materialist, also serve to show
us how much the subject is removed beyond our limited
faculties ; and it is not on such speculations, therefore, that
we rest the evidence for a future state of being. We know
nothing of the nature or the essence of mind ; but whatever
may be its essence, and whatever may be the nature and
extent of that mysterious connection which the Deity has
established between it and our bodily organization, these
points have no reference w^hatever to the great question of
its future existence. This is a principle which seems to
have been too much lost sight of in the discussion of this
subject, namely, that our speculations respecting the imma-
teriahty of the rational human soul have no influence on
our belief of its immortality. This momentous truth rests
on a species of evidence altogether diflerent, which address-
es itself to the moral constitution of man. It is found in
those principles of his nature by w^hich he feels upon his
spirit the awe of a God, and looks forw^ard to the future
with anxiety or with hope ; — by w^hich he knows to distin-
guish truth from falsehood, and evil from good, and has
forced upon him the conviction that he is a moral and re-
sponsible' being. This is the power of conscience, that
monitor w^ithin which raises its voice in the breast of every
man, a w^itness for his Creator. He who resigns himself to
its guidance, and he w4io repels its w^arnings, are both com-
pelled to acknowledge its power ; and, whether the good
man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or the victim of
remorse withers beneath an influence unseen by human eye,
and shrinks from the anticipation of a reckoning to come,
each has forced upon him a conviction, such as argument
never gave, that the being which is essentially himself is
distinct from any function of the body, and will survive in

Immoriality of the soul. Real evidence of it— what ? Conscience. Irr(?.sisf ibie con
vlction on Ihia subjert,

SEC. I.] MATERIALISM. 3

r

iin^liminished vigor when the body shall have fallen into
decay.

When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the high princi-
ples of moral obligation, and the moral government of the
Deity, this important truth is entirely independent of all our
feeble speculations on the essence of mind. For though we
were to suppose, with the materialist, that the rational soul
of man is a mere chemical combination, vvhicli, by the dis-
solution of its elements, is dissipated to the four winds of
heaven, where is the improbability that the Power which
framed the wondrous compound may collect tliese elements
again, and combine them anew, for the great purposes of his
moral administration ? In our speculations on such a mo-
mentous subject, we are too apt to be influenced by our con-
ceptions of the powers and properties of physical tilings;
but there is a point where this principle must be abandoned,
and where the soundest philosophy requires that we take
along with us a full recognisance of the power of God.

There is thus, in the consciousness of every man, a deep
impression of continued existence. The casuist may rea-
son against it till lie bewilder himself in his own sophis-
tries; but a voice within gives the lie to his vain specula-
tions, and pleads with authority for a life which is to come.
The sincere and humble inquirer cherishes the impression,
while he seeks for farther light on a subject so momentous;
and he thus receives, with absolute conviction, the truth
which beams upon him from the revelation of God, — that
the mysterious part of his being, which thinks, and wills,
and reasons, shall indeed survive the wreck of its mortal
tenement, and is destined for immortality.

Does materialism, if admitted disprove immortality? How illustrated. C«Hrj
eluding remarks.

h

PART II.

OF THE OPJGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS RELATING

llOTR TO MIND AND MATTER.

Among writers on the science of mind, tliere \vas former-
ly much controversy in regard to the origin of our ideas.
Some maintained that they are derived entirely from per-
ception, that is, through the external senses ; others con*
sidered them as arising partly from perception and partly
from consciousness, or reflection ; and some added a third
class, which they called innate ideas, and which were sup-
posed to exist in the mind itself, independently of and prior
to the exercise either of perception or reiiection. This
phraseology had its origin in the ancient theor}^ of ideas,
according to which something v^as supposed to exist dis-
tinct both from the mind and the external object of its per-
ception. This, as we have formerly seen, was v/hat phi-
losophers meant by an idea.' It was believed to be the im-
mediate object of the mind's perception, but to be only a kind
of image or representative of the object perceived. • This
hypothesis, which kept its place in the science of mind till a
ver3^ recent period, is now generally admitted to have been
a fiction of philosophers ; and the phraseology respecting
ideas is abandoned by the best practical v/riters ; because,
thougli the ancient doctrine be exploded, and the term may
rjQ used onh/ in a figurative sense, it still seems to imply
somethino' existing in the mind distinct from the mind itself.
The impressions derived from external thing's are therefore
to b J considered as the occasions on v^diich the various pow™
ers of the mind are brought into action. These powers
themselves then become the objects of consciousness or re-
flection, and hy their further exercise we acquire certain no-
tions vvhicli arise out of the mental operations. This doc-
trine p-ives no encouraoement to the scheme of materialism,
for it is clear tliat we cannot remember till we are furnish-

''' ' • .. ^ ■■--..-.—-—■-■ .Ml I .1 . - i - . I. - ■ P ■ -^ I.I— ..--—-■■■ ■ . ■..- I, .^-l— .M.^..!--- M I, ,^.

DifK^rt:;!i opiiij.t:;^. An-' iont ihoory of iJoa'^— '.vhat ? Praseiit opinion of this theory,

«
-4

3S ■ ORIGIN OF OrPw KXOWLEDGE. [PART II.

ed with &on>e fact to he remembered ; but this can never
be supposed to atTect our beUef in the existence of the pow-
er of memory before the fact was so furnished. If we could
suppK)se the case of a man who liad hved all his life in the
dark, he certainly could not see, but we should not say that
the admission of light imparted to him the power of vision;
it onlv furnished the circumstances which sfave occasion to
the exercise of si.fjht. It has accordinofly been shown by
Mr. Stewart, that thouorh we may not be conscious of our
mental powers till thjy are called into action, yet this may
arise from the most simple sensation, — such as affords no
evidence of the properties, or even of the existence of tho
material world.

Through the senses, then, we acquire a knowledge
of the facts relating to extei'nal things. The mental pro-
cesses thus brought into action then become the subjects of
consciousness, and we acquire a knowledge of the facts re-
lating to them. By a further exercise of these powers on
various facts referring to both n^atter and mind, we acquire
certain notions arising out of our reflection upon the rela-
tions of these facts, such as our notions of time, motion,
number, cause and effect, and personal identity ; and we
acquire, farther, the impression of certain fundamental laws
of belief, which are not referable to any process of reason-
ing, but arc to be considered as a part of our constitution,
or a spontaneous and instinctive exercise of reason in eve-
ry sound mind.

The ongin of our knowledge then is referable, in a philo-
sophical point of view, to perception and reflection. Lut,
in point of fact, the knowledge which is acquired by an in-
dividual through his own perception and reflection is but a
small part of what he possesses ; much of the knowledge
possessed by every one is acquired through the perceptions
(jf other men. In an essay, therefore, which .»s intended to
})e entirely practical, I shall include this last department un-
der the head of Testimony. The division of this part of
th.e subject will therefore be,

1. Sensation and Perception.

2. Consciousness and Reflection.
;5. Testimon3^

Jllustraiioii. Kiviwletl^c of cxiprnal ihin^a — how actiuircd ? Of iheir relaliooa?
T vvc sPUT'.'f 3 ? A IJiii.'nal source. Summary.

SSC. I.] SENSATIOxV AND PERCEPTION. 39

SECTION I.

OF SENSATION AND PEFvCEPTION.

We know nothing' of perception except the fact that cor-
(ain impressions made upon the organs of sense convey to
the mind a knowledge of the properties of external things.
Some of the older speculations on this subject have already
been referred to. In these the mind was compared to a
camera obscura, and the transmission of the forms or ima-
ges of things to it from the organs of sense was explained
by the motion of the animal spirits, or the nervous fluid, or
by vibrations in the substance of the nerves. All such
speculations are now dismissed from the investigation, being
considered as attempts to penetrate into mysteries which are
beyond the reach of the human faculties, and consequently
not the legitimate objects of a philosophical inquiry.

Our first knowledge of the existence and properties of the
material world is evidently of a complex nature. It seems
to arise from the combined action of several senses, convey-
ino' to us the 2:eneral notion of certain essences which are
solid and extended, or possessed of those properties which
characterize material things. Without this general knovv^-
fedge previously acquired, our various senses acting indi-
vidually could convey to us no definite notion of the pro-
perties of external things. A smell, that is, a mere odor,
for example, might be perceived by us, but would convey
nothing more than the sensation simply. It could not com-
municate the impression of this being a property of an ex-
ternal body, until we had previously acquired a knowledge
of the existence of that body, and had come by observation
to associate the sensation with the bod}^ from which it pro-
ceeds. The same holds true of the other senses ; and wc
are thus led at the very first step of our inquiry to a com-
plicated process of mind without which our mere sensa-
tions could convey to us no definite knowledge.

Having thus acquired a knowledge of the existence and

Former thaories. Plow now considered ? First knowledge — bow oUainod ? Sue-
*H-'^.'.ing 3^*epe — what?

40 SENSATION AND PEKtEPTIOX. [PAKT ih

e^eneral properties of material things, v.^e ne:st derive from
our various senses a knowledge of their more minute cha-
ricters. These are o:enerallv divided into primary and se-
condar}'. The primary qualities of material things are
such as are essential, and must at all times belong to mat-
ter ; such as solidity and extension. These properties ne-
cessarily convey to us a conviction of something existing
out of the mind, and distinct from its own sensations. The
secondary qualities, again, are coh">r. temperature, srneli.
taste, &c. These are not essential properties of matter,
but qualities producing sensations in a sentient being; they
may or they may not belong to any particular body, or they
may be attached to it at one time and not at another.
Hence they convey to us primarily no delinite notion in re-
gard to the existence or properties of external things, ex-
cept, as Mr. Stewart expresses it, '• as the unknown cause
of a kno\vn sensation." One of the quibbles or paradoxes
of the scholastic philosophy was, denying the real exist-
ence of these secondary qualities of matter. Every one is
familiar w'ith the humorous account given in the " Guardi-
VA *' of the attainments of a youth from coileo^e, and his dis-
play of tliem wlien on a visit to lady Lizard, his mother.
'* When the girls w-ere sorting a set of knots he would de-
monstrate to them that all the ribands were of the same
color, or rather of no color at all. I\Iy lady Lizard her-
se]f, though she w^as not a little pleased wnth her son's im-
provement, was one day almost angry with him; for, hav-
ing accidentally burnt her lingers as she was lighting the
lamp for her teapot, in the midst of her anguish Jack laid
hold of the opportunity to instruct iier that there is no such
thing as heat in the fire.'' Such speculations, which were
at one time common in the schools of philosophy, had their
origin Avholly in an abuse of terms. The term heat, for
example, has two meanings, which are quite distinct from
each other. It means a sensation produced in a sentient
beinor, and in this sense it may be said with truth that there
is no heat in fire; but it means also a quality in material
substances capable of producing this sensation, and it is la
this sense that we speak of heat as a property of matter.

Clasaificalion cf fiiwlitie?. Dofniilioiis. Extract given ii; the Gi:ardia!\.

SEC. I.] " SENSATION AND FEUCEPTION. 41

Notwithstanding this explanation of the different senses in which
the word hea^t is used, many persons And it diflitzult to understand that
there is any sense in which it can be said with truth that there is no
heat in fire. But a little reflection will make it plain.

If a man puts his hand among coals he feels a burnings painful sen-
sation, which wc call heat. Now Avhen it is said there is no heat in
fire, the meaniutr is that there is no such burnings painful sensation.
And certainly no one can suppose that there is. There cannot be suf-
ferijig in the fire, or even any feeling of warmth, or sensation of any
kind ; and it is in this sense alone that the vrord is used, when the exis
tence of heat in the fire is denied. So with ail the other secondary
qualities. Smells, tastes, sounds, &:c. are all /ee/mgs in us. The ex-
ternal objects themselves cannot have these feelings, or any other.
They have some peculiarity or property which excites these feelings
in us, but not the feelings or sensations themselves.

The process by which we acquire a knowledge of exter-
nal things is usually divided into two stages, namely, sen-
sation and perception; the former implying the corporeal,
the latter the mental part of it. Others apply the term per-
ception to both ; and, according to Dr. Brown, sensation is
the simple impression made upon the organs of sense; per-
ception is an association formed between this impression
and an external substance which w^e have ascertained to be
concerned in producing it. Our senses, by which this
knowledge is acquired, are generally reckoned five, — viz :
sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Dr. Brown pro-
poses to add our muscular frame, and apparently w^ith good
reason ; for there seems ground for believing that it is by
resistance to muscular action that we acquire the notion of
solidity, and that this could not be acquired by touch alone.

Our first impression of the existence and solidity of ma-
terial objects, then, seems to be derived from touch combin-
ed w4th muscular resistance ; and at the same time we ac-
quire the knowledge of temperature, roughness or smooth-
ness, &c. There has been some difference of opinion in
regard to the manner in which we acquire the notion of ex-
tension, including figure and magnitude. It is evident that
it cannot be acquired from touch alone ; but it may be ac-
quired from touch combined with muscular motion, as when
we move the hand over the surface of a body. This, how-
ever, includes also the idea of tiine, — for our notion of the
extent of a surface v,dien the hand moves over it is very

Explaaaiion. Secondary qualities; their nature? Distinction between sensation
and perception. Number of the senses. First notions— how ohtahied ?

4^

42 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. [PART 11.

much influenced by the velocity with which the motion is
made. Hence time has been supposed by some to be one
of our very earliest impressions, and antecedent even to the
notion of extension or space. It is probable, however, that
the notion of extension may also be acquired in a more sin>
pie manner from the combined operation of touch and vi-
sion. If this opinion be correct, it will follow that our first
knowledge of the existence and essential properties of ma-
terial things is derived from the combined operation of
sight, touch, and muscular action.

With regard to all our senses, however, the truth seems
to be, that the first notions conveyed by them are of a very
limited and imperfect kind ; and that our real knowledge is
acquired only after considerable observation and experi-
ence, in the course of which the impressions of one sense
are corrected and assisted by those of others, and by a pro-
cess of mind acting upon the whole. The primary objects
of vision, for example, seem to be simply light or color and
expansion. But the judgments which we are in the daily
habit of forming upon vision are of a much more extensive
kind, embracing also distance, magnitude, and what has
been called tangible figure, such as the figure of a cube or
a sphere. This last, it is evident, cannot be considered as
a primary object of vision, but as entirely the result of ex-
perience derived from the sense of touch ; for we never
couki have formed any conception of the figure of a cube
or a sphere by vision alone. Distance and magnitude, also,
are evidently not the primary objects of vision ; for persons
who have been suddenly cured of congenital blindness, by
the operation for cataract, have no conception of the dis-
tance or magnitude of objects ; they perceive only simple
expansion of surface with color. Our judgment of distance
and magnitude by vision, therefore, is an acquired habit,
founded upon the knowledge which we have received by
other means of the properties of the objects. Accordingly,
it is familiar to every one, that we have no idea of the dis-
tance of an object, except we have some notion of its magni-
tude; nor, on the other hand, of its magnitude, except we
have some knowledge of its distance. The application of
. ■• ' '■

First notions derived from the senses. Primary objects of virion 1 Ideas of distance
»nd magnitude — how obtained? Conncciion of these ideas

SEC. I.] SENSATION \ND PKRCEPTION. 43

this principle is also familiar in perspective drawing, in
which the diminished size of known objects is made to con-
vey the notion of distance. On the same principle, known
objects seen through a telescope do not appear to be mag-
nified, but to be brought nearer. In the same manner with
regard to sounds ; we have no idea of their intensity, ex-
cept we have some notion of their distance, and ince versa,
A given degree of sound, for example, if we believed it to
have been produced in the next room, we might conclude
to proceed from the fall of some trifling body ; but if we
supposed it to be at the distance of several miles, we should
im.mediately conclude that it proceeded from a tremendous
explosion.

In regard to certain small distances, however, there is a
power of judging by sight alone; and it appears to arise
out of the degree of inclination which is given to the axis
of vision in directing the two eyes to the object. Thus, in
snuuinof a candle, or carryino- the irap-ev to a small obiect
within arm's length, it will be found that Vv'e are very apt
to miss it if we look v.^ith one eye only, but can touch it
with unerring certainty when both, eyes are directed to it.

This experiment may be easily triec!.. Hold some small object, a
lead pencil for instance, with the point iipAvards at the distance of
about a foot from the eye. Then, with one e3^e closed, endeavor to
bring the end of the finger down exactly upon the point of the pencil.
It will be found quite difficult to do it exactly, though v/ith both eyes
open it will be easy.

It appears to be on the same principle that we enjoy in a

greater degree the deception produced by a painting, vrhen

we look at it with one eye, especially if \ve also look through

a tube. By the former we cut off the means of correct ins"

-. . . . ■ ^

the illusion by the direction of the axis of vision ; and by

the latter \yq remove the influence of all neio-hborinof ob*
jects. It is impossible to determine the precise distance to
which we can extend this povv^er of judging of distance by
the inclination of the axis of vision, but it does not appear
to be great ; and in regard to all greater distances, the judg-
ment by vision is evidently an acquired habit, arising out of
such a nientai exercise as has now been referred to.

Intensity and distance ofsiiunds. Siiiiill distances judged of by sigiii alone. Experl
men: wiUi i"«in tin :.'.■}.

44 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. [PART II

There are some other circumstances, also, the result of
experience, by which we are greatly influenced in all such
cases, particularly the degree of illumination of the objects,
and the decrree of distinctness of their outline and minute
parts. Thus, in a picture, distant objects are represented
as faintly illuminated, and with indistinctness of outline and
minute parts; and vice versa. On this principle, objects
seen through a fog, or in obscure light, are apt to appear
much larger than they really are ; because, in the mental
process which takes place in regard to them, we first as-
sume them to be distant, from their imperfect outline and
faint illumination, and then, judging from this assumed dis-
tance, we conclude them to be of great size. On the other
hand, objects seen in an unusually clear state of the at-
mosphere appear nearer than they really are, from the
greater distinctness of their outline. In our judgment of
distance by sight, we are also greatly influenced by the eye
resting on intermediate objects ; and hence the difficulty of
judging of distances at sea. A striking illustration of the
same principle is furnished by captain Parry, in regard to
objects seen across a uniform surface of snow. " We had
frequent occasion, in our walks on shore, to remark the
deception which takes place in estimating the distance and
magnitude of objects, when viewed over an unvaried sur-
face of snow. It was not uncommon for us to direct our
steps towards what we took to be a large mass of stone, at
the distance of half a mile from us, but which we were able
to take up in our hands after one minute's walk. This was
more particularly the case when ascending the brow of a
hill." Captain Parry adds, that this deception did not be-
come less on account of the frequency with which its efl^ects
vere experienced ; and a late writer has used this as an
objection to the doctrine lately referred to, respecting the
nfluence of experience on our judgment of distance by vi-
,.ion. But this is evidently founded on a misconception of
vlic effect of experience in such cases. Captain Parry could
mean only, that he did not acquire the power of judging of
the distance or magnitude of unknown objects. Ha*d he
been approaching an object by which he had once been dc-

KtTec'.s of cli.stririce — what? Illustration from Piirry's Journal. The deception not
iiniinidhjJ Ly experience. Reason.

%

SEC. I.] SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 45

ceived, knowing it to be the same, he would not have been
deceived a second time; but, judging from its known mag-
nitude, would have inferred its distance. Thus the result of
experience is to enable us to judge of the distance of an ob-
ject of known magnitude, or of the magnitude of an object
at a known distance; but, in regard to objects of which
both the distance and magnitude are unkno\Yn, it teaches
■•js only not to trust the indications of vision. ' >

In our judgment of vision by the magnitude of objects
again, we are much influenced by comparison with other
objects, the magnitude of which is supposed to be known.
T remember once having occasion to pass along Ludgate
Hill, w^hen the great door of St. Paul's was open, and seve-
ral persons were standing in it. They appeared to be very
little children ; but, on coming up to them, were found to
be full-grown persons. In the mental process which here
took place, the door had been assumed as a known magni-
tude, and the other objects judged of by it. Had I attend-
ed to the door being much larger than any door that one is
in the habit of seeing, the mind would have made allow-
ance for the apparent size of the persons ; and, on the other
hand, had these been known to be full-grown persons, a
judgment would have been formed of the size of the door.
On the same principle, travellers visiting the pyramids of
Egypt have repeatedly remarked, how greatly the notion of
their magnitude is increased by a number of large animals,
as camels, being assembled at their base.

There is something exceedingly remarkable in the man-
ner in which loss or diminution of one sense is followed by
increase of the intensity of others, or rather, perhaps, by
an increased attention to the indications of other senses.
Blind persons acquire a wonderful delicacy of touch ; in
some cases, it is said, to the extent of distinguishing colors.
Mr. Saunderson, the blind mathematician, could distinguish
by his hand, in a series of Roman medals, the true from the
counterfeit, with a more unerring discrimination than the
eye of a professed virtuoso ; and, when he was present at

What is really gained by experience. Influence of comparison in judgment by vision.
Illustration. Explanation. Illustration from the pyramids. Efifect of the loss or dhvA
nution of a sense. Examples. Saunderson.

46 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. [PART II.

the astronomical observations in the garden of his college,
he was accustomed to perceive every cloud which passed
over the sun. This remarkable power, which has some-
times been referred to an increased intensity of particular
senses, in many cases evidently resolves itself into an in-
creased habit of attention to the indications of all those
senses which the individual retains. Two instances have
been related to me of blind men who were much esteemed as
judges of horses. One of these, in giving his opinion of a
horse, declared him to be blind, though this had escaped
the observation of several persons who had the use of their
eyes, and who were with some difficulty convinced of it.
Being asked to give an account of the principle on which
he had decided, he said it was by the sound of the horse's
step in walking, which implied a peculiar and unusual cau-
tion in his manner of putting down his feet. The other
individual, in similar circumstances, pronounced a horse to
be blind of one eye, though this had also escaped the obser-
vation of those concerned. When he was asked to explain
the facts on which he founded his judgment, he said he felt
the one eye to be colder than the other. It is related of
the late Dr. Moyse, the v/ell-known blind philosopher, that
he could distinguish a black dress on his friends by its smell :
and there seems to be good evidence that blind persons hav^
acquired the power of distinguishing colors by the touch.
In a case of this kind, mentioned by Mr. Boyle, the indi-
vidual stated that black imparted to his sense of touch the
greatest degree of asperity, and blue the least. Dr. Rush
relates of two blind young men, brothers, of the city of
Philadelphia, that they knew when they approached a post
in walking across a street, by a peculiar sound which the
ground under their feet emitted in the neighborhood of the
post ; and that they could tell the names of a number of
tame pigeons, with which they amused themselves in a lit-
tle garden, by only hearing them fly over their heads. I
have known several instances of persons aflbcted with thai
ixtreme degree of deafness which occurs in the deaf and
dumb, who liad a peculiar susceptibility to particular kinds

Two blind men. Dr. Movse. Instances adduced by Dr. Rush. Certain sounds per
•ciFed by the deaf.

SEC. I.J SENSATION' AND FERCEPTiON. 47

of sounds, depending apparently upon an impression com-
municated to their organs of touch or simple sensation.
They could tell, for instance, the approach of a carriage in
the street, \vithoat seeing it, before it Avas taken notice of by
persons who had the use of all their senses. An analogous
fact is observed in the habit acquired by the deaf and dumb,
of understanding what is said to them by watching the mo-
tion of the lips of the speaker. Examples still more Avon-
derful are on record, but certainly require confirmation. A
story, for instance, has lately been mentioned in some of the
medical journals, of a gentleman in France who lost every
sense, except the feeling of one side of his face ; yet it is
said that his family acquired a method of holding communi-
cation with him, by tracing characters upon the part which
retained its sensation.

Much ingenuity has been bestowed upon attempts to ex-
plain how, with two eyes, we see only one object ; and why
that object is seen erect, when we know that the image on
the retina is inverted. All that need be said upon the sub-
ject, and all that can properly be said, appears to be, that
such is the constitution of our nervous system. It is on the
same principle, that by the sense of touch, in w^hich may be
concerned a thousand or ten thousand distinct points of con-
tact, we receive the impression of only one body ; or, what
perhaps may appear a more strictly analogous case, we re-
ceive the impression of but one body, though we grasp the
substance with two hands, or with ten distinct fingers. For
the healthy perception in both these cases, however, a cer-
tain arrangement is required, which we may call the natu-
ral harmony of the nervous system ; and when this harmo-
ny is disturbed, the result is remarkably altered. Thus,
squinting produces the vision of a double image,"^ because
the images fall upon what we may call unharmonizing points
of the retina; and the same principle m.ay be illustrated in
a very curious manner by a simple experiment with the

• This effect may easily be produced by pressing one of tlie eyes a little out of its
natural position by nneans of the finger at the corner of it, while looking at a single
object. It will be made to appear double.

Extraordinary case of a gentleman in France. Diillculty o[ explaining why the
Qbiect appears single and direct. Analogous case. Effect of squiniing, what ?

4.S SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. [PART II.

sense of touch. If a small round body, such as a pea, be
laid upon the palm of tlie one hand, and rolled about be-
tween the first and second fingers of the other, in their
natural position, one pea only is felt; but, if the fingers are
crossed, so that the pea is roiled between the opposite sur-
faces of the two fingers, a most distinct impression of two
peas is conveyed.

Of the whole of the remarkable process of sensation and
perception, we know nothing but the facts, that certain
impressions made upon tlie organs of sense are followed by
certain perceptions in the mind ; and that this takes place,
in some way, through the medium of the brain and nervous
system. We are in the habit of saying, that the impressions
are conveyed to the brain ; but, even in this, we probably
advance a step beyond what is warranted. We know that
the nerves derive their influence from their connection with
the brain, or as forming along with it one great medium of
sensation ; but we do not know w^hether impressions made
upon the nervous fabric connected \vith the organs of sense
are conveyed to the brain ; or whether the mind perceives
them directly, as they arc made upon the organs of sense.
The w^iole subject is one of those m\'steries which are
phiced above our reach, and in which we cannot advance
a single step beyond the knowledge of the facts. Any at-
tempt to speculate upon it is therefore to be considered as
contrary to the first principles of philosophical inquiry.
We must simply receive the facts as of that class which w*e
cannot account for in the smallest degree; and the evidence
which we derive from our senses, of the existence and pro-
perties of the things of the material ^vorld, is to be recog-
nised as one of those fundamental laws of belief whicli ad-
mit of no other proof than that which is found in the uni-
versal conviction of mankind.

Before concluding the subject of perception, it remains to
be noticed that a certain voluntary effort is required for the
full exercise of it ; or, at least, for that degree of perception
which leaves an impression capable of being retained. It
is familiar to every one, that v/Jicn the mind is closely oc-
cupied, numerous objects may pass before our eyes, and cir-

Kxperimfiiit with tho loncli. Exli"!nt of our kiunvlefl^e of sensali-jn. The brain
Oi'iiculiy of Uu," xuhjoct. Voluntary ivfTort noces^ary. Kviiloncp. of it.

%

SEC. I.J SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 40

'umstanc'es may be talked of in our hearing, of whicli we
'o not retain the slightest recollection ; and this is often in
such a degree as implies, not a want of memory only, but
an actual want of the perception of the objects. We can-
not doubt> however, that there was the sensation of them ;
that is, the usual impression made upon the eye in the one
case, and the ear in tlie otljer. What is wanting, is a cer-
tain effort of the mind itself, without which sensation is not
necessarily followed by perception ; — this is what we cal)
Attentio7i. It is a state or act of the mind which is exer-
cised by different individuals in very diiferent degrees. It
is much influenced by habit ; and though it may not often
be wanting in such a degree as to prevent the perception of
objects, it is often deficient in a manner which prevents the
recollection of them, and consequently has an extensive
influence upon the intellectual character.

The effect of attention is illustrated by various mental
phenomena of daily occurrence. If we are placed in such
a situation that the eye comm.ands an extensive landscape,
presenting a gre?<.t variety of objects, or the wall of an
apartment covered with pictures, we have the power of fix-
ing the mind upon one object in such a manner that all thj?
rest become to us nearly as if they did not exist. Yet we
know that they are actually seen, as far as the m^ere sense of
vision is concerned ; that is, i masses of all of them are formicd
upon the retina ; but they are not objects of attention, or of
that peculiar voluntary effort of mind which is necessary for
the full perception of them. In the same manner, a prac-
tised musician can, in the midst of a musical performance,,
direct his attention to one part, such as the bass, — can
continue this for such a time as he pleases, and then again
enjoy the general harmony of the whole. On the same
principle, the mind may be so intensely fixed upon something
within itself, as an object of conception or memory, or a
process of reasoning, as to have no full perception of present
external impressions. We shall afterward have occasion to
refer to a state of mind in \vhich this exists in such a de-
gree, that objects of conception or memory are believed to
have a real and present existence ; and in which this erro-

Name of this? EfTect of a tention illustrated. In the sense of sight. Of hearing.

60 SENSATION AN^ PE:CEPTI0N. [I'ART U.

neous impression is not corrected by impressions from exter-
nal things : — this occurs in insanity.

Attention is very much influenced by habit; and con-
nected with this subject there are some facts of great inte-
rest. There is a remarkable law of the s^^stem, by which
actions at first requiring much attention are after frequent
repetition performed witli a much less degree of it, or w^ith-
out the mind being conscious of any effort. This is exem-
plified in various processes of daily occurrence, as rcndini^
and w'riting, but most remarkably in music. Musical per-
formance at first requires the closest attention, but the ef-
fort becomes constantly less, until it is often not perceived
at all ; and a lady may be seen running over a piece of
music on a piano, and at the same time talking on ano-
ther subject. A young lady, mentioned by Dr. Darv» in,
executed a long and very difficult piece of music with the
utmost precision, under the eye of her master ; but seemed
ao^itated durinof the execution of it, and w^hen she had con-
eluded, burst into tears. It turned out that her attentr-M
had, during the whole time, been intensely occupied wif"
the agonies of a favorite canary-bird, Avhich at last droppe''
dead in its cage. We see the same principle exemplified i>
the rapidity with which an expert arithmetician can run up
a long column of figures, without being conscious of the
individual combinations. It is illustrated in another mannc
by the feats of jugglers, the deception produced by whici
depends upon their performing a certain number of motion?
with such rapidity that the attention of the spectators does
not follow all the combinations.

In teaching such arts as music or arithmetic, this princi-
ple is also illustrated ; for the most expert arithmetician or
musical performer is not necessarily, and perhaps not gene-
rally, the best teacher of the art ; but he who, with a com-
petent knowledge of it, directs his attention to the individual
minute combinations through which it is necessary for the
learner to advance. ^/

In processes more' purely intellectual, we find the influ-
ence of habit brought under our vicAV in a similar manner

Iriflueucc of habits of ailcnlinn. lllustralr'na. Anecdote of Uie yomig lady. Otlit<
illii.siniiioiis. Illiisiratinii of this pri/iciple from the art of leaching. Influence of hab
In facililaliug inielleciual processes.

^.C. I.J SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 51

oarticularly in following the steps of a process of reason-
ing. A person little accustomed to such a process advances
step by step, with minute attention to each as he proceeds ;
while another perceives at once the result, with little con-
sciousness of the steps by which he arrived at it. For this
reason, also, it frequently happens that in certain depart-
ments of science the profound philosopher makes a bad
teacher. He proceeds too rapidly for his audience, and
without sufficient attention to the intermediate steps by
which it is necessary for them to advance ; and they may
derive much more instruction from an inferior man, whose
mental process on the subject approaches more nearl}^ to
that which, in the first instance, must be theirs. We re-
nark the same difference in public speaking and in writing;
"^nd we talk of a speaker or a writer who is easily followed,
-"d another who is followed with difficulty. The former
.^tards the series of his thoughts, so as to bring distinctly
l;efore his hearers or his readers every step in the mental
process. The latter advances without sufficient attention
to this, and consequently can be followed by those only who
are sufficiently acquainted with the subject to fill up the
intermediate steps, or not to require them.

There is a class of intellectual habits directly the reverse
of those now referred to ; namely, habits of inattention, by
which the mind, long unaccustomed to have the attention
steadily directed to any important object, becomes frivolous
and absent, or lost amid its own waking dreams. A min ^
in this condition becomes incapable of following a train of
reasoning, and even of observing facts with accuracy and
tracing their relations. Hence nothing is more opposed to
the cultivation of intellectual character; and when such a
person attempts to reason, or to follow out a course of in-
vestigation, he falls into slight and partial views, unsound
deductions, and frivolous arguments. This state of mind,
therefore, ought to be carefully guarded against in the
young ; as, when it is once established, it can be removed
only by a long and laborious effort, and after a certam peri-
od of life is probably irremediable.

In rude and savage life remarkable examples occur of

Bad teaching. Public speaking. Habits of iaattenlion. Consequences? Habits of
attention in savage life.

52 FALSE PERiJEPTIONS. [PART IL

the effect of habits of minute attention to those circum-
stances to wiiich the mind is intensely directed by their
relation to the safety or advantage of the observer. The
American hunter finds his way in the trackless forests by
attention to minute appearances in the trees, which indicate
to him the points of the compass. He traces the progress
of his enemies or his friends by the marks of their footsfeps ;
and judges of their numbers, their hahings, their employ-
ments, by circumstances which would entirely escape the
observation of persons unaccustomed to a mode of life re-
vjuiring such exercises of attention. Numerous examples
of this kind are mentioned by travellers, particularly among
ihe aboriginal natives of America.

OF FALSE PERCEPTIONS.

Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to refer to
5ome remarkable facts respecting perceptions taking place,
without the presence of any external body corresponding
with them. These are called false perceptions, and they
are usually referred to two classes ; namely, those arising
in the organs of sense, in which the mind does not partici-
pate ; and those which are connected with hallucination of
mind, or a belief of the real existence of the object The
former only belong to this part of the subject. The latter
will be referred to in another part of our inquiry, as they
do not consist of false impressions on the senses, but depend
upon the mind mist? king its own conceptions for real and
present existences.

Of false perceptions, properly so called, the most familiar
are the mv.sccc volitantes floating before the eyes, and sounds
in the ears resembling the ringing of bells, or the noise of a
waterfall. Changes ire also met with in the organs of
sense giving rise to remarkable varieties of perception.
Dr. Falconer mentions a o^entleman who had such a morbid
State of sensation that cold bodies felt to him as if they
were intensely hot. A gentleman mentioned by Dr. Co-
nolly, when recovering from measles, saAv objects diml-

Exariipleij ? False perceptions — what ? liow classified ? Conunon examples.

SEC. I.] SENSATION AND PBRCEPTION. 53

nished to the smallest imiginable size ; and a patient men-
tioned by Baron Darry, on recovering from amaurosis, saw
men as giants, and all objects magnified in a most remarka-
ble manner : it is not mentioned how long these peculiari-
ties continued. This last peculiarity of perception occurred
also to a particular friend of mine in recovering from ty-
phus fever. His own body appeared to him to be about
ten feet high. His bed seemed to be seven or eight feet
from the floor, so that he felt the greatest dread in attempt'
ing to get out of it ; and the opening of the chimney of his
apartment appeared as large as the arch of a bridge. A
singular peculiarity of this case however was, that the per-
sons about him with whom he was familiar did not appeal
above their natural size. But the most interesting pheno-
mena connected with affections of this kind are furnished
by the various modifications of spectral illusions. These
are referable to three classes.

I. Impressions of visible objects remaining for some time
after the eye is shut, or has been withdrawn from them ;
generally accompanied by some remarkable change in the
color of the objects. Various interesting experiments of
this kind are related by Dr. Darwin ; one of the most strik-
ing is the following: — "I covered a paper about four inches
square with yellow, and with a pen filled with a blue color
wrote upon the middle of it the word BANKS in capitals;
and sitting with my back to the sun, fixed my eyes for a
minute exactly on the centre of the letter N in the word.
After shutting my eyes, and shading them somewhat with
my hand, the word was distinctly seen in the spectrum, in
yellow colors on a blue ground ; and then on opening my
eyes on a yellowish wall at twenty feet distance, the magni-
fied name of Bx4lNKS appeared on the wall written in gold-
en characters."

With a very little ingenuity, tliis kind of spectral illusions can be
easily produced in great variety. Take a common red wafer, and lay
it upon a sheet of white paper. Bring the eye down to v/ithiji six oi
eight inches of it, and gaze very steadily and intently upon it for the
space of twenty or thirty seconds. On moving the eyes away, a beau-

Faise perception of magnitude. Examples of this. Spectral illusions ; how niany
classes ? First class ? Darwin's experiments ? Easy mode of producing these illusions.

5 4 FALSE PERCEPTIONS. [PAET IL

tu^ul light blue spot, of the size and shape of the wafer, will be seen on
the sheet, and will follow the e)'es as they move from side to side. By
cutting the wafer in two, or notching its surface, or varying its form
m any way, a corresponding variety in the form of the blue spot will
be produced. The effect may be varied also by using wafers of a
different color, or even by bright pictures of various colors combined.
The stronger the light, the more striking will be the effect. It ought to
be added, that persons of weak eyes should be very cautious in trying
these experiments.

A friend of mine had been one day looking intensely at
a small print of the Virgin and Child, and had sat bending
over it for some time. On raising his head he was startled
by perceiving, at the farther end of the apartment, a female
figure, the size of life, with a child in her arms. The first
feeling of surprise having subsided, he instantly traced the
source of the illusion, and remarked that the figure corre-
sponded exactly with that which he had contemplated in
the print, being what painters call a kit-cat figure, in which
the lower parts of the body are not represented. The illu-
sion continued distinct for about two minutes. Similar illu-
sions of hearing are met with, though less frequently than
those of vision. A gentleman recently recovered from an
affection of the head, in which he had been much reduced
by bleeding, had occasion to go into a large town a few
miles from his residence. His attention was there attracted
by the bugle of a regiment of horse, sounding a particular
measure which is used at chanorjngr rruard in the eveninor.
He assured me that this sound was from that time never out
of his ears for about nine months. During all this period
he continued in a very precarious state of health ; and it
was only as his health became more confirmed that the
sound of the bugle gradually left him. In regard to ocular
spectra, another fact of a very sins^ular nature appears to
have been first observed by Sir Isaac Newton, — namely,
that when he produced a spectrum of the sim by looking at
it with the right eye, the left being covered, upon uncover-
ing the left, and looking upon a white ground, a spectrum
of the sun was seen with it also. He likewise acquired
the power of recalling the spectra, after they had ceased,
when he went into the dark, and directed his mind intensely.

Modes of varying Uie experiments. Caution. Illusion procUiccd by lookiiig al a
prim ? Illusions o^ hearf'ig. Newton's experiments ?

SEC. I.] SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 55

'' as when a man looks earnestly to see a thing which is dif-
ficult to he seen." By repeating these experiments fre-
quently, such an effect was produced upon his eyes, " that
for some months after," he says, " the spectrum of the sun
Degan to return as often as I began to meditate upon the
phenomena, even though I lay in bed at midnight with my
curtains drawn."

II. Impressions of objects recently seen returning after
a considerable interval. Various interesting examples of
this kind are on record. Dr. Ferriar mentions of himself,
that when about the a^e of fourteen, if he had been vievvino-
any interesting object in the course of the day, as a roman-
tic ruin, a fine seat, or a review of troops, so soon as eve-
ning came, if he had occasion to go into a dark room, the
v/hole scene was brought before him with a brilliancy equal
to what it possessed in daylight, and remained visible for
some minutes.

III. False perceptions arising in the course of some bodi-
ly disorder, generally fever. A lady whom I attended some
years ago, in a slight feverish disorder, saw distinctly a
party of ladies and gentlemen sitting round her bedcham-
ber, and a servant handing something to them on a tray.
The scene continued in a greater or less degree for several
days, and was varied by spectacles of castles and churches
of a very brilliant appearance, as if they had been built of
finely cut crystal. The whole was in this case entirely a
visual phantasm, for there was no hallucination of mind.
On the contrary, the patient had from the first a full im-
pression that it Vv^as a morbid affection of vision, connected
with the fever, and amused herself and her attendants by
watching and describing the changes in the scenery. A
gentleman who was also a patient of mine, of an irritable
habit, and liable to a variety of uneasy sensations in his
head, was sitting alone in his dining-room in the twilight,
the door of the room being a little open. He saw distinct-
ly a female figure enter, wrapped in a mantle, and the face
concealed by a large black bonnet. She seemed to advance

Second class? Examples. Third class? Example; the sick lady. The mind, in
what state, in this case ? Second example ?

56 FALSE PERCEPTIONS. [PART 11.

a few Steps towards him and then stop. He had a full
conviction that the fissure was an illusion of vision, and
artnused himself for some time by watching it ; at the same
time observing that he could see through the figure, so as
to perceive the lock of the door and other objects behind it.
At length, when he moved his body a little forward, it dis-
appeared. The appearances in these two cases w^ere en-
tirely visual illusions, and probably consisted of the renewal
of real scenes or figures, in a manner somewhat analogous
to those in Dr. Ferriar's case, though the renewal took
place after a longer interval. When there is any degree of
hallucination of mind, so that the phantasm is believed to
have a real existence, the affection is entirely of a different
nature, as will be more particularly mentioned under anoth-
er part of our subject.

False perceptions may be corrected bj' one of three me-
thods ; — by the exercise of other senses — by a comparison
with the perceptions of other persons — and by an exer-
cise of judgment. If I suspect that my eye deceives
me, I apply the hand, with the perfect conviction of the
improbability that the two senses should be deceived at
once. If this cannot be done, I appeal to the impressions
of some other persons, with an equally strong conviction
that the same sense will not be deceived in the same man-
ner in several persons at once. Or I may do it in another
way, by a reference to some known and fixed object.
Suppose, for example, I see two objects where 1 imagine
there should be but one, and suspect a visual deception ; I
turn my eyes to some object which I know to be single —
such as the sun. If I see the sun double, I know that there
is a delusion of vision ; if I see the sun single, I conclude the
original perception to be correct. These processes imply
a certain exercise of judgment; and there are other cases
in which the same conviction may arise from an exercise
of judgment, without any process of this kind. In one of
the cases now referred to, for example, the correction took
place instantly, from observing that the lock of the door
was seen as if through the figure.

Explanriiion8. Correcting false imprcsaions, in what ways? First methoil ? SeconJ
method 7

SEC II.] CONSCIOUSNESS. 67

SECTIOJN^ II.

OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION.

Consciousness appears to mean, simply, the act of at-
tending to what is passing in the mind at the time. That
more extensive operation to which we ought to give the
name of reflection, as distinguished from simple conscious-
ness, seems to be connected with a power of remembering
past perceptions and past mental processes, — of comparing
them with present feelings, so as to trace between them a
relation, as belonging to the same sentient being, — and, fur-
ther, of tracing the laws by which the mental processes
themselves are regulated. It is employed also in tracing
the relations and sequences of external things, and thus
proves the source of certain notions expressive of these re-
lations. It is therefore a compound operation of mind, in-
cluding various mental processes, especially consciousness,
memory, and the act of comparison or judgment. The
knowledge which we derive from this source, whether v/e
call it consciousness or reflection, is referable to three
heads.

I. A knowledge of the mental processes, and the laws
and relations by which they are regulated ; a knowledge,
for example, of the laws and facts relating to memory, con-
ception, imagination, and judgment. These will be more
particularly referred to in a subsequent part of our inquiry.
In the same manner we acquire our knowledge of those
which have been called the active and moral powers, as
love, hope, fear, joy, gratitude, 6cc,

II. Certain notions arising out of the exercise of the
mental processes, in reference to the succession and relations
of things; our notion, for example, of time, arising out of
memory and consciousness, — our notion of cause — of mo-

Definiiion of consciousness? Distinction between it and reflection? Its nature?
How many kinds of knowledge derived from it ? First head; mental processes? Se-
cond head; certain abstract ideas ?

5S CONSCIOUSNESS. [PART II.

tion — number — duration — extension or space. From sim-
ple perception we seem to acquire a knowledge of external
things as existing only at the moment ; and from simple
consciousness a knowledge of a mental impression as exist-
ino; onlv at the moment. Our notions of the succession of
things, as implying time and motion, require the exercise
of consciousness and memory ; and our notions of cause,
and the various other relations of things to each other, re-
quire both memory and comparison. To the same head, in
reference to another department of these faculties, belong
our notions of truth and falsehood — rio^ht and wronor.
These result from a certain exercise of mind, aided by
that remarkable principle in our constitution which cc^n-
monly receives the name of conscience.

III. With this exercise of the mental functions there
spring up in the mind certain convictions, or intuitive and
instinctive principles of belief. Thej^ are the immediate
result of a certain exercise of the understanding, but are
not referable to any process of induction or chain of rea-
soning, and can be considered only as an original and fun-
damental part of our constitution. This is a subject of
great and extensive importance, and the articles of belief
which are referable to it are chiefly the following :

(1.) A conviction of our own existence as sentient and
thinkinor beinofs, and of mind as somethincj distinct from
the functions of the body.

(2.) A confidence in the evidence of our senses in re-
gard to the existence and properties of external things ; or
a conviction that they have a real existence independent of
our sensations.

(3.) A confidence in our own mental processes — that
facts, for example, which are suggested to us by our me-
mory, really occurred.

(4.) A belief in our personal identity, derived from the
combined operations of consciousness and memory ; or a
remembrance of past mental feelings and a comparison of
them with present mental feelings, as belonging to the same
sentient being.

Third head ; inluiiive convicliona ? Examples?

SEC. III.] TESTIMONY. 59

(o.) A conviction that every event must have a cause,
and a cause adequate to the ellect.

(6.) A confidence in the uniforniity of the operations of
nature ; or that the same cause, acting in the same circum-
stances, will always be followed by the same effect.

These first or instinctive principles of belief will be referred
to in a more particular manner when we come to speak of
the use of reason in the investigation of truth. They are
usually called First Truths, and will be seen to occup}^ a
most important place as the foundation of all reasoning.
Many inoenious but fallacious aro:uments w^ere at one time
wasted in attempts to establish them by processes of reason-
ing. These again were assailed by sophistical and skep-
tical writers, who easily succeeded in showing the fallacy
of these arsfuments, and thus assumed the credit of under-
mining the authority of the truths themselves. All this
species of sophistical w^arfare is now gone by ; and the most
important era in the modern science of reasoning was,
when it was distinctly shown that these first truths admit of
no other evidence than the conviction wdiich forces itself
upon the understanding of all classes of men. Since that
period it has been generally allowed that they admit of no
proof by processes of reasoning; and, on the other hand,
that they are entirely unaffected by the arguments by which
all such reasoning was shown to be fallacious.

SECTio:^r III.

OF TESTIMONY.

A VERY small portion of our knowledge of external
things is obtained through our own senses ; by far the
greater part is procured through other men, and this .is re-
ceived by us on the evidence of testimonjr. But, in receiv-
ing facts in this manner, we usually proceed with more

Coi!irover^ie3 respecting First Trmhs. Proper view oi' ilioiic coi>lioversie.s ? l/.'i
deuce of lesiijnony, why necesi3.Ty ?

Go TESTIMONY. [PART IL

cpaition than when they come to us by our personal obser-
vation. We are much influenced, in the first place, by our
confidence in the veracity of the narrator, and our know-
ledge of the opportunities which he has had of ascertain-
ing the facts he professes to relate. Thus, if he be a per-
son on Avhose testimony we have formerly received impor-
tant statements, which have turned out to be correct, we
are the more ready to receive his testimony again ; if he
be a stranger to us, we receive it with greater caution ; if
lie has formerly misled us, we viev/ it with suspicion, or
reject it altogether.

But there is another principle of very extensive applica-
tion in such cases, and which is independent in a great
measure of the character of the narrator. In receiving
facts upon testimony, we are much influenced by their ac-
cordance with facts with which v/e are already acquainted.
This is w4iat, in common language, we call their probabili-
ty ; and statements which are probable, that is, in accor-
dance with facts which we already know, are received
upon a lower degree of evidence than these which are not
in such accordance, or which, in other words, appear to us
in the present state of our knowledge to be improbable.
Now this is a sound and salutary caution, but we should
beware of allowing it to influence us beyond its proper
sphere. It should, lead us to examine carefully the evi-
dence upon which we receive facts not in accordance v^ith
those which w^e have already acquired ; but we should be-
ware of allowing it to engender skepticism. For, while an
unbounded credulity is the part of a weak mind, which
never thinks or reasons at all, an unlimited skepticism is
the part of a contracted mind, which reasons upon imper-
fect data, or makes its own knowlednre and extent of obser-
vation the standard and test of probability. An ignorant
peasant may reject the testimony of a philosopher in regard
to the size of the moon, because he thinks he has the evi-
dence of his senses that it is only a foot in diameter; and
a person, Iiolding a respectable rank in society, is said to
have received with contempt the doctrine of the revolution

Conditions of confiilence in testimony ? What is meant by probability ? Its inHu-
pnce ? Caution in rcj^ard to its infiuence Examples ; reasoning in regard lo Lhc
moon ? In reganl to the revolution of the earth f

SKC. in.] TESTIMONY. 61

of the earth on its axis, because he was perfectly satisfied
that his house was never known to turn with its front to
the north. Vvhen the king of Siam \vas told by a Dutch
traveller that m Holland, at certain seasons of the year, wa-
ter becomes so solid that an elephant might walk, over it, ha
replied, "I have believed many extraordinary things v/hich
you have told me, because I took you for a man of truth
and veracity, but now I am convinced that you lie." This
confidence in one's ow^n experience, as the test of probabi-
lity, characterizes a mind which is confined in its views
and limited in its acquirements ; and the tendency of it
would be the rejection of all knowledge for v/hich we have
not the evidence of our senses. Had the king of Siam
once seen water in a frozen state, he would not only have
been put right in regard to this fact, but his confidence
would have been shaken in his own experience as the test
of probability in other things ; and he would have been
more disposed for the further reception of truth upon the
evidence of testimony.

Thus, progress in knowledge is not confined in its results
to the mere facts v/hich we acquire, but has also an exten-
sive influence in enlarging the mind for the further recep-
tion of truth, and setting it free from many of those preju-
dices which .influence men who are limited b}^ a narrow
field of observation. There may even be cases in which,
without any regard to the veracity of the narrator, a culti-
vated mind perceives the elements of truth in a statement
which is rejected by inferior minds as altogether incredible.
An ingenious writer supposes a traveller of rather doubtful
veracity bringing into the country of Archimedes an ac-
count of the steam-engine. His statement is rejected by
his countrymen as altogether incredible. It is entirely at
variance with their experience, and they think it much
more probable that the traveller should lie, than that such
a thing should be. But when he describes to Archimedes
the arrangement of the machine, the philosopher perceives
the result and, without any consideration of the veracity
of the narrator, decides, upon the evidence derived from
the relation of the facts themselves, and their accordance

— -■'■ ■- I ■■■■-■—■ --,.-.■■—- — — ,,, ■ .^— -— ^

ileasoning of Ihs king of Siam ? Influence of general knowledge on the belief of
^siimony ? Example, supposition in regard lo Archimedes ? Ground of Archimedes'
belief- whit ?

6

62 TESTLMONV. [PART II.

with principles which are known to him, that the statement
is unquestionably true.

This illustration leads to a principle of the utmost prac-
tical importance. la judging of the credibility of a state-
n*ent, we are not to be inlluenced simply by our actual
experience of similar events ; for this would limit our re-
ception of new facts to their accordance Avith those which
we already know. We must extend our views much far-
ther than this, and proceed upon the knowledge which we
have derived from other sources, of the powers and pro-
perties of the agent to which the event is ascribed. It
is on this principle that the account of the steam-engine
would have appeared probable to Archimedes, while it was
rejected by his countrymen as absolutely incredible ; be-
cause he would have judged, not according to his expe-
rience of similar machinery, but according to his know-
ledge of the powers and properties of steam. In the same
manner, when the king of Siam rejected, as an incredible
falsehood, the account of the freezing of w^ater, if there
aad been at his court a philosopher who had attended to
the properties of heat, he would have judged in a different
manner, thoug^h the actual fact of the freezinor of water
miofht have been as new to him as it w^as to the kinor. He
would have recollected that he had seen various solid bodies
rendered fluid by the application of heat ; and that, on the
abstraction of the additional heat, they again became solid.
He would thus have argued the possibility, that, by a fur-
ther abstraction of heat, bodies mierht become solid which
are fluid in the ordinary temperature of the atmosphere.
In this manner, the fact, which was rejected by the king,
judging from his own experience, might have been received
by the philosopher, judging from his knowledge of the pow-
ers and properties of heat — though he had acquired this
knowledge from events apparently far removed from that to
which he now applied it.

The principle here referred to is independent altogether
of the direct reliance which we have on testimony, in re-
gard to things which are at variance with our experience,
when we are satisfled that the testimony has the characters

Important principle. Hew ilkuitralcU by the preceding anecdotes? How jihounl the
king of Siam have reasoned *

SEC. III.] TESTIMONY. 03

of credibility ; but, even on these grounds, we may per-
ceive the fallacy of that application of the doctrine of
probability which has been employed by some writers, in
opposition to the truths of revealed religion, and to the
means by which they were promulgated — particularly the
miracles of the sacred writings. Miracles, they contend,
are deviations from the established course of nature, and
are, consequently, contrary to our uniform experience.
It accords with our experience that men should lie, and
even that several men might concur in propagating the
same lie ; and, therefore, it is more probable that the nar-
rators lied, than that the statement respecting miracles is
true. Mr. Hume even went so far as to maintain, that a
miracle is so contrary to what is founded upon firm and un-
alterable experience, that it cannot be established by any
human testimony.

Hume's celebrated argument against the resurrection of Christ,
and of course against the Christian religion, stated a little more fully,
IS this : '^ Twelve witnesses," he says, though not exactly in these
words, '' I admit, agree in testifying that a man rose from the deaui.
I am consequently compelled to believe one of two things, either that
twelve men agreed to tell a lie, or that a man rose from the dead. Ei-
ther of these suppositions is, I confess, very extraordinary, but as one
or the other must be true, I must admit the one that is least extraor-
dinary. NoAv it seems to me more probable that men should lie, than
that one who had been several days dead should return to life again j
for it is a vfery common thing in this world for men to testify falsely ;
but it is ' contrary to all experience' that a man should rise from the
dead."

To this Christian writers reply, in substance, as follow^s : " We ad-
mit the alternative, viz. that we must believe that twelve men have
testified falsely, or that one man rose from the dead ; and we also ad-
mit that we must believe the least improbable of the two. But we
deny that the former is the least improbable. For it is not vert/ impro-
bable that the Creator should wish to make a communication to man
kind ; and if so, restoring to life the messenger who brought it, would
be a very suitable and a very probable mode of authenticating it. But
it is contrary to all experience, and all probability, that twelve men,
without motive, should conspire to fabricate and disseminate a lie. In
regard to the mode by which the Creator would authenticate a message
to men, we have no experience 5 and there is certainly no presumption
against the one in question. In regard to men's falsifying their word,

Hume's argument, what ? Extent to which he carried his reasonings ? Mr. Hiime'a
argument stated more fully ? The alternative he offers 7 His choice ? In reply, what
«lo Christian writers admit ? What do they deny ? ,

bi TESTI3I0x\Y. [part R

in tHe cause of vii'tue,, and against their own interests; we have a great
dea. of experience, and it is all against it."

This brief view of the question will assist the pupil to understand
more clearly the bearing of the reasoning which follows.

The fallacy of Mr. Hume's argument may probably be
maintained from the principles which have been stated. It
is, in fact, the same mode of reasoning which induced the
king of Siam to reject the statement of water becoming
solid. This was entirely contradicted by his '• firm and
unalterable experience," and, therefore, could not be re-
ceived, even upon the evidence of a man Avhom he had al-
ready recognised as a witness of unquestionable veracity,
and upon whose single testimony he had received as truth
"many extraordinary things." He thought it much more
probable that even this man lied, than that such a state-
ment could be true. Strictly speaking, indeed, the objec-
tion of Mr. Hume may be considered as little better than a
play upon words. For what renders an occurrence miracu-
lous is precisely the fact of its being opposed to uniform
experience. To say therefore that miracles are incredible
because they are contrary to experience, is merely to say
that they are incredible because they are miracles.

They who are imposed upon by such a sophism as this,
do not, in the first place, attend to the fact, that the term
experience, if so much is to be founded upon it, must be
limited to the personal observation of every individual ;
that is, it can apply, in each particular case, onl}^ to the last
hfty or sixty years at most, and to events which have hap-
pened during that period, at the spot where the individual
was present. Whatever he knows of events which took
place beyond this spot, or before that period, he knows, not
from experience, but entirely from testimony : and a great
part of our knowl'^dgc, o^' what we call the established
course of nature, has bo^n ' quired in this manner. In the
reception of new knowledge, then, an individual must either
receive facts upon testimony, or believe nothing but that
for which he has the evidence of his senses. It is unne
cessary to state how much the latter supposition is at va*

Its fallacy, how shown ? Hume's reasoning compared with that of the king of Siair
Experience; hovv limited ? Necessity of placin^j confidence in leslimonv ?

SEC. in.] TESTIMONY. 65

riance with the daily practice of every man ; and how much
information we are in the constant habit of receiving upon
testimony, even in regard to things which are very much
at variance Avith our personal observation. How many
facts do Ave receive in this manner, with unsuspecting con-
fidence, on the testimony of the historian, in regard to the
occurrences of ancient times ; and on the testimony of the
naturalist and the traveller, respecting the natural and civil
history of foreign countries. How few persons have veri-
fied, by their personal observation, the Avonders Avhich aa'c
receive on the testimony of the astronomer ; and, even of
the great phenomena of nature on the surface of our globe,
hoAv much do Ave receive upon testimony in regard to things
which are widely at variance AA^ith our OAvn experience. I
need only mention the boiling springs of Iceland, and the
phenomena of earthquakes and volcanoes. But, on the
principles of Mr. Hume, these could not be believed. On
the contrary, if one of our intelligent Highlanders AA^ere
hearing described to him the dev^astations of a volcano, he
Avould point to his heath-coA^ered mountain, as the basis of
his " firm and unalterable experience," and declare it to be
more probable that travellers should lie than that such a
statement could be true.

The reception of facts upon the evidence of testimony
must therefore be considered as a fundamental principle of
our nature, to be acted upon AA^henever Ave are satisfied that
the testimony possesses certain characters of credibility.
These are chiefly referable to three heads : that the indivi-
dual has had sufficient opportunity of ascertaining the facts ;
that AA'e haA^e confidence in his pOAver of judging of their
accuracy ; and that AA^e have no suspicion of his being influ-
enced by passion or prejudice in his testimony, — or, in other
words, that Ave believe him to be an honest AA'itness. Our
confidence is further strengthened by several Avitnesses con-
curring in the same testimony, each of Avhom has had the
same opportunities of ascertaining the facts, and presents the
same characters of truth and honesty. On such testimony
AA'e are in the constant habit of receiving statements Avhich

Extent of confidence universally placed in it. Examples. Supposed reasoning of
Highlanders on Hume's principle? Proper views of confidence in testimony. Op
what three conditions ? Corroborating circumstances ?

6=^

66 TESTIMONY. [PART n

are much beyond the sphere of our personal observatioi\,
and widely at variance with our experience. These are tlie
statements which, for the sake of a name, we m.ay call mar-
vellous. Tn regard to such, the foundation of incredulity,
as we have seen, is generall}" ignorance ; and it is inte-
resting to trace the principles by which a man of culti-
vated mind is influenced in receiving upon testimony,
statements which are rejected by the vulgar as totally in-
credible.

1. He is influenced by the recollection that many things
at one time appeared to him marvellous which he now
knows to be true : and he thence concludes that there may
still be in nature many phenomena and many principles
with which he is entirely unacquainted. In other words, he
has learned from experience not to make his own knowledge
his test of probability.

^ He is greatly influenced by perceiving in the statement
some element of probability, or any kind of sequence or
relation by which the alleged fact may be connected with
principles which are known to him. It is in this manner
that the freezing of water, which was rejected by the king
of Siam as an incredible falsehood, mi^ht have appeared
credible to a philosopher who had attended to the properties
of heat, because he would have perceived in the statement
a chain of relations connectino" it with facts which he knew
to be true.

3. He is much guided by his power of discriminating the
credibility of testimony, or of distinguishing that species and
that amount of it which he feels to be unworthy of abso-
lute credit from that on Avhich he relies with as implicit con-
fidence as on the uniformity of the course of nature. The
vulgar mind is often unable to make the necessary discrimi-
nation in this respect, and therefore is apt to fall into one
of the extremes of credulity and scepticism. Mr. Hume,
indeed, himself admits that there is a certain amount of
testimony on which he would receive a statement widely at
variance with his own uniform experience, as in tlie hypo-
thetical case which he proposes, — the account of a total
darkness over the whole earth, continuing for eight days, two

Belief of marvellous ancountd? Considerations which influence cullivaicd ininda in
receiving le=;limony ? First ? Second ? Exani[>l«. Third ?

SEC. III.] TESTIMONY. 67

hundred years ago. The evidence which he requires for
it is simply the concurrence of testimonies, — namely, that
all authors in all lano'aa<res describe the event : and tha
travellers bring accounts from all quarters of traditions of
the occurrence being still strong and lively among the peo-
ple. On such evidence he a,dmits that philosophers ought
to receive it as certain.

These principles may be considered as the elements of
our belief in resfard to statements which are new to us ;
and it is interesting to remark how they balance and com-
pensate each other. Thus, a statement which appears
probable, or can be readily referred to known relations, is
received upon a lower degree of testimony, as in the illus-
tration respecting x\rchimedes and the steam-engine. Oth-
ers, which we find greater difficulty in referring to any
known principle, vv^e may receive upon a certain amount of
testimony which v/e feel to be worthy of absolute confidence.
But there may be others of so very extraordinary a kind,
and so far removed from, or even opposed to, every knoAvn
principle, that Vv^e may hesitate in receiving them upon any
kind of testimony, unless we can discover in relation to
them something on which the mind can fix as an element
of moral probabilitj^

This leads us to a very obvious distinction of extraordi-
nary events, — into those v/hich are only marvellous, and
those which are to be considered miraculous. A marvel-
lous event is one which differs in all its elements from any
thing that v\^e previously knew, wif/iout being opposed to
any known principle. But a miracuious event implies much
more than this, being directly opposed to what every man
knows to be the established and uniform course of nature.
It is further required that such an event shall be of so ob-
vious and palpable a kind that every man is qualified to
juge of its miracuious character, or is convinced it could
not happen from the operation of any ordinary natural
cause.

In receiving a statement respecting such an event, we
require the highest species of testimony, or that on which
we rely with the same confidence as on the uniformity of

Application of these principles. Distinction of extraordinary events ; what two kinds '
Degree of testimony necessary to establisli a miraculous event?

68 TESTIMONY. [part TI.

the course of nature herself. But even with this amount of
testimony a doubt may still remain. For we have two
amounts of probability which are equally balanced against
each other ; namely, the probability that such testimony
should not deceive us, and the probability that there should
be no deviation from the course of nature. The concurring
evidence of numerous credible witnesses, indeed, gives a
decided preponderance to the testimony ; and upon a cer-
tain amount of testimony we might receive any statement,
however improbable — as in the case admitted by Mr. Hume
of a universal darkness. But, though in such a case we
miofht receive the statement as a fact which we could not
dispute, the mind would be left in a state of absolute sus-
pense and uncertainty in regard to any judgment which we
could form respecting it. Something more appears to be
necessary for fixing the distinct belief of a miraculous inter-
position ; and this is an impression of moral probability.
This consists of two parts. (1.) A distinct reference of the
event to a power which we feel to be capable of producing
it ; namely, a direct interposition of the Deity. (2.) The
perception of an adequate object, or a conviction of high'
moral probability that an interposition of Divine power
might be exerted in such circumstances, or for the accom-
plishment of such an object. Such are the miracles of the
sacred writings. As events opposed to the common course
of nature, they are, by the supposition, physically improba-
ble in the highest degree. Were they not so, were they
in the lowest degree probable, according to our conceptions
of the course of nature, they could not be miracles, and con-
sequently could not answer the purpose for which they are
intended. But notwithstanding this species of improbabili-
ty, they carry with them all the elements of absolute credi
bility ; namely, the highest species of testimony, supported
by a moral probability which bears directly upon every ele-
ment of the statement. This may be briefly referred to the
following heads : —

1. The human mind had wandered far from truth re-
specting God ; and on the great question of his character
and will, a future state, and the mode of acceptance in his

What necessary besides? Grounds of moral probability? Classification of th«
grounds uf it, in this case. Slate of the human race f

«?EC. lll.j TESTIMONY. 69

sight, the light furnished by reason among the wisest of
men was faint and feeble. On points of such importance
there was the highest moral probability that the Deity
would not leave mankind in this state of darkness, but would
communicate to them some distinct knowledge.

2. It is furtlier probable, that if such a communication
were made to man, it would be accom.panied by prodigies
or miraculous events, calculated to show beyond a doubt
the imm.ediate agency of God, and thus to establish the di-
vine authority of the record.

3. There is no improbability that the povv^er of the Deity
should produce deviations from the usual course of nature
capable of answering such a purpose. For what we call
the course of nature is nothing more than an order of
events which he ha.s established ; and there is no improba-
bility that for an adequate end he might produce a deviation
from this order.

4. An imiportant branch of the moral probability of the
whole statement of the sacred writings arises from the cha-
racters of the truths themselves, challensfinof the assent and
approbation of every uncontaminated mind. This part of
the subject resolves itself into three parts ; namely, the
truths relating to the character and perfections of the Deity ;
the high and refined morality of the gospel ; and the adap-
tation of the whole provisions of Christianity to the actual
condition of man as a moral being. The former carry a
conviction of their truth to the mind of every candid inqui-
rer ; the two latter fix themselves upon the conscience or
moral feelings of all classes of men with an impression which
is irresistible.

This mode of reasoninof is not charsfeable with that kind
of fallacy which has sometimes been ascribed to it, — that it
professes first to prove the doctrine by the miracle, and then
to try the miracle by the doctrine. The tendency of it is
only to deduce from the various elements which really en-
ter into the argument, a kind of compound evidence, the
strongest certainly which on such a subject the human mind
is capable of receiving. It is composed of the character of
the truths — the moral probability of a revelation of clear

Necessity of evidence cf a revelation ? Power sufficient. Internal evidence ? Chars!»
'-if fallacy ? RepJy.

70 TESTIMONY. fPART 11

knowledge oa subjects of such infinite importance — and the
highest species of testimony for the miraculous evidence by
which the revelation was accompanied. There are princi-
ples in our nature calculated to perceive the manner in
which the different parts of such an argument harmonize
with each other; and, upon every principle of the human
mind, it is impossible to conceive any thing more highly
calculated to challensre the serious attention and absolute
conviction of every sound understanding.

This imperfect view of a deeply interesting subject will
be sufficient to show the fallacy of the objection which has
been urged against the credibility of miracles, — that they
are contrary to our unalterable experience of the establish-
ed course of nature. There might have been some de-
gree of plausibility in the argument, if these events had been
alleged to have taken place in ordinary circumstances ; but
the case is essentially altered, and this kind of improbabili*
ty is altogether removed, when in the alleged deviation a
new agent is introduced entirely capable of producing it.
Such, as we have seen, are the miracles of the sacred wri-
tings ; and the question in regard to their probability is,
not whether they are probable according to the usual course
of nature, but whether they are probable in the circumstan-
ces in which they are alleged to have taken place ; name-
ly, in the case of a direct interposition of the Deity for cer-
tain great and adequate purposes. In such a case, our es-
timate of probability must be founded, according to the
principles already stated, not upon our experience of simi-
lar events, but on the knowledge which we derive from oth-
er sources of the power of the agent to whom the event is
ascribed. Now the agent to whom miracles are ascribed
is the Supreme Being, the Creator of all things, the stupen-
dous monuments of whose omnipotent power are before us»
and within us, and around us. What we call the establish-
ed course of nature is merely an order of events which he
has appointed; and the question of probability is, whether
it is probable that for certain adequate purposes he should
produce a deviation from this order. For such a statement,
indeed, we require strong, numerous, credible, and concur-

General view of ihe question? The real cuieslion iu regard to Ihe probability of itu*
racles ?

SEC. III.] TESTIMONY. 71

ring testimonies ; but it comes to be simply a question of
evidence ; and there is no real improbability that in these
circumstances such events should take place.

In this manner, then, there is entirely removed from the
statement the improbability which is founded upon the uni-
formity of the ordinary course of nature ; because it is not
in the ordinary course of nature that the events are alleged
to have taken place, but in circumstances altogether new
and peculiar. The subsequent inquiry becomes, therefore
simply a question of evidence ; this evidence is derived from
testimony ; and w^e are thus led to take a slight view of the
grounds on which we estimate the credibility of testimony.

Testimony, we are told, is fallacious, and is liable to de-
ceive us. But so are our senses; — they also may deceive,
and perhaps have deceived us, as in the case of ocular spec-
tra; but we do not on that account discredit the evidence
of our eyes ; we only take means, in certain cases, for cor-
recting their indications by other senses, ashy touching the
object, or by a comparison with the visual impressions of
other men ; and, whatever probability there is that the eyes
of one man may be deceiv^ed in any one instance, the proba-
bility is as nothing that both his sight and touch should be
deceived at once ; or that the senses of ten men should be
deceived in the same manner at the same time. It is the
same with regard to testimony. It may have deceived us
in particular instances ; but this applie-s to one species of
testimony only ; there is another species which never de-
ceived us. We learn by experience to separate distinctly
the one from the other, and fix upon a species of testimony
on which we rely with the same confidence as on the uni-
formity of the course of nature. Thus, if we find a man
who in other respects shows every indication of a sound
mind, relating an event which happened under his own in-
spection, and in such circumstances that he could not possi-
bly be deceived ; if his statement be such as contributes in
no respect to his credit or advantage, but, on the con-
trary, exposes him to ridicule, contempt, and persecution .
iC notwithstanding, he steadily perseveres in it, under

Form which the quesiion assumes when the presumption against the fact is removed?
EviJenci; of testimony arid of the s-onses con)pare<l 7 Example Ca?s in which conf
Jencc ill testimony niit-it be implicit ?

2 TESTDIONY. [PART n.

every species of peri^ecution, and even to the siifferino; of
death; to suppose such a testimony intended to deceive,
would be to assume a deviation from the established course
of human character, as remarkable as any event which ii
could possibly convey to us. This might be maintained in
regard to one such testimony ; but if we find numerous
witnesses agreeing in the same testimony, all equally in-
formed of the facts, all showing the same characters of cre-
dibility, and without the possibility of concert or connivance,
the evidence becomes, not convincing only, but incontro-
vertible.

The grounds on which we receive with confidence the
evidence of testimiony, may, therefore, be briefly stated in
the following manner : —

1. That the statement refers to a matter of fact, — that
the fact was such as could be easily ascertained by the per-
son who relates it, — and that he had sufficient opportunity
of ascertaining it. When the statement includes a point of
opinion, the case comes under another principle ; and we
require, in the first instance, to separate what is opinion
from v/hat is fact.

2. That we have no reason to suspect the witness to be
influenced by interest or passion in his evidence ; or that he
has any purpose to answer by it, calculated to promote his
own advantaofe.

3. That various individuals, without suspicion of conni-
vance, liave concurred in the same statement. This is a
point of the utmost importance ; and in cases in which we
are satisfied that there could be no connivance, a degree of
evidence is derived from the concurrence of testimonies,
which may be often independent even of the credibility of
the individual witnesses. For, though it vrere probable tliat
each of them singly might lie, the chances tliat tliey should
all happen to agree in the same lie, maybe found to amount
to an impossibility. On this subject there is also a further
principle of the greatest interest, which has been well illus
trated by Laplace, namely, that the more improbable a
rtatcment is in which such witnesses agree, the greater is the
probability of its truth. Thus we may have two men whom

Grounds) of CDuf^dence in lostimony ? The subject ? Freedom from bias. Concur
►nee of v/iinesdcs ? Lap!;icc*3 illr.siralion ?

SEC. III.] TESTIMONY. 73

we know to be so addicted to lying that we would not at-
tach the smallest credit to their single testimony on any
subject. If we find these concurring in a statement respect
ing an event which was highly probable, or very likely to
have occurred at the time which they mention, v/e may
^jtill have a suspicion tha,t they are lying, and that they
nay have happened to concur in the same lie, even though
\heve should be no supposition of connivance. But if the
statement was in the highest degree improbable, such as
that of a man rising from the dead, we may feel it to be
impossible that they could accidentally have agreed in such
1 statement ; and, if we are satisfied that there could
be no connivance, we may receive a conviction from its
very improbability that it must be true. In cases of con-
curring testimonies, ^ve expect that the witnesses shall agree
in all essential and important particulars ; and, on the oth-
er hand, evidence of the authenticity of testimony is some-
times derived from the various witnesses differinor in triflinsr
circumstances in such a manner as, without weakening the
main statement, tends to remove the suspicion of collusion
or connivance.

4. In all matters of testimony, we are greatly influenced
by our confidence in a certain uniformity of human charac-
ter. We attach much importance, for example, to our pre-
vious knowledge of the narrator's character for veracity ;
and a man may have acquired such a character in this re-
spect, that we confide in his veracity in every instance in
which his testimony is concerned, v\^ith a confidence equal
to that with v/hich we rely on the uniformity of the course
of nature. In such a case, indeed, we proceed upon a uni-
formity which applies only to a particular order, namely,
those whom we consider as men of veracity. But there is
also a principle of uniformity which applies to the whole spe-
cies ; and in which we confide as regulating every man of
sane mind. Thus, if the statement of a narrator contain
circumstances calculated to promote his own advantage, we
calculate on the probability of fabrication, and reject his evi-
dence, except we had previously acquired absolute confi-
dence in his veracity. But if, on the contrary, his state-
ment operates against himself, conveying an imputation

Examples. Character ? View'3 of interest.

74 TESTIMONY. [part II.

against his own cliaracter, or exposing him to contempt, ri-
dicule, or personal injury ; without any previous knowledge
of his veracity, we are satisfied that nothing could make
him adhere to such a testimony, but an honest conviction
of its truth.

5. A very important circumstance is the absence of any
contradictory or conflicting testimony. This applies, in a
striking manner, to the miraculous statements of the sacred
writings ; for, even on the part of those who were most in-
terested in opposing them, there is no testimony which pro-
fesses to show, that at the time when the miracles are said
to have taken place, they did not take place. It is, indeed,
a remarkable circumstance, that the earliest writers against
Christianity ascribe the mJraculous events to the power of
sorcery or magic, but never attempt to call them in question
as matters of fact.

6. Much corroboration of testimony may often be obtain-
ed from our knowledge of foots of such a nature as, without
directly bearing upon the statements to which the testimony
refers, cannot be accounted for on any other supposition
than the conviction of these statements beino' true. This
principle applies, in a remarkable manner, to the miracu-
lous histories of the sacred writinos. We know, as an liis-
torical fact, the rapid manner in which the Christian faith
was propagated in the early ages, against the most formida-
ble opposition, and by means of the feeblest human instru-
ments. We are told, that this was owing to the conviction
produced by miraculous displays of Divine power; we feel
that the known eflect corresponds with the alleged cause ;
and that it cannot be accounted for on any otiier principle.

It docs not belong to our present inquiry to allude more
particularly to the direct evidence by which the miracles
of the sacred v*^ritings are supported ; we merely refer, in
this general manner, to the principles on which the evidence
is to be estimated. A very interesting branch of the sub-
ject will come under our view when we speak of memory
and arbitrary association. We shall then see the irresisti
ble importance of the commemorative rites of Christianity,
by which the memory of these events has been transmitted

Absence of npnnsing tcsiiniony ? Corroboraiing circumstances ? Illustration? Re-
mnrk-j upon the aired evidence of Christianity 7

SEC. fr.] TESTIMONY. ^ 75

from age to age, or rather from year to year ; and by which
our minds are carried backward, in one unbroken series, to
the time when the events occurred, and to^ the individuals
who witnessed them. In this manner, also, is entirely re-
moved any feeling of uncertainty which may attach to tes-
timony, as we recede from the period at which the events
took place, and as the individuals are multiplied. Upon the
'vhole, therefore, the evidence becomes so clear and conclu-
Eive, that we may say of those who reject it what the great
Author of Christianity said on another occasion, — *' If they
hear not these, neither will they be persuaded though one
rose from the dead."

EyidGQce la proof of Chrisliaiiitf.

PART III.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS.

Through the various sources referred to in the preced-
ing observations, we acquire the knowledge of a certaitt
number of facts, relating either to the mind itself, or to
things external to it. The next part of our inquiry refers
to the operations (to use a figurative expression) which the
mind performs upon the facts thus acquired. The term
functions, or powers of mind, has often been applied to these
operations ; but, as we are not entitled to assume that they
are not in fact separate functions in the usual acceptation of
that expression, it is perhaps more correct, and accords bet-
ter with our limited knowledge of mind, to speak simply of
the operations which it is capable of performing upon a
given series of facts. These seem to be chiefly referable
to the following heads.

I. We remember the facts ; and we can also recall them
into the mind at pleasure. The former is Memory; tho
latter is that modification of it which we call Recollection.
But, besides this simple recollection of facts, we can recall
a perception ; that is, the impression of an actual scene
which has been witnessed, or a person who has been seen,
so as to place them, as it w^ere, before the mind, with all
the vividness of the original perception. This process is
called Conception. It is often described as a distinct pow-
er, or a distinct operation of the mind ; but it seems to be
so nearly allied to memory that it may be considered as a
modification of it. It is the memory of a perception.

II. We separate facts from the relation in which they

Subject. Classification? Memory. Conception. Abstraction.

7#

78 INTELLECTUAL OPEKATIONS. [PAKT ML

were originally presented to us, and contemplate some of
them apart from the rest ; — considering, for example, certain
properties of bodies apart from their other properties.
Among a variety of objects, we thus fix upon qualities which
are common to a certain number of them, and so arranofe
them mto genera and species. This process is usually
called Abstraction.

III. We separate scenes or classes of facts into their con-
stituent elements, and form these elements into new" combi-
nations, so as to represent to ourselves scenes, or combina-
tions of events, w^hich have no real existence. This is Ima-
gination.

IV. We compare facts with each other, — observe their
relations and connections, — and trace the results which fol-
low particular combinations of them. We also observe
their general characters, so as to deduce from the whole
general facts or general principles. This is Reason or
Judgment.

In this arrangement, it will be observed, I confine myself
entirely to facts. I do not say that the mind possesses dis-
tinct faculties, which we call memory, abstraction, imagina-
tion, and judgment, — for this at once leads into hypothesis ;
but simply, that, in point of fact, the mind remembers, ab-
stracts, imagines, and judges. These processes appear to
constitute distinct mental acts, which every one is conscious
of who attends to the phenomena of his own mind. But
beyond the simple facts we know nothing, and no human in-
genuity can lead us one step farther. Some of the follow-
ers of Dr. Keid appear to have erred in this respect, by as-
cribing to the mind distinct faculties or functions, somewhat
in the manner in which we ascribe to the body distinct
senses. Dr. Brown, on the other hand, has shown much in-
genuity in his attempts to simplify the arrangement of the
mental processes, by referring them all to his two princi-
ples of simple and relative suggestion. But, without inquir-
ing what has been gained to the science by this new phra-
seology, and avoiding entirely any system which seems to
. — . t

Imagination. Judgments Tlieories on this subject ? Dr. Reid's? Dr. Brown's ?

SEC. I.J MEMORY. 79

suppose diatinct fic?ict ions of mind, I confine myself to facts
respecting the actual mental operations ; and it appears to
answer best the purpose of practical utility to speak of these
operations in the arrangement, and by the names, which
are commonly used by the generality of mankind.

SECTION I.

MEMORY.

By Memory we retain the impression of facts or events ,
and by Recollection we recall them into the mind by a
voluntary effort. By Conception we recall perceptions, or
the impression of actual scenes, persons, or transactions :
thus a skilful painter can delineate from conception a land-
scape a considerable time after he has seen it, or the coun-
tenance of a friend who is dead or absent. These appear
to be the leading phenomena which are referable to the head
of memory.

There seem to be original differences in the power of
memory, some individuals being remarkable for retentive
memory, though not otherwise distinguished by their intel-
lectual endowments. Thus, persons have been known to
repeat a long discourse after once hearing it, or even a se-
ries of things v/ithout connection, as a long column of
fiofures, or a number of words without meaninsf. There
is on record the account of a man who could repeat the
Vv^hole contents of a newspaper ; and of another who could
retain words that were dictated to him, ^vithout any con-
nection, to the amount of six thousand. A man mentioned
by Seneca, after hearing a poet read a new poem, claimed
it as his own ; and, in proof of his claim, repeated the poem
from beginning to end, which the author could not do. A
similar anecdote is told of an Englishman, whom the king
of Prussia placed behind a screen when Voltaire came to
read to him a new poem of considerable length. It has been
alleged, that this kind of memory is generally connected

Author's remarks ? Dcuiiilions? Original differences? Examples?

80 MEMORY. [part rii

with inferiority of the other intellectual powers : but there
appears to be no foundation for this. For, though the mere
memory of words may be met with in a high degree in
persons of defective understanding, it is also true that men
of hio^h endowments have been remarkable for memory.
It is said that Themistocles could name all the citizens of
Athens, amounting to twenty thousand ; and that Cyrus
knew the name of every soldier in his army.

The late Dr. Ley den v/as remarkable for his memory.
I am informed, through a gentleman who was intimately
acquainted Vv^ith him, that he could repeat correctly a long
act of parliament, or any similar document, after having once
read it. When he was, on one occasion, congratulated by
a friend on his remarkable power in this respect, he replied
that instead of an advantage, it was often a source of great
inconvenience. This he explained by saying, that when
he wished to recollect a particular point in any thing which
he had read, he could do it only by repeating to himself the
whole from the commencement till he reached the point
which he wished to recall.

We may find a mere local memory combined with very lit*
tie judgment ; that is, the power of remembering facts in
the order in which they occurred, or words in the order in
which they were addressed to the individual ; but that kind
of memory which is founded, not upon local or incidental
relations, but on real analogies, must be considered as an
important feature of a cultivated mind, and as holding an
important place in the formation of intellectual character.
The former kind of memory, however, is often the more
ready, and is that which generally makes the greater shov/,
both on account of its readiness, and likewise because the
kind of facts with which it is chiefly conversant are usually
those most in request in common conversation.

The facts now referred to are matters of curiosity only.
The points of real interest and practical importance, in re-
gard to memory, respect the manner in which it is influ-
enced by the intellectual habits of individuals, and the prin-
ciples on which it may be improved. These are referable

In/liicncG on the other powers? Dr. Leydcii's mciiury. Inconver.icacc resulting
from it 1 Diilcrenl kinds of memory ? Two important points?

SEC. I.] ATTENTION. 81

chiefly to two heads, namely, Attention and Associa-
tion. «

Memory is very much influenced by Attention, or a full
and distinct perception of the fact or object with a view to
its being remembered ; and by the perception being kept
before the mind, in this distinct manner, for a certain time.
The distinct recollection of the fact, in such cases, is gene-
rally in proportion to the intensity with which it has been
contemplated ; and this is also very much strengthened by
its being repeatedly brought before the mind. Most peo-
ple, accordingly, have experienced that a statement is more
strongly impressed upon the memory by being several times
repeated to others. It is on the same principle, that me-
mory is greatly assisted by writing down the object of our
knowledge, especially if this be done in a distinct and sys-
tematic manner. A subject also is more distinctly conceived,
and more correctly remembered, after we have instructed
another person in it. Such exercises are not strictly to be
considered as helps to the memory, but as excitements to
attention ; and as thus leading to that clear and full com-
prehension of the subject which is required for the distinct
remembrance of it.

It is familiar to every one that there are great differences
in memory, both in respect to the facility of acqui/ement and
the power of retention. In the former there appear to be
original differences, but a great deal also depends upon ha-
bit. In the power of retention much depends, as we shall
afterwards see, upon the habit of correct association ; but,
besides this, there are facts which seem to show a singular
connection with the manner in which the acquisition was
made. The following fact was communicated to me by an
able and intelligent friend, who heard it from the individu-
al to whom it relates. A distinguished theatrical perfor-
mer, in consequence of the sudden illness of another actor,
had occasion to prepare himself, on very short notice, for a
part v/hich was entirely new to him ; and the part was long
and rather difficult. He acquired it in a very short time,
and went through it with perfect accuracy, but immediately
after the performance forgot every word of it. Characters

Attention. Means of securing it ? Differences in memory. Illustration. Story of
the actor ?

82 xMEMOPwY. [part hi.

which he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he ne-
ver forgets, but can perform them at any time without a
moment's preparation ; but in regard to the character novv'
mentioned, there was the farther and very sinofukir fact, that
though he has repeatedly performed it since that time, he
has been obliged each time to prepare it anew, and has ne-
ver acquired in regard to it that facility which is familiar to
him in other instances. When questioned respecting the
mental process which he employed the first time he per-
formed this part, he says, that he lost sight entirely of the
audience, and seemed to have nothing before him but the
pages of the book from which he had learned it ; and that
if any thing had occurred to interrupt this illusion, he should
have stopped instantly.

That degree of attention vvhich is required for the full re-
membrance of a subject, is to be considered as a voluntary
act on the part of the individual; but the actual exercise of
it is influenced in a great measure by his previous intellec-
tual habits. Of four individuals, for example, who are giv-
ing an account of a journey through the same district, one
may describe chiefly its agricultural produce ; another, its
mineralogical characters ; a third, its picturesque beauties;
while the fourth may not be able to give an account of any
thing except the state of the roads and the facilities for tra-
velling. The same facts or objects must have passed before
the senses of all the four ; but their remembrance of them
depends upon the points to which their attention was direct-
erl. Besides the manner here alluded to, in whijh the at-
tention is influenced by previous habits or pursuits, some
persons have an active inquiring state of mind, which keeps
the attention fully enofaored upon whatever is passins: before
them ; while others give way to a listless, inactive condi-
tion, which requires to be strongly excited before the atten-
tion is roused to the degree required for remembrance.
The former, accord in crly, remember a frreat deal of all that
passes before them, either in reading or observation. The
latter are apt to say that they are deficient in memory ; theii
deficiency, however, is not in memory, but in attention ,
and this appears from the fact that they do not forget any
thing which deeply engages their feelings, or concerns their
interest.

Diflcrenl objccis of allciuiun ? FtTecls of inauciilion 1

SEC. I.] ASSOCIATION. 83

The habit of listless inactivity of mind should be carefully
guarded against in the young; and the utmost care should
be taken to cultivate the opposite, namely, the habit of di-
recting the mind intensely to whatever comes before it, ei
iher in reading or observation. This m.ay be considered as
forming the foundation of sound intellectual character.

Next to the effect of attention, is the remarkable influ-
ence produced upon memory by Association. This princi-
ple holds so important a place in relation to the mental
operations, that some philosophers have been disposed to
refer to it nearly all the phenomena of mind ; but without
ascribing to it this universal influence, its effects are cer-
tainly very extensive, and the facts connected with it pre-
sent a subject of peculiar interest.

The principle of ass'^ciation is founded upon a remarka-
ble tendency, by v/hich ,vo or more facts or conceptions,
which have been conte.fxplated together, or in immediate
succession, become so connected in the mind that one of
them at a future time recalls the others, or introduces a
train of thoughts which, without any mental effort, follov/
each other in the order in v/hich they v/ere originally asso-
ciated. This is called the association of ideas, and various
phenomena of a very interesting kind are connected with it.

But besides this tendency, by which thoughts formerly
associated are brought into the mind in a particular order,
there is another species of association into which the mind
passes spontaneously, by a suggestion from any subject
which happens to be present to it. The thought or fact
which is thus present suggests another w^hich has some
kind of affinity to it ; this suggests a third, and so on, to the
formation of a train or series which, may be continued to a
Sfreat leno^th. A remarkable circumstance likewise is, that
such a train may go or with very little consciousness of, or
attention to it ; so that the particulars of the series are
scarcely remembered, or are traced only by an effort. This
singular fjict every one must have experienced in that state
of mind which is called a revery. It goes on for some time
without effort and with little attention ; at length the atten-
tion is roused, and directed to a particular thought which is

Caulion to the young Association. Its foundation ? Trains of thought. Embracing
ihem ?

84 ME3I0RY. [part III.

in the mind, without the person being at first able to recol^
lect what led hin^ to think of that subject. He then, by a
vohmtary effort, traces the chain of thoughts backwards,
perliaps through a long series, till he arrives at a subject of
which he has a distinct remembrance as havinff g-iven rise
to it.

It is impossible distinctly to trace the principles which
lead to the particular chain of thoughts v/hich arise in a
case of this kind. It is probably much influenced by the
previous intellectual habits of the individual ; and perhaps
in many instances is guided by associations previously
formed. There are also amono^ the facts or thoucrhts them-
selves certain principles of analogy, by which one suggests
another without that kind of connection which is established
by previous proximity. These have usually been called
principles of associatio?i, or, according to the phraseology
of Dr. Brown, principles of simple suggestion. They
have been generally referred to four heads, — namely, re-
semblance, contiguity in time and place, cause and effect,
and contrast : and others have reduced them to three, con-
siderinof contin^uity and cause and effect as referable to the
same head. On these principles, then, one thought may
suggest another which has some relation to it, either in the
way of resemblance, contiguity, cause, effect, or contrast.
But still the question recurs. What gives rise to the occur-
rence of one of these relations in preference to the others ?
This may depend, in some instances, on previous habits of
thought and peculiarities of mental temperament ; and in
other cases associations may be more apt to occur, accord-
insf as some analof]^ous association may have been more
recently formed, more lively, or more frequently repeated.
When the common topic of the weather, for example, is
introduced in conversation, or presented to the mind, the
agriculturist Vv'ill naturally refer to its influence on vegeta-
tion ; the physician to its effect on the health of the com-
munity ; the man of pleasure may think only of its refer-
ence to the sports of the field ; the pliilosopher may endea-
vor to seek for its cause in some preceding atmospheric
phenomena ; and another person of certain habits of ob-

Explanalion ? Priiiciplc5i of a.^.sociaiion ? Form us'c.l hy Dr. Brov.n ? Cla-^sifii. a
lion ? ElTecLs uf liabil ? Illu-j'raliou {

SEC. I.] ASSOCIATION. 85

servation may compare or contrast it with the weather of
the same period in a preceding year. Thus, in five indi-
viduals, the same topic may give rise to five trains of
thought, perfectly distinct from each other, yet each de-
pending upon a very natural and obvious principle of sug-
gestion. In other instances it is impossible to trace the
cause which leads the mind off into peculiar and unusual
associations. The following example from Hobbes has
been frequently referred to : — " In a company in which
the conversation turned on the civil war, what could be
conceived more impertinent than for a person to ask ab-
ruptly what was the value of a Roman denarius? On a
little reflection, however, I was easily able to trace the train
of thought which suggested the question ; for the original
subject of discourse naturally introduced the history of the
king, and of the treachery of those who surrendered his
person to his enemies ; this again introduced the treachery
of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of money which he received
for his reward. And all this train of ideas passed through
the mind of the speaker in a tv/inkling in consequence of
the velocity of thought." Mr. Stewart adds, in relation to
this anecdote, " It is by no means improbable, that if the
speaker had been interrogated about the connection of
ideas which led him aside from the original topic of dis-
course, he Vv^ould have found himself, at first, at a loss for
an answer."

In the mental process now referred to it is evident that
the term siiggestioii is much more correct than association,
which has often been applied to it. For in the cases which
belong to this class, the facts or thoughts suggest each
other, not according to any connection or association which
the mind had previously formed between them, but accord-
ing to some mental impression or emotion, which by a law
of our constitution proves a principle of analogy or sug-
gestion. We readily perceive how this takes place in re-
gard to circumstances which are allied to each other by
resemblance, contiguity, cause, or eflect ; and the sugges-
tion of contrast must also occur to every one as by no
means unnatural. Thus, the sight of a remarkably fat
man may recall to us the thought of another man we had

■"-•■— ■ ■ ■ " -H^.. ■ ■ ■ — ■ — — ■ - .. -, ■ — ■ ■■ ■ — — — ■■ — ■ — — - ■■ , ., — -■ . m

Hobbos' e\-amp!e? Mr. Stewart's reiiiark? Terras. Which preferable ?

8

S6 MEMORY. [PAKT III.

lately seen, who was equally remarkable for his leanness ;
the playfulness and mirth of childhood may suggest the
cares and anxieties of after life ; and an instance of con-
duct Avhich we greatly disapprove may lead us to recollec?
how very differently another individual conducted himse.;
in similar circumstances.

In a practical view, the subject of association leads us
chiefly to a consideration of the manner in which facts are
so associated in the mind as to be recalled by means of the
connection ; in other words, the influence of association
upon memory. In this view, associations are distinctly
referable to three classes :

I. Natural or philosophical association.

II. Local or incidental association.

III. Arbitrary or iictitious association.

A variety of mental phenomena of the most interesting
kind Avill be found connected with the subjects referred to
under these classes. The principle on which they all de-
pend is simply the circumstance of two or more facts,
thoughts, or events being contemplated together by the
mind, though many of them may have no relation to each
other except this conjunction. The strength of the associ-
ation is generally in proportion to the intensity of the men-
tal emotion ; and is likewise in a great measure regulated
by the length of time, or the number of times, in which
the facts have been contemplated in this connection. As-
tonishing examples may be often met with of facts or oc-
currences which have long ceased to be objects of simple
memory, being brought up in this manner by association,
though they had not passed through the mind for a very
long^ time.

I. Natural or Philosopkical Association takes place
when a fact or statement on which the attention is fixed, is
by a mental process associated with some fact previously
known to which it has a relation, or with some subject
which it is calculated to illustrate. The fact so acquired
is thus, to use a figurative expression, put by in its proper

Why ? A:?socialion, how clasaifieil ? Foundation of all. The strength of il depends
on what ? Philosophical a.^'sociation.

SEC. I.] PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCL\TIOx\. 87

place in the mind, and can afterward be recalled by means
of the association.

The formation of associations, in this manner, is of course
influenced in a very great degree by previ*ous mental ha-
bits, pursuits, or subjects of reflection ; and, according to
the nature and the variety of these pursuits or subjects of
thought, facts which by some are passed by and instantly
forgotten may be fixed upon by others with eager attention,
and referred to some principle which they are calculated
to illustrate. Examples of this kind must be fam.iliar to
every one ; I may mention the following : — In a party of
Sfentlemen, the conversation turned on the warlike charae-
ter of the Mahrattas, as compared with the natives of
Lower India, and the explanation given of it by an author
who refers it to their use of animal food, from v/hich the
Hindoos are said to be prohibited by their religion. A
doubt Avas started respecting the extent to which Hindoos
are prohibited from the use of animal food : some were of
one opinion and some of another, and the point was left un-
decided. Reading soon after the Journal of bishop Heber,
I found it stated, that on one occasion during his journey,
when a large supply of meat w^as brought to him, he or-
dered three lambs to be sent to his Hindoo attendants, and
that the gift was received wdth every expression of grati-
tude. On another occasion such a fact might have been
passed by without producing any impression ; or it might
have been slightly associated with the good bishop's atten-
tion to the comfort of all around him, but not remembered
beyond the passing moment. In connection with the dis-
cussion now mentioned it became a fact of great interest,
and never to be forgotten ; and led to inquiry after more
precise information on the subject to Vv^hich it related.

This trifling exam.ple may serve to illustrate the princi-
ple, that the remiembrance of insulated facts does not de-
pend merely upon the degree of attention directed to them,
but also on the existence in the mind of subjects of thought
with which the new fact may be associated. Other facts,
as they occur, will afterward be added from time to time,
giving rise to a progressive increase of knowledge in a

Influence of previous habits. Example ? Inference 7 Theory cf progress ia
knowledsre?

88 MEMOFvY. [part III.

mind in which this mental process is regularly carried on.
This habit of attention and association oii2;ht therefore to
be carefully cultivated, as it must have a great influence
on our progress in knowledge, and likewise on the forma-
tion of intellectual character, provided the associations be
made upon sound principles, or according to the true and
important relations of things. It is also closely connected
with that activity of mind which is ever on the alert for
knowledge, from every source that comes within its reach ;
and that habit of reflection which always connects with
such facts the conclusions to which they lead, and the views
which they tend to illustrate. On this principle, also, every
new fact which is acquired, or every new subject of thought
which is brought before the mind, is not only valuable in
itself, but also becomes the basis or nucleus of further im-
provement. Minds which are thus furnished with the re-
quisite foundation of knowledge, and act uniformly upon
these principles of enlarging it, will find interesting matter
to be associated and remembered, where others find only
amusement for a vacant hour, which passes away and is
forgotten. There is also another respect in which the
habit of correct and philosophical association assists the
memory, and contributes to progress in knowledge. For
by means of it, when applied to a great mass of facts re-
lating to the same subject, we arrive at certain general
facts, which represent a numerous body of the individuals,
and the remembrance of which is equivalent to the remem-
brance of the whole.

The associations referred to under this first head arise
out of the real relations of facts to each other, or to sub-
jects of thought previously existing in the mind. The
particular train of association, therefore, which is formed
from the same facts by diflt;rent individuals, may vary ex-
ceedingly. Thus, the same facts may often admit of va-
rious applications, or, in other words, of being associated
in various ways, by different persons, according to their
intellectual habits, or by the same person at difl^erent times,
according to the subject of thought which happens to be
more immediately present.

Influence of correct liabitd of astiocialion ? Of previous allainmcnls ? Of claa-
iiticalion 7

SEC. I.] rHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 89

When a variety of facts have been associated in the
mind in the manner noAV referred to, they form a series
which hang together and recall each othar in a very re-
markable manner. There are two ways in which this
takes place, which may be called voluntary and spontane-
ous. (1.) We call up facts by a voluntary effort, by di-
recting the mind into particular trains of thought calculated
to lead to those which we are in search of. This is what
we call recollecting ourselves on a particular subject. We
have an impression, perhaps, that the mind is in possession
of information which bears upon the subject, but do not at
the moment remember it; or we remember some circum-
stances, and wish to recall a more full and complete remem-
brance. We therefore commence a mental process which
cjnsists in putting in motion, to speak figuratively, a train
of thoughts, or a series of associated facts, which we think
calculated to lead us to the facts we wish to recall. (2.)
Associations recur spontaneously, either when particular
topics naturally leading to them are brought before the
mind, in reading or conversation, or in that state in which
the mind is left to follow, without any effort, the current of
thoughts as they succeed each other. In the healthy state
of the mind, we can give v/ay to this spontaneous succes-
sion of thoughts ; or v/e can check it at our pleasure, and
direct the mind into some new train connected with the
same subject, or arising out of it; or we can dismiss it al-
together. While we allow it to go on, it does so, not only
without effort, but often without consciousness ; so that
when the attention is, after some time, arrested by a sub-
ject of thought which is in the mind, we do not at first re-
member what led us to think of it, and begin to recollect
ourselves by tracing the series backwards. In this state
of mind, it is most interesting to observe the manner in
which old associations are reviv^ed, and old recollections
renewed, which seemed to have been lost and forg^otten ;
and how facts and occurrences come into the mind which
had not been thought of for many years. They are re-
called, we scarcely know how, by some train of association
which we can hardly trace, and which had long ceased to

Recalling facts. Firc^t mode ? Second mode ? Our power to control our train of
thought ? Old associations revived.

90 MEMOKY. [part »..*

be the subject of any voluntary effort of attention. We
shall again allude to this most interesting subject, in rela-
tion to the manner in which associations, long forgotten, are
sometimes brought into the mind in dreaming, and in cer-
tain states of delirium.

The voluntary power over the succession of thoughts
and associations which has now been alluded to is a subject
of extreme interest. We shall have occasion to refer to
it again when we come to speak of a remarkable condition
in which it is lost; and in Avhich the mind is left entirely
under the influence of the series of thoughts as they hap-
pen to succeed each other, according probably to old as-
sociations, without the power of arresting or varying it.
This occurs in two very interesting mental conditions to bo
afterward more particularly mentioned; namely, dreaming
and insanity.

»

II. Local or Incidental Association. — In the mental
process referred to under the preceding head, facts or
thoughts are associated according to certain real relations;
though these, we have seen, may be various, and the par-
ticular relation which is fixed upon, in particular cases, de-
pends upon the intellectual habits of the individual. In the
class nov\^ to be mentioned, the associations are formed ac-
cording to no other relations than such as are entirely local
or casual. Thus, a fact, a thought, or a mental impression
is associated with the person by whom it was comm.uni-
cated, or the place where the communication was made;
and is recalled to the mind when the place or person is
seen, mentioned, or thought of. Some persons seem to
form almost no other associations than those of this descrip-
tion. When a place which they had visited, for example,
is spoken of, they immediately relate, in connection with it,
the persons whom they met there, incidents which occurred
in their company, and opinions or statements which were
mentioned in conversation with tliem ; and from this, per-
haps, they may branch off to other circumstances relating
to these individuals, their families, or connections.

These mere local associations, however, often make a

Is the powp.r ovor the succession of ihoughis ever lo.sl ? In what casco ? Local
adsociaiion. Dc{ir«ition? ExtuDples.

SEC. I.] LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 91

very deep impression upon the inind ; more vivid, certain-
ly, than simple memory of the facts or transactions con-
nected with them. Thus, we avoid a plaice which is as-
sociated with some painful recollection ; yet the very fact
of avoiding it shows that we have a full remembrance of
the circumstances, and, at the same time, a conviction that
the sight of the spot vv^ould make the impression more vivid
and more painful. After the death of a beloved child or a
much valued friend, we may retain a lively remembrance
of them, and even anxiously cherish the impression of their
endearing qualities ; yet, after time has in some measure
blunted the acuteness of feeling, the accidental discovery
of some trifling memorial strongly associated with the la-
mented object of our affection produces a freshness and
intensity of emotion, known only to those Vv^ho have expe-
rienced it. This feeling is peculiarly strong if the memo-
rial has been long lost sight of, and discovered by accident ;
because, as has been well remarked by Dr. Brov/n, it in
this case presents the unmixed image of the friend with
whom it is associated ; w^hereas, a memorial which has be-
come familiar to us is associated Vv^ith other feelings not
relating exclusively to him. Philosophers have endeavored
to explain the mental phenomenon here referred to by sup-
posing, that in such cases the mingling of mental emotion
with actual perception gives a feeling of reality to the
emotion, and for the time a kind of belief of the existence
of the object of it. This is sufficiently plausible, but, after
all, amounts to little more than expressing the fact in other
words, without conveying any real explanation.

Similar impressions, whether of a pleasurable or painful
character, according to the original feeling which is thus
recalled, are excited by the sight of a spot which we have
visited v/hile under the influence of strong emotion ; by a
tune, a piece of poetry, an article of dress, or the most
trifling object with which, from incidental circumstances,
the association was made. The effect of a particular tunc
on the Swiss regiments in foreign service is familiar to every
one ; and a similar effect has been remarked, from a simi-
lar cause, among the Highland regiments of our own

Vividness of some local associations. When peculiarly strong ? Proposed explana
lion ? Amount of it? The Swiss soldiers.

92 MEMORY. [part v ...

country. The (( elings thus produced may be so vivid as
even to overpower present emotions ; to excite pleasure
amid circumstances of pain or depression; and to produce
depressing and painful emotions, when all present circum-
stances are calculated to give satisfaction. Hence, it is
probable that the principle might often be employed with
niuch advantage, as a moral remedy, in various circum-
stances of depressing disease, as in the low state of fever,
nid certain conditions of insanity. A pleasing anecdote
'^f this kind is mentioned by 'Dr. Rush. " During the time
tiiat I passed at a country school in Cecil county in Mary-
land, I often went on a holy day, with my schoolmates, to
see an eagle's nest upon the summit of a dead tree, in the
neighborhood of the school, during the time of the incuba-
tion of the bird. The daughter of the fiirmer in whose
field the tree stood, and w^ith whom I became acquainted,
married, and settled in this city about forty years ago. In
our occasional interviews, we now and then spoke of the
innocent haunts and rural pleasures of our youth, and among
others, of the eagle's nest in her father's field. A few
years ago, I was called to visit this woman Avhen she was
in the lowest stage of typhus fever. Upon entering the
room, I caught her eye, and with a cheerful tone of voice
said only, The eagle's nest. She seized my hand, without
being able to speak, and discovered strong emotions of
pleasure in her countenance, probably from a sudden as-
sociation of all her early domestic connections and enjoy-
ments with tlic words which I uttered. From that time she
began to recover. She is now living, and seldom fails,
when we meet, to salute me with the echo of — ' The ea-
gle's nest.' "

There is even something in these mere local association?
which fixes an impression upon the mind, almost indepcn-
flent of memory, and upon a principle with which we are
httle acquainted. The follovv'ing anecdote is, 1 believe
a''thcntic, though I cannot at present refer to the work in
which it is related. It is certainly one of the most extra-
ordinary of its kind, and yet we see enough of the prmci-
ple, in various instances, to give it a high degree of proba-
bility.— A lady, in the last stage of a chronic disease, was

Slory Qf ilic eaL,'l{;'6 nosl ? Pcnr.nnence nftlip^'^ i:):prr.ss-ior.3^

SEC. I.] LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 93

carried from London to a lodging in the country ; there her
infant daughter was taken to visit her, and, after a short
interview, carried back to town. The lady died a few days
after, and the daughter grew up without any recollection of
her mother, till she was of mature age. At this time, she
happened to be taken into the room in which her mother
died, without knowing it to have been so ; she started on
entering it, and when a friend who was along with her
asked the cause of her agitation, replied, " I have a dis-
tinct impression of having been in this room before, and
that a lady, who lay in that corner, and seemed very ill,
leaned over me and wept."

The singular influence of local association is often illus-
trated by the most trivial occurrences. Walking in the
street lately, I met a lady whose face was familiar to me,
but whom I could not name. I had, at the same time, an
impression that I ought to have spoken to her, and to have
inquired for some relative who had lately been my patient ;
but, notwithstanding repeated efforts, I could not recognise
her, and passed on. Some time after, in passing along the
road a few miles from town, my eye caught a cottage, to
which I had been taken about six months before, to see a
gentleman who had been carried into it in a state of insen-
sibility, in consequence of being thrown from a gig. The
sight of the cottage instantly recalled the accident, and the
gentleman who was the subject of it ; and, at the same in-
stant, the impression that the lady whom I had passed in
the manner now mentioned was his wife. In this case no
recollection was excited by the sight of the lady, even after
repeated and anxious attempts ; and I believe I should not
have recognised the patient himself, had he been long with
her ; whereas the whole was recalled in an instant by the
sight of the cottage. Similar illustrations must have oc-
curred to every one. We meet a person in the street, who
stops and speaks to us ; but we cannot recognise him. We
are unwillinor to tell him so, and walk alonor with him con-
versing on various topics ; at length, he makes an allusion
to some person or some circumstance, by means of which
we instantly recollect who he is, and where we met w4th
him. On the same principle, when we are endeavoring

-r- - - - I . ■ ■ I - - - -- \ ~m

Anecdote illustrating it? Anecdote of the author? Common examples ?

94 MEMORY. [pari III

to remind a person of a transaction which he has forgotten,
and which we are anxious to call to his recollection, we
mention various circumstances connected with it, until at
length we mention one which, hy association, instantly
brings the whole distinctly before him. There are even
facts which seem to show that the impression recalled by
local association may afiect the bodily organs. Van Swie-
ten relates of himself, that he was passing a spot v/here the
dead body of a dog burst and produced such a stench as
made him vomit ; and that, happening to pass the same
spot some years after, he was affected by sickness and
vomiting^ from the recollection.

Finally, to the influence of local association we are to
refer the imipressions produced by the monuments of the
illustrious dead ; the trophies of other times ; the remains
of Greece and Rome ; or by the visitation of spots distin-
guished by illustrious deeds, as Thermopylae, Bannockburn,
or Waterloo. " Far from me," says Dr. Johnson, " and
from my friends, be such frigid philosophy, as may conduct
us, indifferent and unmoved, over any ground which has
been dignified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man is
little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain force
upon the plains of JMarathon, or whose piety would not
grow warmer among the ruins of lona."

III. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association. — This asso-
ciation is generally produced by a voluntary effort of the
mind ; and the facts associated are not connected by any
relation except what arises out of this eflbrt. The process
is exemplified in the connection we establish between some-
thinof which we wish to remember, and somethinc^ which
we arc in no dan^rer of forfrettincr ; as in the common ex-
pedients of tying a thread about the finger, or making a
knot on the pocket-handkerchief. A Roman, for the same
purpose, turned the stone of his ring inwards towards the
palm of his hand. There is an analogous expedient which
most people probably have employed for enabling them to
remember the names of persons. It consists in forming an
association between the name to be remembered and that

Moniimrnts ? Or what priuc ip!c doc^ Ihoir interest ilcpcr.ii ? Arbitrary iisdociiUion
Comnifin examples.

SEC. I.J ARBITKAKV ASSOCIATION. 95

of some intimate friend or public character of the same
name, which is familiar to us. The rema/kablc circum-
stance in these cases is, that whatever difficulty a person
may have in simply remembering a name, he never forgets
who the individual was with whose name he formed the
association.

On this principle have been founded various schemes of
artificial memory. One of the most ancient consisted \n
associatincr the divisions of a discourse to be delivered wiiii
the various apartments of a building, and the leading sen-
timents Avith articles of furniture. This is said to have
been much practised by the ancient orators, and to have
given rise to the phraseology by which we speak of the
divisions of a discourse, as the iirst place, the second place,
6cc. I have repeatedly made experiments on this method
in remembering the discourses of public speakers, and the
effect is certainly astonishing; for though it is many years
since the experim.ents were made, I still find articles of fur-
siiture associated in the clearest manner with sentiments
delivered by some of the speakers. Other systems of arti-
ficial memory are founded upon the same general princi-
ple, though the particular applications of it may vary ; and
some of them are extremely absurd. One of the last which
attract'cd notice in this country was that of a German of
the name of Feinao-le, who delivered lectures on memory
to crowded and fashionable audiences, about the year 1809
or 1310. A leading part of his system was the memory
of dates, and it consisted in chani^ino- the fio-ures in the date
into the letters of the alphabet corresponding to them ia
number. These letters vrere then formed into a word to
be in some way associated with the date to be remembered.
One example, Vvdrlch I happen to recollect, will be sufUcieat
to illustrate the peculiarity of the system, and at the same
time its efficiency for its purpose. Henry IV., king of
England, was born in the year 1366. This date, changed
into letters, gives 7nff, which are very easily formed into
the word miiff. The method is not so obvious of establish%
ing VvHth this a relation to Henry IV. " Henry IV.,'' says
M. Feinagle, " is four hens, and we put them into the mu(\]

Ailificial mcir;OL-y. Supposed practice of ihe ancients? Fcinagle's systom? Ex-
»mple.

96 MEMORY. [part HI.

one in each corner." No one, certainly, after hearing ihis;
is in any dano^er of forgfettinsf the date of the birth of
Henry IV.; but vrhether the remembrance is worth such
a process is a separate question.

There is a very obvious and decisive objection to all plans for re-
member' '^g history by means of any such artificial systems. It is this ;
the object of studying history is to enlarge and elevate the mind, to fill
u \vith useful thoughts and clear conceptions, extended views of hu-
man character and conduct, and interesting recollections of the past.
If history is read as a storv, and remembered as a story, this is the
effect ; but on M. Feinagle's plan, all this efiect is deslro3'ed, and
the student of history stores his mind with many incongruous and
ridiculous ideas. The name of Henry IV., for example, ought
to bring to the recollection of the pupil the real events of his
reign, the moral or political truths which it illustrates, and the im-
portant persons or events with which it was connected. Instead of
this, however, this system connects with the name of the monarch
only the absurd and ridiculous idea of four hens in the four corners of
a muff'. So with all the other applications of the system. It pro-
ceeds on altogether erroneous ideas, or rather on a total forgetful-
ness of the real design with which the history of the past is to be
studied. The real objects ought to be the intellectual, moral and po-
litical lessons which it teaches. A knowledge of names and dates
is only of service in assisting the pupil to obtain clearer and more
connected views, and thus in enabling him to feel more fully the moral
effect.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the subject of arbitrary
association, as the observation of every one will furnish
numerous examples of it. There is one application of the
principle, however, which deserves to be referred to in a
more particular manner. I allude to the practice of com-
memorative rites or periodical observances, for transmitting
the remembrance of remarkable events. These are in their
nature, in general, entirely arbitrary ; or, if they have any
analogy to the events, the relation is only figurative. But
the influence of such celebrations is of the most extensive
and most important kind. If the events, particularly, are
of a very uncommon character, these rites remove any
feeling of uncertainty which attaches to traditional testi-
mony, when it has been transmitted through a long period
of time, and consequently through a great number of indi-

Objection to system of artificial memory. Object of history ? Effect of Feiaugle'a
plan? Example; case of Heary IV. Error on whicli s\\c\\ 6y.-:iem3 are fouiuled ?
(/omiiieiuoraLlve riles. Their i.illuGncc.

SEC. I.J ARBITKARY ASSOCIATION. 97

viduals. They carry us back, in one unbroken series, to
the period of the events themselves, and to,the individuals
who were witnesses of them.

The most important application of the principle in the
manner now referred to is in the observances of religion
which are intended to commemorate those events v/hich
are connected with the revelation of the Christian faith.
The importance of this mode of transmission has not been
sufficiently attended to by those who have urged the insuf-
ficiency of human testimony to establish the truth of
events which are at variance Avith the common course of
nature. We have formerly alluded to one part of this so-
phism, and have stated the grounds on which we contend
that no objection to the credibility of these events can be
founded upon our observation of what we call the course
of nature. We have admitted that a much higher species
of evidence is required for them than would be required
for events which correspond v/ith our previous observation ;
and this high and peculiar evidence is confirmed in a strik-
ing manner by the periodical rites now referred to. By
means of these we are freed entirely from every impression
of the fallibility of testimony, and the possibility of the
statements having been fabricated ; as we are conducted
in one uninterrupted series to the period when the events
took place, and to the individuals who witnessed them.
This will appear if we state in a few words a hypothe-
tical case. Let us conceive a person attempting to im-
pose upon the Avorld by an account of some Vv^onderful or
miraculous event, which he alleges occurred five hun-
dred years ago. He, of course, exerts every possible inge-
nuity in fabricating documents, and framing the appear-
ance of a chain of testimony in support of his statement.
It is quite possible that he might thus deceive a considera-
ble number of credulous persons ; and that others, who did
not believe his statement, might yet find difficulty in
proving its fallacy. But if the report were further to bear,
that ever since the occurrence of the alleged event it had
been regularly and specially celebrated by a certain peri-
odical observance, it is clear that this would bring the

Important case. Case supposed for illustration.

9

9S MEMORY. [part III.

statement to the test of a fact ODen to examination, and that
the fallacy of the whole would he instantly detected.

On thes3 principles it must appear that the statements of
the sacred writings, respecting miraculous events whicli
are said to have occurred upwards of ISOO years ago, could
not have been fabricated at any intermediate era during
that period. It is unnecessary to state how much more
iniprobable it is that they could have been fabricated at the
very time and place in which they are said to have oc'
curred, and in the midst of thousands who are said to have
witnessed them, many of whom were deeply interested in
detecting their fallacy. This part of the question is not
connected with our present inquiry, but it is impossi-
ble to dismiss the subject without one reflection : — that if
we are to proceed upon the principle of probabilities, we
must balance fairl\' the probabilities of fabrication. If we
do so, we hesitate not to assert, that the probability of the
world being imposed upon, under all the circumstances now
alluded to, is more at variance with our firm and unalte-
rable experience than all that we are called upon to be-
'eve.

It does not appear necessary to say much of that modifi-
cation of memory Avhich is called Conception. It is the
recalling of a perception. If, for example, we have passed
a person in the street whose face we think we have seen,
but without beinof able to recosfnise him, we can recall the
impression of his countenance, and endeavor to recollect
who he is. By a higher exercise of this faculty a painter
can draw from conception a landscape or a building long
after he has visited them, and even the portrait of a friend
\v\io is dead or absent, and whom he has not seen for a con-
6iderable time. By another modification of this power we
can imbodv into a conception a scene, a fiofure. or a trans-
action which has been described to us bv another. Tlic
vividness of our conception, in such cases, does not depend
upon tlie accuracy or even the truth of the description, but
upon the degree of liveliness with which it is given, or the
intensity with which our attention is directed to it. Thus,

Ari^'ment. Concciition. what ? Examples. Iiiiportani modification o?* ihi.^ power
Vp'^n what the vivid.iesi d<^p<»a'i'.

SEC. 1.] coNcErnoxV. Olj

it has been remarked that we have a more clear conception
of Don Quixote or Sancho than of any characters in real
history, unless they have been made familiar to us by
paintings. The business of the novelist being to create
his hero, he gives a more full and graphic delineation of
him than the authentic historian finds it necessary to do :
hence, the former begins his narrative by an impression
made upon our conception ; the latter disregards this, and
proceeds at once to the facts which he has to address to
our attention and memory.

There is no intellectual habit which can be more immediately im-
proved by cultivation, than this power of painting distinctly to the
mind scenes described by another. Both the enjoyment and the
improvement which is derived from reading depend very much up-
on it. One person will read a narrative, such an one for instance
as the story of Eobinson Crusoe, and the mental ].)ictures, which the
descriptions bring up in his mind, are cold, and meagre, and barren.
Nothing comes to view Avhich is not expressly described ; and even
that is very faintly and confusedly sketched by the mind. In the case
of another individual, all is clear and distinct. The slight sketch which
the description gives is filled up by the imagination, and clothed with
Deauty ; so that while the printed words which meet the eye, in both
cases, are the same, the real scenes to which they introduce the rea-
der are entirely dissimilar. This is one great cause of the diffe-
rences of opinion about the interest excited by a story. One reader
praises and one condemns. They speak of the book. But the real
object of the censure and of the praise, is, on the one hand, the mea-
gre conceptions of a reader Avhose imagination has not been culti-
vated ; and on the other, the gloAving pictures Avhich are formed by a
mind of higher imaginative powers.

Now the habit of forming distinct and vivid conceptions of what
an author describes, vill not only very much increase the interest
with which his description is read, but it will cause it to be very
much more strongly impressed on the memory. What we see Ave
remember much more distinctly than what we merely hear described ;
but by the power of strong and vivid conception, we can sometimes
almost realize the effect of actual sight.

There are tAvo modes of cultivating this poAver. 1. Occasionally
pausing and making an effort to paint distinctly to the mind the scenes
described by an author. Think of it as a reality, and dAvell upon it
until you liaA^e completed it, in its details, and made all the parts
consist(mt Avith one another, and Avith the A\'hole. Practice of this

Conceptions fornioil of imaginary persons? Why more distinct? Influence of culti-
vation upon it ? Example of the ditTerencc in different individuals. EtTect of tl>is on
opinions about books ? Double advantage from the habit of forming vivid concepiioas'?
Modes of cuUivating- this power ? First mode 1

100 MEMOKY. [part lil.

kind will very soon lead to decided improvement. 2. Carefully ob-
serving scenery, as exhibited in prints and in naiurej and impressing
its features, both of beauty and grandeur, upon the mind, so as to pro-
vide the memory Tvith a store of images, which are to be employed
as elements or materials, to enter into the composition of imaginary
scenes. Strictly speaking, there is nothing new or original in the
conceptions we form of scenes described. They maj'' be new com
binations, but the elements from which they are composed are all
furnished from memory. The memory then should be provided with a
supply.

Conception, properly so called, or the recalling of a
perception, does not appear to be necessarily connected
with the impression of past time, but rather to be at first
accompanied by a feeling of the present existence of the
object. Connecting the impression with past time seems to
be a distinct act of the mind ; and the conception may be so
strong, as, for the moment, almost to exclude all idea of the
past. That degree of conception by which a painter can
take the likeness of a friend who has been long dead, or
delineate a scene visited at a remote period, must amount
to something of this nature. In the active and healthy
state of the other faculties of the mind this impression is
but momentary, being almost instantly corrected by im-
pressions received from the external world. We shall af-
terward have occasion to refer to a remarkable state of
mind in which it is not thus corrected, but in which objects
which exist only in conception are believed to have a real
and present existence. On this condition depend many of
the peculiarities of dreaming, insanity, and spectral illu-
sions.

Different individuals possess the faculty of conception in
different degrees ; and, connected with the degree of it,
there is generally a corresponding talent for lively descrip-
tion. The faculty itself, or the formation of the concep-
tion, probably follows nearly the same laws with memory,
and depends in a great measure upon the degree of atten-
tion which was originally directed to the objects. This,
again, is influenced, as in the case of memory, partly by
the general activity of mind of the individual, and partly
by his particular habits and pursuits. Thus, as formerly

f""" ■- ■ ■ I ■ -I. ■ — i^..i ■-■■.■■■-..■■I.I ■■ ■ •

Second mode ? Rea.son for this rule ? Connection of conception with the idea of
lime. Conception, when most vivid ? Power of conception in diffcrcnl individuals
Depends npon what ?

SEC. I.] CONCEPTION. 101

remarked, in describing the features of a country which
they have passed over, one person will give a clear and
lively description of its general characters, ^so as to place it,
as it were, before you ; a second will describe chiefly its
pastures and produce ; a third may include both ; while a
fourth may not be able to give an intelligible account of
any one feature of the scene.

There are particular situations in which conception is
apt to be most intensely brought into exercise, especially
those of seclusion and the absence of all external impres-
sions. A beautiful example of this occurs in the Life of
Niebuhr, the celebrated Danish traveller. When old, blind,
and so infirm that he was able only to be carried from his
bed to his chair, he used to describe to his friends the
scenes v/hich he had visited in his early days with wonder-
ful minuteness and vivacity. When they expressed their
astonishment, he told them, " that as he lay in bed, all vi-
sible objects shut out, the pictures of what he had seen in
the East continually floated before his mind's eye, so that
it was no wonder he could speak of them as if he had seen
them yesterday. With like vividness the deep intense sky
of Asia, with its brilliant and twinkling host of stars, which
he had so often gazed at by night, or its lofty vault of blue
by day, was reflected, in the hours of stillness and darkness,
on his inmost soul." This may perhaps be considered as an
example of what we may call the highest degree of healthy
conception. Something a little beyond this leads to that
state on which depends the theory of apparitions or spectral
illusions.

In concluding this brief allusion to the subject of concep-
tion, I shall only add the following example of another
application of this mental process. In the church of St.
Peter at Cologne the altar-piece is a large and valuable
picture by Rubens, representing the martyrdom of the
apostle. This picture having been carried av/ay by the
French in 1805, to the great regret of the inhabitants, a
painter of that city undertook to make a copy of it from
recollection ; and succeeded in doing so in such a manner,
that the most delicate tints of the original are preserved

Power of description various? Anecdote of Niebuhr? What ilhialratcJ by this ^
storv of llie picture ?

9#

102 MEMORY. [part III.

with the most minute accuracy. The original painting has
now been restored, but the copy is preserved along with it ;
and even when they are rigidly compared, it is scarcely
lossible to distinguish the one from the other. I, am not
aware that this remarkable anecdote has been recorded by
any traveller; I am indebted for it to my friend Dr. Dun-
''an, of the university of Edinburgh, who heard it on the
f'OOt in a late visit to the Continent, and saw both the pic-
tures.

f

OF THE CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ATTENTION AND

MEMORY.

The facts which have been briefly referred to, in regard
to the phenomena of memory, lead to some remarks of a
practical nature. These relate to the improvement of at-
tention and memory in persons of adult years, and the cul-
tivation of these powers in the education of the young.

The rules from which benefit is to be derived for the
improvement of memory, in persons of adult years, may
be chiefly referred to the following heads.

I. The cultivation of habits of attention, or of intense
application of the mind to whatever is at the time its more
immediate object of pursuit.

II. Habits of correct association. These consist in the
constant practice of tracing the relation between new facts
and others with which we are previously acquainted ; and
of referring facts to principles which they are calculated to
illustrate, or to opinions which they tend to confirm, modi-
fy, or overturn. This is the operation of what we call a
reflecting mind ; and that information which is thus fully
contemplated and associated is not likely to be forgotte.i.

III. Intimately connected with both the former rules is
the cultivation of that active, inquiring state of mind which

Authorii}' for it. Fir.^t rule ? Kiilc in regard to asteOciali(»n, wliai 1 Correct asisocia-
lion, what ?

SEC. I.] ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 103

is ahvays on the watch for knowledge from every source
that comes vvdthin its reach, either in reading, conversation,
or observation. Such a mind is ever ready to refer newly-
acquired knowledge to its proper place. It is thus easily
retained, and made to yield those conclusions which are
legitimately deduced from it.

IV. Method ; that is, the pursuit of particular subjects,
\ipon a regular and connected plan.

All these principles are opposed to that listless, inactive
state of mind v/hich is occupied v.dth trifles, or with its
own waking dream.s ; or which seeks only amusement in
desultory pursuits which pass away and are forgotten.
They are likewise opposed to habits of irregular and de-
sultory application, which even intellectual persons are apt
to fall into, by means of which the mind loses the train of
investig^ation, or of aro-ument, in vv^hich it had made some
progress, and may not be able to recover it in a satisfactory
manner. Nothing, indeed, appears to contribute more to
progress in any intellectual pursuit than the practice of
keeping the subject habitually before the mind, and of daily
contributing something towards the prosecution of it.

V. Attention and memory are greatly promoted by writ-
ing on a subject, especially if it be done in a distinct and
systematic manner ; also, by conversing on the subject, and
by instructing others in it. These exercises, indeed, may
perhaps be considered rather as aids to attention, or a clear
comprehension of the subject, than to memory. For in re-
gard to m.emory, it is remarkable how much its power is
increased in many instances by that kind of exercise by
which it is alone trusted to, without any aid from writing.
I have known medical men, for example, who had to recol-
lect numerous appointments, do so with perfect accuracy
by trusting to memory, to which they had habituated them-
selves, but blunder continually when they kept a written
memorandum. The mental power which is in some cases
acquired by constant and intense exercise, is indeed asto-

— --II ., r

What stale of mind best promotes the memory 7 Method. Habits of mind to which
these rules are opposed ? In/iuence of writing ? What its mode of operation 7
Exceptions.

104 jIEjiORY. [PAKT llh

nishing. Bloomficld the paet relates gf himself, that nearly
one half of his poem, the Farmer's Boy, was composed, re-
vised, and corrected, without writinof a word of it, while he
was at work v/ith other shoemakers in a gari'et.

Similar rules apply to the cultivation of these powers in
young persons. They may be chiefly referred to the fol-
lowing heads ;

I. Excitins: constant attention and constant interest.
For this purpose it is of essential importance that v»hatever
reading is presented to children shall be of a kind which
they understand, and in which they can feel interest and
pleasure. This will be greatly promoted by directing their
attention to the meaning of words, and explaining them by
familiar illustrations. The practice of setting tasks as
punishments cannot be alluded to in terms adequate to its
extreme absurdity. On this ground also it must be consi-
dered as a oTeat error in education, to make children at-
tempt too much ; that is, more than they can do with close
attention. When a sense of weariness or mental languor
takes place, what follows is not merely a loss of time, but
an important injury done to the mental constitution ; and

t appears to be of the utmost consequence that the time of
children should be as much as possible divided between in-
tense attention and active recreation. By a shorter time
occupied in this manner, not only is more progress made
than by a longer, with listless and imperfect application, but
an important part of mental discipline is secured, which by
the other method is entirelv neglected. Similar obscrva-
tions, indeed, apply to persons at every period of life, and
we are fully persuaded that progress in any intellectual
pursuit does not depend so much upon protracted laborious
study, as on the practice of keeping the subject habitually
before the mind, and on the intcnsit}^ of mental application

II. Cultivating habits of association, by pointing out to
children the relation of facts to each other, the manner in
which they illustrate one another, or lead to some general

AuecdoLe o( Blooiiifieltl. Means of ciillivaiing ihe lueinory in ihe yonng. Infiiienco
of atlenlion and inlc^esi J Errors in educaiiou ? H;t!iiu< (>f a^-rociaiion.

SEC. I.] ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 105

conclusion. By directing them in this manner from any
particuhir fact to recollect similar or analogous facts which
had formerly passed before them, they will be trained at
once to attention, memory and reflection.

III. Cultivating that general activity of mind which
seeks for information on every subject that comes in its way.
The most common and trivial occurrences may thus be
made the source of mental improvement : the habits of ani-
mals ; the natural history of the articles that are constantly
before us, in clothes, food, furniture ; articles of manufac-
ture from a watch to a pin ; the action of the mechanic
powers, as illustrated by various contrivcxnces in constant
use ; the structure of a leaf, a flov/er, a tree. To those
farther advanced, a constant source of interest may be found
in history, geography, and memoirs of eminent individuals ;
and in the leading principles of natural history, natural phi-
losophy, and chemistry. Every new subject of thought
which is thus presented to the mind is both valuable in it-
self by the powers which it calls into action, and by proving
a nucleus to which new facts may be afterv/ard associated.

IV. Memory and attention are greatly promoted in young
persons by writing ; provided it be done, not merely in the
form of extracts from books, but in their own words : in his-
tory, for example, in the form of chronological tables ; and
on other subjects in clear and distinct abstracts, neatly and
methodically written.

V. These exercises of mind are greatly promoted in the*,
young by verbal communication. Hence the importance of
frequent examination. The teacher is thereby enabled,
not only to ascertain their progress, but to explain what
they do not understand ; to impress upon them important
points to which they may not have sufficiently attended ;
to excite attention, inquiry, and interest ; and so to culti-
vate the habits of association and reflection. These, in fact,
ought to be the objects to be kept in view in all such exer-
cises, as of much greater moment than the mere putting of

Activity of mind. Means of awakening it? Written exercises : of what kind ? Ver-
Hal communication— how secured ? Advantages of it ?

106 RIEMQKV. [pAilT 112

questions. On the same principle, a most useful exercise
for young persons is instructing others still younger, on sub-
jects which they have themselves recently acquirecL

VI. In the cultivation of the mental powers in the young,
a point of essential importance is the selection of proper and
worthy objects of acquirement. In the general conduct
of education in this respect^the chief error appears in gene-
ral to have been, devoting t€K) much time and attention in
females to superficial accomplishments, and in males to mere
acquirement in languages and mathematics ; and the great
object to be kept in view from the very earliest period is the
paramount importance of the actual knowledge of things
on subjects of real utility, the actual cultivation of habits of
observation, inquiry, association and induction; and, as the
foundation of the whole, the habit of steady and continued
attention. The cultivation of these mental habits is of
greater value by far than any one acquirement whatever ;
for they are the basis of all future improvement, and are
calculated to give a tone to the whole character.

In this brief outline I have said nothing on the subject of
religious instruction ; for tiie &ame iTiles apply to it as to
branches of inferior importance, in as far as it is to be con-
sidered as engaging the intellectual powers. The chief er-
ror here appears to be, the practice of trusting too much to
the mere repetition of tasks or catechisms, without that kind
of direct personal instruction which is calculated to interest
the attention, to fix the truths upon the understanding, and
to cultivate the habits of association and reflection. A lead-
ing branch of this subject, the culture of the moral feelings,
does not belong^to our present inquiry; but it is impossible
to mention it without alludino^ to its intense interest even in
a phik)sophical point of view. One of the most striking
phenomena, certainly, in the science of the human mind, is
the high degree of culture of which the moral powers are
susceptible, even in the infant mind, long before the powers
of intellect are developed for the investigation of truth.

Mutual in.slruction. Influence of a proper sclcciion of ohjccts? Prevalent errors'*
What is really of paramount importauce ? Kciigious i]:struclk)u. Cuinuiou error hcr«J

Cullurc of moral feelings?

t^E€. I.j ITS CULTURE AND LUPROVEMENT. l07

In reference to the whole science of education, nolhinnf
is of greater importance than the principle of association,
which, we liave formerly seen, exerts a most extensive in
flucnce, not in tlie remembrance of facts alone, but in per
petuating and reealling mental emotions. We take a very
limited view, indeed, of this great subject, if we confine
education entirely or chiefly to the acquisition of know-
ledge, or even to the culture of the intellectual powers.
That system is deficient in its most essential part which
does not carry on along with these a careful and habitual
culture and regulation of the passions and emotions of the
young ; their attachments and antipathies, their hopes and
fears, their joys and sorrows ; the cultivation of the social
and benevolent afiections ; the habit of repressing selfish-
ness, and bearing inconveniences and disappointments with-
out mur;nuring ; a disposition to candor and ingenuousness,
and a sacred regard to truth. Their future character as
social and moral beings will be greatly influenced by the
fnanner in wliich they are taught from an early period to
regulate their emotions, by directing them to adequate and
worthy objects, and controlling them by the great princi-
ples of wisdom and virtue. In this important process the
principle of association exerts a most extensive influence.
The stern lessons of morality, and even the sublime truths
of religion, may be rigidly in^.pressed upon the minds of the
young, and may, in after-life, recur from, time to time, as a
mere matter of remembrance ; but many must have experi-
enced how different is the impression when they recur in
close association vv^ith a father's affection and a mother's
tenderness, — with the lively recollection of a home, where
the kindest sympathies of the human heart shed around the
domestic circle all that is lovely in life, while a mild and
consistent piety habitually pointed the way to a life which
is to come.

Influence of association in resfard to the moral feelings? Essential oljjects to be m
CTsr^id ?* What princ4iP.e most effect^^al in secui'-iag theva ? Ex&mple,

108 MEMORY. [part HI.

OF THF INFLUENCE OF DISEASE UPON ATTENTION AND

MEMORY.

The preceding imperfect outline of the subject of memo-
ry naturally leads us briefly to investigate the manner in
which this function is impaired in connection v/ith bodily
disease. This takes place chiefly from injuries of the head,
affections of the brain, fever, and diseases of extreme debi-
lity. Similar effects arise from intemperance and other
habits of dissipation. Our present purpose, however, is, not
to investigate the peculiar effects of these various causes,
but to endeavor to trace the manner in which attention and
mem.ory — and we may include perception — are affected by
any or all of them.

The first mental function w^hich is impaired by bodily
. disease, is usually the power of attention ; this we see illus-
/ trated in all febrile affections. The patient, in the early
'■ or milder stages, is incapable of fixing his mind upon any
thing that requires much attention, of following out an ar-
jTLiment, or of transacting" business v/hich calls for much
thouo^ht or consideration. He is acute and intellis^ent as to
all common occurrences, and shows no want of recollec-
tion or of the power of reasoning when his attention is ex-
cited; but he feels it an exertion that is painful to him. In
a higher degree of this condition, he is still intelligent as to
what is said or done at the time, or in recognising persons ;
but in a short time forgets every thing in regard to the per-
son or the occurrence. He is incapable of that degree of
attention which is necessary for memory, though the pow-
ers of perception are entire. In the next stage he becomes
incapable of receiving the full impression from external
things ; and, in consequence of this, he mistakes the objects
of his own thoughts for realities. This is delirium, and
there are various degrees of it. In some cases the attcn
tion of the patient can be roused for a time, and directed to

Wliit bodily afTcclions influence the memory? Object of Ibis discnssion ? Wbal
function Hrsl iiniKiircd ? P^ir«t stage, etfccta what? Second stage ? Third stage ? Its
name ?

SEC. I.] INFLUENCE OF DISEASK. 109

the true relations of external things, though he relapses in-
to his delirious impressions when he is left undisturbed : in
others, the false impression is constant, and cannot be cor-
rected by any effort which is made to direct the attention ;
and in a third modification of this remarkable condition, he
mixes up his hallucinations with external im.pressions in a
most singular manner. He is still capable, however, of
describing his impressions, — that is, of talking so as to be
understood^ though what he speaks of relates only to his er-
roneous conceptions, or mere bodily feelings. In the next
stage he either does not attempt to express himself at all, or
is entirely unintelligible. He is now cut off from commu-
nication with external thinofs and v/ith other sentient beinofs :
and the highest degree of this is what we call coma, or stu-
por, which resembles profound sleep.

This description refers chiefly to the gradations in the
state of the mental functions which we observe in continued
fever. It is particularly interesting to trace them in this
disease, because we see the various grades passing into one
another, and thus showing in a connected series the lead-
ing peculiarities Vv^hich, in other affections, we have to con-
template separately. These peculiarities may be chiefly
referred to the folio wins: heads.

It Avill be observed that these heads are substantially a repetition
and more full examination of ihose in the preceding paragraphs. The
pupils will be very much assisted in understanding and remembering
them, by calling to mind cases Avhich have occurred within their ovm
observation, and arranging them under their respective heads.

I. A state in which the attention cannot be steadily di-
rected to a long and connected train of thought, or to any
thing requiring a continued effort of mind. This takes
place, as already stated, in the earlier stages of all febrile
diseases. It likewise occurs in connection with the debility
which succeeds acute diseases, in persons broken down by
intemperance, and in the first approaches of old age. It is
also often observed in a remarkable degree in connection
with a disordered state of the stomach.

II. A state in which the impression made by external

Tliree modifications of this stage? Fourth stage? Its name?^ In what disease
most coiimonly observed. First state ? In what disease does il occur 7 Seco*;/"
state ?

10

110 MEMORY. [part in

things is not sufficient to produce remembrance, though
there appears to be, at the time, a perfect perception. A
person so affected understands what is said to him, and an-
swers correctly, but very soon forgets what has passed; he
know^s a friend, and is happy to see him, but in a short time
forgets the occurrence. This is met with in a more ad
vanced state of febrile diseases, in the higher deo^rees of the
condition wdiich resuhs from habitual intemperance, and in
the more advanced periods of age. It also occurs in dis-
eases of the brain, and in cases of injuries of the head. A
lady whom I attended some time ago, on account of an in
jury produced by a fail from a horse, lay, for the first week,
in a state of perfect stupor; she then gradually revived, so
as to be sensible to external impressions, and after somf
time to recognise her friends. But afterward, whe'i she
was entirely recovered, she had no recollection of this peri-
od of her convalescence, or of having seen various friends
v/ho then visited her, though, at the time, she recognised
them, conversed with them sensibly, and v/as very happy to
see them.

III. The third condition is that in which external impres-
sions are either not perceived at all, or are perceived in a
manner v.diich cannot convey any distinct notion of their
relations to the mind. On this account the conceptions or
trains of ideas existing in the mind itself are believed to be
realities. This remarkable condition belongs properly to
another part of our subject. It occurs in various forms of
delirium, and constitutes the peculiar characters of insanity
and dreaming. The ideas or conceptions which occupy
the mind in this condition are various. They may be trains
of thought excited by some passing event or some bodily
sensation; and frequently the patient repeats something
which is said in his licaring, and then branches off into
some other train to which that has orivcn rise. In other cases
the impression is one which has been brought up by some
old associations, even relMting to things which the person
when in licalth had not recollected. Of this kind there
are various remarkable examples on record, especially in

Describe iho cflfecU. DibCOcCo in which it occurs 7 Case described. Third sla^fc—
what ? Describe its eflecia

SEC. I.] INFLUENCE OF DISEA.SE. Ill

regard to the memory of languages. A man, mentioned by
Mr. Abernethy, had been born in France, but had spent the
greater part of his life in England, and for many years had
entirely lost the habit of speaking French. But when un-
der the care of Mr. Abernethy, on account of the effects of
an injury of the head, he always spoke French. A similar
case occurred in St. Thomas' hospital, of a man w^ho was
in a state of stupor in consequence of an injury of the head.
On his partial recovery, he spoke a language which nobody
in the hospital understood, but which was soon ascertained
to be Welsh. It was then discovered that he had been thir-
ty years absent from Wales, and, before the accident, had
entirely forgotten his native language. On his perfect re-
covery, he completely forgot his Welsh again, and recover-
ed the English language. A lady, mentioned by Dr. Pri-
chard, when in a state of delirium spoke a language which
nobody about her understood ; but which also was disco-
vered to be Welsh. None of her friends could form any
conception of the manner in which she had become acquaint-
ed with that language ; but after much inquiry it was dis-
covered, that in her childhood she had a nurse, a native of
a district on the coast of Brittany, the dialect of which is
closely analogous to the Welsh. The lady had at that time
learned a good deal of this dialect, but had entirely forgot-
ten it for many years before this attack of fever. The case
lias also been communicated to me of a lady who vv^as a na-
tive of Germany, but married to an English gentleman, and
for a considerable time accustomed to speak the English lan-
guage. During an illness, of the nature of wdiich I am not
informed, she always spoke German, and could not make
herself understood by her English attendants, except when
her husband acted as interpreter. A woman who was a
native of the Highlands, but accustomed to speak English,
was under the care of Dr. Macintosh of Edinburgh, on ac-
count of an attack of apoplexy. She was so far recover-
ed as to look around her with an appearance of intelli-
gence, but the doctor could not make her comprehend any
thing he said to her, or answer the most simple question.

Case described by IVIr. Abernethy ? The patient at St. Thonias' hospital. Tha
lady mentioned by Dr. Prichard. Explanation of it? The German lady. Dr. Mac -
Vitosh'a patient.

112 MoiaKT. [fart m.

He then desired one of her friends to address her in Gaelic,
when &he immediately ansv/ered with readiness and fluen-
cy. An Italian gentleman, mentioned by Dr. Rush, who
died of the yellow fever in New York, in the beginning of
his illness spoke English, in the middle of it French, but on
the day of his death he spoke only Italian. A Lutheran
clergyman of Pliiladelphia informed Dr. Rush that Germans
and Swedes, of whom he had a considerable number in his
congregation, when near death always prayed in their na-
tive languages, though some of them he was confident ha.d
not spoken these languages for fifty or sixty years.

A case has been related to me of a boy, v/ho at the age
of four received a fracture of the skull, for which he under-
went the operation of trepan. He v/as at the time in a state
of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recol-
lection either of the accident or the operation. At the age
of fifteen, during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mo-
ther a correct description of the operation, and the persons
who were present at it, w4th their dress, and other minute
particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it
before, and no means were kno\\ii by which he could have
acquired the circumstances which he mentioned. An emi-
nent medical friend informs me, that during fever, without
any delirium, he on one occasion repeated long passages
from Homer, which he could not do when m health ; and
another friend has mentioned to me, that in a similar situa-
tion there were represented to his mind, in a most vivid
manner, the circumstances of a journey in the Highlands,
which he had performed long before, including many minute
particulars v/hich he had entirely forgotten.

In regard to the memory of languages as influenced by
these affections of the brain, a condition occurs, the reverse
of that now mentioned, and presenting some singular phe-
nomena : the cause of the difference is entirely beyond our
researches. The late Dr. Gregory was accustomed to men-
tion in his lectures the case of a clergyman, who, while la-
boring under a disease of the brain, spoke nothing but He-
brew, which was ascertained to be the last language that he
had acquired. An English lady, mentioned by Dr. Pri-

Other examples. Case of the boy 7 Things which he remembered ? Peculiar pbe
nomena connected with lUe memory of languages ?

iEC. I.J INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 113

chard, in recorering from an apoplectic ^attack, always
spoke to her attendants in French, and had actually lost the
k:nowledge of the English language : this continued about
I month.

IV. The fourth condition is the state of stupor, or co-
ma, in which the mind is entirely cut off from intercourse
with the external world. This occurs in the worst states
of fever, in various diseases of the brain and injuries of the
head ; and the same condition takes place, from a very dif-
ferent cause, in the state of fainting. In such cases there
is seldom any recollection of mental impressions ; yet there
are facts v/hich tend to show, that the patient is not in such
a state of total insensibility to external things as his appear-
ance v/ould indicate. A gentleman whom I attended in a
state of perfect apoplexy, from which he did not recover,
was frequently observed to adjust his nightcap with the ut-
most care, vv^ien it got into an uncomfortable state ; first
pulling it down over his eyes, and then turning up the front
of it in the most exact manner. Another, vv'hom I saw
lately in a state of profound apoplexy, but from which he
recovered, had a perfect recollection of what took place
during the attack, and mentioned many things which had
been said in his hearing when he was supposed to be in a state
of perfect unconsciousness. A lady, on recovering from a
similar state, said she had been asleep and dreaming, and
mentioned v/hat she had dreamed about. Facts are want-
ing on this curious subject ; but there can be little doubt,
that many of the stories related of things seen by persons in
a state of trance are referable to this head, and that their
visions consisted of the conceptions of the mxind itself, be-
lieved for the time to be real, in a manner analosfous to
dreaming. That such impressions should not be more fre-
quently remembered in the ordinary cases of stupor, proba-
bly arises from the higher degree and greater permanency
of the affection than that which occurs in sleep. For we
have reason to believe that dreams which are remembered
occur only in imperfect sleep, and that in very profound

Fourth state — what ? It occurs when ? The phenoinena it exhibits ? Is the patient
lota'.ly iasensible ? Facts in proof. Trances ; supposed explanation of them ? These
impressions not always remembered, and why ?

10#

114 MEMORY. [part III

sleep we do not remember any mental impressions, though
we have satisfactory proof that they exist. Thus, a per-
son will talk in his sleep so as to be distinctly understood by
another, but without having the least recollection of the
mental impression which led to what he said.

In the preceding observations we have referred chiefly
to the temporary influence of disease^ in impairing or sus-
pending the powers of attention and memory. But there
is a part of the subject quite distinct from this, namely, the
eflect of certain diseases in obliterating impressions former-
ly received and long retained. The higher degrees of this
condition amount to that state which we call idiotism, and
this we find supervening both upon affections of the brain
and protracted febrile diseases. The condition so pro-
duced is sometimes permanent, but frequently is recovered
from ; and recovery takes place in some cases gradually,
in others very suddenly. A man, mentioned by Willis, on
recovering from a putrid fever, was found to have so en-
tirely lost his mental faculties, that he knew nobody, re-
membered nothing, and understood nothing: " vix supra
brutum saperet." He continued in this state for two
months, and then gradually recovered. Some years ago I
attended a young man, who, on recovering from a tedious
fever, was found to be in a state bordering upon idiotism ;
and this continued, even after his bodily health was entirely
restored. In this state he was taken to the country, where
he gradually recovered, after several months. A gentle-
man, mentioned by Wepfer, on coming out of an apoplec-
tic attack, was found to know nobody, and remember no-
thing. After several weeks he began to know his friends, to
remember words, to repeat the Lord's Prayer, and to read
a few words of Latin, rather than German, which was his
own language. When urged to read more than a few
words at a time, he said that he formerly understood thest
things, but now did not. After some time he began to pay
more attention to what was passing around him ; but, while
thus making slight and gradual progress, he was, after a
few months, suddenly cut off' by an attack of apoplexy.

These observations refer to what? Another effect of disease ? Its nanie ? Case
mentioned. Point illustrated by all ?

SEC. 1. 1 INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 115

The sudden recoveries from this condition^ of the mental
powers, are still more remarkable. Dr. Prichard, on the
authority of the late Dr. Rush of Philadelphia, mentions an
American student, a person of considerable attainments,
who, on recovering from a fever, was found to have lost all
his acquired knowledge. When his health was restored,
he began to apply to the Latin grammar, had passed through
the elementary parts and was beginning to construe, when,
one day, in making a strong effort to recollect a part of his
lesson, the whole of his lost impressions suddenly returned
to his mind, and he found himself at once in possession ol
all his former acquirements.

In slighter injuries of the head, accompanied by loss ot
recollection, we observe the circumstances gradually re-
called in a very singular manner. Some years ago I saw a
boy who had fallen from a wall, and struck his head against
a stone which lay at the foot of it. He was carried home
in a state of insensibility, from ^vhich he soon recovered,
but without any recollection of the accident. He felt that
his head Vv^as hurt, but he had no idea how he had received
the iajury. After a short time he recollected that he had
struck his head against a stone, but had no recollection how
he had come to do so. After another interval, he recollect-
ed that he had been on the top of a wail, and had fallen from
it and struck against the stone, but could not remember
where the wall was. After some time longer, he recovered
the recollection of all the circumstances. Dr. Prichard
mentions a gentleman who suffered a severe injury by a fall
from his horse, and who, on his recovery, had no recollec-
tion of any thing relating to the accident, or for some time
before it. A considerable time elapsed before his recollec-
tion of it began to return, and it was only as he repeatedly
rode over the country where the accident had happened, that
the sight of the various objects gradually recalled the cir-
cumstances of the journey in which it occurred, and of tho
accident itself.

A still more remarkable phenomenon connected with
cases of this kind, occurs in some instances in which there
is perfect intelligence in regard to recent circumstances, but

Sti]^ more remarkable examples ? The American student. Story of the boy. Nar
r.ite all the circjmstanceg.

116 MEMORY. [P.^RT HI

an obliteration of former impressions. Of this I have re*
ceived the following striking example from an eminent me-
dical friend. A respectable surgeon was thrown from his
horse while riding in the country, and was carried into an
adjoining house in a state of insensibility. From this he
very soon recovered, described the accident distinctly, and
gave minute directions in regard to his own treatment. In
particular, he requested that he might be immediately bled ;
the bleeding was repeated, at his own desire, after two
hours ; and he conversed correctly regarding his feelings
and the state of his pulse with the medical man who visited
him. In the evening he was so much recovered as to be
able to be removed to his own house, and a medical friend
accompanied him in the carriage. As they drew near
home, the latter made some observation respecting precau-
tions calculated to prevent unnecessary alarm to the wife
and family of the patient, when, to his astonishment, he
discovered that his friend had lost all idea of having either a
wife or children. This condition continued during the fol-
lowing day, and it w^as only on the third day, and after
further bleeding, that the circumstances of his past life be-
gan to recur to his mind. On the other hand, remarkable
instances occur of the permanency of impressions made
upon the mind previously to such injuries, though the men-
tal faculties are entirely obscured as to all subsequent im-
pressions. An affecting example is mentioned by Dr. Co-
nolly : — a young clergyman, when on the point of being
married, suffered an injury of the head, by which his under-
standing was entirely and permanently deranged. He lived
in this condition till the age of eighty; and to the last
talked of nothing but his approaching wedding, and ex-
pressed impatience for the arrival of the happy day.

It is chiefly in connection with attacks of an apoplectic
nature that we meet with singular examples of loss of me-
mory on particular topics, or extending only to a particular
period. One of the most common is loss of the memory of
words, or of names, while the patient retains a correct idea
of things and persons. The kite Dr. Gregory used to men-
tion a lady who, after an apoplectic attack, recovered cor-

Case of Ihe surgeon. Narralo tlio circumstances. Tim clergyman. What disease
c'caeicna most numerous examples ? Case of ihe i:uly who forgot names?

SEC. l.J INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. ^ 117

rectly her ideas of things, but could not nanne theni. Ir
giving directions respecting family matters, She was quite
distinct as to what she wished to be done, but could make
herself understood only by going through the house, and
pointing to the various articles. A gentleman whom I
attended some years ago, after recovering from an apoplec-
tic attack, knew his friends perfectly, but could not name
them. Walking one day in the street, he met a gentleman
to whom he was very anxious to communicate something
respecting a mutual friend. After various ineffectual at-
tempts to make him understand whom he meant, he at last
seized him by the arm and dragged him through several
streets to the house of the gentleman of whom he was
speaking, and pointed to the name-plate on the door.

A singular modification of this condition has been related
to me. The gentleman to whom it referred could not be^
made to understand the name of an object if it was spoken
to him, but understood it perfectly when it was written.
His mental faculties were so entire, that he was engaged
in most extensive agricultural concerns, and he managed
them with perfect correctness, by means of a remarkable
contrivance. He kept before him, in the room where he
transacted business, a list of the words which were most apt
to occur in his intercourse with his workmen. When one
of these wished to communicate with him on any subject,
he first heard what the workman had to say, but without
understanding him further than simply to catch the words.
He then turned to the words in his written list, and when-
ever they met his eye he understood them perfectly. These
particulars I had from his son, a gentleman of high intelli-
gence. Another frequent modification consists in putting
one name for another, but always using the words in the
same sense. An example of this also occurred in the gen-
tleman last mentioned. He uniformly called his snuff-box
a hogshead, and the association which led to this appeared
to be obvious. In the early part of his life he had been in
Virginia, and connected with the trade in tobacco ; so that
the transition from snuff to tobacco, and from tobacco to a
hogshead, seemed to be natural. Another gentleman afiect-

Case of recollecting writing, but not words. The patient's mode of understanding hia
workmen ? Mistaking names.

118 MEMORY. [part III.

ed in this manner, when he wanted coals put upon his iire,
alw^ays called for paper, and v/hen he wanted paper, called
for coals : and these words he always used in the same
manner. In other cases, the patient seems to invent names,
using words which to a stranger are quite unintelligible ;
but he always uses them in the same sense, and his imme-
diate attendants come to understand what he means by
them.

Another remarkable modification of this condition of the
mental powers is found in those cases in which there is loss
of the recollection of a particular period. A clergyman,
mentioned by Dr. Beattie, on recovering from an apoplectic
attack, was found to have lost the recollection of exactly
four years ; every thing that occurred before that period
he remembered perfectly. He gradually recovered, j;artly
by a spontaneous revival of his memory, and partly by
acquiring a knowledge of the leading events of the period.
A young lady w^ho w^as present at a late catastrophe in
Scotland, in which many people lost their lives by the fall
of the gallery of a church, escaped without any injury, but
with the complete loss of the recollection of any of the
circumstances ; and this extended, not only to the accident,
but to every thing that had occurred to her for a certain
time before going to church. A lady whom I attended
some years ago in a protracted illness, in which her memo-
ry became much impaired, lost the recollection of a period
of about ten or twelve years, but spoke with perfect consis-
tency of things as they stood before that time.

As far as I have been able to trace it, the principle in
such cases seems to be, that when the memory is impaired
to a certain degree, the loss of it extends backvv^ards to
some event or some period by which a particularly deep
impression had been made upon the mind. In the lady last
mentioned, for instance, the period of which she lost the
recollection was that during which she had resided in Edin-
burgh, and it extended back to her removal from anothei
city in which she had lived for many years. During her
residence in the latter, she had become the mother of a
large family, and other events had occurred likely to make

Loss of recollection of a particular period. What example? General principle ia
regard to such cases ? Proposed explanation.

SEC. l.J L\FLUE.\'CE OF DISEASE. 110

a deep impression on her mind. The period of her resi-
dence in Edinburgh had been uniform and tranquil, and
without any occurrence calculated to excite much attention
in a person of rather slender mental endowments. I do
not know whether we can give a similar explanation of
cases in which the loss of memory has extended only to
particular subjects ; namely, by supposing that these sub-
jects had been more slightly impressed upon the mind than
those v/hich were retained. A gentleman is mentioned by
Dr. Beattie, who, after i blow on the head, lost his know-
ledge of Greek, and did not appear to have lost any thing
else.

While we thus review the manner in which the manifes-
tations of mind are affected, in certain cases, by diseases
and injuries of the brain, it is necessary that we should re-
fer briefly to the remarkable instances in which the brain
has been extensively diseased without the phenomena of
mind being imxpaired in any sensible degree. This holds
true both in regEird to the destruction of each individual
part of the brain, and likewise to the extent to which the
cerebral mass may be diseased or destroyed. In another
work I have mentioned various cases which illustrate tliis
fact in a very striking m.anner ; particularly the case of a
lady in whom one-half of the brain was reduced to a mass
of disease ; but who retained all her faculties to the last,
except that there was an imperfection of vision, — and had
been enjoying herself at a convivial party in the house of a
friend a few hours before her death. A man, mentioned
by Dr. Ferriar, who died of an affection of the brain, re-
tained all his faculties entire till the very mom.ent of death,
which was sudden : on examining his head, the whole ri2:ht
hemisphere, — that is, one-half of his brain,— was found
destroyed by suppuration. In a similar case recorded by
Diemerbroek, half a pound of matter was found in the
brain ; and in one by Dr. Heberden, there was half a
pound of water. A man, mentioned by Mr. O'Halloran,
suffered such an injury of the head that a large portion of

Applicability of it to other cases? Is disease of the brain always attended by
disorder of the mind ? Case of the lady. Did she enjoy all lier facullios 1 Case
mentioned by Dr. Ferriar. The^-'C cases siniilarj in what respect? Freiinency of
Buch cases ?

120 MEMORY. [part III.

the bone was removed on the ris^ht side ; and extensive
suppuration having taken place, there was discharged at
each dressing, through the opening, an immense quantity
of matter mixed with large masses of the substance of the
brain. This went on for seventeen days, and it appears
that nearly one-half of the brain was thrown out mixed
with the matter; yet the man retained all his intellectual
faculties to the very moment of dissolution; and through
the whole course of the disease, his mind maintained uni-
form tranquillity. These remarkable histories might be
greatly multiplied if it were required, but at present it seems
only necessary to add the very interesting case related by
Mr. Marshall. It is that of a man who died with a pound
of v^ater in his brain, after having been long in a state of
idiocy, but who, a very short time before death, became
perfectly rational.

The facts which have been thus briefly referred to, pre-
sent a series of phenomena of the most remarkable kind,
but on which we cannot speculate in the smallest degree
without advancing beyond the sphere of our limited faculties;
one thing, however, is certain, that they give no counte-
nance to the doctrine of materialism,- which some have pre-
sumptuously deduced from a very partial view of the influ-
ence of cerebral disease upon the manifestations of mind.
They show us, indeed, in a very striking manner, the mind
holdin<T intercourse with the external world throucrh the
medium of the brain and nervous system ; and, b}^ certain
diseases of these organs, they show this intercourse impair-
ed or suspended ; but they show nothing more. In particu-
lar, they warrant nothing in any degree analogous to those
partial deductions which form the basis of materialism. On
the contrary, they show us the brain injured and diseased
to an extraordinary extent, without the mental functions
being nfl^ected in any sensible degree. They show us, fur-
ther, the manifestations of mind obscured for a time, and
yet reviving in all tlieir original vigor, almost at the very
niomcnt of dissolution. Finally, the}'' exhibit to us the
mind, cut off from all intercourse with the external world,

Pauqcr of speculating on Uie^e facts. Certain irfcreiKc from thcin — what ? 'Jhcy
ehovv U3 what i Summary of the facts stated in this section.

SEC. II.] ABSTRACTION. 121

recalling its old impressions, ev^en of things long forgotten;
and exercising its powers on those which had long ceased
to exist, in a manner totally irreconcilable with any idea we
ean form of a material function.

SECTION II.

ABSTRACTION.

By Abstraction we separate various facts from each
other, and examine them individually. We separate, for
example, the qualities of a substance, and contemplate one
of them apart from the rest. This act of the mind is em-
ployed in two processes of the utmost importance. By the
one, we examine a variety of objects, select the properties
in which certain numbers of them agree, and thus arrange
them into classes, genera, and species. By the other, we
take a more comprehensive view of an extensive collection
of facts, and select one which is common to the whole.
This we call generalizing, or deducing a general fact or
general principle ; and the process is of extensive applica-
tion in all philosophical inquiries. The particular points to
be attended to in conductinof it, will come under view in
another part of our subject. The most important is, that
the fact assumed as o;eneral really belonD;s to all the indi-
vidual instances, and has not been deduced from the exami-
nation of only a part of them.

The process of classification is of so great practical miportance,
ihat it deserves to be carefully considered. To show how the dtjfini-
fion given above applies, let us take a particular case.

A person has made, we will imagine, a large collection of sea-
shells, v/hich lie promiscuously on tables before him.. He proposes to
classify them. This, according to the deilnition, consists '' in c:ca??iinuig
them jvith reference to selecting the properties in which certain navibers
of them agree, that they may be arranged in classes according to their
properties. '^

Let us suppose the property he first examines is color. He looks

Its definiiiotK Classification — what ? Generalizatioa — what ? Example illustrating
*ha"priicess of classification. Definition — what ? How applicable '}

11

122 ABSTRACTION. [fAKT III.

over the \vhole, and takes out all that are spotted, and places them by
themselves. He next takes ail -which are vrhite, and forms of them
another class, and so on, arranging them in classes, according as they
agree in the property of color. Or they might, in the same way, be
classiiied with reference to any other property, or, as the more com-
mon phrase is, on any other principle. Take, for example, form.
All those which are in two parts, as the oyster, the clam, «5cc., might
be arranged by themselves, in one class, and those which consist of a
single part, in another. These classes might be easih' subdivided on
the same principle, i. e., with reference to form alone. All the spiral
shells might form one division, the conical ones another, and those of
some different form still, a third. This would be classifying them on
the principle of form.

Now it must be observed that this classification would entirely
break up and destroy the other. For the spotted shells, which v.'ere
before arranged together, in one class, would now be scattered among
several, according to their various forms. In other words, they
agreed in the property of color, so that when considering them with
reference to color they were put together; but they disagree in respect
to form.

The pri'iciple of dassificatiou, which is thus adopted in the case of any
collection of indiAidaal objects, may be varied almost indefinitely.
The shells, for example, might be classified vdih reference to the habits
of the animals., i. e., all which lived in fresh water might form one di
vision, and salt water shells another. Each of these might be subdi-
vided with reference to the food or the habits of the animal.

Or the principle of classification might be gco graphical. Those
from Africa might be placed on one shelf, those from Asia on another,
and American specimens on a third. Thus the principle might be va-
ried indefinitely.

In determining on the principle of classification to be adopted in any
case, that is. the property or peculiarity in which those placed toge-
ther are to be similar, we must have regard to the object in view.
Sometimes it is necessary to classily the same individual objects in
several difitrent ways, for different purposes. Words, for example,
are classified in a common dictionan,^ -^^ith reference to similarity m
ihe initial letters — in a rhyming dictionary, the sound of the last syl-
lable determines their place — in a grammar and in a spelling book,
two other principles are ado}»tcd, entirely distinct from the preceding,
and each other. Thus the same things, that is, the words of the Eng-
Jish language, are classified on four entirely different principles, ac-
cording to the end in view.

In some cases it is very dilficult to determine what principle of
classification will best answer the purpose. A common case of this
kind is the question of arranging the books of a library. Shall they

First mode of clxssification ? Based upon what property ? Seco.nd mode ; on rt-h.it
property ? Sulxlivision on the same principle, how effected .' Relation of thf-se
inrxles to one aiio!li?r ? Extent to wliich the principle of classification may Ix; varietl »
Kxample^. Opograpliicaj arrangement J Varioiu cliasiticaliuas of vvurtls, why made <
A. 'ranging a library ; wliai dirnculty 7

SEC. II.J ABSTRACTION. 123

be classified according to the subjects of the ^vorks; or m the alplia-
betical o/der of their titles, or in the alphabetical order of the authors'
names, or according to the languages or countries in which they
were written. It is plain that a library may be arranged in perfect
order on each of these plans, though each is entirely different from
the rest, and altering the arrangement from one to the other vrould
perhaps change the place of every book in the whole collection. Each,
too, would have its ground of preference over the others, depending
on the object which the reader has in view in consulting the collec-
tion. The advantages of all are sometimes in a good degree secured
by arranging the books, on the shelves, on one principle, and making
out two or three catalogues, in which the other methods of classifica-
tion are respectively adopted.

A classification cannot, however, in any ca^e, be carried into full
effect, except in the exact sciences ; for, from the very nature of the
case, the several classes ^vi\\ run into each other, whatever may be
the principle adopted, and consequently there will be many individu-
al objects, of which it will be impossible to say unhesitatingly where
they belong. Some shells will be neither decidedly w^hite nor deci-
dedly spotted, but something between. A librarian may be perplex-
ed in considering whether to class Marshall's Life of Washington as
history or biography, and a Avriter on English grammar may, in the
same m^anner, hesitate vv^hether to call a certain word a pronoun or an
adjective, when it partakes of the nature of both. This difficulty
does not apply to the exact sciences. If a figure is either a triangle
or a quadrangle, it will be very clear which of the two it is. It can-
not be intermediate. It must have either three sides or four. In the
exact sciences, therefore, the classification may be exact, but in others
it cannot always be, and in doubtful cases we may arrange the object
in either of the classes which seem to claim it. There are often, in
such cases, very idle disputes, especially on the subject of grammar.
True philosophy, in such cases, requires us to consider either as right,
when the nature of the case leaves it doubtful.

These remarks, then, naturally lead us to the following practical
rules, which are worthy of very careful consideration, since there is
perhaps no process, a thorough understanding of which is more essen-
tial to a well disciplined mind than classification.

1. In determining upon a principle of classification, there should be
a careful regard to the object in view, in making the classificatioii
itself.

2. The classes should be bounded by as distinct and well defined
lines as the nature of the case will allow.

3. The classes should be such as to include all the individuals, i. e.,
so that every individual object shall belong to some one or other of
them.

Various modes. IIow may they be combined ? difficulty in carrying a classification
into full effect. Examples. Exact sciences. Example ? Inferences from these re-
marks ? Rules. To the boundaries.

124 ABSTRACTION. [PART III.

4. The classification, when completed, should be considered in its
true light, viz. as an artificial arrangement, resorted to meiely as a
matter of convenience, and therefore not a proper subject for angry
disputes. Questions arising from this source are substantially no
more nor less than this, — ^vhether a mineral in a cabinet shall be
placed on one shelf or another, v.hen it is admitted that it is doubtful
to which it belongs.

^' Generalizing is to be distinguished from classification, though the
mental process concerned is in both essentially the same. We class
together a certain number of substances by a property in which they
agree ; and, in doing so, we specify and enumerate the individual sub-
stances included in the class. Thus, we may take a number of sub-
stances differing widely in their external and mechanical properties,
some being solid, some fluid, and some gaseous, and say they are all
acids. The class being thus formed, and consisting of a defined
number of substances which agree in the property of acidity, we may
next investigate some other propert}^ which is common to all the indi-
viduals of the class, and belongs to no other, and say, for example,
that all acids redden vegetable blues. The former of these opera-
tions is properly classification ; the latter is generalizing in reference
to the class. In the former, we take or exclude individual substances,
according as they possess or not the property on which the classifi
cation rests ; in performing the latter, the property which is assumed
must belong to all the individuals without a single exception, or, if it
does not, it must be abandoned as a general fact or general princi
pie in reference to the class. In classifying, we may use every free*
dom regarding individuals in taking or excluding them. In gene*
ralizing, we must not exclude a single individual ; for the principle
which does not include every one of them, — that is, the proposed
fact which is not true of all the individuals, is not a general fact, and
consequently cannot be admitted as a general principle. For in
physical science, to talk of exceptions to a general rule, is only to
say, in other words, that the rule is not general, and, consequently,
is unworthy of confidence. If one acid were discovered which does
not redden vegetable blues, it would belong to a history of these sub-
stances to state that a certain number of them have this property; but
the property of reddening vegetable blues would require to be aban-
doned as a general fiict or general principle applicable to the class of
acids.

''A general law, or general principle, then, is nothing more than a
general fact, or a fact which is invariably true of all the individual
cases to which it professes to apply. Deducing such facts is the
great object of modern science ; and it is by this peculiar character
that it is distinguished from the ancient science of the schools, the
constant aim of which was to discover causes. The general law of

►— ' •

Proper view of the nature and object of classification ? risiinclion between general-
izing aiul clay.sificalion. Process in forming a class ? Process in deducing its proper-
ties ? Ditlerences resuliir.^ from this distinction 7 Exceptions to a general law ? 01?
jecls of modern science ? Uf ancient science ? PJxampIe.

SEC. II.] ABSTIIACTION. 125

gravitation, for example, is nothing more than the general fact, or
fact invariably true, that all bodies when left unsupported fall to the
ground. There were at one time certain apparent exceptions to the
universality of this law, namely, in some very light bodies, which
v\ere not observed to fall. But a little farther observation shoAved
that these are prevented from falling by being lighter than the atmos-
phere, and that in vacuo they observe the same law as the heaviest
bodies. The apparent exceptions being thus brought under the law,
it became general, namely, the fact universally true, that all unsup-
ported bodies fail to the ground. Now, of the cause of this pheno-
menon vv"e know nothing ; and what we call the general law, or gene-
ral principle of gravitation, is nothing more than a universal fact, or
a fact that is true without a single exception. But having ascertain-
ed the fact to be invariably and universally true, we assume it as a.
part of the established order of nature, and proceed upon it with as
much confidence as if we knew the mysterious agency on which the
phenomenon depends. The establishment of the fact as universal
brings us to that point in the inquiry which is the limit of our pow-
ers and capacities, and it is sufficient to the purposes of science. On
the same principle, it is familiar to every one that extensive discove-
ries have been made in regard to the properties and laws of heat j
but we do not know what heat is, whether a distinct essence, or, as
has been supposed by some philosophers, a peculiar motion of the mi-
nute atoms of bodies.

''In the same manner, the person who first observed iron attracted by
the magnet, observed a fact which was to him new and unaccounta-
ble. But the same phenomenon having been observed a certain num-
ber of times, a belief would arise that there existed between it and the
substances concerned a connection of cause and effect. The result
of this belief w^ould be, that when the substances were brought toge-
ther, the attraction would be expected to take place. Observations
would then probably be made with other substances ; and farther ob
servations with the same substances ] and it being found that the at-
traction took place between iron and the magnet only, and that be-
tween these it took place in every instance, the general principle would
be deduced, or the fact universally true in all instances, that the m.ag-
net attracts iron. The same observation applies to the other remarka-
ble property derived from the magnet, namely, pointing to the north.
The phenomenon received the name of magnetism, and the laws were
then investigated by which it was regulated ; but what v\'e call magnet-
ism is still nothing more than a mode of expressing the universal fact,
that the magnet attracts iron, and points to the north.

'' On what hidden influence these remarkable phenomena depend, we
are still as ignorant as the man v\'ho first observed them ; and, how-
ever interesting it would be to know it, the knowledge is not necessary
to the investigation of the laws of magnetism.

'' These may, perhaps, be considered as fair examples of the inductive
philosophy, as distinguished from the hypothetical systems of the era

Law of gravitation. Apparent excepiioiis. Another example ; nature and effects of
heat. The magnet. Process for ascertaining its general laws. In what respect aie
v:e still Ignorant in regard to it 1
11#

126 ABSTRACTION. [pART IIL

\^■hich preceded it. According to these, the constant aim of the in-
quirer vcas the explanation of phenomena ; and in the case before us
a theory would have been constructed calculated to account for the at-
traction by the fluxes and refluxes of some invisible fluid or ether,
which would have bee\i described with as much minuteness as if there
had been real ground for believing it to exist. Strikingly opposed to
all such speculations is the leading principle of the inductive philoso-
phy, that the last object of science is to ' ascertain the universality of
a fact.' " — Abercromhie on Medical Sciejice.

There have been disputes among writers on the science of
mincl, whether mind is to be considered as a distinct men-
tal operation, or is referable to judgment. But I have al-
ready stated that my object in this outline is to avoid all
such discussions, and to allude simplj^ to the actual processes
of the mind in a practical view. One thing at least is clear,
namely, that our abstractions must be corrected by reason,
the province of which is to judge whether the process is
performed correctly, and on sound principles. This, hov.'-
ever, is distinct from the primary act of the mind to which
I now apply the term abstraction, which is simply the pow-
er of contemplating one property of a substance apart from
its other properties. It thus disjoins things which by nature
are intimately united, and which cannot be separated in any
other manner. Reason does not appear to be immediate-
ly concerned in this, though it is most closely connected
with the purposes to which the process is afterward ap-
plied ; namely, classifying substances according to a cer-
tain agreement of properties, and fixing upon those whicli
are common to all the individuals of a numerous scries, in
the act of generalizing, or deducing a general fact or gene-
ral principle.

I have formerly alluded to a period in the science of
mind, when our ideas of external things were supposed to
be certain actual essences, separated from the substances
and conveyed to the thinking principle. In connection with
this theory there arose a controversy, whether, v/hen we
perform the mental act of generalizing, there exists in na-
ture any essence corresponding to a general idea ; or whe-
ther, in generalizing, we merely make use of an abstract

Method by which the subject of mag^nelism would probably have been treated \\\
former lime.s ? ni.si)utes on thi.'3 subject. The author avoid-s thorn, how ? Connection
of abstraction with reason. Distinction between ihein ? Former dispute on thia
Biibjecl ?

SEC. II.] ABSTRACTION. 127

term ; whether, for example, in using the word man^ we
only employ a term, or whether we have the power of form-
ing an idea of man in the abstract, without thinking of any
individual man ; and, in the same manner, whether we can
reason respecting a class of substances, without thinking of
any of the individuals composing it. Hence arose two
sects, whose disputes make a most remarkable figure in th^j
history of intellectual science, namely, the Nominalists and
Realists.

The controversies of these sects we now consider as little
more than a matter of historical curiosity ; but, for several
centuries, they divided the learned of Europe, and were
often carried on with an asperity amounting to actual perse»
cution. " The Nominalists," says Mosheim, " procured the
death of John Huss, who was a Realist ; and in their letter
to Lewis, king ol France, do not pretend to deny that he
fell a Adctim to the resentment of their sect. The Realises,
on the other hand, obtained, in the year 1479, the condem-
nation of John de Wesalia, who was attached to the party
of the Nominalists. These contending sects carried their
fury so far as to charge each other with the sin against the
Holy Ghost." " The dispute," says IMr. Stewart, " was
carried on with great warmth in the universities of France,
Germany, and England, more particularly in the tvro for-
mer countries, where the sovereigns Vv^ere led by some po-
litical views to interest themselves deepl}^ in the contest,
and even to employ the civil power in support of their fa-
vorite opinions. The emperor Lewis, of Bavaria, in return
for the assistance which in his disputes v/ith the pope Oc-
cam had given him by his writings, sided with the Nominal-
ists ; Lewis the Eleventh, of France, on the other hand,
attached himself to the Realists, and made their antagonists
the objects of a cruel persecution."

We find some difficulty in believing, in the present day,
that the controversy which thus embroiled the continent of
Europe in all the rancor of actual persecution, related to
the question, whether, in employing general terms, we use
words or names only, or whether there is in nature any

Example. Names of the sects — what? These controversies, how now considered ?
Their violence ? Results of il ? In what countries chiefly carried on? Conneclina
with politics. Real question at issue ?

128 ABSTRACTION. [PART I!L

thing corresponding to what we mean by a general idea. It
is well designated by Mr. Stewart as " one of the most curi-
ous events Avhich occur in the history of the human mind."
The question is one of no practical importance, and when
it is cleared from its connection with the ancient doctrine
of ideas, appears to be one of no difficulty. W'ithout sup-
posing that there is in nature any actual essence corre-
sponding to a general idea, the truth seems to be, that we
do form a certain notion or conception of a quality in which
several substances agree, distinct from any one substance
to which the quality belongs. Hence some have proposed
the term Notionalist, or Conceptualist, as designating opi-
nions distinct from those both of the Nominalist and Real-
ists. But, according to the principles of modern science,
Ave cannot consider the discussion as any thing more than
an ingenious arguing on points of no real importance. The
process which the mind really carries on in that mental 1
operation to which these remarks have referred, consists
simply in tracing relations or points of resemblance in
which certain individual things agree, though they may in
others be remarkably different. We then give a name to
this common quality, and thus form the individuals into a
class of which this quality is the distinguishing character.
Thus we may take a number of animals differing remarka-
bly from each other, and say they are all quadrupeds. We
may take a number of substances very dissimilar in their
external and mechanical properties, and say they are all
acids. Some of these substances are solid, some fluid, and
some gaseous ; but the property of acidity is common to
them all, and this accordingly becom.es the name and the
distinguishing character of the class into which we now
arrange, them.

Churaclar of the controversy 1 What is llie real process in sirh a case ? Examples

SEC. III. J IMAGINATION. 129

SECTIO]?^ III.

IMAGINATION.

In the exercise of Imagination, we take the component
elements of real scenes, events, or characters, and combine
them anew by a process of the mind itself, so as to form
compounds which have no existence in nature. A painter,
by this process, depicts a landscape combining the beauties
of various real landscapes, and excluding their defects. A
poet or a novelist, in the same manner, calls into being a
fictitious character, endowed with those qualities with which
it suits his purpose to invest him, places him in contact with
other beings equally imaginary, and arranges, according to
his will, the scenes in which he shall bear a part, and the
line of conduct Avhich he shall follow. The compound in
these cases is entirely fictitious and arbitrary ; but it is ex-
pected that the individual elements shall be such as actu-
ally occur in nature, and that the combination shall not
differ remarkably from what might really happen. When
this is not attended to, as in a picture or a novel, we speak
of the work being extravagant or out of nature. But,
avoiding combinations which are grossly at variance with
reality, the framer of such a compound may make it supe-
rior to any thing that actually occurs. A painter may draw
a combination of beauties in a landscape superior to any
thing that is actually known to exist ; and a novelist may
delineate a more perfect character than is met with in real
life. . It is remarked by Mr. Stewart, that Milton, in his
garden of Eden, " has created a landscape more perfect,
probably, in all its parts, than has ever been realized in
nature, and certainly very different from any thing that
this country exhibited at the time when he wrote." " It
is a curious remark of Mr. Walpole," he adds, " that Mil-
ton's Eden is free from the defects of the old English
garden, and is imagined on the same principles which

^

Nature of imagination? Examples, How much fictitious, and how much true?
Superiority of such creations. Examples. Stewart's remark ?

130 IMAGINATION. [PART III.

it was reserved for the present age to carry into exe-
cution."

The mode of artificial combination which resuhs from
the exercise of imagination is applicable chiefly to four
kinds of composition.

1. Fictitious narrative, in which the author delineates
imaginary scenes or transactions ; and paints imaginary
characters, endowing them wdth such qualities as may suit
the purpose which he has in view\

2. Composition or verbal address, directed to the pas-
sions, and intended to excite particular mental emotions.
To this head are referable many of the combinations of the
poet, and addresses calculated to operate upon the feelings
of a popular assembly; also, those w^hich derive their cha-
racter from the language of trope and metaphor. The ge-
nius of the orator, and the inventive powers of the poet, are
exhibited in the variety and the novelty of the analogies,
resemblances, illustrations, and figures, w^hich he thus brings
to bear upon his subject.

3. Those unexpected and peculiar associations w^hich
form the basis of wit and humor.

4. Combinations of objects of sense, calculated to pro-
duce mental emotions of a pleasurable or painful kind, as
our impressions of the sublime, the beautiful, the terrible, or
the ludicrous. The combinations of this class are chiefly
referable to the head of objects of taste, or the fine arts;
and are exemplified in the inventions of the painter and the
statuary, in decorative architecture and artificial gardening,
— w'e may add, theatrical exhibitions and music.

The facility of rapidly forming in these several depart-
ments combinations calculated to produce the effect w^iich
is intended, constitutes wdiat wx call inventive genius. Si-
milar powers of invention, founded on an exercise of ima-
gination, may also be applied to the investigations of sci-
ence. It may be employed, for example, in the contrivance
of experiments calculated to aid an investigation or to
illustrate a doctrine; and in the construction of those leui-
timate hypotheses wdiich have often led to the most impor-
tant discoveries.

Kinds of composition, how many and wliat "J First kind, what ? Second kind ? How
(lifTercnl from Ihfi first? Tliird kind? Fourth kind? Examples Invenlive genUia,
what? How applicable to science ?

SEC. III.] IMAGINATIOxN. 131

The union of elements, in all such productions of the
imagination, is regulated by the knowledge, the taste, and
the intellectual habits of the author; and, we mus^t add, by
his moral principles. According to the views, the habits,
and the principles of him who frames them, therefore, they
may either contribute to moral and intellectual improve-
ment, or they may tend to mislead the judgment, vitiate
the taste, and corrupt the moral feelings.

Similar observations apply to the conduct of the imagina-
tion in individuals, and its influence in the cultivation of mo-
ral and intellectual character. There is certainly no power
of the mind that requires miore cautious management and
stern control ; and the proper regulation of it cannot be too
strongly impressed upon the young. The sound and proper
exercise of it may be made to contribute to the cultivation
of all that is vijrtuous and estimable in human character. It
leads us, in particular, to place ourselves in the situation of
others, to enter into their feelings and wants, and to parti-
cipate in their distresses. It thus tends to the cultivation of
sy^mpathy and the benevolent affections; and promotes all
those feelings Avhich exert so extensive an influence in the
duties of friendship and the harm.onies of civil and social
intercourse. We may even say^ that we exercise imagina-
tion wdien w^e endeavor to act upon that high standard of
morals which requires us " to do to others as we would that
they should do unto us :" for in this mental act we must
imagine ourselves in the situation of other men, and, in their
character, judge of our own conduct towards them. Thus
a man deficient in imagination, though he m.ay be free from
any thing unjust or dishonorable, is apt to be cold, con-
tracted, and selfish, — regardless of the feelings and indiffer-
ent of the distresses of others. Further, we may be said
to exercise imagination when we carry our views beyond
present and sensible objects, and endeavor to feel the power
of " things which are not seen," and the reality of scenes
and times which are y^et to come. On the other hand,
imagination may be employed for calling into being evils
which have no existence, or for exaggerating those which.

The exercise of imagination, how reiriilated ? Effecf.s ? Importance of a proper
regu'.aiion of it? lis u.^eful effects? Moral effects of a deficiency of imagirialion ?
Perverted imasrination. Its effects?

132 IMAGINATION. [PART 111

are real ; for fostering inalevolent feelings, and for im-
puting to those with whom we are connected motives and
intentions which have no foundation in truth. Finally, an
ill-regulated imagination may be employed in occupying the
mind with waking dreams and vain delusions, to the exclu-
sion of all those high pursuits which ought to employ the
faculties of a rational being.

There has been considerable difference of opinion in re-
gard to the effects produced upon the mind by fictitious nar-
rative. Without entering minutely upon the merits of this
controversy, I think it may be contended, that two evils are
likely to arise from much indulgence in works of fiction.
The one is a tendency to give way to the wild play of the
imagination ; a practice most deleterious, both to the intel-
lectual and moral habits. The other is a disruption of the
harmony which ought to exist between the moral emotions
and the conduct, — a principle of extensive and im^portant
influence. In the healthy state of the moral feelings, for
example, the emotion of sympathy excited by a tale of sor-
row ought to be followed by some efforts for the relief of
the sufi'erer. When such relations in real life are listened
to from time to time without any such efforts, the emotion
gradually becomes weakened, and that moral condition is
produced which we call selfishness, or hardness of heart.
Fictitious tales of sorrow appear to have a similar tenden-
cy ; — the emotion is produced without tiie corresponding
conduct ; and Vv'hen this habit has been much indulo;ed the
result seems to be, that a cold and barren sentimentalism is
produced, instead of tiie habit of active benevolence. If
fictitious narratives be employed for depicting scenes of
vice, another evil of the greatest magnitude is likely to re-
sult from them, even though the conduct exhibited should
be shown to end in remorse and misery : for by the mere
familiarity with vice an injury is done to the youthful mind,
which is ill no degree compensated by the moral at the
close.

Imagination, therefore, is a mental power of extensive
influence, and capable of being turned to important purposes

Ficiilion;^ narrative. Two evils resulting from it? Example. What evils from
fictitious tales of sorrow ? From fictitious talcs of vice ? Inference from iheao

SEC. III.] IMAGINATION. 133

in the cultivation of individual character. But to be so, it
must be kept under the strict control both of jreason and of
virtue. If it be allowed to wander at discretion, through
scenes of imagined wealth, ambition, frivolity, or pleasure
it tends to withdraw the mind from the important pursuits
of life, to weaken the habit of attention, and to impair the
judgment. It tends, in a most material manner, to prevent
the due exercise of those nobler powers which are directed
to the cultivation both of science and virtue. The state of
a mind which has yielded itself to the influence of this de-
lusive habit cannot be more forcibly represented than in the
words of an eloquent writer : — " The influence of this habit
of dwellino^ on the beautiful fallacious forms of imao-ination
will accompany the mind into the most serious speculations,
or rather musings, on the real world, and what is to be done
in it, and expected ; as the image w^hich the eye acquires
from looking at any dazzling object still appears before it
wherever it turns. The vulgar materials that constitute
the actual economy of the world will rise up to its sight in
fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into plain reality,
nor will even suspect to be deceptive. It cannot go about
with sober, rational inspection, and ascertain the nature and
value of all things around it. Indeed, such a mind is not
disposed to examine with any careful minuteness the real
condition of things. It is content vv^ith ignorance, because
environed with something more delicious than such knovv-
ledge in the paradise which imagination creates. In that
paradise it walks delighted, till some imperious circum-
stance of real life call it thence, and gladly escapes thither
again when the avocation is past. There every thing is
beautiful and noble as could be desired to form the residence
of an angel. If a tenth part of the felicities that have been
enjoyed, the great actions that have been performed, the
beneficent institutions that have been established, and the
beautiful objects that have been seen in that happy region,
could have been imported into this terrestrial place, — Avhat
a delip-htful thinof it would have been to awake each morn-
ing to see such a world once more."^

• Foster's Essays.

feitate of mind induced by a perverted imagination ? Foster's description of ht
tffects ?

10

1. Aa>

134 REASON. [part UK

To the same purpose are the words of another writer of
the highest authority : — " To indulge the power of fiction,
and send imagination out upon the wing, is often the sport
of those who delight too much in silent speculation. He
w^io has nothing external that can divert him must find
pleasure in his own thoughts, and must conceive himself
what he is not, — for who is pleased with what he is ? He
then expatiates in boundless futurity, and culls from all ima-
ginable conditions that which for the present moment he
should most desire ; amuses his desires with impossible en-
joyments, and confers upon his pride unattainable dominion.
The mind dances from scene to scene, unites all pleasures
in all combinations, and riots in delights which nature and
fortune, with ail their bounty, cannot bestow. In time,
some particular train of ideas fixes the attention ; all other
intellectual gratifications are rejected ; the mind, in v\'eari-
ness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favorite conception,
and feasts on the luscious falsehood whenever she is offended
with the bitterness of truth. By deoress the reign of fancy
is confirmed ; she grows first im.perious, and in time des-
potic. Then fictions begin to operate as realities, false
opinions fasten upon the mind, and life passes in dreams of
rapture or of anguish.'"^

SECTION IV.

OF REASON OR JUDGMENT.

The most simple view which we can take of reason pro-
b.iLly is, that it is the exercise of mind by which we com-
pare facts with each other, and mental impressions with
external things. The applications of this mental process
may be referred to the following heads : —

I. We compare facts with each other, so as to trace their
relations, connections, and tendencies; and to distinguish

• Johnson's Rasselas.

Johnson'^ d06crii)li()n. Dcfiailion of ri:;i;>on 7 How i;uuiy general cipplicaliors ?

6EC. IV.] REASON. 135

the connections which are incidental from those which are
fixed and uniform.

What we call the relations of things, whether referring
to external events or mental processes, comprehend all those
facts which form the great objects of human knowledge,
with respect either to the individuals, or their tendencies
towards each other. They may be briefly enumerated in
the following manner : —

1. Kelations of character, — or those marks, characters,
or properties by which a substance may be recognised, and
may be distinguished from all others ; for example, the bo-
tanical characters of a plant — the chemical properties of a
mineral — the symptoms of a disease — sensible properties
of color, taste, smell, &c. — the mental endowments and
moral qualities of individual men.

2. Relations of resemblance and analogy, arising out of a
comparison of the qualities of various individual substances
or events. These admit of various degrees. When there is
a close agreement between two events or classes of events
it constitutes resemblance : when there are points of differ-
ence, it is analogy. In the latter case, we then trace the
degrees of analogy, depending upon the number of points in
which the resemblance holds and the number of points in
which there is a difference. On the relations of resemblance
also depend the arts of arrangement and classification ;
and the use of those general terms by which we learn to
express a great number of individual objects by a single
term, derived from certain characters in which they agrecj
such as solids, fluids, quadrupeds, &;c. We find a certain
number of substances which agree so much in their proper-
ties, that we class them together as one species. We then
find other substances, which agree with these in a certain
number of their properties, but differ in others. We dis-
miss the latter, and retain those only in which they all
agree, and so form the whole into a genus. The individuals
forming the genus are still found to agree in some of their
properties with various other substances, and by leaving out
of view those in which they differ, we again form this still
larger number into a class or order.

First ? What comprehended under the phrase relations of things 7 First class ?
Examples ? Second class ? Distinction between resemblance and analogy ? Arts de-
pending upon these relations ? Process of classification.

156 REASON. [part III.

3. Nearly connected with the former, but still more ex
tensive, is that important process by which, among a great
series of facts, we trace an accordance, and thus deduce from
the whole a general fact or general principle.

4. Eelations of composition ; comprehending the resolu-
tion of a substance into its elements or constituent parts, —
the connection of the parts as constituting a whole — of the
whole to the parts, and of the parts to each other.

5. Relations of causation, or the tendencies of bodies to
produce or be followed by certain actions upon each other
in certain circumstances. These refer chiefly to that uni-
form sequence of events from which we derive our idea of
the one beinor the cause of the other. But the class like-
w^ise includes other relations arising out of the same sub-
ject ; such as the relation of two events as the joint causes
of a common effect, or the joint effects of a common cause ;
or as forming links in a chain of sequences in which we
have still to look for other events as the true antecedents
or final results. It includes also that most important men-
tal process by which, from the properties of a known ef-
fect, we infer the powers and properties of an unknown
cause. /

6. Relations of degree and proportion, as in those truths
and relations which are the subjects of mathematics.

7. The important question of moral relations, which
does not properly belong to the present part of our inqui-
ry— including the relation of certain actions to the great
standard of moral rectitude, and to those principles which
bind men together in the harmonies of social and domestic
intercourse.

These appear to include the principal relations of things
which the mind requires to investigate in an intellectual
point of view. The facts respecting them arc acquired by
attention and memory ; but it is the province of reason to
separate from the mass so acquired those which are inci-
dental and temporary from those which arc uniform, — to
ascertain, for example, those characters by which a sub-
stance may be certainly recognised, — the symptoms by

Third class? Relations of composition ? Relations of causation ? What included 7
Relations of degree and proportion ? Moral relations ? Province of reason, as distin-
guished from that of attention and memory ?

SEC. IV.] REASON. 137

which a disease may be distinguished from other diseases
which resemble it, — and the actions which a substance may
be confidently expected to produce upon other substances in
particular circumstances. When the mental process re-
quired for doing so is performed in a legitimate manner, the
deduction constitutes truth, in regard to the particular point
Avhich is the immediate subject of it ; when the contrary, it
leads to fallacy or falsehood. Hence reason has sometimes
been defined that exercise of mind by which we distinguish
truth from falsehood.

II. Having by the preceding processes ascertained the
uniform tendencies of bodies to be followed by certain ac-
tions upon each other, we bring these tendencies into ope-
ration for the production of certain results. Hence reason
has been considered also to be that power by which we
combine means for accomplishing an end ; but this, per-
haps, may be regarded ratlier as the practical application
of the knowledge to which reason leads us, than as a pri-
mary part of the province of reason itself.

III. We compare mental impressions with external things,
so as to correct the impressions of the mind in regard to the
external world. Mental processes of the most important
kind are connected with this application of reason.

Reason or judgment, when duly exercised, conducts us
through these various mental operations, and guides us to-
v/ards the discovery of truth. It does so by enabling us to
compare facts with facts, and events with events ; to weigh
their relations, bearings, and tendencies ; and to assign to
each circumstance its proper weight and influence in the
conclusions which we are to deduce from them. The person
who does so we call a man of sound judgment, whose opi-
nions and conclusions we receive with confidence. On the
contrary, we receive with distrust and suspicion the con-
clusions of a man of an opposite character, who forms his
opinions and deductions hastily, — that is, from a limited
number of facts, or a hasty and imperfect examination of
their relations.

Truth and falsehood ? Second g-eneral application of reason ? Third general appli
cation ? General view of reason ?

12=^

138 REASON. [part III.

A distinction has sometimes been made between the term
reason, as used in the language of science, and as employed
in the common affairs of life ; but there seems to be no
real ground for the distinction.

Reason, in the language of intellectual science, appears
to be that process by which we judge correctly of the true
and uniform relations of facts, or events, and give to each
circumstance its due influence in the deductions. It is
chiefly opposed to imagination, in which the mind is al-
lowed to ramble through chains of events which are con-
nected by loose and casual associations, leading to no true
results. It is also distinguished from simple memory, in
Avhich facts or events are connected in the mind by certain
principles of association, without a full view of their rela-
tions. Thus, when we find a person remembering an ex-
tensive collection of facts, and forming certain combinations
among them, or deductions from them, without attending to
points of difference which tend to other deductions, we say,
his memory is better than his judgm.ent.

Reasoning, again, appears to be the continued exercise
of reason, when applied to the investigation of a particular
subject, or a certain series of facts or events, so as to trace
their relations or to establish a particular conclusion as de-
duced from such a series. This process, however, which
is commonly called the discursive faculty, is to be distin-
guished from the simple exercise of reason. It ought to be
guided by reason ; that is, by a full view of the real rela-
tions of the facts about which it is exercised ; but it is
often allowed to fix on a slight and partial view of them ;
or is applied ingeniously to discover relations of a particular
kind only. Thus, we speak of a man who reasons clo?cIy,
or Vv'ith a correct attention to the real relations of thinirs,
and the true weight of every fact in the investigation ; of
another who reasons loosely, or who is led away by casual
relations and partial views, afibrding no true deductions ;
and of a third, who reasons ingeniously and plausibly, but
not soundly, — that is, who argues on one side of a question,
and contemplates facts in particular relations only, or as

Dislinciion commonly made? Ground for it? Roason as opposed to imaginalion 1
To memory ? Ueasoniijg iu conlradidlinciiou from reason ? Kiiid;^ of reasonii'ig ?

SEC. IV.] REASON. 139

supporting particular opinions, neglecting those views of
them which tend to a different conclusion. This art of in-
genious reasoning or disputation, accordingly, we shall af«
terward have occasion to show, is not only to be distin-
guished from the sound exercise of reason or judgment, but
is often found directly opposed to it.

In the language of theology, reason is distinguished from
revelation ; and means that exercise of the mind by which
we deduce a certain knowledge of the Deity from the power
and wisdom displayed in the works of creation, apart from
any direct revelation of his character and will.

In the language of common life, the mental process
which we term reason or judgment appears to be the same,
though the facts on which it is exercised may be different.
A reasonable man is one who, both in the formation of his
opinions and the regulation of his conduct, gives the due
weight and influence to all the facts and considerations
which ought to influence his decision. A man of the op-
posite character is one who takes up his opinions upon
slight, partial, and inadequate grounds ; and then cannot,
or will not, admit the impression of facts or arguments
which are calculated to correct these unsound deductions ;
or who, in the regulation of his conduct, is led away by hasty
impressions, or feeble and inadequate motives, without giv-
ing due consideration to those which are calculated to lead
him into a different course. The former we call a reason-
able, considerate, thinking man ; the latter we say is an
unreasonable, inconsiderate man, who cannot or will not
think. It also very often happens that the latter, having
formed his conclusions, is obstinately tenacious of them ;
while the former is still open to the true and full impression
of any nev/ fact or argument that is proposed to him. So-
lomon has expressed in a very striking manner the leading
features of two such characters, namely, of the man who
takes up opinions with little examination, and then adheres
to them with inaccessible pertinacity ; and him who forms
them only after full and candid examination, and with a
ilear conception of the grounds on which they are formed : —

Disputation. Reason as distinguished from revelation 7 Reason comparad witli
udgment. Character of a reasonable man ? Tlie opposite character ? Tenacity
f^iih which the two characters hold their opinions ? Solomon's remark ?

l4C REASON. [tart III.

*• The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men
that caa render a reason."

The process of mind which we call reason or judgment,
therefore, seems to be essentially the same, whether it be
applied to the investigation of truth, or the affairs of com-
mon life. In both cases, it consists in comparing and weigh-
ing facts, considerations, and motives, and deducing from
them conclusions, both as principles of belief and rules of
conduct. In doing so, a man of sound judgment proceeds
with caution, and with a due consideration of all the facts
which he ought to take into the inquiry. Having formed
his conclusions, he is still open to the influence of new facts,
by v;hich they may be corrected or modified; but he is not
to be shaken in his confidence by trivial statements or frivo-
lous objections. Opposed to this there are two modifica-
tions of character which present an interesting subject for
observation. Both form their conclusions hastily, and with-
out due examination of the facts and considerations which
ought to influence them ; but their subsequent conduct is
widely different. The one is shaken in his conclusions by
every new fact that is presented to him, and every slight
objection that is brought against his inductions ; and the
consequence is, that his opinions and his principles of con-
duct are constantly changing. The other, having framed
his opinions, though on grounds the most inadequate, ad-
heres to them with inaccessible firmness ; and seems total-
ly proof against the force of any facts or arguments that
can be brought against them. The former is the more
hopeful character of the two, his error consisting in a
want of attention, rather than of judgment ; or in a ha-
l)it of framing his conclusions too hastily. By education
or attention on his own part, his habit may be corrected in
a greater or less degree ; but the latter appears to labor
under a radical defect of judgment, which makes him insen-
sible to the due force of the considerations and arguments
which influence other men. In the affairs of life, the for-
mer, after perhaps committing various indiscretions, ac-
quires wisdom from experience; that is, by having the fal-
lacy of his conclusions in many instances forced upon him.

Operation of sound judgment ? Characters opposed to this ? Fickleness and oosli
Qacy compared ? Which character most hopeful ? Wliy ?

SEC. IV. J REASON. 141

The latter remains unchanged; retaining the same confi-
dence in his own conclusions, and the same contempt for
every thing that can be opposed to them. 'This unfortu-
nate condition of mind, though it may have had its origin
in peculiarity of mental constitution or deficient education,
is fostered and increased by indulgence, and by a neglect of
cultivating the important habit of calm and candid investi-
gation. The man seems at last to become totally insensi-
ble to the motives and evidences which influence other men ;
and the more striking and convincing these are to others,
the more remarkable appears the condition of that mind
which does not feel or estimate their importance. This
state of mind is emphatically ascribed, in the sacred WTi-
tings, to the man who denies the existence of a great First
Cause : — " The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God."
By some process of mind, known to himself, he has arrived
at this conclusion ; and he is totally insensible to the mani-
fold evidence, which meets him wherever he turns his eye,
of its futility and folly. And surely, if there be in human
things an affecting representation of a mind lost to every
function of a healthy understanding, incapable of rising from
effects to causes, or of tracing the relations of things, — a
mind deserted by its rightful guardian, and left the unpro-
tected victim of every wild delusion that flutters by, — it is
to be found in him who, possessed of the senses of a living
man, can stand before the fair face of creation, and say in
his heart, " There is no God."

In every exercise of judgment, it is of essential impor-
tance that the mind shall be entirely unbiassed by any per-
sonal feeling or emotion which might restrain or influence
its decisions. Hence the difficulty we feel in deciding on
a subject in which we are deeply interested, especially if
our inclinations and the facts and motives presented by the
case be in any degree opposed to each other. Thus, we
speak of a man who allows his feelings to influence his judg-
ment ; and of another, of a cool head, who allows no feel-
ing to interfere with his decisions. Any particular emo-
tion, which has been deeply indulged and fostered, comes

Results of the latter character. Instance mentioned in the Bible ? Circumstance ear
eential to the exe cise of the judgment ? Sources of bias ?

142 REASON. VART m.

in this manner to influence the judgment in a most extraor-
dinary degree. It is tlius that a vitiated and depraved state
of the moral feelings at last misleads the judgment, in re^
gard to the great principles of moral rectitude ; and termi-
nates in a state of mind emphatically described in the sa-
cred writings, in which a man puts evil for good and good
for evil, and is left to the influence of strong delusion, so
that he " believes a lie." This remarkable condition of
the power of reasoning and judging we cannot refer to any
principle with which we are acquainted ; but we must re-
ceive it as a fact in the history of our moral constitution
which is not to be questioned. A poet has sung, that vice,
which at first is hated as an odious monster, is, when seen
too oft, endured, then pitied, then embraced : and he has
only added his evidence to a fact which has been received
upon the testimony of the philosopher and the moralist in
every age, and is acted upon as a fixed and uniform prin-
ciple of our nature by all classes of men.

Upon the grounds which have been briefly referred to
in the above observations, it will appear that the principles
on which a man should form his opinions are essentially the
same with those by whicli he ought to regulate his conduct.
If this conclusion be admitted, it will enable us to perceive
the fallacy of a dogma which has often been brought for-
ward with much confidence, — that a man is not responsible
for his belief. When taken abstractly, this is true ; but in
the practical application of it there is a great and danger-
ous fallacy. In the opinions which a man forms on any
particular subject, he is indeed influenced, not by his own
will, but by the facts or evidence by which the doctrines are
supported ; and, in this sense, a man may justly be said not
to be responsible for his belief But when we apply the
principle to practical purposes, and especially to those
truths of religious belief to which the dogma has been point-
ed, it may easily be seen to be as fallacious as it is danger-
ous. A man is undoubtedly responsible for the care with
which he has informed himself of the facts and evidences
by which his belief on these subjects ought to be influ-
enced ; and for the care and anxiety with which he gives to

Kesponsibiiiiy of a maa for his belief? Common dogma in regard lo ii ? lu vvhar
*yise irue ? la what sense not true ? Fur what is a man really respoasible?

SEC. IV.] REASON. 143

each of these facts and evidences its due weight in the mo-
mentous inquiry. He is further responsible jbr any deofree
of that vitiated and corrupted state of the moral feelings by
which his judgment nay have been biassed, so as to pre-
vent him from approac. ing the subject with the sincere de-
sire for truth of a pure md uncontaminated mind. If, in
this sense, we say that a man is not responsible for his be-
lief, we may quite as reasonably allege that he is not re-
sponsible for his conduct, because he chooses on some slight
and partial grounds to frame for himself principles of ac-
tion, without taking into consideration those fundamenta
rules of moral rectitude by which mankind in general are
expected to be influenced. We may as well contend that
the man is not responsible for his conduct who, by long fa-
miliarity with vice, has lost sight of its malignity, and has
come to approve and love that which he once contemplated
v/ith abhorrence.

It appears, then, that the exercise of reason is precisely
the same, and is guided by the same laws, whether it be ap-
plied to the investigation of truth ^r to the regulation of
conduct. The former is more particularly connected with
the further prosecution of our inquiry : but the leading prin-
ciples apply equally to the great questions of morals, and
the important subject of religious belief. In prosecuting
the subject as a branch of intellectuil science, it seems to
resolve itself into two parts : —

L The use of reason in the investigation of truth.

II. The use of reason in correcting the impressions of
the mind in reg^ard to external thinsfs.

Before proceeding to these branches of the subject, how-
ever, this may perhaps be the proper place for again stat-
ing, in a few words, that in the preceding observations my
object has been to confine myself to facts, respecting the
processes which the mind actually performs, without enter-
ing on the question how it performs them. On this sub-
ject we find great differences among philosophers, v>^hlch I
have alluded to only in an incidental manner. Some ap-

Consequences resulting from any other view. Reason as applied to opinions and to
conduct ? Grand divisions of Ihisj subject ; how many and what ?

c

144 KEASCX. [part III.

pear to have spoken in too unqualified terms respecting va-
rious and distinct faculties of the mind, and have enu-
merated a variety of these, corresponding to the various
mental operations. Dr. Brov\*n, on the other hand, has fol-
lowed a very different course, by referring all our mental
processes to the two principles of simple and relative sug-
gestion. According to this eloquent and ingenious waiter,
we have no direct voluntary power over the succession of
our thoughts j but these follow each other in consequence
of certain principles of suggestion, by which conceptions,
in certain circumstances, call up or suggest other concep
tions, which are in some manner related to them. We have
the power only of fixing the mind more intensely upon some
images of this series, when they arise, in consequence of
approving of them, as referring to some subject of thought
which is before us, Avhile v\"e disapprove of others of the se-
ries as less allied to it. The former become more fixed and
vivid in consequence of this approbation, while the latter
are allowed to sink back into oblivion. AVhat systematic
writers have called the faculty of coiiception is, according
to this system, the simple presence in the mind of one of
these suggested or recalled images. Memory is this sim-
ple suggestion combined with the impression of past time.
In imagination, again, which has been considered as a
voluntary power of forming conceptions or images into new
combinations by a peculiar mental process, Dr. Brown be-
lives that we have only the power of perceiving images as
they are brought up by established principles of suggestion,
approving of some which thus become fixed, and disapprov-
ing of others wliich thus pass away. In thus approving
or disapproving of the suggested images, we are guided
by a perception of their relation to any particular sub-
ject which is before us, and which we may desire to cul-
tivate or illustrate. According to this writer, therefore,
what is usually called conception is simple suggestion ;
memory is simple suggestion with a feeling of past time ;
imagination is simple suggestion combined with desire and
with a perception of relation, j The relative suggestion of
Dr. Brown, again, is that percjqotion of relations arising out

I)ifferencosamo!i2:phi!o3opherd? Dr. Bro\Tn'd view ? Hi^i view of conception ? Of
memory ? Of imajinaiion ?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 145

of the comparison of different facts or objects which we
have treated of under the more familiar name^of judgment ,*
and the mental process usually called abstraction he re-
solves simply into a perception of resemblances. \'arious
objections might be urged against this system ; and we may,
perhaps, be allowed to doubt whether by means of it any
thing has been gained to the science of mind. But the plan
which I proposed to myself in this outline does not lead me
into any consideration of it, or of those systems to w^hich it
is opposed. My object has been simply to inqmre 20 hat the
mind does, without entering on the question hoio it does so.
On this ground, the division which has been adopted of dis-
tinct mental operations, not distinct faculties, appears to be
that best calculated for practical utility.

§ I.

OF THE USE OF REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH.

In applying our reason to the investigation of truth in
any department of knowledge, we are, in the first place, to
keep in mind that there are certain intuitive articles of be-
lief which lie at the foundation of all reasoning. For, in
every process of reasoning, we proceed by founding one
step upon another which has gone before it ; and when we
trace such a process backwards, we must arrive at certain
truths which are recognised as fundamental, requiring no
proof and admitting of none. These are usually called
First Truths. They are not the result of any process of
reasoning, but force themselves with a conviction of infalli-
ble certainty upon every sound understanding, without re-
gard to its logical habits or powers of induction. The force
of them is accordingly felt in an equal degree by all classes
of men ; and they are acted upon with absolute confidence
m the daily transactions of life. This is a subject of great
and extensive importance. The truths or articles of

Remarks upon this system? The foundation of all reasoning? Name given to
Iheie truths? Their universal authority.

13

146 KEASON. [part IH

belief which are referable to it were briefly mentioned m
a former part of our inquiry ; they are chiefly the follow-
ing :—

I. A conviction of our own existence, as sentient and
thinking beings ; and of mind, as something distinct from
the functions of the body. From the first exercise of per-
ception we acquire a knowledge of two things ; namely,
the thing perceived, and the sentient being who perceives
it. In the same manner, from the exercise of any mental
o])eration, such as memory, we acquire an impression of the
thing remembered, of an essence or principle which remem-
bers it, and of this essence as something entirely distinct
from any function of the bod3^ This last conviction must
be considered as a first truth, or intuitive article of belief,
standing on the same ground vrith the other truths which
are referable to this class. It does not, as was formerly
stated, rest upon any metaphysical or physiological argu-
ment, but upon an appeal made to the conviction of every
man who attends to what is passing within. It resolves
itself into a consciousness of the various mental processes,
impressions, and emotions, as referable to one permanent
and unchanging essence, while the body is known to be in
a constant state of change ; and of these processes as being
exercised without any necessary dependence upon present
impressions from external things. Like other truths of
this class, it is, consequently, unaffected by sophisms which
are brought against it ; and the ansvv^er to these does not
properly consist in any process of reasoning, but in this ap-
peal to every man's absolute conviction, if brought into
comparison, indeed, the evidence which we have for the ex-
istence of mind is perhaps less liable to deception than that
which ^ve have for tlie existence of matter.

II. A confidence in the evidence of our senses in regard
to the existence and the properties of external things ; or a
conviction that they have a real existence independently of
our sensations. We have formerly referred to a celebrated
doctrine, by which it was maintained that the mind perceives

How many classes ? First? inluiiivc conviclion? Nature and foundation of our be-
lief of our own existence ? Proper answer to sophisms against it 7 Second convic-
tion?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 147

only its own ideas or impressions ; and that, consequently,
we derive from our senses no evidence of the existence of
external things. The only answer to such' a sophism is,
that a confidence in the evidence of our senses is a first
truth, or intuitive principle of belief, admitting of no other
proof than that which is derived from the universal con-
viction of mankind.

III. A confidence in our own mental processes ; that facts,
for example, which are suggested to us by our memory re-
ally occurred.

IV. A belief in our personal identity. This is derived
from the combined operation of consciousness and memory ;
and it consists in a remembrance of past mental feelings,
and a comparison of them with present feelings as belong-
ing to the same sentient being. There were formerly many
disputes on this subject ; some maintaining that the notion
of personal identity is inconsistent with the different states
in which the mind exists at different times, as love and ha
tred, joy and sorrow ; and also with the remarkable changes
of character which often take place at different periods of
life. This was one of the sophisms of the schools, founded
upon an obscure analogy with changes which take place in
material things, and is not at all applicable to mind. The
only answer to the paradox is, that every man, under every
variety of mental emotion, and every possible change of
character, retains an absolute conviction that the sentient
being whom he calls himself remains invariably the same ;
and that in all the affairs of life, whether referring to the
past or the future, every man acts upon this conviction.

V. A conviction that every event must have a cause, and
Ji cause adequate to the effect ; and that appearances, show-
ing a correct adaptation of means to an end, indicate de-
sign and intelligence in the cause. These, as fundamental
truths, are quite distinct from the question relating to the
connection of any two specified events as cause and effect.
The latter belongs to another part of our inquiry.

»»' ■ ■ ■ .-■■■■ I I Hl.ll ^» ■ I ■■ — ■ > ■ I II ■■ ■!-■ ■■!- ■ PI ■ ■ l».Ml»^^— ^i^»^^— I ■■ IBM

Answer to sophisms against it? Third conviction? Fourth conviction, relating to
personal identity ? Former disputes? Answer? Fifth conviction, relating to causa
and effect

148 REASON. [part III.

VI. A confidence in the uniformity of nature; or, that
the same substance will always exhibit the same charac-
ters ; and that the same cause, under the same circumstan-
ces, will always be followed by the same effect. This, as a
first truth, is a fundamental and instinctive conviction. The
province of experience, we have already seen, is to ascer-
tain the particular events which are so connected as to be
included under the law.

Our confidence in the uniformity of nature is the founda-
tion of all the calculations which we make for the future in
regard to our protection or comfort, or even for the continu-
ance of our existence ; and without it the whole system of
human things would be thrown into inextricable confusion.

It is referable to the two heads now stated ; namely, uni-
formity of characters, and uniformity of sequences or ope-
rations.

By uniformity of characters, in any substance, we mean
that the substance will always continue to exhibit the same
combination of characters ; so that, when we have ascer-
tained its presence by some of them, we conclude that it
also possesses the others. These characters may be nume-
rous, and referable to various classes ; such as the botanical
characters of a plant, the chemical properties of a mineral,
sensible qualities of smell, taste, and color, and capabilities
of action upon other bodies. Such is our confidence in
the undeviating uniformity of nature, that whatever num-
ber of these qualities we have ascertained to belong to a
substance, we expect to find in every specinien of it in all
time coming. For example, I find a substance which, by
its smell and color, I know to be opium. Without any fur-
ther information, I decide with confidence on its taste, its
composition, its chemical afllnity, its action on the human
body, and the characters of the plant from whicli it was de-
rived; and 1 never calculate upon tlie possibility of being
deceived in any of these particulars.

Our confidence in the uniformity of the sequences or ope-
rations of nature resolves itself into a conviction of the con-
tinuance of that order which experience has shown us to

— - - . - -.

sixth conviction, relating to the uniformity of nature? What calc\ilalions foinulefl
upon it? How many branches, and what? Unifvinniiy of ciiaracters? Examplns?
Uniformity of operation.'j ?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 149

exist in a uniform manner in the succession of phenomena.
The conviction itself is an original or instinctive principle,
felt and acted upon by all classes of men in the daily trans-
actions of life. It is from experience that we learn the par-
ticular cases to which we are warranted in applying it ; or,
in other words, the successions of phenomena which, there
is sufficient ground for believing, have occurred in a certain
order in time past. These we expect with perfect confi-
dence to continue to be equally uniform, or to occur in the
same order in time to come. The error to be guarded
against in such investigations is, assuming the past uniformi-
ty of phenomena on insufficient grounds ; or, in other words,
concluding that events have always occurred in a certain
order because we have seen them occur in that order in a
few instances. A principle assumed in this manner may
of course disappoint us if applied to future phenomena ; but
in this case there is no deviation from the uniformity of
nature : the error consisted in assuming such a uniformity
where none existed.

The uniformity of the sequences of phenomena is the
foundation of our idea of causation in regard to these phe-
nomena ; that is to say, when w^e have observed one event
uniformly follow another event, we consider the first as
cause, and the second as effect ; and, when this relation has
been ascertained to be uniform, we conclude that it will
continue to be uniform ; or that the same cause in the same
circumstances will always be followed by the same effect.
This expectation will of course disappoint us if we have
assumed the relation on inadequate grounds ; or have con-
sidered two events as cause and effect which have been only
accidentally combined in a few instances. To entitle* us to
assume that the relation will be uniform in time to come,
we must have full and adequate grounds for believing that
it has been uniform in time past.

In the great operations of nature a very extensive obser-
vation often enables us to trace a remarkable uniformity
even in regard to events which at first sight appear to be
most irregular and uncertain. Thus, the most uncertain of

Error to be guarded against? Foundation of our idea of cause and effect. Caution
necessary ? Remarkable uniformity among events! apparently irregular 7 Examplo.
Duration of human life ?

150 REASON. [part III.

all things is human life, as far as respects individuals ; but
the doctrine of the continuance of life in reerard to a larsfe
body of men is, by extensive observation, reduced almost to
a certainty. Notliing is more uncertain than the proportion
of males and females that shall be born in one family ; but
in great communities this also is uniform. There is much
uncertainty in the character of different seasons, but there
are facts which give probability to the conjecture that in a
long series of years there may also be discovered a remark-
able uniformity. An impression of this kind was carried so
far by the ancients as to lead to the doctrine of the Annes
Magnus, or Platonic year, in which it was believed that the
v/hole series of human events would be acted over again.

The uniform successions of phenomena are, with reason-
able care, easily ascertained in regard to material things;
and when they are ascertained, we rely upon their uniform
continuance ; or, if we find a deviation in any instance, we
easily ascertain the incidental cause by which the sequence
is interrupted, and can provide against the interference of
the same or any similar cause in future instances. There is
greater uncertainty when our researches refer to the pheno-
mena of mind, or the actions of living bodies. The causes
of this uncertainty were formerly mentioned. It arises
partly from the greater difficulty of aocertaining the true
relations ; that is, of tracing causes to their true effects, and
effects to their true causes ; and partly from the tendency
to these being interrupted in future instances by some new
cause, in regard to which we cannot calculate either the
existence or the precise effects. Hence, for example, the
uncertainty of human laws ; one of the contingencies by
which they are interrupted being the chances of evading
them. If we could conceive a case in which every crime was
with certainty detected, and every criminal brought to pu-
nishment, it is probable that the effect of human laws would
be nearly as certain as the operation of material causes. But
the criminal, in the first instance, calculates on the chance
of evading detection, and, even in the event of detection, of
escaping punishment; and thus the tendency of the wisest
laws is constantly interrupted in a manner which no human

Proportion ofmales and females? Notion of the ancients ? Facility of ascertaining
the laws of rnal(!rial things? The laws of niiiul 7 Why more dillicull? Ope?ation of
human iawd? Calculation of the criminal in violating them ?

SEC. IV.J . FIRST TRUTHS. 151

wisdom can calculate upon or prevent. There is often a
similar uncertainty in human character in other situations :
for example, in judging how an individual will act in
particular circumstances, or be influenced by particular
motives ; for a motive which we have found to induce a
particular line of conduct in one individual may fail in
producing the same result in another, being prevented by
circum.stances in his moral condition which entirely elude
our observation.

Yet there is a uniformity in moral phenomena which,
though it may be ascertained with greater difficulty than
the order of natural phenomena, we calculate upon with
similar confidence when it has been ascertained. Thus, a
man may have acquired such a character for integrity, that
we rely upon his integrity in any situation in which he may
be placed, w4th the same confidence wuth which we rely on
the uniformity of nature ; and there is a man distinguished
by veracity and fidelity to his promise, of whom we say, in
common language, that his word is as good as his bond.
In such examples as these, indeed, our confidence is found-
ed, not upon any laws which have been observed in regard
to the whole species, but on a uniformity which has been
observed in regard to the individuals, or rather a class to
which the individuals belonsf. There are also, however,
laws which apply to mankind in general, and on which
we rely as far as they go, — namely, principles of conduct
in which we confide, as regulating every man of a sane
mind, whatever may be our knowledge of his previous
habits of judging or acting. It is in this manner, for ex-
ample, as formerly stated, that we regulate our confidence
in testimony. If a man who is either a stranger to us or
bears a character of doubtful veracity, relates circumstances
which tend greatly to promote his own purposes, we cal-
culate on the probability of fabrication, and reject his testi-
mony ; and if w^e even suspect that he has a purpose to
serve, a similar impression is produced. If, on the contra-
ry, we are satisfied that the circumstances are indifferent
to him, and that he has no purpose to answer, we give
greater credit to his testimony. If, further than this, we

Similar uiiccrtainty in other cases ? Can the uniformity of moral phenomena be
relied upon in any cases? Example. General principles of human conduct.

152 REASON. [part III.

perceive that the statement operates against himself, con-
veying an imputation against his own conduct, or exposing
liim to contempt, ridicule, or personal injury, we are satis-
fied that nothing could make him adhere to such a testimo-
ny but an honest conviction of its truth. Under the former
circumstances, we believe only a man whom we consider as
a person of known and established veracity ; under the lat-
ter, we believe any man whom we consider to be of a sane
mind. Thus, in both instances, we proceed upon a certain
uniformity of moral phenomena ; only that we refer them
to two classes, — namely, one w^hich is ascertained to be
uniform in regard to the whole species, and another which
is uniform only in regard to a certain order, that is, all men
of integrity and veracity. In the one case, we rely upon
the uniformity in every instance ; in the other, we do not
rely upon it until we are satisfied that the individual exam-
ple belongs to that order in which the other kind of moral
uniformity has been ascertained.

There are other inquiries closely connected with the
uniformity of moral relations ; but at present we must al-
lude to them very briefly. We have every reason to be-
lieve that there are moral causes, that is, truths and mo-
tives, which have a tendency to influence human volition
and human conduct with a uniformity similar to that with
which physical agents produce their actions upon each
other. These moral causes, indeed, do not operate in
every instance, or in all circumstances ; but neither do
physical causes. Substances in chemistry, for example
have certain tendencies to act upon each other, which are
uniform and necessary; but no action takes place unless
the substances are brought into certain circumstances which
are required for bringing these tendencies into operation.
They must, in the first place, be brought into contact ;
and, besides this, many of them require other collateral
circumstances, as a particular temperature, or a particular
state of concentration or dilution. It is the same with
moral causes : their tendencies are uniform, and there are
principles in the mind of man which these are adapted for

Examplo; laws of testimony ? Influence of the circumstances of the case on the
crediliiliiy of witncase.s ? Other cases of the uniformity of moral relations? Moral and
physical causes comparcvl. Influence of circumstances in both cases?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 153

acting upon. But they require certain circumstances in
the man on whom they are expected to act^ without which
they produce no influence upon him. It is necessary, for
example, that he be fully informed in regard to them as
truths ; and that his attention be directed to them with
such a degree of intensity as shall bring him fully under
their influence as statements addressed to his understand-
ing ; also, that there be a certain healthy state of his
moral feelings, — for this has a most extensive influence
on the due operation of moral causes. Without these the
most powerful moral causes may produce no efi^ect upon
a man ; as the most active chemical agents may fail en-
tirely of their actions, if the substances are not placed in
the requisite circumstances of temperature, dilution, or
concentration.

These considerations seem to bear an important refer-
ence to a question which has been much argued, namely,
that respecting liberty, necessity, and the freedom of the
will. On a subject on which some of the wisest and the
best of men have been found on opposite sides, I would ex-
press myself with becoming caution and diflidence ; but
perhaps some of the obscurity in which the question has
been involved arises from the w^ant of a clear definition of
the terms in which it has been argued ; and by not fully
distinguishing between ivill or simple volition^ and desire or
inclination. Will, or simple volition, is the state of mind
which immediately precedes action ; and the action follow-
ing upon this is not only free, but it is absolutely impossible
to suppose it should be otherwise. A man is not only free
to do what he wills, but we cannot conceive a case in which
he could exert a power of not doing what he wills, or of
doing what he wills not. Impulse or restraint from with-
out, acting upon his bodily organs, could alone interfere
with his follov/ing, in this sense, the tendency of his will,
or simple volition. The only idea, indeed, that we can
form of free agency, or freedom of the will, is, that it con-
sists in a man being able to do what he wills, or to ab-
stain from doing what he wills not. Necessary agency, on

Circumstances essential to the full operation of moral causes ? Important question
connected with this subject ? Terms used ? Distinction between them ? The will —
•vhat ? Proper idea of free agency ? Necessary agency ?

154 REASON. [part IH.

the other hand, would consist in the man being compelled,
by a force from without, to do what he wills not, or pre-
vented from doing what he wills.

The real bearing of the inquiry does not lie in this con-
nection between the volition and the act, but in the origin
or cause of the volition, or in the connection between the
volition and the desire ; and this will be seen to be entirely
distinct. A man, for example, may desire, or have an in-
clination to, that which he has not the power to will ; be-
cause he may be under the influence of motives and princi-
ples which prevent the inclination from being followed by
volition, with as absolute a necessity as we observe in the
sequences of natural phenomena. Thus, also, v/e may say
to a man of strict integrity and virtue that he has not the
power to commit murder or robbery, or any act of gross
injustice or oppression. He may reply that he has the
power to do it if he willed ; and this is granted, for this
is free agency ; but it is not the question in dispute. We
do not say that he has not the power to do any or all of
these acts if he willed, but that he has not the power to
will such deeds. He is under the influence of motives and
principles which make it as much a matter of necessity for
him not to will such acts, as it is for a stone not to rise from
the earth's surface contrary to its gravity. Such a neces-
sity as this, if we must retain the term, so far from being
unfavorable to the interests of virtue and morals, or op-
posed to the practice of exhorting men to virtue, seems, on
the contrary, to hold out the strongest encouragement in
doing so ; and to be, in fact, the only scheme on which we
can expect an argument or motive to have any influence
upon human conduct. For it represents man as possessed
of certain uniform principles in his nature which are capa-
ble of being acted upon by certain moral causes, truths,
laws, or motives, with a uniformity similar to that which
we observe in physical phenomena, provided he can be
brought under their influence, and into those circumstances
which are required for their due operation. These cir-
cumstances are, — that the moral causes, laws, motives, or

Real point of inquiry ? Distinction between desire and will ? Examples. Control-
ling infuence of motives in such cases. Is this riecessiti/? Influence of it on virtus
and morals ? How does this view represent man ? Circumstanced essential ?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 155

truths, shall be brought before his iinderstandlng" ; that ho
shall direct his attention to them with suitable intensity ;
and that he is free from that degree of corruption of his
moral feelings, or any of those distorted moral habits which
we know to produce a most extensive influence on the ope-
ration of moral causes. To suppose a kind of moral liberty
opposed to such a necessity as this, would be to represent
man as a being possessed of no fixed or uniform principles,
— not to be calculated upon as to his conduct in any in-
stance,— and not capable of being acted upon by any motive
or principle except the blind caprice of the moment. To
endeavor to act upon such a being, by persuading him to
virtue or dissuading him from vice, would be like expecting
fixed results in chemistry, by bringing substances to act
upon each other, the actions of which we had previously
found to be without any kind of uniformity. This is, in
fact, precisely the situation of the maniac, whom, accord-
ingly, we never expect to guide or influence by motives or
arguments, but by external restraint. He may act harm-
lessly, or he may act mischievously ; but we never can cal-
culate upon his actions in any one instance ; we therefore
shut him up, so as to prevent him from being dangerous to
the community.

Necessity, then, as applied to the operation of moral
causes, appears simply to correspond with the uniformity
which we observe in the operation of physical causes. We
calculate that a man of a certain character will act in a par-
ticular manner in particular circumstances, or that he will
be acted upon in a certain manner by particular truths and
motives, when they are presented to him, by a principle
of uniformity similar to that with which we expect an acid
to act in a particular manner upon an alkali. The action
of the acid we know to be uniform, but we know also, that
no action will take place till the substances are brought
fully in contact, and in certain circumstances which are
required for their action ; — and the action of moral causes
is uniform, but they exert no influence on a man till he is
fully acquainted wdth them, — directs his attention to them

Is man possessed of any moral liberty, inconsistent v/ith this view? Why not
Uniformity of the operations of moral causes ? Compared with physical ? Exaarplc.

156 REASON. [part III.

with suitable care, — and is besides in a certain healthy
state of moral feelinsr. It is thus that we calculate on the
full and uniform operation of moral causes on some indi-
viduals, and not on others ; namely, by having previously
ascertained that the former are in those intellectual and
moral circumstances which are required for their action.
When, in another individual, we find these causes fail in
their natural actions, we endeavor, as far as may be in
our power, to supply those collateral circumstances, — by
instructing him in the facts, truths, or motives ; — by rousing
his attention to their importance ; — by impressing them
upon him in their strongest characters, and by all such ar-
guments and representaiions as we think calculated to fix
the impression. All this we do under a conviction, that
these causes have a certain, fixed, uniform, or necessary
action, in regard to human volition and human conduct ;
and it is this conviction which encourages us to persevere
in our attempts to bring the individual under their influence.
If we had not this conviction, we should abandon the at-
tempt as altogether hopeless ; because we could have no
ground on which to form any calculation, and no rules to
guide us in our measures. Precisely in the same manner,
when we find a chemical agent fail of the efTect which we
expect from it, we add it in larger quantity, or in an in-
creased state of concentration, or at a higher temperature,
or with some other change of circumstances calculated
to favor its action ; and we persevere in these measures,
under a conviction that its action is perfectly uniform or
necessary, and will take place whenever these circumstances
have been provided for. On the same principle, we see
hou^ blame may attach to the intelligent agent in both
cases, though the actions of the causes are uniform and
necessary. Such is the action of chemical agents, — but
blame may attach to the chemist who has not provided
them in the necessary circumstances as to quantity, con-
centration, and temperature. Such is the action of moral
causes, — but deep guilt may attach to the moral agent, who
has been proof against their influence. There is guilt in
ignorance, when knowledge was within his reach; — there

PraciicHl 1156 of ihe.-se principles. Conviction upon which such practice is based
Tlie uime with physical processes. What cousiiuiles guill ?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 157

is guilt in heedless inattention, when truths and mc/tives of
the hicrhest interest claimed his serious consideration : —
there is guilt in that corruption of his moral fcelir/gs which
impedes the action of moral causes, because this has origi-
nated, in a great measure, in a course of vicious desires,
and vicious conduct, by which the mind, familieirized with
vice, has gradually lost sight of its malignity. During the
whole of this course, also, the man felt that he was a free
agent ; that he had power to pursue the course which he
followed, and that he had power to refrain from it. When
a particular desire was first present to his mind, he had the
power imxmediately to act with a view to its accomplish-
ment; or he had the power to abstain from acting, and to
direct his attention more fully to the various considerations
and motives which were calculated to guide his determina-
tion. In acting as he did, he not only withheld his atten-
tion from those truths which were thus calculated to ope-
rate upon him as a moral being ; but he did still more direct
violence to an impulse within, which warned him that he
was v/andering from the path of rectitude. The state of
moral feeling which gradually results from this habitual
violation of the indications of conscience, and this habitual
neglect of the serious consideration of moral causes, every
individual must feel to be attended with moral guilt. The
effect of it is not only to prevent the due operation of moral
causes on his future volitions, but even to vitiate and dis-
tort the judgment itself, respecting the great principles of
moral rectitude. Without attempting any explanation of
this remarkable condition of the mental functions, its actual
existence must be received as a fact in the constitution of
human nature, which cannot be called in question ; and it
offers one of the most remarkable phenomena that can be
presented to him who turns his attention to the moral eco-
nomy of man.

Before concludinof this incidental allusion to a much con-
troverted subject, I may be allowed to remark, that the
term necessity, as applied to moral phenomena, is not for-
tunate, and perhaps not philosophical ; and something
would perhaps be gained in conducting the inquiry, if, for

lu what sense the indiviJaal is free ? Guilt of habitually viclaiing conscience. Re
marks upon the terin necessitij.

14

158 REASON. [part III.

necessity,, we were to substitute uniforviity . In strict pro-
priety, indeed, the terms necessity and necessary ought to
be applied only to mathematical truth. Of physical rela-
tions, all that we know is the fact of their uniformity ; and
it would appear equally philosophical to apply the same
term to mental phenomena. On this principle, therefore,
we should say, that the tendency of moral causes or mo-
tives is not necessary, but uniform ; and that on this de-
pends all our confidence in the uniformity of human cha-
racter, and in the power of truths, motives, or arguments,
to produce particular results on human conduct. To sup-
pose the mind possessed of a power of determining, apart
from all the influence of moral causes or motives, would be
to overthrow this confidence, and to reduce our whole cal-
culations on human character to conjecture and uncertain-
ty. When, indeed, we talk of a self-determining power of
the will, we seem to use a combination of words without
any definite meaning. For the will is not distinct from the
being who wills ; and to speak of an individual determining
his will, is only saying, in other words, that he wills. He
wills some act for some reason, which is known to himself;
if communicated to another, the reason might not appear a
satisfactory one; but still it is to him the reason which in-
duced him to will the act, and this appears to be all that we
can make of the subject. A power of determining, without
any reason, appears to be not only unphilosophical, but, in
point of fact, inapplicable to any conceivable case. Igno-
rance, inattention, or gross perversion of the moral feelings
may make the worse reason appear the better ; but we
cannot conceive a case, in which an individual could exert
a power of determining without any reason, or according
to what appears to him at the time to be a weaker reason,
in opposition to one which appears a stronger. It will also,
I think, be found that the warmest advocates for philosophi-
cal liberty, and a self-determining power, in actual practice
recognise as much as others the principle of the uniformity
of moral causes. Thus, if we find a person acting in a
manner widely different from that which we expected from
him, all men concur in saying, " what motive could induce

Proposed subslilule ? Sjjlf-determiiiin;^: power of the will ? Objections to that lan-
guage J Uniformity of moral causes admitted in practice?

SEC. IV.J FIRST TRUTHS. 159

him to act in that manner ?'' and if we cannot reconcile his
conduct to any conceivable motive, we say, " it really looks
like insanity." Another may remark, " his conduct indi-
cates a singular want of consideration ;" thus clearly re-
cognising the existence of certain motives or moral causes,
which would have led the man into a different line of con-
duct, had he allowed his attention to fix upon them. The
doctrine of a self-determining power should remove every
difficulty in such a case to those who believe in it ; but I
am not aware that it ever was made use of for such a pur-
pose. It will also be found to agree with the universal
conviction of mankind, that the circumstance which gives
to an action the character of merit or demerit is entirely
the motive from which it was done ; and that if we could
conceive such a thing as an action performed by the im-
pulse of a free self-determining power apart from any influ-
ence of motives or moral causes, no man of sane mind
would for a moment allow to such an act the character of
virtue. On the contrary, it is familiar to every one, that
we often find in a man's motive an excuse for conduct in
which we think he has acted wrong. We say, he erred in
judgment, but his motive was good; and this mode of
reasoning meets with the cordial concurrence of the whole
mass of mankind.

The First Truths, or intuitive principles of belief,
which have been the subject of the preceding observations,
are of the utmost practical importance, as they furnish the
true and only answer to many of the sophisms of the scho-
lastic philosophy, and to many sceptical arguments of more
modern times. They admit of no other evidence than an
appeal to the consciousness of every man, that he does and
must believe them. " We believe them," says Dr. Brown,
" because it is impossible not to believe them." ''In all
these cases," says Mr. Stewart, " the only account that
can be given of our belief is, that it forms a necessary part

Evidence of it ? Moral character of an action without motive ? Only evidence of
these First Truths ? Dr. Brown's remark ?

160 REASON. [PART m.

of our constitution, against which metaphysicians may ar-
gue, so as to perplex the judgment, but of which it is im-
possible to divest ourselves for a moment, when we are
called to employ our reason, either in the business of life or
in the pursuits of science."

It is likewise to be kept in mind, as was formerly stated,
that our idea of reasoning necessarily supposes the existence
of a certain number of truths, which require and admit of
no evidence. The maxim, indeed, is as old as the days of
Aristotle, and has never been called in question, " that, ex-
cept some first principles be taken for granted, there can be
neither reason nor reasoning; that it is impossible that
every truth should admit of proof, otherwise proof would
extend in infimtum^ which is incompatible with its nature ;
and that, if ever men attempt to prove a first principle, it
is because they are ignorant of the nature of proof '"^ As
these truths, therefore, do not admit of being called in
question by any sound understanding, neither do they ad-
mit of being supported by any process of reasoning ; and,
when paradoxes or sophisms in opposition to them are
proposed, any attempt to argue with such, upon logical
principles, only leads to discussions as absurd as them-
selves. Of attempts of both kinds many examples are to
be met with among the writers of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, as Des Cartes and Hobbes; and even some
eminent persons, of more modern times, are not entirely
free from them. Thus, Des Cartes, Malebranche, and
others, thought it necessary to prove that external objects,
and the sentient beings with whom we are connected, have
a real existence whether we think of them or not, and are
not merely ideas in our own minds. Berkeley showed the
weakness of this argument, and on this founded the well-
known doctrine by which he denied the real existence of
material things.

Many of the dogmas of modern sophistical writers, such
as Mr. Hume, have consisted of attempts to overturn, by
processes of argument, these fundamental or first truths.

• Aristotle's Metaphysics, K)ok iv.

Mr. Stewart's remark ? Impossibility of reasoning without the admission cf such
Inilhs. They can neither be proved nor called in queslion. Former attempts to provo
hem? Exampk'. Attempts to disprove lliem ?

SEC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 161

On the other hand, the unsatisfactory nature of some of
the replies to these sophisms, depends upon the attempts to
combat them having been made by reasonings, of which
the subject is not susceptible. For these principles admit
of no proof by processes of reasoning, and, consequently,
are in no degree affected by demonstrations of the fallacy
of attempts to establish them by such processes. An inte-
resting illustration of this has been reserved by Mr. Stew-
art, in a correspondence between Mr. Hume and Sir Gilbert
Elliot."^ " From the reply to this letter," says Mr. Stew-
art, " by Mr. Hume's very ingenious and accomplished
correspondent, we learn that he had drawn from Mr.
Hume's metaphysical discussions the only sound and philo-
sophical inference : that the lameness of the proofs offered
by Des Cartes and his successors, of some fundamental
truths, universally acknowledged by mankind, proceeded,
not from any defect in the evidence, but, on the contrary,
from their being self-evident, and consequently unsuscepti-
ble of demonstration." The same view of Mr. Hume's
sceptical reasonings was taken by other eminent persons,
by whom his system was attacked, particularly Reid,
Beattie, and Oswald ; and on the continent, the nature and
importance of these first truths had been at an earlier
period illustrated in a full and able manner by father Buf-
fier.

Various characters have been proposed, by which these
primary and fundamental truths may be distinguished. One
of those given by father BufRer appears to be the best,
and to be alone sufficient to identify them. It is, that their
practical influence extends even to persons who affect to
dispute their authority ; in other words, that in all the
affairs of life, the most sceptical philosopher acts, as much
as the mass of mankind, upon the absolute belief of these
truths. Let a person of this description, for example, be
contending very keenly, in regard to something which
deeply concerns his interest or his comfort, he w^ould scarce-
ly be satisfied by being told, that the thing about which

• Introductory Essay to the Appendix of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Illustration of this ? Effect of Hume's reasoning upon Elliot's mind? Upon otliei
minds ? Distinctive characters of these primary truths ? Buffier's ? Example ?

14^

162 REASON. [part III

he contends has no real existence, and that he who con-
tends about it so eagerly is himself a nonenity, or, at best,
nothing more than an idea. Let him be taking cognizance
of an offence committed against him ten years ago, he
never doubts that he is still the person against whom the
offence was committed. Let him lay plans for future ad-
vantage or comfort, it is done under a full conviction that
he is still to continue the individual who may enjoy them.
Has a building started up on his premises, which he did not
expect to see, he immediately asks who ordered the ma-
sons, and would be very ill-satisfied by being told, that the
thing had appeared without any known cause, by a fortui-
tous combination of atoms. However much he may reason
to the contrary, he shows no doubt, in his own practice,
that every event must have an adequate cause. The same
mode of reasoning will be seen to apply to the other truths
which belong to the class under consideration, namely, thiit
those who argue against them act in all cases on a belief
of their truth.

The distinction between a process of reasoning and the
act of the mind in arriving at these fundamental and in-
stinctive truths, is a principle of the utmost practical im-
portance. For a chain of correct reasoning requires logi-
cal habits, and a certain cultivation of the mental powers ;
and, consequently, it is confined to a comparatively small
number of mankind. But the process here referred to is
the spontaneous and immediate induction of the untutored
mind, and a correct exercise of it requires only that the
mind shall not be debased by depravity, nor bewildered by
the refinements of a false philosophy. The truths, which
we derive from it accordingly do not concern the philoso-
pher alone, but are of daily and essential importance to
the whole class of mankind. Let us take, for example, the
principle referred to under tbe fifth head, namelJ^ our intui-
tive conviction that every change or event must have an
adequate cause. This is a principle of daily application,
and one which is acted upon with absolute confidence in
(he ordinary affairs of life by all classes of men. By the

Practical a-lmissions of them in various cases ? Important distinction ? What C3-
Bcnti.il to correct reasoninEr? — to intuitive belief ? Universal influence of these truths ?
Example, inferring a cause from an effect.

£EC. IV.] FIRST TRUTHS. 163

Immediate and unconscious exercise of it, we infer the skill
of one workman from works indicating skill, and the vigor
of another from works indicating strength. We infer from
every work, not only a cause, but a cause which, both in
degree and kind, is exactly proportioned to the effect pro-
duced. From a chronometer, which varieS only a second
in a year, we infer exquisite skill in the artist ; and from
the construction of the pyramids of Egypt, the united
strength of a multitude of men. We never supposed for a
moment that the minute skill of the artist raised the pyra-
mid, or that the united force of the multitude constructed
the chronometer ; still less, that these monuments of art
started into their present condition without a cause. We
infer with absolute certainty in both cases an adequate
cause ; that is, a cause distinguished in the one case by de-
sign and mechanical power, in the other, by design, adap-
tation, and exquisite skill.

The principle which is thus acted upon, in the ordinary
affairs of life, with a conviction of infallible certainty, is
precisely the same by which, from the stupendous \vorks
of creation, we infer by the most simple step of reasoning
the existence of a great First Cause. This cause also we
conclude to be a desio-ninof and intellifrent mind, infinite in

CD Zj O '

wisdom and boundless in power; and by a very slight and
natural extension of the same principle, we arriv^e with
equal certainty at the conviction of this cause being the
first, — not arising out of any thing preceding it. conse-
quently self-existent and eternal. All this is not such a
process of reasoning as requires logical habits, and admits
of debate, deliberation, or doubt ; — the metaphysician may
bewilder himself in its very simplicity; but the uncontami-
nated mind finds its way to the conclusion with unerring cer-
tainty, and with a conviction which is felt to be not only
satisfactory, but irresistible.

When we proceed from these first or intuitive articles of
belief to the further investigation of truth in any department
of knowledge, various mental processes are brought into

Instances m common life ? IiKstauce in regard to the works of creation.

164 REASON. [part UL

operation ; but in regard to all of them reason is our ulti-
mate guide. in judging whether they are performed in a le-
gitimate manner, and upon principles calculated to lead to
the discovery of truth. These processes may be chiefly
referred to the following heads : —

I. To make a careful collection of facts relating to the
subject, and to abstain from deducing any conclusions till
we have before us such a series as seems calculated to war-
rant them. The first operation of reason therefore is, to
judge when we have a sufficient number of facts for this
purpose.

II. To separate from the mass those facts which are con-
nected with it incidentally, and to retain those only which
we hav^e reason to consider as uniform and essential. In
some sciences this is accomplished by repeated and varied
experiments ; and in those departments which do not admit
of this, it is done by cautious and extensive observation.
Our object in both cases is to ascertain how many of the
circumstances observed, and what particular combinations
of them uniformly accompany each other, or are really con-
nected with the effects which are produced. In this care-
ful clearing of our statement from all incidental combina-
tions consists that faithful observation of nature which forms
the first step in every scientific investigation. It is oppos-
ed to two errors, both equally to be avoided, namely, leav-
ing out of view, or not assigning an adequate value to, im-
portant and essential facts ; and giving a place and an im-
portance to those which arc incidental and trivial. In eve-
ry scientific investigation this is a process of the utmost
importance ; and there is another nearly connected with it,
namely, to judge of the authenticity of the facts. This al-
so IS a mental process of the utmost delicacy. In conduct-
inrr it, there are two extremes from which the exercise of
sound judgment ought equally to guard us, namely, receiv-
ing facts upon imperfect evidence, and rejecting those which
have a sufficient title to credit ; in other words, credulity
and scepticism. Both these extremes are equally unwor-
thy of a mind which is guided by sound reason.

Classification of menial processes necessary for the invesiiiralion of Irulh ? Fir.Jl
head ; colleclinir facta. Second head ; selecting lho.se wliich are essential. Two er-
-ors to be avoided ? Two extremes in regard to the admission of f ids 7

SEC. IV.] LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 165

III. To compare facts with each other, so as to tracf
iheir resemblances, or to ascertain those characters or pro-
perties in which a certain number of facts or substances
agree. We thus arrange them into classes, genera, and
species.

IV. To compare facts or events with each other, so as
to trace their relations and sequences; especially that re-
lation of uniform sequence on which is founded our notion
of cause and effect. This delicate and most important pro
cess consists entirely in a patient observation of facts, and
of their relation to each other. When, in a certain num-
ber of instances, we find two events following one another
without any exception, we come to consider the sequence
as uniform, and call the one cause, and the other effect ; and
when, in other instances, we are disappointed in finding such
a succession, this confidence is shaken, unless we can dis-
cover a cause by which the sequence was interrupted.
Reason, acting upon extensive observation, must here guide
us ; on the one hand to judge of the uniformity of the se-
quences, and, on the other, to account for apparent devia-
tions.

V. To review an extensive collection of facts, so as to
discover some general fact common to the whole. This is
the process which we call generalizing, or the induction of
a general principle. The result of it is the last and greatest
object of human science, and that to which all the other
steps are preliminary and subservient. An ordinary mind
is satisfied with the observation of facts as they pass before
it, and those obvious relations which obtrude themselves up-
on its notice ; but the philosopher analyzes the phenomena,
and thus discovers their more minute relations. His ge-
nius is distinguished above the industry of the mere observer
of facts, v/hen he thus traces principles of accordance
among facts Vi^liich, to the vulgar eye, appear remote and
dissimilar. A remarkable example of this is familiar to
every one, Betv/een the fall of an apple from a tree and

Third head ; comparison of facts with reference to their nature. Fourth head ; conr
parison of facts with reference to their causes and relations. Fifth head • generalizing
The operation of an ordinary and of a philosophical mind compared.

1

166 PEASON. [part ni.

the motions of the heavenly bodies a common mind would
have been long ere it discovered any kind of relation; but
on such a relation Newton founded those grand principles
by which he brought to light the order and harmony of the
universe. For it was this simple fact that first suggested
to him the great principle of physical science, that matter
attracts matter in the reciprocal ratio of their masses.

In a practical view, these processes may be referred to
three heads, — namelj^ collecting authentic facts, — tracing
causation, — and deducing general principles. Here vari-
ous mental operations are brought into action, especially
attention, memory, conception, and abstraction ; but it is
the province of reason to judge whether these are conduct-
ed in a legitimate manner, or, in other words, to distinguish
truth from falsehood. It may, therefore, be important to
keep in mind what those circumstances are in which consist
truth and falsehood, in reference to any department ol
knowledge.

I. In collecting facts, it is required in the first place that
they shall be authentic ; secondly, that the statement shall
include a full and fair view of all the circumstances which
ought to be taken into our investigation of the case ; and
thirdly, that it shall not include any facts which are not
connected with the subject, or whose connection is only in-
eidental. When we have thus formed a collection of facts,
authentic, full, and essential, the statement, in as far as re-
lates to the facts, constitutes truth. AVhen any of the facts
are not authentic ; when important facts are left out of the
statement, or misrepresented; or when facts are taken into
it which, though true, have no real relation to the subject;
this constitutes fallacy or falsehood.

II. In considerinof two events as connected in the man-
ner of cause and eflect ; when this relation is deduced from
a full and extensive observation of the sequence being uni-
form,— this is truth. When it is assumed upon inadequate
grounds, that is, from the observation of a connection which
is only incidental or limited, — this is either falsehood or hy-

Example? More general clissification of these processes? Three principles to he
observed in collecting facts. Principles to bo observed in determining the relation of
cause and efTecl ?

SEC. IV.] LAWS OF INVESTI6AT10N. 167

pothesis; for the relation may be assumed upon g-rouiuls^
which, though not actually false, are yet not sufficient to
establish it as true — namely, on observation which is too
limited in extent. This is conjecture or hypothesis ; and it
is in some cases a legitimate process, provided it be used
only as a guide for further observation, and be not received
as true until such observation shall have been sufficieiit lo
confirm it.

III. In deducing from a large collection of facts a gene
ral fact or general principle ; when this induction is made
from a full examination of all the individual cases to which
tlie general fact is meant to apply, and actually does apply
to them all, — this is truth. When it is deduced from a small
number of observations, and extended to others to wdiich it
does not apply, — this is falsehood. As in the former case,
how^ever, a general principle may be produced hypotheti-
cally or by conjecture ; that is, it may be assumed as gene-
ral so far as we at present know. This process is often le-
gitimate and useful as a guide in further inquiry, if it be
employed for this purpose only, and the result be not re-
ceived as truth until it be established by sufficient observa-
tion. A great and not unfrequent error is, that when such
hypothetical principles are proposed in a confident manner,
they are very often received as true ; and the consequence
is, that a degree of observation is required for exposing their
fallacy, perhaps as extensive as, if properly employed, might
have been sufficient to discover the truth. Those who are
acquainted with the history of medical doctrines wall be best
able to judge of the accuracy of this observation, and to
estimate the extensive influence which this error has had in
retarding the progress of medical science.

The proper rules to be observed, in deducing a general
principle, are therefore opposed, in the first place, to the er-
ror of hasty generalizing, or deducing such a principle from
a limited number of facts. They are further opposed to
another error, prevalent in the hypothetical systems of t\\G
old philosophy, by which phenomena Avere referred to prin-
ciples altogether fictitious and imaginary, or, in other words.

Principles lo be observed in deducing general laws. False deductions. Hypothesis i
its legitimats use ■ Abuse of it ? Coiiniiou errors I

168 REASON. [part III.

which could not be shown to be facts. In opposition to both
these errors the great rule of induction in modern science
is, that the principle which is assumed as general shall be
itself a fact, and that the fact shall be universal. Thus,
w^hat we call the law of gravitation is primarily nothing
more than the fact that bodies fall to the earth ; and that
this is true of all bodies, without a single exception. Of the
cause of this fact, or the hidden principle on which it de-
pends, we know nothing, and all the investigations of New--
ton were carried on independently even of the attempt to
discover it. " When Newton," says Mr. Stewart, " show-
ed that the same law of gravity extends to the celestial
spaces, and that the pov*'er by which the moon and planets
are retained in their orbits is precisely similar in its effects
to that W'hich is manifested in the fall of a stone ; he left
the efficient cause of gravity as much in the dark as ever,
and only generalized still further the conclusions of his
predecessors."

False investigation may be briefly referred to three heads
• — fallacies in facts, — false inductions, — and false reason-
ing.

I. Fallacies in Facts. A statement of facts is falla-
cious when any of the alleged facts are not true, — when
it includes facts not relating to the subject, — and when im-
portant facts are omitted. This last error is most frequent-
ly exemplified in those cases in which facts are collected
on one side of a question, or in support of a particular doc-
trine. To the same class we may likewise add those in-
stances in which statements are received as facts which are
not facts, but opinions.

II. False Induction includes false causation and false
generalization. False causation is, when two events are
considered as cause and effect without sufficient reason
um which are, in fact, only incidentally combined ; w^hen
events are considered as cause and effect which are only
joint effects of a common cause ; and when, of two events
really connected as cause and effect, we mistake tlie ordcj

<;real rule of induction ? Examples. False investisalion ; referred lo how nianj
Alii what heado ? First head ? Second head ?

SEC. IV.J FALLACIES L\ INVESTIGATION. 169

of the sequence, considering that as the cause which is real-
ly the etfect, and that as the effect which is really the
cause. The error of false causation is most apt to occur
in those sciences in which there is peculiar difficulty in
tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to their true
effects. These, as formerly mentioned, are exemplified by
medicine and political economy. A physician, for exam-
ple, ascribes the cure of a patient to a remedy which he has
taken, though it perhaps had no influence on his recovery ;
and a political declaimer refers some circumstance of na-
tional distress or commercial embarrassment to certain pub-
lic measures which happened to correspond in time, but
were in fact entirely unconnected. False generalization,
again, as was lately stated, includes general principles which
are deduced from a limited number of facts ; and hypothe-
ses which cannot be shov/n to be facts, but are entirely fic-
titious and imaginary.

III. False Reasoning. This consists either, — in ap-
plying to the explanation of facts principles which are un-
sound,— in applying sound principles to facts which have
no relation to them, — or in deducing conclusions which do
not follow from these facts and principles.

Reasoning is usually divided into two parts, which have
been called the intuitive and the discursive. Intuitive rea-
soning, or intuitive judgment, is when the truth of a propo-
sition is perceived whenever it is announced. This applies
to axioms or self-evident truths, and to first truths or fun-
damental articles of belief, formerly referred to, which rest
upon the absolute conviction of the whole mass of mankind.

In discursive reasoning, again, some of these axioms or
first truths are applied to particular facts, so as to deduce
from the connection new conclusions. Thus, when we say
that " every event must have an adequate cause," we state
a principle of intuitive judgment. When Vv'e then collect
from the phenomena of nature various examples of adapta-
tion and design, and, applying that intuitive principle to
these facts, arrive at the conclusion that the universe is the
work of an intelligent and designing First Cause, — this is

Examples? Third head ? Reasoning, how divided ? Tntuitive reasoning ? Discur-
Siive reasoning 7 Example of each 7 ^

15

IT'O REASON. ' [part III.

discursive reasoning. The new principle or conclusion
thus deduced may be applied in a similar manner to the de-
duction of farther conclusions, and so on through what we
call a chain of reasoning. Any particular piece of reason-
ing, then, may generally be resolved into the following ele-
ments :~

1. Certain principles or propositions which are stated ei-
ther as axioms, as first truths, or as deductions from some
former process of reasoning.

2. Certain facts or relations of facts, derived either from
observation or testimony, which are stated as true, and to
which the principles are to be in some manner applied.

3. Certain new conclusions deduced from the application
of the principles to the facts.

In examining the validity of such a process, we have not
only to attend to the correctness of the principles, and the
authenticity of the alleged facts, but likewise to inquire
whether the facts are of that class to which the principles
are legitimately applicable ; for the principles may be true,
and the facts authentic, and yet the reasoning may be un-
sound, from the principles being applied to the facts to
which they have no relation.

This method of examining, separately, the elements of
an argument, appears to correspond with the ancient syllo-
gism ; and this, accordingly, when divested of its systematic
shape, is the mental process w^hich we perform, whenever
we either state or examine any piece of reasoning. If 1
say, for example, " the greatest kings are mortal, for they
arc but men ;" I appear to state a very simple proposition ;
but it is in fact a process of reasoning which involves all
the elements of the syllogism ; namely, —

1. The general fact or proposition that all men are
mortal.

2. The fact referable to the class of facts which are in-
cluded under this proposition, — that kings are men.

3. The deduction from this connection, that kings are
mortal.

Element! (if ruasoniiiir ? Axioms. Fart^. Coaclii^iniis. PoiiiL-s to ho aUciuled lo 7
Nature of iho :inc,i(Mit .sylloizi^m. Exiiinijie of sihiplo rcaoouing and tiualysis of it
f-fovv mxny umc) wliui parti /

SEC. IV.] FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. 171

For the validity and efficacy of such a process, two things
are necessary, namely, —

1. That the general proposition which forms the first
part of the statement, or, in logical language, the major pro-
position, be absolutely and universally true, or true with-
out exception in regard to facts of a certain class, and be
admitted as such by those to whom the reasoning is ad-
dressed.

2. That the fact referred to it, or the minor proposition,
be admitted or proved to be one of that class of facts which
are included under the general proposition.

The conclusion then follows by a very simple process.
If either of the two former propositions be deficient or un-
true, the argument is false. Thus, if I had varied the state-
ment as follows, — " Angels, like other human beings, are
mortal ;" there is a fallacy which, when put into the syl-
logistic form, is immediately apparent ; thus, —

All human beings are mortal,
Angels are human beings ;
Therefore, angels are mortal.

The general or major proposition here is true ; but the
minor is not one of the class of facts which are included
under it; therefore the conclusion is false. If I had said,
again, " Angels, like other created beings, are mortal ;" the
fallacy is equally apparent, though from a different source ;
thus, —

All created beings are mortal.
Angels are created beings ;
Therefore, angels are mortal.

Here the minor proposition is true, or is a fact included
under the first ; but the first, or major, is not true, for we
have no ground to believe that all created beings are mor-
tal. On the other hand, when a general fact is assumed
as true of a certain class of cases, we must not assume the
converse as true of those which are not included in the class ;
thus, from the proposition, that all human beings are mor-

What necessary for the validity of the process ? The syllogistic form rendering falsa
reasoning apparent. Example. Names of the propositions ?

172 REASON. [part 111.

tal, we are not entitled to infer that angels, who are not hu-
man beings, are immortal. Whether this conclusion be
true or not, the argument is false ; because the conclusion
does not arise out of the premises : — for, from the admitted
general fact, that human beings are mortal, it does not fol-
low, that all who are not human beings are not mortal.
Yet this will be found a mode of fallacious reasoning of very
frequent occurrence. The rule to be kept in mind for
avoiding such fallacies is, — that a general truth, which ap-
plies invariably to a certain class, may be applied to any
individual which can be shown to be included in that class ;
but that we are not entitled to extend it to any which can-
not be shown to belong to the class ; and that we are not
to assume the reverse to be true of those which do not be-
long to it. On the other hand, we are not to assume a
property as belonging to a class, because we have ascer-
tained it to belong to a certain number of individuals. This
error comes under another part of our subject, and has been
already alluded to under the head of false generalization.
The syllogism, therefore, cannot properly be considered an
engine for the discovery of truth, but rather for enabling us
to judge of the application of, and deductions from truths
previously ascertained. For, before we can construct such
a process as constitutes the syllogism, we require to have
premised that most important process of investigation by
which a fact is ascertained to be general in regard to all
the individuals of a class ; and, likewise, that certain indi-
viduals specified in the argument belong to this class.
Thus, the syllogism was nothing more than that process of
mind which we exercise every time when we examine the
validity of an argument, though we may not always put it
into this systematic form. And yet there may often be ad-
vantage in doing so, as it enables us to examine the ele-
ments of the arguments more distinctly apart. It is relat-
ed of an eminent English barrister, afterward a distinguish-
ed judge, that, on one occasion, he was completely puzzled
by an argument adduced by his opponent in an impor-
tant case, and that he did not detect the fallacy till he
went home and put it into the form of a syllogism. Though

General rules in all such reasoning ? Real nature of the syllogism ? Advantage of
ft? Anecdote of the English lawyer.

SEC. IV.] FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. 173

a syllogism, therefore, may not lead to any discovery of
truth, it may be an important instrument in the detection
of sophistry, by directing the attention distinctly and sepa-
rately to the various elements which compose a statement
or an argument, and enabling us to detect the part in which
the sophistry is involved.

In every process of reasoning there are two distinct ob-
jects of attention, or circumstances to be examined, before
we admit the validity of the argument. These are, — the
premises or data which the reasoner assumes, and which he
expects us to admit as true, — and the conclusions which he
proposes to found upon these premises. The premises again
consist of three parts, which we require to examine sepa-
rately and rigidly. These are, —

1. Certain statements which he brings forward as facts,
and which he expects to be admitted as such.

2. Certain principles or propositions which he assumes
as first truths, or articles of belief universally admitted.

3. Certain other propositions which he refers to, as de-
ductions from former processes of investigation, or processes
of reasoning.

If the statements referable to these three heads are ad-
mitted as true, the argument proceeds, and we have only to
judge of the validity or correctness of his farther deduc-
tions. [[ they are not at once admitted, the argument can-
not proceed till we are satisfied on these preliminary points.
If we do not admit his facts, we require him to go back to
the evidence on which they rest. If we no not admit the
general propositions which he assumes, we require the pro-
cesses of reasoning or investigation on which these are
founded. When we are at last agreed upon these premises,
we proceed to judge of the conclusions which he proposes
to deduce from them.

The circumstances now referred to may be considered
as the essential parts of a process of reasoning, in a logical
view ; but there is another point which we require to keep
carefully in mind in examining such a process, and that is,

Utility of the syllogism? Objects of attention in reasoning? How many an-i
what? Premises; how many parts? Examination of the^e premises? Use of
lerms.

15'^

174 REASON. [part III.

the use of terms. Much of the confusion and perplexity in
reasoning consists in the ambiguity of the terms ; this is re-
ferable to three heads, namely : 1. Terms of a vague and
indefinite character, the precise import of which has not
been defined. 2. Terms employed in a sense in some re-
spect different from their common and recognised accepta-
tion. 3. Varying the import of a term, so as to use it in
difierent meanings in different parts of the same argument ;
or employing it at different times in degrees of comprehen-
sion and extension.

In examining the validity of a process of reasoning, then,
the mental operation which we ought to perform may be
guided by the following considerations : —

1. What statements does the author propose as matters
of fact ; — are these authentic ; are they all really bearing
upon, or connected with the subject ; do they comprise a
full and fair view of all the facts which ought to be brought
forward in reference to the inquiry : or have we reason to
suspect that any of them have been disguised or modified, —
that important facts have been omitted or kept out of view,
—that the author has not had sufficient opportunities of ac-
quiring the facts which he ought to have been possessed of,
— or that he has been collectinsf facts on one side of a cues-
tion, or in support of a particular opinion ?

2. What propositions are assumed, either as first or in-
tuitiv^e truths, or as deductions' arising out of former pro-
cesses of investigation ; and are we satisfied that these are
all legitimate and correct ? In particular, does he make any
statement in regard to two or more events being connected
as cause and effect ; and is this connection assumed on suffi-
cient grounds : — does he assume any general principle as
applicable to a certain class of facts ; is this principle in it-
self a fact, and does it really apply to all the cases which
he means to include under it ; have we any reason to be-
lieve that it has been deduced from an insufficient number
of facts ; or is it a mere fictitious hypothesis, founded upon
a principle which cannot be proved to have a real existence ?

3. Do these assumed principles and facts really belong

Sources of <i]nl)i2;iiily ? Considerations wliich should guide in examining reasoning?
As 10 matters of fael ? Cautions? Proposition assumed / Cautions in regard tolhem.
Connection between the principles and facts ?

SEC. IV.] A PROCESS OF REASONING. ' 175

to the same subject, — or, in other words, do the facts belong
to that class to which the principles apply ?

4. Are the leading terms which he employs fully and dis-
tinctly defined as to their meaning ; does he employ them
in their common and recognised acceptation ; and does he
uniformly use them in the same sense ; or does he seem to
attach dilierent meanings to the same term in different parts
of his argument ?

5, What are the new conclusions which he deduces from
the whole view of the subject ; are these correct and valid ;
and do they really follow from the premises laid down iu
the previous part of his argument ? For on this head it is
always to be kept in mind that a conclusion may be true,
while it does not follow from the argument which has been
brought to prove it ; in such a case the argument is false.

Much of the confusion, fallacy, and sophistry of reason-
ing arises from these points not being sufficiently attended
to, and distinctly and rigidly investigated. An argument
may appear fair and consecutive, but when we rigidly exa-
mine it we may find that the reasoner has, in his premises,
contrived to introduce some statement which is not true in
point of fact, or some bold general position which is not
correct, or not proved ; or that he has left out some fact, or
some principle, which ought to have been brought forward
in a prominent manner, a?s closely connected with the in-
quiry. Hence the necessity for keeping constantly in view
the various sources of fallacy to which every process of
reasoning is liable, and for examining the elements rigidly
and separately before we admit the conclusion.

A process of reasoning is to be distinguished from a pro-
cess of inv^estigation ; and both may be illustrated in the
following manner : All reasoning must be founded upon facts,
and the ascertained relations of these facts to each other.
The nature of these relations has already been mentioned,
as referable to the various heads of resemblance, cause, ef-
fect, &c. The statement of an ascertained relation of two
facts to each other is called a proposition, such as, — that A

Use of terms ? Conclusions ? Infiportance of attending to these points ? Distinction
between reasoning and invesiigalion ? Foundation of reasoning? Proposition, — what?

170 REASON. [part HI.

is equal to B ; that C has a close resemblance to D ; that
E is the cause of F, (fee. These statements, propositions,
or ascertained relations are discovered by processes of in-
vestigation. In a process of reasoning, again, we take a
certain number of such propositions or ascertained relations,
and deduce from them certain other truths or relations, aris-
ing out of the mutual connection of some of these proposi-
tions to each other. Thus, if I state as propositions, ascer-
tained by processes of investigation, that A is equal to B,
and that B is equal to C, I immediately decide by a single
step of reasoning that A is equal to C, in consequence of the
mutual relation which both A and C have to B. Such a
process may be rendered more complicated in two ways.

1. By the number of such ascertained relations, which
we require to bear in mind and compare with each other
before we arrive at the conclusion. Thus the relation that
A is equal to E might rest on such a series of relations as
the following : — A is equal to B ; B is the double of C ; C
is the half of D ; D is equal to E ; therefore A is equal
to E.

2. By propositions which are the conclusions of one or
more steps in a process becoming the premises in a subse-
quent step. Thus, — I may take as one process A is equal
to B, and B is equal to C ; therefore A is equal to C ; —
and, as a distinct process, C is equal to D, and D is equal
to E ; therefore C is equal to E. The conclusions from
these two processes I then take as the premises in a third
process — thus : it has been proved that A is equal to C, and
that C is equal to E ; therefore A is equal to E.

In examining the validity of such processes, there are
two circumstances or objects of inquiry which we ouglit to
keep constantly in view. (1.) Have we confidence in the
accuracy of the alleged facts, and ascertained relations,
which form the premises ? Can we rely on the process of
investigation by which it is said to have been ascertained
that A is equal to B, and that B is equal to C, Sec. ? (2.)
Arc the various propositions in the series so related as to

Example? Province of inveslif^alion ? Province of reasoning? Ways in which the
process becomes complicated. First way, — what? Example. Second way ? Exam-
ple. Objects of inquiry in examining the validity of such processes?

SEC. IV.] A PROCESS OF REASONING. 177

bring out a new truth or new relation ? For it is to be
kept in mind that a series of propositions may all be true,
and yet lead to nothing ; such propositions, for example, as
that A is equal to B, C is equal to D, E is equal to F.
There is here no mutual relation, and no new truth arises
out of the series. But when I say A is equal to B, and B
is equal to C, a new truth is immediately disclosed in con-
sequence of the relation which both A and C have to B ;
namely, that A is equal to C.

Inventive genius, in regard to processes of reasoning,
consists in finding out relations or propositions which are
thus capable of disclosing new truths or new relations ; and
in placing them in that order which is calculated to show
how these new relations arise out of them. This is the
exercise of a reflecting mind; and there may be much
acquired knowledge, that is, many facts accumulated by
memory alone, without any degree of this exercise or habit
of reflection. But both are required for forming a well-
cultivated mind ; the memory must be stored with informa-
tion, that is, ascertained facts and ascertained relations ;
and the power of reflection must be habituated to discover
new truths or new relations by a comparison of these facts
and ascertained relations with each other. For the dis-
covery of new truths may consist either of new facts or of
new relations among facts previously known. Thus, it
might happen that we had long been familiar with two
facts, without being aware that they had any particular
connection. If we were then to ascertain that the one of
these was the cause of the other, it would be a real and
important discovery of a new truth, though it would consist
only of a new relation between facts which had long been
knov/n to us.

A process of reasoning, as we have seen, consists of two
parts, namely, the premises, and the conclusion deduced
from them. If the premises be admitted as true, the re-
maining part of the process becomes comparatively simple.
But it often happens that a reasoner must begin by esta-
blishing his premises. This is most remarkably exemplified

Inventive genius in reasoning ? Knowledge of facts. Necessity of both? A process
©f reasoning consists of how many, and whafparts ?

178 REASON. [part HI.

in what we call a chain of reasoning, consisting of nume-
rous distinct arguments or steps, so arranged that the con-
clusion from one step becomes an essential part of the
premises in the next ; and this may be continued through a
long series. The process then becomes much more compli-
cated, and in judging of the accuracy of the reasoning we
require to examine carefully every part of it as we proceed,
to guard against the introduction of fallacy. Without this
attention it may often happen that the more advanced parts
of an argument may appear fair and consecutive, while a
fallacy has been allowed to creep into some part of it,
which, in fact, vitiates the whole. In the preceding obser-
vations we have endeavored to point out some of the lead-
ing cautions to be observed in this respect, especially in
regard to the admission of facts, the assumption of causation,
and the deduction of general principles : and also the
sources of fallacy to be kept in view in conducting these
processes. But there is another class of fallacies which,
though less immediately connected with our inquiries, it
may be right briefly to point out in relation to this subject.
These are what may be called logical fallacies, or perver-
sions of reasonincr. In reofard to them, as well as to those
formerly mentioned, it is to be kept in mind, that however
obvious they may appear when simply stated, this is by no
means the case when they are skilfully involved in a long
process of reasoning. The fallacies of this class may be
chiefly referred to the following heads : —

I. When a principle is assumed which, in fact, amounts
to the thing to be proved; slightly disguised, perhaps, by
some variation in the terms. This is commonly called peti-
tio principiij or begging the question. When simply stated,
it appears a fallacy not likely to be admitted; but will be
found one of very frequent occurrence. It is indeed remark-
able to observe the facility with which a dogma, when it
has been boldly and confidently stated, is often admitted by
numerous readers, without a single inquiry into the evidence
on which it is founded.

Chain of reasoning 7 Cautions necessary. Two classes of fallacies. Logical falla-
cled — how divided ? Begging the question.

SEC. IV.] FALLACIES IN REASONING. 179

A very common example of this is when a man's promises or state-
ments are received with some suspicion, and he attempts to fortify
them by asserting that he never told a falsehood or broke a promise
m his life, or by solemn assurances that he would on no account
violate his word. This, or something like this, is very common
among men of doubtful veracity. The reasoning, however, when ana-
lyzed, is ^' begging the question.'' The very doabt is about the autho-
rity of his statements, and he offers you that very authority in proof of
them.

II. When a principle is assumed without proof; when
this is employed to prove something else ; and this is again
applied in some way in support of the first assumed princi-
ple. This is called reasoning in a circle ; and the difficulty
of detecting it is often in proportion to the extent of the
circle, or the number of principles which are thus made to
hang upon one another.

Such an argument as the following would be a fair example of thir^
sort.

1 . The Bible must be true, because miracles were wTOUght in attes-
tation of it.

2. The miracles must have been wrought, because twelve honest
men agree in bearing testimony to them.

3. We know that twelve honest men did unite in this testimony, foi
the Bible says that they did.

Here the reader will perceive that we come round exactly to our first
position. The first proposition is proved by the second, the second
by the third, and the third rests on the truth of the Bible, w^hich is
the ver)" point to be proved. The propositions thus depend upon one
another, and are without any common foundation.

To make the reasoning sound, the last proposition must be establish-
ed on independent evidence ; which is the course always pursued by
writers on the subject, the fact that twelve honest men did thus testify
being established by peculiar evidence, entirely distinct from the mere
assertion of the book itself.

III. A frequent source of fallacy is when a reasoner
assumes a principle, and then launches out into various il-
lustrations and analogies, which are artfully made to bear
the appearance of proofs. The cautions to be kept in mind
in such a case are, that the illustrations may be useful and
the analogies may be of importance, provided the principle
has been proved ; but that if it has not been proved, the il-
lustrations must g-o for nothino:, and even analosfies seldom

Exani})l(- of ii? Kcasouiiic" in a circle, Kxart'i[)ie of it? What necessary in order to
corroci this rca.-3onirjij ? Dcclaraiion insiead of roa:ionin^.

180 REASON. [part lU.

have any weight which can be considered as of the nature
of evidence. Fallacies of this class are most apt to occur
in the declamations of public speakers ; and when they
are set off with all the powers of eloquence, it is often diffi-
cult to detect them. The questions which the hearer
should propose to himself in such cases are, Does this re-
ally contain any proof bearing upon the subject, or is it
mere illustration and analogy, in itself proving nothing? —
if so, has the reasoner previously established his principle
or has he assumed it, and trusted to these analogies as hia
proofs ?

IV. A fallacy somewhat analogous to the preceding con-
sists in arguing for or against a doctrine on the ground of
its supposed tendency, leaving out of view the primary
question of its truth. Thus, a speculator in theology will
contend in regard to a doctrine which he opposes, that it is
derogatory to the character of the Deity ; and, respecting
another which he brings forward, that it represents the
Deity in an aspect more accordant with the benignity of his
character. The previous question in all such cases is, not
what is most accordant vfith our notions respecting the Di-
vine character, but what is truth.

V. When a principle which is true of one case, or one
class of cases, is extended by analogy to others which differ
in some important particulars. The caution to be observed
here is, to inquire strictly whether the cases are analogous,
or whether there exists any difference which makes the
principle not applicable. We have formerly alluded to a
remarkable example of this fallacy in notions relating to
the properties of matter being applied to mind, without at-
tention to the fact that the cases are so distinct as to have
nothing in common. An example somewhat analogous is
found in Mr. Hume's objection to miracles, that they are
violations of the established order of nature. The cases, wc
have seen, are not analogous ; for miracles do not refer to
the common course of nature, but to the operation of an
agency altogether new and peculiar. Arguments founded

Teats to be np[;li(Ml. Ar;:riiing from Icndeiicica ? False rcasohing from analogy?
Kjkdmplce 7 Mr. Hume's argumcnl.

GEC. IV. j FALLACIES IN REASONING. 181

\ipon analogy, therefore, require to be used with the utmost
jaution, when they are employed directly for the discovery
>r the establishment of truth. But there is another purpose
lO w^iich they may be applied wdth much greater freedom,
aamely, for repelling objections. Thus, if we find a per-
son bringing objections against a particular doctrine, it is a
sound and valid mode of reasoning to contend that he re-
ceives doctrines which rest upon the same kind of evidence ;
or that similar objections might be urged with equal force
against truths which it is impossible to call in question. It
is in this manner that the argument from analogy is em-
ployed in the valuable work of bishop Butler. He does not
derive from the analogy of nature any direct argument in
support of natural or revealed religion ; but shows that
many of the objections Avhich are urged against the truths
of religion might be brought against circumstances in the
economy and course of nature which are known and un-
doubted fact^.

VI. A fallacy the reverse of the former is used by sophis-
tical writers ; namely, when two cases are strictly analogous
they endeavor to prove that they are not so by pointing out
trivial differences not calculated in any degree to weaken
the force of the analogy.

VII. When a true general principle is made to apply ex-
clusivel}' to one fact, or one class of f^icts, while it is equally
true of various others. This is called, in logical language,
the non-distribution of the middle term. In an example
given by logical writers, one is supposed to maintain that
corn is necessary for life, because food is necessary for life,
and corn is food. It is true that food is necessary for life,
but this does not apply to any one particular kind of food; it
means only, that food of some kind or other is so. When
simply stated, the fallacy of such a position is at once ob-
vious, but it ma.y be introduced into an argument in such ^
manner as not to be so immediately detected.

VIII. When an acknowledged proposition is inverted,

Proper use of analogy ? Cutler's vise of it ? The reverse of Lhe former ? rsv-udistri-
bution of ihe niidcile lerni ? Ejiample.

16

IS2 REASON. [part III.

and the converse assumed to be equally true. We may
say, for example, that a badly governed country must be
distressed ; but we are not entitled to assume that every
distressed country is badly governed ; for there may be
many other sources of national distress. I may say, " al)
wise men live temperately," but it does not follow that
every man who lives temperately is a wise man. This fal-
lacy was formerly referred to under the syllogism. It is,
at the same lime, to be kept in mind that some propositions
do admit of being inverted, and still remain equally true.
This holds most remarkably of propositions which are uni-
versally negative, as in an example given by writers on
logic. " No ruminating animal is a beast of prey." It
follows, as equally true, that no beast of prey ruminates.
But if I were to vary the proposition by saying, " all ani-
mals which do not ruminate are beasts of prey," this would
be obviously false ; for it does not arise out of the former
statem^ent.

IX. A frequent source of fallacy among sophistical writ-
ers consists in boldly applying a character to a class of
facts, in regard to which it carries a general aspect of truth,
without attention to important distinctions by which the
statement requires to be modified. Thus, it has been ob-
jected to our belief in the miracles of the sacred writings,
that they rest upon the evidence of testimony, and that tes-
timony is fallacious. Now, when we speak of testimony
in general, we may say with an appearance of truth that it
is fallacious ; but, in point of fact, testimony is to be re-
ferred to various species; and, though a large proportion of
these may be fallacious, there is a species of testimony on
which we rely with absolute confidence ; — that is, we feel
it to be as improbable that this kind of testimony should
deceive us, as that we should be disappointed in our expec-
tation of the uniformity of nature. The kind of sophism
now referred to seems to correspond with that which logical
writers have named the fallacy of division. It consists in
applying to facts in their separate state what only belongs

Inversion of a pri^posiiion ? Examples? Can any propoaiiiona be inverted safely 3
InnLieniion to imporianl diiLinctions ? Example Ueply to this 7 Fallacies of division
and composition /

SEC IV.J FALLACIES IN REASONING. 183

to them collectively. The converse of it is the fallacy of
composition. It consists in applying to the facts collec-
tively what belongs only to them, or to some of them, in
their separate state : — as if one were to show that a certain
kind of testimony is absolutely to be relied on, and thence
were to contend that testimony in general is worthy of ab-
solute confidence.

X. A frequent fallacy consists in first overturning an un-
sound argument, and thence reasoning against the doctrine
which this argument was meant to support. This is the
part of a mere casuist, not of a sincere inquirer after truth ;
for it by no means follows that a doctrine is false because
unsound arguments have been adduced in support of it. We
have formerly alluded to some remarkable examples of this
fallacy, especially in regard to those important principles
commonly called first truths ; which, we have seen, admit
of no processes of reasoning, and consequently are in no
degree affected by arguments exposing the fallacy of such
processes. We learn from this, on the other hand, the im-
portance of avoiding all weak and inconclusive arguments,
or doubtful statements ; for, independently of the opening
which they give for sophistical objections, it is obvious that
on other grounds the reasoning is only encumbered by
them. It is the part of the casuist to rest the weight of his
objections on such weak points, leaving out of view those
which he cannot contend with. It may dve^ happen that a
conclusion is true, though the whole reasoning may have
been weak, unsound, and irrelevant. The casuist, of course,
in such a case attacks the reasoning, and not the conclu-
sion. On the other hand, there may be much in an argu-
ment which is true, or which may be conceded ; w^hile the
most important part of it is untrue, and the conclu'sion false.
An inexperienced reasoner, in such a case, thinks it neces-
sary to combat every point, and thus exposes himself to
sound replies from his adversary on subjects which are of
no importance. A skilful reasoner concedes or passes over
all such positions, and rests his attack on those in which

Confounding an argument witli the doctrine it was intended to support. Practical
direction arising from this ? Course to be taken in regard to weak points. Skilf*]
ceasoning.

184 REASON. [part IH.

the fallacy is really involved. An example illustrative of
this subject is familiar to those who are acquainted with
the controversy respecting our idea of cause and effect.
Mr. Hume stated in a clear manner the doctrine that this
idea is derived entirely from our experience of a uniform
sequence of two events; and founded upon this an argument
against our belief in a great First Cause. This led to a
controversy respecting the original doctrine itself; and it is
not many years since it ^vas contended by respectable indi-
viduals that it is nothing less than the essence of atheism
to maintain that our notion of cause and effect originates in
the observation of a uniform sequence. It is now, perhaps,
universally admitted that this doctrine is correct, and that
the sophism of Mr. Hume consisted in deducing from it
conclusions which it in no degree warranted. This impor-
tant distinction we formerly alluded to; namely, that our
idea of cause and effect in regard to any two individual
events is totally distinct from our intuitive impression of
causation, or our absolute conviction that every event musi
have an adequate cause.

XI. A sophism somewhat connected with the former con
sists in disproving a doctrine, and on that account assuming
the opposite doctrine to be true. It may be true, but its
truth does not depend upon the falsehood of that which is
opposed to it ; yet this will be found a principle of not un-
frequent occurrence in unsound reasonings.

XII. Fallacies are often introduced in what may be
termed an oblique manner ; or, as if upon a generally
admitted authority. The effect of this is to take ofl" the
appearance of the statement being made directly by the
author, and resting upon his own authority, by which we
might be led to examine its truth. For this purpose it
is put, perhaps, in the form of a question ; or is intro-
duced by such expressions as the following : — " it is a
remarkable fact," — " it is somewhat singular," — " it has

Example. Mr. Hume's doctrine, and his inference from it? Former opinion of his
doctrine? Present opinion of the doctrine and the inference? Di-^iproving: a doclrina
and inferring the opposite to be true ? Fallacies introduced in an oblique manner J
Eramples

SEC. IV.] FALLACIES IN REASONING. 185

been argued with much justice," — *' it will be generally
admitted," &c.

XIII. Fallacy may arise from leaving the main subject
of discussion, and arguing upon points which have but a
secondary relation to it. This is one of the resources of
the casuist when, he finds himself in the worst of the argru-
ment. Nearly allied to this is the art of skilfully dropping
part of a statement, when the reasoner finds he cannot sup-
port it, and going on boldly with the remainder as if he still
maintained the whole.

XIV. Much of the fallacy and ambiguity of processes of
reasoning depends entirely, as formerly stated, on the use of
terms. This may consist in two contending parties using
the same word in diiTerent meanings without defining what
their meanings are ; in one or both using terms in a sense
different from their commonly recognised acceptation, or in
using them in one sense in one part of the argument, and in
another in a different part of it. Such disputes, according-
ly, are often interminable; and this mode of disputation is
one of the great resources of the casuist, or of him who
argues for victory, not for truth. The remedy is, that every
reasoner shall be required clearly to define the terms which
he employs ; and that in every controversy certain premises
or preliminaries shall be fixed in which the parties are
agreed. The ambiguity of terms is in fact so extensive a
source of fallacy, that scarcely any sophistical argument
will be found free from it ; as in almost every language the
same term is used with great diversity of meanings. Let
us take, for example, the term faith. It means a mere sys-
tem of opinions, confidence in testimony, reliance on the
inteo^rity, fidelity, and stability of character of other beingfs,
an act of the understanding in regard to abstract truth pre-
sented to it, and a mental condition by which truths of an-
other description exert a uniform influence over the moral
feelings, the will, and the whole character. In the contro-
versies which have arisen out of this word, it will probably
be found that these various meanings have not been suffi-

^" — ■.! ■ II ■ -■ ■ I - ,..■■■■_,.- .1,1 ■■II. .i .,i ■ I i ■ . . __,, »■! „ , ^^ . — I I. ■ ■- -- m^

Wandering from the question ? Wrong v,se of terms ? Consequences of it ? HemO'
dy ? Example; terni fait h ?

16^^

186 REASON. [part III.

ciently distinguished from each other. A celebrated pas-
sage in the " Spirit of Laws" has been justly referred to as
a remarkable example of the same kind of sophism. " The
Deity," says Montesquieu, " has his laws ; the material
world, its laws ; intelligences superior to man, their laws ;
the brutes, their laws; man, his laws." In this short pas-
sage the term law^s is employed, probably, in four senses,
remarkably different.

XV. There are various other sources of fallacy, consist-
ing chiefly in the use of arguments which cannot be ad-
mitted as relevant in regard to the process of reasoning,
though they may carry a certain weight in reference to the
individuals concerned. Among these may be reckoned
appeals to high authorities, to popular prejudices, or to the
passions of the multitude ; and w4iat is called the argument
tura ad hominem. If a person, for example, be arguing in
support of a particular rule of conduct, we may retort upon
him that his own conduct in certain instances was in direct
opposition to it. This may be very true in regard to the
individual, but can have no influence in the discussion of
the question.

XVI. One of the most common sources of fallacy con-
sists of distorted views and partial statements ; — such as
facts disguised, modified, or collected on one side of a ques-
tion ; or arguments and authorities adduced in support of
particular opinions, leaving out of view those which tend
to different conclusions. Misstatement, in one form or an-
other, may indeed be considered as a most fruitful source
of controversy ; and, amid the contests of rival disputants,
the chief difficulty which meets the candid inquirer after
truth, is to have the subject presented to his mind without
distortion. Hence the importance, in every inquiry, of
suspending our judgment, and of patiently devoting our-
selves to clear the subject from all imperfect views and
partial statements. Without the most anxious attention to
this rule, a statement may appear satisfactory, and a dc-

Exaniple from the "Spirit of Laws." The argument i/m ad hominem. Example of
vhis ? Incorrect views and slatemonla ? Frequency of it ?

SEC. IV.] MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 187

duction legitimate, which are in fact leading us widely
astray from the truth.

After every possible care in any process of reasoning,
we may still find, in many cases, a degree of doubt, and
even certain varieties of opinion in regard to the import
and bearing of the argument. This arises partly from
actual differences in the power of judging, or what we call,
in common language, vigor of mind ; and partly from
differences in attention, or in the habit of applying the
judgment closely to the elements of an inquiry. Hence
the varieties of opinion that may be held by different indi-
viduals on the same subject, and with the same facts before
them ; and the degree of uncertainty which attends various
processes of reasoning. There is one species of reasoning
which is free from all this kind of uncertainty, namely, the
mathematical ; and the superiority of it depends upon the
following circumstances : —

1. Nothing is taken for granted, or depends upon mere
authority ; and, consequently, there is no room for fallacy
or doubt in regard to the premises on which the reasoning
is founded. No examination of facts is required in any
degree analogous to that which is necessary in physical
science. The mathematician, indeed, proceeds upon as-
sumptions of such a kind that it is in his own pov/er to
clear them from all ambiguity, and from every thing not
connected with the subject.

2. In the farther progress of a mathematical argument,
if we have any doubt of a proposition which is assumed as
the result of a former process, we have only to turn to the
demonstration of it, and be immediately satisfied. Thus,
if any step of a process be founded upon the principle that
all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles, or
that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of
the squares of the two sides, should we have any doubt of
the truth of these conclusions, the demonstration of them is
before us. But if an argument be founded on the principle
that the heavenly bodies attract one another with a force
which is directly as their quantity of matter, and inversely

Some uncertainty unavoidable. Reason for it ? Exception. Grounds of the superiority
of mattiemaiical science ? Nature of the premises ? Evidence easily accessible ? Illu*
trationg of tiiis ?

ISS REASON. [part 111.

as the square of their distance ; this great principle must
be received on the authority of the eminent jnen by whom
it was ascertained, the mass of mankind having neither the
power nor the means of verifying it.

8. All the terms are fully and distinctly defined, and
there is no room for obscurity or ambiguity in regard to
them.

4. The various steps in a process of mathematical reason-
ing follow each other so closely and consecutively, as to
carry a constant conviction of absolute certainty ; and, pro-
vided we are in possession of the necessary premises, each
single step is short, and the result obvious.

5. The proper objects of mathematical reasoning are
quantity and its relations ; and these are capable of being
defined and measured with a precision of w^hich the objects
of other kinds of reasoning are entirely unsusceptible. It
is, indeed, always to be kept in mind, that mathematical
reasoning is only applicable to subjects which can be de-
fined and m.easured in this manner, and that all attempts to
extend it to subjects of other kinds have led to the greatest
absurdities.

Notwithstanding the high degree of precision which thus
distinguishes mathematical reasoning, the study of mathe-
matics does not, as is connnonly supposed, necessarily lead
to precision in other species of reasoning, and still less to
correct investigation in physical science. The explanation
that is given of the fact seems to be satisfiictory. The
mathematician arofues certain conclusions from certain as-
sumptions, rather than from actual ascertained facts ; and
the facts to which he may have occasion to refer are so
simple, and so free from all extraneous matter, that their
truth is obvious, or is ascertained without dilTiculty. By
being conversant with truths of this nature, he does not
learn that kind of caution and severe examination which is
required in physical science, for enabling us to judge
whether the statements on which we proceed are true, and
\vhether they include the whole truth which ouglit to enter
into the investigation. He thus acquires a habit of too
great facility in the admission of data or premises, which is

Use of terms. Regular succession of steps. Objects of mathematical reasoning >
EfTocls of mathematical studies on the mind ? Common error ? Explanation of the facts 7

SEC. IV.] REASONING. 189

the part of every investigation which the physical inquirer
scrutinizes with the most anxious care, and too great con-
fidence in the mere force of reasoning, without adequate
attention to the previous processes of investigation on which
all reasoning must be founded. It has been, accordingly,
remarked by Mr. Stewart, and other accurate observers of
intellectual character, that mathematicians are apt to be
exceedingly credulous, in regard both to opinions and to
matters of testimony ; while, on the other hand, persons
who are chiefly conversant with the uncertain sciences,
acquire a kind of scepticism in regard to statements, which
is apt to lead them into the opposite error. These observa-
tions, of course, apply only to what we may call a mere
mathematician, a character which is now probably rare,
since the close connection was established between the
mathematical and physical sciences in the philosophy of
Newton.

In the various steps constituting a process of reasoning,
or a process of investigation, in any departmient of know-
ledge, our guide is reason or judgment. Its peculiar pro-
vince is to give to each fact or each prmciple a proper
place and due influence in the inquiry, and to trace the real
and true tendency of it in the conclusion. It is, of course,
assisted by other mental operations, as memory, conception,
and abstraction, but especially by attention, or a deliberate
and careful application of the mind to each fact and each
consideration which ought to have a place in the inquiry.
This is entirely a voluntary exercise of the mind, strength-
ened and made easy by habit, or frequent exercise, and
weakened or impaired by disuse or misapplication ; and
there is, perhaps, nothing which has a greater influence in
the formation of character, or in determining the place
which a man is to assume among his fellow-men.

This sound exercise of judgment is widely distinct from
the art of ingenious disputation. The object of the former
is 10 weigh fully and candidly all the relations of things,
and to give to each fact its proper weight in the inquiry ;

Mr. Stewart's remark? To what class does this remark apply? The guide in rea-
Boning. Other powers which assist. Distinction between sound judgment and inge*
nious disputation ?

190 REASON. [part 111

the aim of the latter is to seize with rapidity particular re-
lations, and to find facts bearing upon a particular view of
a subject. This habit when much exercised tends rather tc
withdraw the attention from the cultivation of the former
Thus, it has not unfrequently happened, that an ingenious
pleader has made a bad judge ; and that acute and power-
ful disputants have perplexed themselves by their own
subtleties, till they have ended by doubting of every thing.
The same observation applies to controversial writing ; and
hence the hesitation with which we receive the argfuments
and statements of a keen controvertist, and the necessity of
hearing both sides. In making use of this caution, we may
not accuse the reasoner of any unsound arguments or false
statements. We only charge him with acting the part of
an ingenious pleader, who brings forward the statements
and arguments calculated to favor one side of a question,
and leaves those of the opposite side out of view. The can-
did inquirer, like the just judge, considers both sides, and
endeavors, according to the best of his judgment, to decide
between them. To the same principle we trace the suspi-
cion with which we receive the statements of an author,
who first brings forward his doctrine, and then proceeds to
collect facts in support of it. To a similar process we may
ascribe the paradoxical opinions in which sophistical writers
have landed themselves, often on subjects of the highest im-
portance, and which they have continued to advocate, with
much appearance of an honest conviction of their truth. It
would be unjust to suppose that these writers have alwaj^s
intended to impose upon others ; they have very often im-
posed upon themselves ; but they have done so by their
own voluntary act, in a misapplication of their reasoning
powers. They have directed their attention, exclusively or
chiefly, to one view of a subject, and have neglected to
direct it, with the same care, to the facts and considerations
which tend to support the opposite conclusions.

In regard to the sound exercise of judgment, it is farther
to be remarked, that it may exist without the habit of ob-
serving the various steps in the mental process which is con-

Comparison of the two. Influence of the habit of disputation. Difference betw in
a keen dispuler and a candid inquirer. Self-deception common. Step.s of a m& «I
process sometimes unobserved.

5EC. IV.J ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. 191

lected with it. Thus we find men of that character to
^hich we give the name of strong sound sense, who form
ust and comprehensive conchisions on a subject, without
)eing able to explain to others the chain of thought by which
;hey arrived at them ; and who, when they attempt to do
50, are apt to bewilder themselves, and fall into absurdities.
Such persons, accordingly, are adapted for situations re-
quiring both soundness of judgment and promptitude in
iction ; but they make a bad figure in public speaking or
•easoning. They are, indeed, possessed of a faculty more
^^aluable than any thing that metaphysics or logic can fur-
lish ; but a due attention to these sciences might increase
heir usefulness, by enabling them to communicate to others
;he mental process which led to their decisions. A person
)f this description, according to a well-known anecdote, when
ippointed to a judicial situation in one of the colonies, re-
ceived from an eminent judge the advice to trust to his own
rood sense in forming his opinions, but never to attempt to
>tate the grounds of them. " The judgment," said he, " will
)robably be right, the argument will infallibly be wrong."
^Vhen this strong: sound iudo^ment and correct los^ical habits
ire united in the same individual, they form the character
)f one who arrives at true conclusions on any subject to
vhich his attention is directed, and, at the same time, carries
)thers along with him to a full conviction of their truth.

We have, then, every reason to believe that, thoug-b
,here may be original diiTerences in the power of judgment,
:he chief source of the actual varieties in this important
unction is rather to be found in its culture and regulation.
3n this subject there are various considerations of the high-
est interest, claiming the attention of those who wish to
lave the understandinof trained to the investicration of truth.
Fhese are chiefly referable to two heads, namely, the man-
ler in which the judgment suffers from deficient culture ;
md the manner in which it is distorted by want of due reou-
ation.

I. The judgment is impaired by deficient culture. This

Example. Such individuals qualified for what duties? Means of increasir.g their
isefulness? Aaecdote. Imporiaace of cultivation? Division of the subject? De
icieat culture ?

192 REASON. [p.iilT III.

is exemplified in that listless and indifferent habit of the
mind in which there is no exercise of correct thinking, or
of a close and continued application of the attention to sub-
jects of real importance. The mind is engrossed by frivo-
lities and trifles, or bewildered by the wild play of the ima»
gination ; and, in regard to opinions on the most important
subjects, it either feels a total indifference, or receives them
from others without the exertion of thinkina: or examininor
for itself. The individuals who are thus affected either be-
come the dupes of sophistical opinions imposed upon them
by other men, or spend their lives in frivolous and unworthy
pursuits, with a total incapacity for all important inquiries.
A slinfht detrree removed from this condition of mind is
another, in which opinions are formed on slight and partial
examination, perhaps from viewing one side of a question,
or, at least, without a full and candid direction of the atten-
tion to all the facts which ought to be taken into the in-
quiry. Both these conditions of mind may perhaps origi-
nate partly in constitutional peculiarities or erroneous edu-
cation ; but they are fixed and increased by habit and
indulgence, until, after a certain time, they probably be-
come irremediable. They can be corrected only by a dili-
gent cultivation of the important habit which, in common
language, we call sound and correct thinking ; and which
is of equal value, whether it be applied to the formation of
opinions, or to the regulation of conduct.

II. The judgment is vitiated by want of due regulation ;
and this may be ascribed chiefly to two sources, prejudice
and passion. Prejudice consists in the formation of opi-
nions before the subject has been really examined. By
means of this, the attention is misdirected, and the judgment
biassed, in a manner of which the individual is often in a
crreat measure unconscious. The hisfhest des^ree of it is
exemplified in that condition of the mind in which a man
first forms an opinion which interest or inclination may
have suggested ; then proceeds to collect arguments in sup
port of it ; and concludes by reasoning himself into the be
lief of what he wishes to be true. It is thus that the judg-

113 particular effects ? Coiidiiii^ns of mind formed by ii ? Rtiiicdy. Waui of rer'U'
iaiiori. Sources? Prejudice— wlu: ?

SEC. IV.] ITS CULTURE AXD REGULATiOxN. 1 9o

merit is apt to be misled, ia a c:reatcr or less degree, by par-
ty spirit and personal attachments or antipathies ; and it is
clear that all such influence is directly opposed to its sound
and healthy exercise. The same observations apply to pas-
sion, or the influence exerted by the moral feelings. The
most striking example of this is presented by that depraved
condition of the mind, which distorts the judgment in regard
to the great principles of moral rectitude. " A man's un-
derstanding," says Mr. Locke, " seldom fails him in this
part, unless his will v/ould have it so; if he takes a wrong
course, it is most commonly because he goes wilfully out of
the w^ay, or at least chooses to be bewildered ; and tlicre
are few, if any, who dreadfully mistake, that are willing to
be rio^ht."

These facts are worthy of much consideration, and they
appear to be equally interesting to all classes of men, what-
ever maybe the degree of their mental cultivation, and what-
ever the subjects are to w^hich their attention is more parti-
cularly directed. There is one class of truths to which they
apply with peculiar force, — namely, those which relate to
the moral government of God, and the condition of man as
a responsible being. These great truths and the evidence
on which they are founded, are addressed to our judgment
as rational beings ; they are pressed upon our attention as
^^reatures destined for another state of existence ; and the
sacred duty from which no individual can be absolved, is a
voluntary exercise of his thinking and reasoning powers, —
it is solemnly, seriously, and deliberately to consider. On
these subjects a man may frame any system for himself, and
may rest in that system as truth ; but the solemn inquiry is,
not what opinions he has formed, but in what manner he
has formed them. Has he approached the great inquiry
with a sincere desire to discover the truth ; and has he
brought to it a mind neither misled by prejudice, nor dis-
torted by the condition of its moral feelings ; — has he direct-
ed his attention to all the facts and evidences with an in-
tensity suited to their momentous importance ; and has he
conducted the whole investigation with a deep and serious
feeling that it carries with it an interest which reaches into

Pa-sion ? Locke's remark. Tipportaul applicalioa of these priuciuloj. The real
I'vieiil'o-,) in regard l-) our if'^^iiiioas ?

17

194 REASON. [part III.

eternity ? Truth is immutable and eternal, buj; it may elude
the frivolous or prejudiced inquirer: and, even when he
thinks his conclusions are the result of much examination,
he may be resting his highest concerns in delusion and
falsehood.

The human mind, indeed, even in its highest state of cul-
ture, has been found inadequate to the attainment of the true
knowledge of the Deity; but light from heaven has shone
upon the scene of doubt and of darkness, which will conduct
the humble inquirer through every difficulty, until he arrive
at the full perception and commanding influence of the
truth ; — of truth such as human intellect never could have
reached, and which, to every one who receives it, brings its
own evidence that it comes from God.

Finally, the sound exercise of judgment has a remarka-
ble influence in producing and maintaining that tranquillity
of mind which results from a due application of its powers,
and a correct estimate of the relations of thino^s. The want
of this exercise leads a man to be unduly engrossed with the
frivolities of life, unreasonably elated by its joys, and unrea-
sonably depressed by its sorrows. A sound and Avell regu-
lated judgment tends to preserve from all such dispropor-
tioned pursuits and emotions. It does so, by leading us to
view all present things in their true relations, to estimate
aright their relative value, and to fix the degree of atten-
tion of which they are worthy ; — it does so, in a more espe-
cial manner, by leading us to compare the present life,
which js so rapidly passing over us, with the paramount
iinoortance and overwhelmino^ interest of the life which is
to come.

The trtUh within ihe reach of every mind. EtTect of" sound judgment in produ uig
"nen'.al irancuilliiy. How does it produce iliia efieci ?

SEC. IV. J REASON. 195

OF THE USE OF REASON IN CORRECTING THE IMPRESSIONS OF
THE MIND IN REGARD TO EXTERNAL THINGS.

This subject leads to an investigation of great and exten-
sive interest, of which I cannot hope to give more than a
slight and imperfect outline. My anxiety is, that what is
attempted may be confined to authentic facts, and the most
cautious conclusions ; and that it may be of some use in
leading to farther inquiry.

We have seen the power which the mind possesses of re-
calling the vivid impressions of scenes or events long gone
by, in that mental process which we call conception. We
have seen also its power of taking the elements of actual
scenes, and forming them into new combinations, so as to
represent to itself scenes and events which have no real ex-
istence. We have likewise observed the remarkable man-
ner in which persons, events, or scenes, long past, perhaps
forgotten, are recalled into the mind by means of associa-
tion ; — trains of thought taking possession of the mind in a
manner which we often cannot account for, and bringing
back facts or occurrences which had long ceased to be ob-
jects of attention. These remarkable processes are most
apt to take place when the mind is in that passive state
which we call a revery ; and they are more rarely observed
when the attention is actively exerted upon any distinct and
continued subject of thought.

During the presence in the mind of such a representation,
whether recalled by conception or association, or fabricated
by imagination, there is probably, for the time, a kind of
belief of its real and present existence. But, on the least
return of the attention to the affairs of life, the vision is in-
stantly dissipated ; and this is done by reason comparing
the vision with the actual state of things in the external
world. The poet or the novelist, it is probable, feels him-

Caution in regard to the ensuing discussion 7 Conception ? Imagination ? Associa-
tion ? In what state of mind are these processes most frequently performed? Belief
of the reality of these represenUitions. How dispelled ?

106 REASON. [pari III.

self, for the time, actually imbodied in the person of his he-
ro, and in that character iudaes, talks, and acts in the scene
which lie is depicting. This we call imagination ; but were
the vision not to be dissipated on his return to the ordinary-
relations of life, — were he then to act in a single instance
in the character of the being of his imagination, — this would
constitute insanity.

The condition of mind here referred to does actually take
place; namely, a state in which the visions or impressions
of the mind itself are believed to have a real and present
existence in the external world, and in which reason fails to
correct this belief by the actual relations of external thinors.
There are two conditions in which this occurs in a strikino-
manner; namely, insanity and dreaming. Considered as
mental phenomena, they have a remarkable affinity to each
other. The great difference between them is, that in in-
sanity the erroneous impression being permanent, affects
the conduct ; whereas, in dreaming, no influence on tl>e
conduct is produced, because the vision is dissipated upon
awaking. The difference, again, between the mind under
the influence of imagination, and in the state now under
consideration, is, that in the former the vision is built up by
a voluntary effort, and is varied or dismissed at pleasure;
while in dreaming and insanity this power is suspended
and the mind is left entirely under the influence of the chain
of thoughts w^hich happens to be present, without being able
either to vary or dismiss it. The particular chain or series
seems, in general, perhaps always, to depend upon associa-
tions previously formed ; the various elements of which
bring up one another in a variety of singular combinations,
and in a manner which we often cannot trace, or in any
decree account for. The facts connected with this brtmch
of the subject form one of the most interesting parts of this
investigation.

There are some other affections which come under the
same class ; but insanity and dreaming are the t^vo extreme
examples. In dreaming, the bodily senses are in a great
measure shut up from external impressions ; and the influ-
ence of the will upon bodily motions is also suspended, so

Example. The vi.sion sometimes not dissipated. Two cases? Stale of the mind m
Ihesj caae3 ? ^'late of ihc bodily senses in dreaming ?

SEC. IV.] REASON. 197

that no actions in general follow. We shall afterward see
that there are exceptions to this ; but it is the common state
in dreaming. In insanity, on the other hand, the bodily
senses are awake to impressions from without, and bodily
motion is under the influence of the will ; hence the maniac
acts, under his erroneous impressions, in a manner which
often makes him dangerous to the community. There is
an affection Avhich holds an intermediate place between
these two extremes, and presents a variety of interesting
phenomena. This is somnambulism. It differs from dream-
ing, in the senses being, to a certain degree, awake to
external things ; though that power is suspended by which
the mental impressions are corrected by the influence of
the external world. Thus, the somnambulist often under-
stands what is said to him, and can converse with another
person in a tolerably connected manner, though always
with some reference to his erroneous mental impressions.
He acts, also, under the influence of these ; but the remark-
able difl^erence between him and the maniac is, that the
somnambulist can be roused from his vision, and then the
whole is dissipated. There are cases, indeed, in which the
hallucination is more permanent, and cannot be at once in-
terrupted in this manner: — these of course come to border
on insanity.

There is still a fourth condition connected with this curi-
ous subject ; namely, that in which a person awake, and in
other respects in possession of his rational powers, perceives
spectral illusions. This, we shall see, is allied in a singu-
lar manner to the affections now referred to.

The subject, therefore, divides itself into four parts, which
will form the separate topics of the following observa-
tions : —

1. Dreamincf.

2. Somnambulism.

3. Insanity.

4. Spectral Illusions.

The causes of these remarkable conditions of the mental
unctions are entirely beyond the reach of our inquiries;

In insanity ? Somnambulism. lis nature ? Illustration of this. More or less per-
manent. Fourth condition ? Recapitulation.

17#

198 REASON. [part III

but the phenomena connected with them present a subject
of most interesting investigation.

I. DREAMING.

The peculiar condition of the mind in dreaming appears
to be referable to tAVO heads : —

1. The impressions which arise in the mind are believed
to have a real and present existence ; and this belief is not
corrected, as in the waking state, by comparing the concep-
tion with the things of the external world.

2. The ideas or imaores in the mind follow one another
according to associations over which we have no control ;
we cannot, as in the waking state, vary the series, or stop
it at our will.

One of the most curious objects of investigation is to
trace the manner in which the particular visions or series
of images arise. When considered in this viev.^ a great
variety may be observed in dreams. Some of those which
we are able to trace most distinctly, appear to be the fol-
io win 2" ' —

I. Recent events, and recent mental emotions, mingled up
into one continuous series with each other, or with old
events, by means of some feeling which had been in a
greater or less degree allied to each of them, though in
other respects they vrere entirely unconnected. We hear,
perhaps, of a distressing accident ; we have received some
unpleasant news of an absent friend ; and we have been
concerned in some business which gave rise to anxiety : a
dream takes place, in which all these are combined toge-
ther; we are ourselves connected with the accident; the
absent friend is in our company ; and the person with whom
the business was transacted also appears in the scene.
The only bond of union among these occurrences was,
that each of them gave rise to a similar kind of emotion ;
and the train was probably excited by some bodily feeling
of uneasiness, perhaps an oppression at the stomach, at the

Condition of the rnind in dreaming, iiow referred? Sources of the images which aris*
in dreaming 7 Recent events or enioliond. Examples /

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 199

time when the dream occurred. Without this, the particu-
lar series might not have take place at all ; or some of the
elements of it might have occurred in a totally different
association. The absent friend might have appeared in
connection with old and pleasing recollections, combined
perhaps with persons and events associated with these, and
without any reference to the painful intelligence by which
the attention had been directed to him. We meet a person
whom we have not seen for many years, and are led to in-
quire after old friends, and to allude to events long past.
Dreams follow, in which these persons appear, and othei
persons and occurrences connected with them ; but the in-
dividual, whose conversation gave rise to the series, does
not appear in it, because he was not connected Vv^th the
particular chain of events which was thus recalled into the
mind.

A woman who was a patient in the clinical ward of the
infirmary of Edinburgh, under the care of Dr. Duncan,
talked a great deal in her sleep, and made numerous and
very distinct allusions to the cases of other sick persons.
These allusions did not apply to any patients who were in
the ward at that time ; but, after some observation, they
were found to refer correctly to the cases of individuals
who were there when this woman was a patient in the ward
two years before.

II. Trains of images brought up by association v/ith
bodily sensations. Examples of this kind are of frequent
occurrence. By the kind attention of my friend Dr. James
Gregory, I have received a most interesting manuscript by
his late eminent father, v/hich contains a variety of curious
matter on this subject. In this paper, Dr. Gregory men-
tions of himself that, having on one occasion gone to bed
with a vessel of hot water at his feet, he dreamed of walk-
ing up the crater of mount Etna, and of feeling the ground
warm under him. He had at an early period of his life
visited mount Vesuvius, and actually felt a strong sensation
of warmth in his feet when walking up the side of the cra-
ter ; but it was remarkable that the dream was not of Ye-

Story of Dr. Duncan's patient. Image.^ brought up by bodily sensations 7 Storv ci
tlie effect of hot water at the feet.

200 REASON. [PAKT HI.

savius, but of Etna, of which he had onl/ read Brydone's
description. This was probably from the hitter impression
having been the more recent. On another occasion, he
dreamed of spending a winter at Hudson's Bay, and of
suffering much distress from the intense frost. He found
that he had thrown off' the bed-clothes in his sleep ; and, a
few days before, he had been reading a very particular
account of the state of the colonies in that country during
winter. Again, when suff^ering from toothache, he dreamed
of undergoing the operation of tooth-drawing, with the ad-
ditional circumstance that the operator drew a sound tooth,
leaving the aching one in its place. But the most striking
anecdote in this interesting document is one in which simi-
lar dreams were produced in a gentleman and his wife, at
the same time, and by the same cause. It happened at the
period when there was an alarm of French invasion, and
almost every man in Edinburgh was a soldier. All things
had been arranged in expectation of the landing of an ene-
my; the first notice of w4iich was to be given by a gun
from the castle, and this was to be followed by a chain of
signals calculated to alarm the country in all directions.
Further, there had been recently in Edinburgh a splendid
military spectacle, in which five thousand men had been
drawn up in Prince's street, fronting the castle. The gen-
tleman to whom the dream occurred, and wlio had been a
most zealous volunteer, was in bed between two and three
o'clock in the morning, when he dreamxd of hearing the
signal gun. He was immediately at the castle, witnessed
the proceedings for displaying the signals, and saw and
heard a great bustle over the town from troops and artillery
assembling, especially in Prince's street. At this time he
was roused by his wife, who awoke in a fright in conse-
quence of a similar dream, connected with much noise and
the landing^ of an enemy, and concludincr with the death of
a particular friend of her husband's, who had served with
him as a volunteer during^ the late war. The ori^riii of this
remarkable concurrence was ascertained, in the morning,
to be the noise produced in the room above by the fall of
a pair of tongs which had been left in some very awkward
position in support of a clothes-screen. Dr. Kcid relates

Other ex.imples. Story of the Eilinburgh p^cnilcman and liis wife ?

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 201

of himself, that the dressing applied after a blister on his
head having become ruffled so as to produce considerable
uneasiness, he dreamed of falling into the hands of savages
and being scalped by them.

To this part of the subject are to be referred some re-
markable eases in which, in particular individuals, dreams
can be produced by whispering into their ears when they
are asleep. One of the most curious as well as authentic
examples of this kind has been referred to by several wri-
ters : I find the particulars in the paper of Dr. Gregory,
and they were related to him by a gentleman who witness-
ed them. The subject of it was an officer in the expedition
to Louisburg in 1758, who had this peculiarity in so re-
markable a degree, that his companions in the transport
were in the constant habit of amusing themselves at his
expense. They could produce in him any kind of dream
by whispering into his ear, especially if this was done by
a friend with whose voice he was familiar. At one time
they conducted him through the whole progress of a quarrel,
which ended in a duel ; and, when the parties were sup-
posed to be met, a pistol was put into his hand, which he
fired, and was awakened by the report. On another occa-
sion they found him asleep on the top of a locker or bunker
in the cabin, when they made him believe he had fallen
overboard, and exhorted him to save himself by swimming.
He immediately imitated all the motions of swimming.
They then told him that a shark was pursuing him, and
entreated him to dive for his life. He instantly did so with
such force as to throw himself entirely from the locker upon
the cabin floor, by which he was much bruised, and awaken-
ed of course. After the landing of the army at Louisburg,
his friends found him one day asleep in his tent, and evi-
dently much annoyed by the cannonading. They then
made him believe that he was engaged, when he expressed
great fear, and showed an evident disposition to run away.
Against this they remonstrated, but at the same time in-
creased his fears by imitating the groans of the wounded
and the dying ; and when he asked, as he often did, who
was down, they named his particular friends. At last they

Effect of a blister 7 Producing dreams, in particular individuals ? Case of the officer 5
Various experiments tried upon him.

202 RKASON. [part III.

told him that the man next himself in the Ime had fallen,
when he instantly sprang from his bed, rushed out of the tent,
and was roused from his danger and his dream together by
falling over the tent-ropes. A remarkable circumstance in
this case was, that after these experiments he had no distinct
recollection of his dreams, but only a confused feeling of
oppression or fatigue ; and used to tell his friends that Iig
was sure they had been playing some trick upon him. A
case entirely similar is related in Smellie's Natural Histo-
ry, the subject of Vvdiicli was a medical student at the uni-
versity of Edinburgh.

A singular fact has often been observed in dreams Avhich
are excited by a noise : namely, that the same sound
awakes the person, and produces a dream which appears to
him to occupy a considerable time. The following example
of this has been related to me : — A gentleman dreamed that
he had enlisted as a soldier, joined his regiment, deserted,
was apprehended, carried back, tried, condemned to be
shot, and at last led out for execution. After all the usual
preparations a gun was fired ; he awoke with the report,
and found that a noise in an adjoining room had both pro-
duced the dream and awakened him. The same want of
the notion of time is observed in dreams from other causes.
Dr. Gregory mentions a gentleman, who, after sleeping in a
damp place, was for a long time liable to a feeling of suffo-
cation whenever he slept in a lying posture ; and this was
always accompanied by a dream of a skeleton which grasp-
ed him violently by the throat. He could sleep in a sitting
posture without any uneasy feeling; and after trying
various expedients he at last had a sentinel placed beside
him, with orders to awake him w^henever he sunk down.
On one occasion he was attacked by the skeleton, and a
severe and long struggle ensued before he awoke. On
findinof fault with his attendant for allowinof him to lie so
long in such a state of suffering, he was assured that he
had not lain an instant, but had been awakened the mo-
ment he began to sink. The gentleman after a considera-
ble time recovered from the affection. A friend of mine
> «

Hi3 recollections afterwards? Remarkable fact respeciiiii: pc^rsons awakened by a
noise. Example ? Dr. Gregory's instance ? Instances illiistraling mistakes as to lime
In sleep?

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 203

dreamed that he crossed the Atlantic, and spent a fortnight
in America. In embarking on his return, he fell into the
sea ; and, having awoke witii the fright, discovered that lie
had not been asleep above ten minutes.

III. Dreams consistinof of the revival of old associations
respecting things which had entirely passed out of the mind,
and which seemed to have been forgotten. It is often im-
possible to trace the manner in which these dreams arise ;
and some of the facts connected with them scarcely appear
referable to any principle with which we are at present ac-
quainted. The following example occurred to a particular
friend of mine, and may be relied upon in its most minute
particulars : —

The gentleman was at the time connected with one of
the principal banks in Glasgow, and was at his place at the
teller's table, w^iere money is paid, when a person entered
demanding payment of a sum of six pounds. There were
several people waiting, who were, in turn, entitled to be
attended before him ; but he was extremely impatient, and
rather noisy ; and, being besides a remarkable stammerer,
he became so annoying, that another gentleman requested
m}^ friend to pay him his money and get rid of him. He
did so, accordingly, but with an expression of impatience at
being obliged to attend to him before his turn, and thought
no more of the transaction, ilt the end of the year, which
was eight or nine months after, the books of the bank could
not be made to balance, the deficiency being exactly six
pounds. Several days and nights had been spent in endea-
voring to discover the error, but without success ; when, at
last, my friend returned home, much fatigued, and went to
bed. He dreamed of being at his place in the bank, and
the whole transaction Vv^th the stammerer, as nov/ detailed,
passed before him in all its particulars. He awoke under a
full impression that the dream was to lead him to a dis-
covery of what he was so anxiously in search of; and, on
examination, soon discovered that the sum paid to this
person in the manner now mentioned, had been neglected
to be inserted in the book of interests, and that it exactly
accounted for the error in tlie balance.

Revival of fjr^KUc.i a^.so'cidii'Jnc'. Ca.o'c ofihe teller of a bank.

204 REASON. [part IH.

This case, upon a little consideration, will appear to be
exceedingly remarkable, because the impression recalled in
this singular manner was one of which there was no con-
sciousness at the time V.' hen it occurred; and, consequently,
we cannot suppose that any association took place which
could have assisted in recalling it. For the fact upon
which the importance of the case rested was, not his hav-
ing paid the money, but having neglected to insert the
payment. Now of this there was no impression made upon
the mind at the time, and we can scarcely conceive on
what principle it could be recalled. The deficiency being
six pounds, we ma.y, indeed, suppose the gentleman endea-
voring to recollect whether there could have been a pay-
ment of this sum made in any irregular manner which could
have led to an omission, or an error ; but in the transac-
tions of an extensive bank, in a great commercial city, a
payment of six pounds, at the distance of eight or nine
months, could have made but a very faint impression ; and
upon the whole, the case presents, perhaps, one of the most
remarkable mental phenomena connected with this curious
subject. The following is of the same nature, though much
less extraordinary, from the shortness of the interval ; and
it may perhaps be considered as a simple act of memory,
though, for the same reason as in the former case, we can-
not trace any association which could have recalled the
circumstance : — A g^entleman w^ho was appointed to an
ofhce in one of the principal banks in Edinburgh found, on
balancing his first day's transactions, that the money under
his charge was deficient by ten pounds. After many fruit-
less attempts to discover the cause of the error, he went
home, not a little annoyed by the result of his first experi-
ment in banking. In the night he dreamed that he was at
ills place in the bank, and that a gentleman who w^r.s per-
sonally known to him presented a draught for ten pounds.
On avv'aking, he recollected the dream, and also recollected
that the gentleman who appeared in it had actually receiv-
ed ten pounds. On goinc^ to the bank, he found that he
had neglected to enter the payment, and that the gentle-
man's order had by accident fallen among some pieces of

Reiiiarkd!)lc iirGiim;U&nce in lUis case i Auolhcr similar e.vaniijle.

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 205

paper, which had been thrown on the floor to be swept
away.

I have formerly referred to some remarkable cases in
v/hich lanofuaofes lonof forgrotten were recovered durino- a
state of delirium. Something very analogous seems to oc-
cur in dreaming, of which I have received the following
example from an able and intelligent friend. In his youth
he was very fond of the Greek language, and made consi-
derable progress in it ; but afterwards, being actively en-
gaged in other pursuits, he so entirely forgot it that he can-
not even read the words. But he has often dreamed of
reading Greek works which he had been accustomed to use
at college, and with a m.ost vivid impression of fully under-
standing them.

A further, and most interesting illustration of the class of
dreams referred to under this head, is found in an anecdote
lately published by the distinguished author of the Waverly
novels, and considered by him as authentic : — " Mr. R. of
Bowland, a gentleman of landed property in the vale of Ga-
la, was prosecuted for a very considerable sum, the accumu-
lated arrears of teind, (or tithe,) for which he was said to
be indebted to a noble family, the titulars, (lay impropria-
tors of the tithes.) Mr. R. was strongly impressed with
the belief that his father had, by a form of process peculiar
to the law of Scotland, purchased these lands fj^om the titu-
lar, and therefore that the present prosecution was ground-
less. But after an industrious search among his father's
papers, an investigation of the public records, and a care-
ful inquiry among all persons who had transacted lavv^-busi-
ness for his father, no evidence could be recovered to sup-
port his defence. The period was now near at hand when
he conceived the loss of his lav/suit to be inevitable, and he
had formed his determination to ride to Edinburgh next day,
and make the best bargain he could in the way of compro-
mise. He went to bed with this resolution, and with all
the circumstances of the case floating upon his mind, had
a dream to the follov/ing purpose : — His father, who had
been many years dead, appeared to him, he thought, and
asked him why he was disturbed in his mind. In dreams

Knowledge of languages revived in dreams. Example. Anecdote related by Walter
Scoit. Narrate all the circurastanees.

18

206 REASON. [part III.

men are not surprised at such apparitions. Mr. R. thought
that he informed his father of the cause of his distress, add-
ing that the payment of a considerable sum of money was
the more unpleasant to him, because he had a strong con-
sciousness that it was not due, though he was unable to re-
cover an 3^ evidence in support of his belief. ' You are
right, my son,' replied the paternal shade; 'I did acquire
right to these teinds, for payment of which you are now
prosecuted. The papers relating to the transaction are in

the hands of Mr. , a writer (or attorney) who is now

retired from professional business, and resides at Inveresk,
near Edinburgh. He was a person whom I employed on
that occasion for a particular reason, but who never, on
any other occasion, transacted business on my account. It

is very possible,' pursued the vision, * that ]\Ir. may have

forgotten a matter which is now of a very old date ; but
you may call it to his recollection by this token, that when
I came to pay his account, there was difficulty in getting
change for a Portugal piece of gold, and that we were
forced to drink out the balance at a tavern.'

" Mr. R. awoke in the morning, with all the words of
his vision imprinted on his mind, and thought it worth while
to ride across the country to Inveresk, instead of going
6traig"ht to Edinburoh. When he canie there he waited
on the gentleman mentioned in the dream, a very old man ;
without saying any thing of the vision, he inquired whether
he remembered having conducted such a matter for his
deceased father. The old gentleman could not at first
bring the circumstance to his recollection ; but, on mention
of the Portugal piece of gold, the whole returned upon his
memory ; he made an imniediate search for the papers, and
recovered them, — so that Mr. R. carried to Edinburgh the
documents necessary to gain the cause which he was on
the verge of losing."

There is every reason to believe that this very interest-
ing case is referable to the principle lately mentioned : that
tiic gentleman had heard the circumstances from his father,
but liad entirely forgotten them, until the frequent and in-
tense application of his mind to the subject with wliich they
were connected at length gave rise to a train of associa-

Prin' iolo iilu6lraii;J by ihi3 ca:;.-. 7 E\]j'.a.:.j.liun of :l?

SEC. IV.J • DREAMING. 207

tion which recalled them in the dream. To the same prin-
ciple are referable the two following anecdotes, which 1
have received as entirely authentic. A gentleman of the
law in Edinburgh had mislaid an important paper, relating
to some affairs on which a public meeting was soon to be
held. He had been making most anxious search for it for
many days ; but the evening of the day preceding that on
which the meetinsf was to be held had arrived, without his
being able to discover it. He v/ent to bed under great anx-
iety and disappointment, and dreamed that the paper was
in a box appropriated to the papers of a particular family,
with which it was in no way connected : it was accor-
dingly found there in the morning. — Another individual,
connected with a public office, had mislaid a paper of such
importance, that he was threatened with the loss of his
situation if he did not produce it. After a long but unsuc-
cessful search, under intense anxiety, he also dreamed of
discovering the paper in a particular place, and found it
there accordingly.

IV. A class of dreams which presents an interesting sub-
ject of observation includes those in which a strong pro-
pensity of character, or a strong mental emotion, is imbodi-
ed into a dream, and by some natural coincidence is fulfil-
led. A murderer mentioned by Mr. Combe had dreamed
of committing murder some years before the event took
place. But more remarkable still are those instances, many
of them authentic, in which a dream has given notice of
an event which was occurring at the time, or occurred soon
after. The following story has been long mentioned in
Edinburgh, and there seems no reason to doubt its authen-
ticity:— A clergyman had come to this city from a short
distance in the country, and was sleeping at an inn, when
he dreamed of seeing a fire, and one of his children in the
midst of it. He awoke with the impression, and instantly
left town on his return home. When he arrived within
sight of his house, he found it on fire, and got there in time
to assist in saving one of his children, who, in the alarm
and confusion, had been left in a situation of danger. With-

Case of the Edinburgh lawyer. Dreams resulting from some strong propensity of
character. Case mentioned by Mr. Combe ? Case of the clergyman ?

208 REASON. [part III.

out calling in question the possibility of supernatural com-
munication in such cases, this striking occurrence, of which
I believe there is little reason to doubt the truth, may per-
haps be accounted for on simple and natural principles. Let
us suppose, that the gentleman had a servant who had
shown great carelessness in regard to fire, and had often
given rise in his mind to a strong apprehension that he
might set fire to the house. His anxiety might be increased
by being from home, and the same circumstance might
make the servant still more careless. Let us farther sup-
pose that the gentleman, before going to bed, had, in addi-
tion to this anxiety, suddenly recollected that there was on
that day, in the neighborhood of his house, some fair or pe-
riodical merry-making, from which the servant was very
likely to return home in a state of intoxication. It was
most natural that these impressions should be imbodied in-
to a dream of his house beinof on fire, and that the same
circumstances mis^lit lead to the dream beinof fulfilled.

A g-entleman in Edinburorh was affected with aneurism of
the popliteal artery, for which he was under the care of two
eminent surgeons, and the day was fixed for the operation.
About two days before the time appointed for it, the wife of
the patient dreamed that a change had taken place in the
disease, in consequence of which the operation would not
be required. On examining the tumor in the morning, the
gentleman was astonished to find that the pulsation had en-
tirely ceased ; and, in short, this turned out to be a sponta-
neous cure. To persons not professional it may be right to
mention that the cure of popliteal aneurism without an ope-
ration is a very uncommon occurrence, not happening in one
out of numerous instances, and never to be looked upon as
probable in any individual case. It is likely, however, that
the lady had heard of the possibility of such a termination,
and that her anxiety had very naturally imbodied this into
a dream ; the fulfilment of it at the very time when the
event took place is certainly a very remarkable coinci-
dence. The following anecdotes also I am enabled to give
as entirely authentic. A lady dreamed that an aged female
relative had been murdered by a black servant, and th^-
dream occurred more than once. She was then so in?

Explanation of it? The Edinburgh patient. Narrate the circumatancea.

SEC. lY.] DREABIING. 209

pressed by it that she went to the house of the lady to
whom it related, and prevailed apon a gentleman to watch
in an adjoining room during the following night. About
three o'clock in the morning, the gentleman, hearing foot-
steps on the stairs, left his place of concealment, and met
the servant carrying up a quantity of coals. Being ques-
tioned as to where he was going, he replied, in a confused
and hurried manner, that he was going to mend his mis-
tress' fire, — which, at three o'clock in the morning, in the
middle of summer, was evidentlj^ impossible ; and, on further
investio^ation, a strono^ knife was found concealed beneath
the coals. Another lady dream.ed that a boy, her nephew,
had been drowned along with some young companions with
whom he had ens^aoed to oo on a sailinof excursion in thp
Frith of Forth. She sent for him in the morning, and, with
much difficulty, prevailed upon him to give up his engage-
ment : his companions went and were all drowned. A
gentleman dreamed that the devil carried him down to the
bottom of a coal-pit, where he threatened to burn him, un-
less he would agree to give himself up to his service. This
he refused to do, and a warm altercation followed. He was
at last allowed to depart, upon condition of sending down an
individual whom the devil named, a worthless character
well known in the neighborhood. A few days after, this
person was found drowned, and under circumstances which
gave every reason to believe that his death had been volun-
tar3^ A lady in Edinburgh had sent her watch to be re-
paired : a long time elapsed without her being able to reco-
ver it, and, after many excuses, she began to suspect that
something was wrong. She now dreamed that the watch-
maker's boy, by whom the watch was sent, had dropped it
in the street, and injured it in such a manner that it could
not be repaired. She then went to the master, and, with-
out any allusion to her dream, put the question to him di-
rectly; when he confessed that it was true.

Such coincidences derive their wonderful character from
standing alone and apart from those numerous instances in
which such dreams take place without any fulfilment. An
instance of a very singular kind is mentioned by Mr. Joseph

Dream of a murder. Danger of drowning apparently foretold by a dreain. Other
cases ? Ttxe lady and her watch.

810 • REASON. [part HI.

Taylor, and is given by him as an undoubted fact. A young
man who was at an academy a hundred miles frcm home
dreamed that he went to his father's house in the niglit,
tried the front-door, but found it locked ; got in by a back-
door, and finding nobody out of bed, went directly to the
bedroom of his parents. He then said to his mother, whom
he found awake, " Mother, I am going a long journey, and
am come to bid you good-bye." On this she answered,
under much agitation, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead!" He
instantly awoke, and thought no more of his dream, until,
a few days after, he received a letter from his father inquir-
ing very anxiously after his health, in consequence of a
frightful dream his mother had on the same night in which
the dream now mentioned occurred to him. She dreamed
that she heard some one attempt to open the front-door,
then go to the back-door, and at last come into her bed-
room. She then saw it was her son, who came to the side
of her bed, and said, " Mother, I am going a long journey,
and am come to bid you good-bye ;" on which she exclaim-
ed, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead !" But nothing unusual
happened to any of the parties. The singular dream must
have originated in some strong mental impression which
had been made on both the individuals about the same time ;
and to have traced the source of it would have been a mat-
ter of great interest.

On a similar principle, we are to account for some of the
stories of second sight : — a gentleman sitting by the fire on
a stormy night, and anxious about some of his domestics
who are at sea in a boat, drops asleep for a few seconds,
dreams very naturally of drowning men, and starts up with
an exclamation that his boat is lost. If the boat returns in
safety, the vision is no more thought of. If it is lost, as is
very likely to happen, the story passes for second sight ;
and it is, in fact, one of the anecdotes that are given as the
most authentic instances of it.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples of the fulfilment of
dreams on the principles which have now been mentioned ;
but I am induced to add the following, as it is certainly of
a very interesting kind, and as I am enal)led to give it as

Cas'.' of the academy sUideiil? Kclalo the circunislances. Explanation. Second
■Ighl, bow explained.

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 2H

entirely authentic in all its particulars. A most respectable
clergyman in a country parish of Scotland, made a collec-
tion at his church for an object of public benevolence, in
which he felt very deeply interested. The amount of the
collection, which was received in ladles carried through the
church, fell greatly short of his expectation ; and, during
the evening of the day, he frequently alluded to this with
expressions of much disappointment. In the following
night he dreamed that three one-pound notes had been left
in one of the ladles, having been so compressed that they
had stuck in the corner when the ladle was emptied. He
was so impressed by the vision, that at an early hour in the
morning he went to the church, found the ladle which he
had seen in his dream, and drew from one of the corners of
it three one-pound notes. This interesting case is perhaps
capable of explanation upon simple principles. It appears,
that on the evening preceding the day of the collection,
the clergyman had been amusing himself by calculating
vvhat sum his congregation would probably contribute, and
tiiat in doing so he had calculated on a certain number of
families, who would not give him less than a pound each.
Let us then suppose that a particular ladle, which he knew
to have been presented to three of these families, had been
emptied in his presence, and found to contain no pound
notes Flis first feeling would be that of disappointment ;
but, in aftervv^ard thinking of the subject, and connecting it
with his former calculation, the possibility of the ladle not
having been fully emptied might dart across his mind. This
impression, which perhaps he did not himself recollect,
might then be imbodied into the dream, which, by a natural
coincidence, was fulfilled.

The four classes which have now been mentioned appear
to include the principal varieties of dreams ; and it is often
a matter of great interest to trace the manner in which the
particular associations arise. Cases of dreams are indeed
on record, which are not referable to any of the principles
which have been mentioned, and which do not admit of
explanation on any principles which we are able to trace.

The clergyman and the charitable collection. Relate the whole case. Do these
classes include all ? Other cases on record ?

212 REASON. [part UI.

Many of these histories, there is every reason to believe,
derive their marvellous character from embellishment and
exaggeration ; and in some instances which have been re-
lated to me in the most confident manner, I have found
this to be the case after a little investigation. Others,
however, do not admit of this explanation, and we are com-
pelled to receive them as facts which we can in no degree
account for. Of this kind I shall only add the following
example; and I shall do so without any attempt at expla-
nation, and without any other comment than that its accu-
racy may be relied on in all its particulars. Two ladies,
sisters, had been for several days in attendance upon their
brother, who was ill of a common sore throat, severe and
protracted, but not considered as attended with danger. At
the same time, one of them had borrowed a watch from
a female friend, in consequence of her own being under
repair ; — this watch was one to which particular value was
attached on account of some family associations, and some
anxiety was expressed tliat it might not m.eet with any in-
jury. The sisters were sleeping together in a room com-
municating with that of their brother, when the elder of
them awoke in a state of great agitation, and having roused
the other, told her that she had had a frightful dream. " I
dreamed," said she, " that IMary's watch stopped ; and
that, Avhen I told you of the circumstance, you replied, much
worse than that has happened, for 's breath has stop-
ped also," — naming their brother who was ii). To quiet
her agitation, the younger sister immediately got up, and
found the brother sleeping quietly, and the watch, which
had been carefully put by in a drawer, going correctly. The
following night the very same dream occurred, followed by
similar agitation, which was again composed in the same
manner, — the brother being again found in a quiet sleep,
and the watch going well. On the following morning,
soon after the family had breakfasted, one of the sisters was
sitting by her brother, while the other was writing a note
in the adjoining room. When her note was ready for
being sealed, she was proceeding to take out, for this pur-
pose, the watch alluded to, v/hich had been put by in her

Their crcdibiliiy. Are some unaccoimlahle ? Example; the Uvo latlies. Relate lh»
whole story .

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 213

writing-desk, — she was astonished to find it had stopped.
At the same instant she heard a scream of intense distress
from her sister in the other room, — their brother, who had
still been considered as going on favorably, had been seized
with a sudded fit of suffocation, and had just breathed
his last.

There are various other circumstances relating to the
philosophy of dreams, which may be mentioned very
briefly. It has been alleged that we never dream of ob-
jects which we have not seen. On this I cannot decide ;
but we certainly dream of things in combinations in which
they never occurred to us. Our dreams appear to be very
much influenced by the intensity of our conceptions, and,
in this respect, there is great variety in regard to the ob-
jects of the different senses. Our most vivid conceptions
are certainly of objects of sight ; and they appear to be
much less distinct in regard to tastes, smells, and even
sounds. Accordingly, I think dreams are chiefly occupied
with objects of sight ; and I am not sure that we dream of
tastes, or smells, or even of sounds, except when a sound
actually takes place, as in several instances which have been
mentioned. This, indeed, only applies to simple sounds,
for we certainly dream of persons speaking to us, and of
understanding what they say ; but I am not sure that this
is necessarily accompanied with a conception of sound. I
am informed by a friend, who is a keen sportsman, that he
often dreams of being on shooting excursions ; — that he
starts his game, and points his gun, but never succeeds in
firing it. It sometimes seems to miss fire, but in general
there appears to be something wrong with the lock, so that
it cannot be moved. A gentleman, mentioned by Dr. Dar-
win, had been for thirty years so deaf that he could be con-
versed wdth only in writing, or by forming letters with the
fingers. He assured Dr. Darwin, that he never dreamed
of persons conversing w^ith him, except by the fingers or
in waiting, and that he never had the impression of hearing
them speak. Two persons who had long been blind also

Other principles relating to the philosophy of dreams. Dreams occupied principal)/
with what objects ? Why ? Case of the sportsman. Point illustrated by it ? Th^
deaf gentleman's dreams.

214 REASON. [part ID.

informed him, that they never dreamed of visible objects
since the loss of their sight. ]Mr. Bcw, however, in the
Manchester Memoirs, mentions a blind gentleman who
dreamed of the figure, though he could not distinguish the
varieties, of the human countenance ; and Smellie men-
tions of Dr. Blacklock, w^io lost his si^ht at the acje of a
few months, that in his dreamiS he had a distinct impression
of a sense which he did not possess when awake. He de-
scribed his impression by saying that when aw^ake there
W'Cre three w^ays by which he could distinguish persons,
namely, — by hearing them speak, by feeling the head and
shoulders, and by attending to the sound and manner of
their breathing. In his dreams, however, he had a vivid
impression of objects in a manner distinct from any of these
modes. He ima.gined that he was united to them, by a kind
of distant contact, which was effected by threads or strings
passing from their bodies to his own.

On a similar principle, probably, we may explain the fact
that dreams refer chiefly to persons or events which we have
actually seen, though they are put into new combinations ;
and that we more rarely dream of objects of simple memory
unless they have been strongly associated with some object
of conception. Thus v»^e seldom dream of events or charac-
ters in ancient history. Dr. Beattie, indeed, mentions hav-
ing dreamed of crossing the Alps with Hannibal ; but such
dreams, I think, are verv" rare. It would be curious to
observe their occurrence, and to trace the train that leads to
them.

It appears, then, that the mental operations which take
place in dreaming consist chiefly of old conceptions and old
associations, following one another according to some prin-
ciple of succession over which Ave have no control. But
there are facts on record which show mental operations in
dreams of a much more intellectual character. i\Iany
people have been conscious of something like composition
in dreams. Dr. Gregory mentions that thouixhts which
sometimes occurred to him in dreams, and even the particu-
lar expressions in which they were conveyed, appeared to

The blind man's dreams. To what pt^rsotis and things do onr (Ircams chiefly refer?
Exception; Dr. fieaiiie's dream. Inference from these cases. Composition in dreams?
Dr. Gregory.

SEC. IV.J DREAMING. 215

him afterward when awake so just in point of reasoning and
illustration, and so good in point of language, that he has
used them in his college lectures, and in his written lucu-
brations. Condorcet related of himself, that when engaged
in some profound and obscure calculations, he was often
obliged to leave them in an incomplete state, and retire to
rest ; and that the remaining steps, and the conclusion of
his calculations, had more than once presented themselves
in his dreams. Dr. Franklin also informed Cabanis that
the bearings and issue of political events, which had puzzled
him when awake, were not unfrequently unfoldied to him in
his dreams. A gentleman of Edinburgh, whose name is
deeply associated with the literature of his country, had
been one day much amused by reading a very witty epigram
by Piron on the French Academy. In a dream the follow-
ing night he composed a parody or imitation of it, much at
the expense of a learned society in Edinburgh, and some
individuals of this city. A gentleman had been reading
an account of cruelties practised upon some Christians in
Turkey by the mutilation of their noses and ears. In a
dream the following night he witnessed the execution of a
punishment of this kind, and heard a Turk who was stand-
ing by address the sufferer in some doggerel rhymes, which
he distinctly recollected and repeated in the morning.
Another gentleman invented a French verb in a dream.
He thought he was in a very close sort of penthouse with
such a number of persons that they were threatened with
suffocation, as there appeared no way of letting in air. In
this state he called out, ''^ il jaitt detoiter y There is no
such word, but it was evidently formed from toit^ the roof
of a building.

The following anecdote has been preserved in a family
of rank in Scotland, the descendants of a distinguished
lawyer of the last age :— This eminent person had been
consulted respecting a case of great importance and much
difficulty ; and he had been studying it with intense anxie-
ty and attention. After several days had been occupied
in this manner, he w^as observed by his wife to rise from
his bed in the night and go to a wTiting-desk which stood

Concloroet. Fnmkliu. A liierarv geiitlemau of Edinburgh. Olhcr cases. Anecdote
of the Scoich lau'yer.

216 REASON. [part Hi.

in the bedroom. He then sat down and wrote a Ions
paper, which he put carefully by in the desk, and returned
to bed. The following morning he told his wife that he
had a most interesting dream ; — that he had dreamed of
delivering a clear and luminous opinion respecting a case
which had exceedingly perplexed him ; and that he would
give any thing to recover the train of thought which had
passed before him in his dream. She then directed him to
the WTiting-desk, v/here he found the opinion clearljr and
fully Avritten out, and which was afterward found to be
perfectly correct.

There can be no doubt that many dreams take place
which are not remembered, as appears from the fact of a
person talking in his sleep so as to be distinctly understood
without rememberins: any thincf of the imnression that crave
rise to it. It is probable, also, that the dreams which are
most distinctly remembered, are those which occur during
imperfect sleep, or vrhen the sleep begins to be broken by an
approach towards waking. Another very peculiar state
has perhaps occurred to most people, in which there is a
distressing dream, and at the same time an impression that
it probably is only a dream. This appears to take place
in a still miore imperfect state of sleep, in which there is the
immediate approach to waking, and to the exercise of the
reasoning powers. But there are some very singular facts
on record of this kind of reasoning being applied to dreams
for the purpose of dissipating them. Dr. Beattie mentions
of himself, that in a dream he once found himself standinrr
in a very peculiar situation on the parapet of a bridge. Re-
collecting, he says, that he never Vv^as given to pranks of
this nature, he began to fancy that it might be a dream, and
determined to throw, himself headlong, in the belief that this
would restore his senses, which accordingly took place.
In the same manner Dr. Rcid cured himself of a tendency
to fri^rhtful dreams, with which he had been annoyed from
his early years. He endeavored to fix strongly on his
mind the impression that all such dangers in dreams are
but imaginary; and determined, whenever in a dream lie
found himself on the brink of a precipice, to throw himself

Forgotten drearns. What dreams prolxibly most di.->iinctly remenib ed ? Peculiar
etale of mind in drcanw. Dr. Buullic'a case Dr. Keid,

SEC. IV.] DREAMING. 217

over, and so dissipate the vision. By persevering m this
method he so removed the propensity that for forty years
lie was never sensible of dreaming, though he was very
attentive in his observation on the subject.

Some persons are never conscious of dreaming ; and a
gentleman, mentioned by Locke, was not sensible of dream-
ing till he had a fever at the age of twenty-six or twenty-
seven.

A leading peculiarity in the phenomena of dreaming, is
the loss of power over the succession of our thoughts. We
have seen that there are some exceptions to this, but the
fact applies to by far the greater number of dreams, and
some curious phenomena appear to be referable to it. Of
this kind are probably some of those singular instances of
imaginary difficulties occurring in dreams on subjects on
which none could be felt in the wakinsf state. It is not un-
common for a clergyman to dream that he is going to
preach, and cannot fmd his text ; or for a clergyman of the
Church of England, that he cannot find the place in the
prayer-book. This, I think, can only be explained by sup-
posing that in the chain of ideas passing through the mind,
the church and prayer-book had come up, but had then led
off into some other train, and not into that of actually going
on with the service; while, at the same time, there arose
in the mind a kind of impression that, under these circum-
stances, it ought to have been gone on with.

The remarkable analogy between dreaming and insanity
has already been referred to ; and I shall only add the fol-
lowing illustration : — Dr. Gregory mentions a maniac who
had been for some time under his ca.re, and entirely recover-
ed. For a week after his recovery he was harassed during
his dreams by the same rapid and tumultuous thoughts,
and the same violent passions by which he had been agitated
during his insanity.

The slight outline v/hich has now been given of dream-
ing, may serve to show that the subject is not only curious
but important. It appears to be worthy of careful investi-

Persons unconscious of dreams. Power over tlie successioii of thoughts lost in
dreams. Gmimon troubles. Aualojy between dreaming and insanity ? Example iliua-

lra*ni2 It.

19

218 REASON. [part 111.

gatlon, and there is much reason to believe that an exten-
sive collection of authentic facts, carefully analyzed, would
unfold principles of very great interest in reference to tho
philosophy of the mental powers.

II. SOMNAMBULISM.

Somnambulism appears to differ from dreaming chiefly
in the degree in w^hich the bodily functions are affected.
The mind is fixed in the same manner as in dreaming upon
its own impressions as possessing a real and present exis-
tence in external things ; but the bodily organs are more un-
der the control of the will, so that the individual acts under
the influence of his erroneous conceptions, and holds con-
versation in reci^ard to them. He is also, to a certain do-
gree, susceptible of impressions from without through his
organs of sense; not, however, so as to correct his errone-
ous impressions, but rather to be mixed up with them. A
variety of remarkable phenoniena arise out of these pecu-
liarities, w^hich will be illustrated by a slight outline of this
sino^ular affection.

The first degree of somnambulism generally shows itself
by a propensity to talk during sleep ; the person giving a
full and connected account of what passes before him in
dreams, and often revealing his own secrets or those of his
friends. Walking during sleep is the next degree, and that
from which the affection derives it? name. The phenome-
na connected with this form are familiar to every one. The
individual gets out of bed ; dresses himself; if not prevent-
ed, goes out of doors ; walks frequently over dangerous
places in safety ; sometimes escapes by a window, and gels
to the roof of a house; after a considerable interval, returns
and goes to bed ; and all that has passed conveys to his
mind merely the impression of a dream. A young noble-
man, mentioned by Horptius, living in the citadel of Bres
lau, was observed by his brother, who occupied the same
room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in a cloak, and
escape by a window to the roof of the building. He there

Difference boiwcen somna.iibulidin arul dreaniins^. Stale of the senses? First de-
gree of soinnambulistm ? Next degree ? Inatanoc of il ?

SEC. IV.] SOMNAMBULISM. 21&

tore in pieces a magpie's nest, wrapped the young birds in
his cloak, returned to his apartment, and went to bed. la
the morning he mentioned tiie circumstances as having oc-
curred in a dream, and could not be persuaded that there
had been any thing more than a dream, till he was shown
the magpies in his cloak. Dr. Prichard mentions a man
who rose in his sleep, dressed himself, saddled his horse,
and rode to the place of a market which he was in the habit
of attending once every week ; and Martinet mentions a
man who was accustomed to rise in his sleep and pursue
his business as a saddler. There are many instances on
record of persons composing during the state of somnambu-
lism; as of boys rising in their sleep and finishing their tasks
which they had left incomplete. A gentleman at one of
the English universities had been very intent during the
day in the composition of some verses which he had not
been able to complete : during the following night he rose
in his sleep and finished his composition ; then expressed
great exultation, and returned to bed.

In these common cases the aflTection occurs during ordi-
nary sleep ; but a condition very analogous is met with,
coming on in the daytime in paroxysms, during which the
person is affected in the same manner as in the state of
somnambulism, particularly with an insensibility to exter-
nal impressions : this presents some singular phenomena.
These attacks in some cases come on without any warning ;
in others, they are preceded by a noise or a sense of con-
fusion in the head. The individuals then become more or
less abstracted, and are either unconscious of any external
impression, or very confused in their notions of external
things. They are frequently able to talk in an intelligible
and consistent manner, but always in reference to the im-
pression which is present in their own minds. They in
some cases repeat long pieces of poetry, often more correct
ly than they can do in their waking state, and not unfre-
quently things which they could not repeat in their state
of health, or of which they were supposed to be entireljr
ignorant. In other cases, they hold conversation with
imaginary beings, or relate circumstances or conversations

Oiher examples ? Case of the English scholar. Attacks in the daytime. Variout
effects produced.

220 REASON. [part III.

which occurred at remote periods, and which they were
supposed to have forgotten. Some have been known to
sing in a style far superior to any thing they could do in
their waking state ; and there are some well-authenticated
instances of persons in this condition expressing themselves
correctly in languages with which they were imperfectly
acquainted. I had lately under my care a young lady who
is liable to an affection of this kind, which comes on re-
peatedly during the day, and continues from ten minutes to
an hour at a time. Without any warning, her body be-
comes motionless, her eyes open, fixed, and entirely insensi-
ble ; and she becomes totally unconscious of any external
impression. She has been frequently seized while playing
on the piano, and has continued to play over and over a
part of a tune with perfect correctness, but without advanc-
ing beyond a certain point. On one occasion, she was
seized after she had begun to play from the book a piece
of music which was new to her. During the paroxysm,
she continued the part which she had played, and repeated
it five or six times with perfect correctness ; but, on coming
out of the attack, she could not play it without the book.
During the paroxysms the individuals arc, in some instan-
ces, totally insensible to any thing that is said to them ; but
in others they are capable of holding conversation with
another person with a tolerable degree of consistency,
though they are influenced to a certain degree by their
mental visions, and arc very confused in their notions of
external things. In many cases, again, they are capable
of going on with the manual occupations in which they had
been engaged before the attack. This occurred remarkably
in a watchmaker's apprentice mentioned by Martinet. The
paroxysms in him appeared once in fourteen days, and
commenced with a feeling of heat extending from the epi-
gastrium to the head. This was followed by confusion of
thought, and this by complete insensibility ; his eyes were
open, but fixed and vacant, and he was totally insensible to
any thing that was said to him, or to any external im-
pression. But he continued his usual employment, and was
always much astonished, on his recovery, to find the change

The author's patient. Insensibility dwruig iho paroxysnia. The watchmalccr's ap
prentice. Point illiLa-trdleil by tliis case ?

s

?.C. IV.J SOMNAMBULISM. 22J

'.hat had taken place in his work since the commencemen
of the paroxysm. This case afterward passed into epi
lepsy.

Some remarkable phenomena are presented by this sin
gular affection, especially in regard to exercises of memory
and the manner in which old associations are recalled into
the mind ; also in the distinct manner in which the individu
als sometimes express themselves on subjects with which
they had formerly shown but an imperfect acquaintance
In some of the French cases of epidemic " extase," this has
been magnified into speaking unknown languages, predict-
ing future events, and describing occurrences of which the
persons could not have possessed any knowledge. These
stories seem in some cases to resolve themselves merely
into embellishment of what really occurred, but in others
there can be no doubt of connivance and imposture. Some
facts however appear to be authentic, and are sufficiently
remarkable. Two females, mentioned by Bertrand, ex-
pressed themselves during the paroxysm very distinctly
in Latin. They afterward admitted that they had some
acquaintance with the language, though it was imperfect.
An ignorant servant-girl, mentioned by Dr. Dewar, during
paroxysms of this kind, showed an astonishing knowledge
of geography and astronomy ; and expressed herself in her
own language in a manner which, though often ludicrous,
showed an understanding of the subject. The alternations
of the seasons, for example, she explained by saying that
the earth was set a-gee. It was afterward discovered that
her notions on these subjects had been derived from over-
hearing a tutor giving instructions to the young people of
the family. A woman who was some time ago in the in-
firmary of Edinburgh, on account of an affection of this
dnd, during the paroxysms mimicked the manner of the
physicians, and repeated correctly some of their prescrip-
tions in the Latin language.

Another very singular phenomenon, presented by some
instances of this affection, is what has been called, rather
incorrectly, a state of double consciousness. It consists in

r'ld.ininena in reeartl to the memory. French cases ? Explanation of them. Case
>r..-v . f.-.iuiijs. The servant-girl. Explanation of these cases?

222 REASON. [part III.

the individual recollecting, during a paroxism, circum-
stances which occurred in a former attack, though there
was no remembrance of them during the interval. This,
as well as various other phenomenaconnectedwith the affec-
tion, is strikingly illustrated in a case described by Dr.
Dyce of Aberdeen, in the Edinburgh Philosophical Trans-
actions. The patient was a servant-girl, and the affection
began w^ith fits of somnolency, w^iich came upon her sud-
denly during the day, and from which she could, at first,
be roused by shaking, or by being taken out into the open
air. She soon began to talk a great deal during the at-
tacks, regarding things which seemed to be passing before
her as a dream ; and she was not at this time sensible of
any thing that was said to her. On one occasion she re-
peated distinctly the baptismal service of the Church of
England, and concluded with an extemporary prayer. In
her subsequent paroxysms she began to understand what
was said to her, and to answer with a considerable degree
of consistency, though the answers w^ere generally to a
certain degree influenced by her hallucinations. She also
became capable of following her usual employments during
the paroxysm ; at one time she laid out the table correctly
for breakfast, and repeatedly dressed herself and the chil-
dren of the family, her eyes remaining shut the whole time.
The remarkable circumstance w^as now discovered that
during the paroxysm she had a distinct recollection of what
took place in former paroxysms, though she had no remem-
brance of it during the intervals. At one time she w^as
taken to church while under the attack, and there behaved
with propriety, evidently attending to the preacher ; and
she was at one time so much affected as to shed tears. In
the interval she had no recollection of bavins: been a+
church ; but in the next paroxysm she gave a most distinct
account of the sermon, and mentioned particularly the part
of it by which she had been so much afiected.

This woman described the paroxysms as coming on with
a clc>adiness before her eyes and a noise in the head.
Durmg the attack her eyelids were generally half-shut ;
hp.f eyes sometimes resembled those of a person affected

Double consciousness? Case described by Dr. Dyce. Relate the circumstaucea.
^ympioinfl preceding and attending the attack ?

SEC. IV.] fclOMNAMBULISBI. 223

With amaurosis, that is, with a dilated and insensible state
of the pupil, but sometimes they were quite natural. She
had a dull vacant look; but, when excited, knew what was
said to her, though she often mistook the person who was
speaking; and it was observed, that she seemed to discern
objects best which were faintly illuminated. The parox-
ysms generally continued about an hour, but she could
often be roused out of them ; she then yawned and stretched
herself, like a person awaking out of sleep, and instantly
knew those about her. At one time, durinsr the attack, she
read distinctly a portion of a book which was presented to
her ; and she often sung, both sacred and common pieces,
incomparably better. Dr. Dyce affirms, than she could do
in the waking state. The affection continued to recur for
about six months, and ceased when a particular change took
place in her constitution. ^

Another very remarkable modification of this affection
IS referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by major Elliot,
professor of mathematics in the United States' Military
^.cademy at West Point. The patient w^as a young lady
)f cultivated mind, and the affection began wnth an attack
of somnolency, which was protracted several hours beyond
the usual time. When she came out of it, she was found to
have lost every kind of acquired knowledge. She imme-
diately began to apply herself to the first elements of edu-
cation, and w^as making considerable progress, when, after
several months, she was seized with a second fit of somno-
lency. She was now at once restored to all the knowledge
which she possessed before the first attack, but without the
least recollection of any thing that had taken place during
the interval. After another interval she had a third attack
of somnolency, which left her in the same state as after the
first. In this manner she suffered these alternate condi-
tions for a period of four years, with the very remarkable
circumstance that during the one state she retained all her
original knowledge ; but during the other, that only which
ihe had acquired since the first attack. During the healthy
interval, for example, she was remarkable for the beauty
C'-f her penmanship, but during the paroxysm WTote a poor
twkward hand. Persons introduced to her during the

esult of this case. Case at West Polat '\ Her hand- writing ?

224 REASON. [part III.

paroxj^sms she rocognised only in a subsequent paroxysm,
but not in the interval ; and persons whom she had seen for
the first time during the healthy interval she did not recog-
nise durinof the attack.

In reference to this very curious subject, the author is in-
duced to add a fact which has been recently communicated
to him. A young woman of the lower rank, aged nineteen,
became insane about tv/o years ago ; but was gentle, and
applied herself eagerly to various occupations. Before
ber insanity she had been only learning to read, and to
form a few letters ; but during her insanity she taught her-
self to write perfectly, though all attempts of others to
teach her failed, as she could not attend to any person who
tried to do so. She has intervals of reason, which have
frequently continued three weeks, sometimes longer. Dur-
mg these she can neither read nor write ; but immediately
on the return of her insanity she recovers her power of
writing, and can read perfectly.

Of the remarkable condition of the mental faculties, ex-
emplified in these cases, it is impossible to give any expla-
nation. Something very analogous to it occurs in other
aft'ections, though in a smaller degree. Dr. Prichard men-
tions a lady who was liable to sudden attacks of delirium,
which, after continuing for various periods, went off as sud-
denly, leaving her at once perfectly rational. The attack
was often so sudden that it commenced while she was en-
gaged in interesting conversation, and on such occasions it
happened, that on her recovery from the state of delirium
ihe instantly recurred to the conversation she had been en-
gaged in at the time of the attack, though she had never re-
■3rred to it during the continuance of the affection. To such
I degree was this carried, that she would even complete an
mfinished sentence. During the subsequent paroxysm,
igain, she would pursue the train of ideas which had occu-
pied her mind in the former. Mr. Combe also mentions a
porter, who in a state of intoxication left a parcel at a wrong
house, and when sober could not recollect what he had done
with it. But the next time he got drunk, he recollected
where he had left it, and went and recovered it.

Her accjiiaiiilances ? The insane e^irl. Possibility of an explanation of these cases)
Analogous case rnonlioncd by Dr. Prichard. The intoxicated porter.

SEC. IV.] INSANITY. 225

III. INSANITY.

Reason we have considered to be that exercise of mind
by which we compare facts with each other, and mental
impressions with external things. By means of it we are
enabled to judge of the relations of facts, and of the agree-
ment betw^een our impressions and the actual state of things
in the external world. We have seen also that peculiar
power w^hich is possessed by the mind in a healthy state, —
of arresting or changing the train of its thoughts at plea-
sure,— of fixing the attention upon one, or transferring it to
another, — of changing the train into something which is
analogous to it, or of dismissing it altogether. This power
is, to a greater or less degree, lost in insanity ; and the re-
sult is one of two conditions. Either the mind is entirely
under the influence of a single impression, without the
power of varying or dismissing it, and comparing it with
other impressions ; or it is left at the mercy of a chain of
impressions which have been set in motion, and which suc-
ceed one another according to some principle of connection
over which the individual has no control. In both cases
the mental impression is believed to have a real and present
existence in the external world ; and this false belief is not
corrected by the actual state of things as they present
themselves to the senses, or by any facts or considerations
which can be communicated by other sentient beings. Of
the cause of this remarkable deviation from the healthy
state of the mental functions we know nothing. We may
trace its connection with concomitant circumstances in the
bodily functions, and we may investigate certain effects
which result from it ; but the nature of the change and the
manner in which it is produced are among those points in
the arrangements of the Almighty Creator which entirely
elude our researches.

It appears, then, that there is a remarkable analogy be-
tween the mental phenomena in insanity and in dreaming;
and that the leading peculiarities of both these conditions
are referable to two heads : —

Reason; its definition ? Power over the succession of thoughts. Effects of insanity 1
Cause / Analogy between insanity and dreaming.

226 REASON. [part III.

1. The impressions which arise in the mind are believed
to be real and present existences, and this belief is not cor-
rected by comparing the conception with the actual state of
things in the external world.

2. The chain of ideas or images which arise follow one
another according to certain associations over which the in-
dividual has no control ; he cannot, as in a healthy state,
vary the series or stop it at his wdll.

In the numerous forms of insanity, we shall see these
choracters exhibited in various degrees ; but we shall be
able to trace their influence in one degree or another
through all the modifications ; and, in the higher states, or
what we call perfect mania, we see them exemplified in the
same complete manner as in dreaming. The maniac fan-
cies himself a king possessed of boundless power, and sur-
rounded by every form of earthly splendor ; and, with all
his bodily senses in their perfect exercise, this hallucination
is in no degree corrected by the sight of his bed of straw
and all the horrors of his cell.

From this state of perfect mania the malady is traced
through numerous gradations to forms which exhibit slight
deviations from the state of a sound mind. But they al.
show, in one degree or another, the same leading charac-
ters, namely, that some impression has taken possession of
the mind, and influences the conduct in a manner in which
it would not affect a sound understanding ; and that this is
not corrected by facts and considerations which are calcu-
lated immediately to relieve the erroneous impression.
The lower degrees of this condition we call eccentricity •
and, in common language, we often talk of a man being
crazed upon a particular subject. This consists in giving
to an impression or a fancy undue and extravagant impor-
tance, without taking into account other facts and consider-
ations which ought to be viewed in connection with it. The
man of this character acts with promptitude upon a single
idea, and seems to perceive notliing that interferes with it *
he forms plans, and sees only important advantages which
would arise from the accomplishment of them, without
perceiving difficulties or objections. The impression itself

Two leading peculiarities? When most completely exemplified ? Leading charac
Icrs the same in all stages. Lower stage, what? Nature of eccentricity.

SEC. IV.] INSANITY. 227

may be correct, but an importance is attaches' to it dispro-
portioned to its true tendency; or consequences are deduc-
ed from, and actions founded upon it, which would not be
warranted in the estimate of a sound understanding. It is
often difficult to draw the line between certain degrees of
this condition and insanity ; and, in fact, they very often
pass into each other. This will be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example : —

A clergyman in Scotland, after showing various extrava-
gances of conduct, was brought before a jury to be cog-
nosced ; that is, by a form of Scotch law to be declared in-
capable of managing his own affairs, and placed under the
care of trustees. Among the acts of extravagance alleged
against him was, that he had burnt his library. When he
was asked by the jury what account he could give of this
part of his conduct, he replied in the following term^s : —
*' In the early part of my life I had imbibed a liking for a
most unprofitable study, namely, controversial divinity.
On reviewing my library, I found a great part of it to con-
sist of books of this description, and I was so anxious that
my family should not be led to follow the same pursuit, that
I determined to burn the whole." He gave answers equal-
ly plausible to questions which were put to him respecting
other parts of his conduct ; and the result was that the
jury found no sufficient ground for cognoscing him ; but in
the course of a fortnight from that time he was in a state
of decided mania.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say of insanity, as has been
said, that the maniac reasons correctly upon unsound data.
His data may be unsound, that is, they may consist of a
mental image which is purely visionary, as in the state of
perfect mania lately referred to ; but this is by no means
necessary to constitute the disease ; for his premises may
be sound, though he distorts them in the results which he
deduces from them. This was remarkably the case in the
clergyman now mentioned. His premises were sound and
consistent, namely, his opinion of the unprofitable nature of
the study of controversial divinity, and his anxiety that his
family should not prosecute it. His insanity consisted in

Case of the clergyman. His defence before the jury. Erroneous theory of insanity
Uustrated by the preceding case.

22S REASON. [part III.

the rapid and partial view which he took of the means for
accomplishing" his purpose, — burning his whole library.
Had he sold his library or that part of it which consisted
of controversial divinity, the measure would have been in
correct relation to the object which he had in view ; and if
we suppose that in going over his library he had met with
some books of an immoral tendency, to have burnt these to
prevent them from falling into the hands of any individual
Vvould have been the act both of a wise and virtuous man.
But to burn his whole library to prevent his family froni
studying controversial divinity, Avas the suggestion of in-
sanity,— distorting entirely the true relation of things, and
carrying an impression, in itself correct, into consequences
which it in no degree warranted.

A remarkable peculiarity in many cases of insanity is, a
great activity of mind, and rapidity of conception, — a ten-
dency to seize rapidly upon incidental or partial relations of
things, — and often a fertility of imagination which changes
the character of the mind, sometimes without remarkably
distorting it. The memory, in such cases, is entire, and
even appears more ready than in health ; and old associa-
tions are called up with a rapidity quite unknown to the
individual in his sound state of mind. A gentleman, men-
tioned by Dr. Willis, who was liable to periodical attacks
of insanity, said that he expected the paroxysms with im-
patience, because he enjoyed during them a high degree of
pleasure. " Every thing appeared easy to me. No ob-
stacles presented themselves, either in theory or practice.
JMy mem.ory acquired all of a sudden a singular degree of
perfection. Long passages of Latin authors occurred to
my mind. In general I have great difficulty in finding
rhythniical terminations, but then I could write verses with
as great facility as proGc." " I have often," says Pine),
"stopped at the chamber door of a literary gentleman who,
during his paroxysms, appears to soar above the mediocri-
t}^ of intellect that was familiar to him, solely to admire his
newly acquired powers of eloquence. He declaimed upon
the subject of the revolution Avith all the force, the dignity,
and the purity of language that this very interesting subject

Exiiminaiion of hia reasoning. Remarkable etfecls of insanity in some cases. Ca::«
mculioncd by Dr. Willii>? By Pinel )

>£C. IV.] INSANITY. 229

.:ouid adnilt of. At other times he was a man of very ordi-
lary abihties."

It is this activity of thought and readiness of association
-hat gives to maniacs of a particular class an appearance
&f great ingenuity and acuteness. Hence they have been
said to reason acutely upon false premises ; and one author
has even alleged that a maniac of a particular kind would
make an excellent logician. But to say that a maniac
reasons either soundly or acutely is an abuse of terms.
He reasons plausibly and ingeniously; that is, he catches
rapidly incidental and partial relations; and from the ra-
pidity with which they are seized upon, it may sometimes
be difficult at first to detect their fallacy. He might have
made a skilful logician of the schools, whose ingenuity con-
sisted in verbal disputes and frivolous distinctions ; but he
never can be considered as exercisinof that sound locric, the
aim of which is to trace the real relations of things, and the
object of which is truth.

The peculiar character of insanity, iii all its modifications
appears to be that a certain impression has fixed itself upon
the mind in such a manner as to exclude all others ; or to
exclude them from that influence which they ought to have
on the mind in its estimate of the relations of things. This
impression may be entirely visionary and unfounded ; or it
may be in itself true, but distorted in the applications which
the unsound mind makes of it, and the consequences w^hich
are deduced from it. Thus a man of wealth fancies himself
a hegg?ir, and in danger of dying of hunger. Another takes
up the same injpression who has, in fact, sustained some
considerable loss. In the one, the impression is entirely
v'^ionary, like that which might occur in a dream ; in the
other, it is a real and true impression, carried to conse-
quences which it does not warrant.

There is great variety in the degree to vvdiich the mind
IS influenced by the erroneous impression. In some cases
it is such as entirely excludes all others, even those imme-
diately arisinor from the evidence of the senses, as in the state
of perfect maiiia formerly referred to. In many others,

Results of this in many cases. The re.i--niii;ji of a maniac. Peculiar character of
msaniiy .- Examples. Change^ of char.ictcr eiTuctcd by it.

20

230 REASON. [part HI.

though in a less degree than this, it is such as to change the
whole character. The particular manner in which this
more immediately appears wnll depend, of course, upon the
nature of the erroneous impression. A person formerly
most correct in his conduct and habits may become obscene
and blasphemous ; accustomed occupations become odious
to him ; the nearest and most beloved friends become ob-
iects of his aversion and abhorrence. Much interestinor
matter of observation often arises out of these peculiarities :
and it is no less interesting to observe during convalescence
the gradual return to former habits and attachments. A
young lady, mentioned by Dr. Rush, who had been for some
time confined in a lunatic asylum, had shown for several
weeks every mark of a sound mind except one, — she hated
her father. At length, she one day acknowledged with
pleasure the return of her filial attachment, and was soon
after discharged, entirely recovered. Even when the erro-
neous impression is confined to a single subject, it is remark-
able how it absorbs the attention, to the exclusion of other
feelings of a most intense and powerful kind. I knew a
person of wealth who had fallen into a temporary state of
melancholic hallucination, in connection with a transaction
in business which he reorretted havinsf made, but of which
the real effect was of a trifling nature. While in this situ-
ation, the most severe distress occurred in his family, by
the death of one of them under painful circumstances, with-
out his being afl^ected by it in the slightest degree.

The uniformity of the impressions of maniacs is indeed
so remarkable that it has been proposed by Pinel as a test
for distinofuishing real from feigned insanity. He has seen
melancholies confined in the Bicetre for twelve, fifteen,
twenty, and even thirty years; and through the whole of
that period their hallucination has been limited to one sub-
ject. Others, after a course of years, have changed from
one hallucination to another. A man, mentioned by him,
was for eiirht years constantly haunted with the idea of
being poisoned: he then changed his hallucination, became
sovereipn of the world and extremely happy, and thus con-
tinned for four years.

Tiie sudden revival of old impressions, aftor having been

Dr. Kudli'i Daiicii. Uiniormliy of ;Ue iiuuresaiojis of mauiaca.

SEC. IV. \ INSANITY. 231

long entirely suspended by mental hallucinations, presents
some of the most singular phenomena connected with this
subject. Dr. Prichard mentions an interesting case of this
kind from the American Journal of Science. A man had
been employed for a day with a beetle and wedges in split-
ting pieces of wood for erecting a fence. At night, before
going home, he put the beetle and wedges into the hollow
of an old tree, and directed his sons, who had been at work
in an adjoining field, to accempany him next morning to
assist in making the fence. In the night he became mani-
acal, and continued in a state of insanity for several years,
during which time his mind was not occupied with any of
the subjects with which he had been conversant when in
health. After several years his reason returned suddenly,
and the first question he asked was whether his sons had
brought home the beetle and wedges. They, being afraid
of entering upon any explanation, only said that they could
not find them ; on which he arose from his bed, went to the
field where he had been at work so many years before, and
found where he had left them the wedges and the iron
nugs of the beetle, the wooden part being entirely moul-
Jered away. A lady, mentioned in the same journal, had
aeen intensely engaged for some time in a piece of needle-
work. Before she had completed it, she became insane,
and continued in that state for seven years, after which her
reason returned suddenly. One of the first questions she
asked related to her needle-work, though she had never
alluded to it, so far as wo„s recollected, during her illness.
I have formerly alluded to the remarkable case of a lady
who was liable to periodical paroxysms of delirium, which
often attacked her so suddenly, that in conversation she
would stop in the middle of a story, or even of a sentence,
and branch off into the subject of her hallucination. On
the return of her reason, she would resume the conversation
in which she was engaged at the time of the attack, begin-
ning exactly where she had left off, though she had never
alluded to it during the delirium ; and on the next attack
of delirium she would resume the subject of hallucination
with which she had been occupied at the conclusion of the
» .1

Revival of old impressions Story of the beetle and wedges. The piece of needle
work. Other cases.

232 REASON. [part la

former paroxysm. In some cases there Is a total loss of
the impression of time respecting the period occupied by
the attack, which on the partial recovery of the patient
shows itself by singular fancies. A man, mentioned by
Haslam, maintained that he had seen the seed sown in
a particular field, and on passing it again three or four
days after saw the reapers at work cutting down the
corn. The interval of which he had thus lost entirely
the impression, had been spent in a state of furious insa-
nity ; from this he had in so far recovered as, by a mere
act of observation and memory, to form this notion, but not
so far as, by an act of comparison or judgment, to perceive
its absurdity.

Among the most singular phenomena connected with in-
sanity we must reckon those cases in which the hallucina-
tion is confined to a single point, while on every other sub-
ject the patient speaks and acts like a rational man : and he
often shows the most astonishing power of avoiding the sub-
ject of his disordered impression, when circumstances make
it advisable for him to do so. A man, mentioned by PineJ,
who had been for some time confined in the Bicetre, was on
the visitation of a commissary ordered to be discharged as
perfectly sane, after a long conversation in which he had
conducted himself with the greatest propriety. The officer
prepared the proces verbal for his discharge, and gave it
him to put his name to it, when he subscribed himself Jesus
Christ, and then indulged in all the reveries connected with
that delusion. Lord Erskine gives a very remarkable
history of a man who indicted Dr. Munro for confining him
without cause in a mad house. He underwent a most ri-
gid examination by the counsel of the defendant without
discovering any appearance of insanity, until a gentleman
came into court who desired a question to be put to him
respecting a princess with whom he had corresponded in
cherry-juice. He immediately talked about the princess in
the most insane manner, and the cause was at an end. But
this having taken place in Westminster, he commenced
another action in the city of London, and on this occaniion
no effort could induce him to expose his insanity; so that

Case mer.tioned by Haslam ? Derangement on a single point. The prisoner in tho
Bicetre. Case given by Lord Erskine.

SEC. IV. J INSANITY. 233

the cause was dismissed only by bringing against him the
evidence taken at Westminster. On another occasion Lord
Erskine examined a gentleman who had indicted. his brother
for confining him as a maniac, and the examination had
gone on for great part of a day without discovering any
trace of insanity. Dr. Sims then came into court, and in-
formed the counsel that the gentleman considered himself as
the Savior of the world. A single observation addressed to
him in this character showed his insanity, and put an end
to the cause. Many similar cases are on record. Several
years ago a gentleman in Edinburgh who was brought be-
fore a jury to be cognosced, defeated every attempt of the
opposite counsel to discover any trace of insanity, until a
gentleman came into court who ought to have been present
at the beginning of the case, but had been accidentally de-
tained. He immediately addressed the patient by asking
him what were his latest accounts from the planet Saturn,
and speedily elicited proofs of his insanity.

Of the nature and cause of that remarkable condition of
the mental faculties which gives rise to the phenomena of
insanity, we know nothing. We can only observe the facts,
and endeavor to trace among them som.e general principle
of connection : and even in this there is great difhcuity,
chiefly from the want of observations particularly directed
to this object. There would be much interesting subject of
inquiry in tracing the orig-in of the particular chain of ideas
which arise in individual cases of insanity ; and likewise the
m.anner in which similar impressions are modified in different
cases, either by circumstances in the natural disposition of
the individual, or by the state of his bodily functions at the
time. From what has been observed, it seems probable that
in both these respects there is preserved a remarkable ana-
logy to dreaming. The particular hallucinations may be
chiefly referred to the following heads : —

I. Propensities of character, which had been kept under
restraint by reason or by external circumstances, or old habits
which had been subdued or restrained, developing themselves
without control, and leading the mind into trains of fancies

Otner similar cases. Cause of insanity ? Our knowledge on the subject confine(i ic
what? Classes of hallucinations? Old habits or propensities.

20-^

234 REASON. [PAKT III.

arising out of them. Thus a man of an aspiring, ambitious
character may imagine himself a king, or great personage •
while in a man of a timid, suspicious disposition, the mind
may fix upon some supposed injury, or loss either of pro-
perty or reputation.

II. Old associations recalled into the mind, and mixed up
perhaps with more recent occurrences, in the same manner
as we often see in dreaming. A lady mentioned by Dr.
Gooch, who became insane in consequence of an alarm from
a house on fire in her neighborhood, imagined that she
was the Virgin Mary, and had a luminous halo around her
head.

III. Visions of the imagination which have formerly been
indulged in, of that kind which we call waking dreams, or
castle-building, recurring to the mind in this condition, and
now believed to have a real existence. I have been abls to
trace this source of the hallucination. In one case, for ex-
ample, it turned upon an office to which the individual ima-
gined he had been appointed ; and it was impossible to per-
suade him to the contrary, or even that the office was not
vacant. He afterward acknowledged that his fancy had at
various times been fixed upon that appointment, though there
w^ere no circumstances that warranted him in entertaining
any expectation of it. In a man mentioned by Dr. Morison,
the haHucination turned upon circumstances which had been
mentioned when his fortune was told by a Gipsey.

IV. Bodily feelings giving rise to trains of associations,
in the same extravagant manner as in dreaming. A man,
mentioned by Dr. Rush, imagined that he had a Caffi-e in
his stomach, who had got into it at the cape of Good Hope,
and had occasioned him a constant uneasiness ever since.
In such a case, it is probable that there had been some
fixed or frequent uneasy feeling at the stomach, and that
about the commencement of his complaint he had been
strongly impressed by some transaction in which a CafTre
was concerned.

Old associalioiis. Viaiuna of inuu'MiuUion. Case? Bodily feelings. Dr. Rush'i
paiienu

SEC. IV.] INSANITY. 235

V. There seems reason to believe that the hallucinations
of the insane are often influenced by a certain sense of the
new and singular state in which their mental powers really
are, and a certain feeling, though confused and ill-defined,
of the loss of that power over their mental processes which
they possessed when in health. To a feeling of this kind
I am disposed to refer the impression so common among
the insane of being under the influence of some supernatu-
ral power. They sometimes represent it as the working of
an evil spirit, and sometimes as witchcraft. Very often
they describe it as a mysterious and undue influence which
some individual has obtained over them, and this influence
they often represent as being carried on by means of elec-
tricity, galvanism, or magnetism. This impression being
once established of a mysterious agency, or a mysterious
chanofe in the state and feelings of the individual, various
other incidental associations may be brought into connection
with it, according as particular circumstances have made
a deep impression on the m^ind. A man mentioned by Pinel,
who had become insane during the French revolution, ima-
gined that he had been guillotined; that the judges had
changed their mind after the sentence was executed, and had
ordered his head to be put on again ; and that the persons
intrusted with this duty had made a mistake, and put a wrong
head upon him. Another individual, mentioned by Dr.
Conolly, imagined that he had been hanged, and brought to
life by means of galvanism; and that the whole of his life
had not been restored to him.

Out of the same undefined feeling of mental processes
very different from those of their healthy state probably
arises another common impression, namely, of intercourse
v/ith spiritual beings, visions, and revelations. The particu-
lar character of these, perhaps, arises out of some previous
processes of the mind, or strong propensity of the character ;
and the notion of a supernatural revelation may proceed
from a certain feeling of the new and peculiar manner in
which the impression is fixed upon the mind. A priest,
mentioned by Pinel, imagined that he had a commission
from the Virgin Mary to murder a certain individual, who

Influence of a sense of their stale oa the insane. Cases menlioned ? Ideas of com*
municaiion with suiwrnatnral beings. Slory of the priest ?

236 KEAsox. [part riL

was accused of infidelity. It is probable that the patient in
tills case had been naturally of a violent and irascible dis-
position ; that he had come in contact with this person, and
had been annoyed and irritated by infidel sentiments uttered
by him ; and that a strong feeling in regard to him had
thus been excited in his mind, which, in his insane state,
was formed into this vision.

When the mental impression is of a depressing charac-
ter, that modification of the disease is produced Vvhich is
called melancholia. It seems to differ from mania merely
m the subject of hallucination, and accordingly we find the
two modifications pass into each other, the same patient
being at one time in a state of melancholic depression, and
at another of maniacal excitement. It is, however, more
common for the melancholic to continue in the state of de-
pression, and generally in reference to one subject ; and the
difference between him and the exalted maniac does not
appear to depend upon the occasional cause. For we
sometimes find persons who have become deranged in con-
nection with overwhelming calamities, show no depression,
nor even a recollection of their distresses, but the hicrhest
state of exalted mania. The difference appears to depend
chiefly upon constitutional peculiarities of character

The most striking peculiarity of melancholia is the pre-
vailing propensity to suicide; and there are facts connected
with this subject which remarkably illustrate what may be
called the philosophy of insanity. When the melancholic
hallucination has fully taken possession of the mind, it be-
comes the sole object of attention, without the power of
varying the impression, or of directing the thoughts to any
facts or considerations calculated to remove or palliate it.
The evil seems ov^erwhelming and irremediable, admitting
neither of palliation, consolation, nor hope. For the pro-
cess of mind calculated to diminish such an impression, or
even to produce the hope of a palliation of the evil, is pre-
cisely that exercise of mind which, in this singular condition,
is lost or suspended ; namely, a power of changing the sub-
ject of thought, of transferring the attention to other facts

Mulancholy. How diaiinguidhed from mania ? Most striking peculiaril)' of melan-
sholy ? Overwhelming inlluence of the niRlancholy feelingd.

SEC. IV. J INSANITY. 237

and considerations, and of comparing the mental impression
with these, and with the actual state of external things.
Under such a conviction of overAvhelming and hopeless
misery, the feeling naturally arises of life being a burden,
and this is succeeded by a determination to quit it. Whe:\
such an association has once been formed, it also fixes itself
upon the mind, and fails to be corrected by those considera-
tions which ouorht to remove it. That it is in this manner
the impression arises, and not from any process analogous
to the determination of a sound mind, appears, among other
circmnstances, from the singular manner in which it is
often dissipated ; namely, by the accidental production of
some new impression, not calculated in any degree to influ-
ence the subject of thought, but simply to give a momentary
direction of the mind to some other feeling. Thus a man,
mentioned by Pinel, had left his house in the night with the
determined resolution of drowninsf himself, when he was
attacked by robbers. He did his best to escape from them,
and, having done so, returned home, the resolution of sui-
cide being entirely dissipated. A wo'nan, mentioned, I
believe, by Dr. Burrows, had her reso^ vition changed in the
same manner, by something falling on her head after she
had gone out for a similar purpose.

A very singular modification occurs in some of these
cases. With the earnest desire of death, there is combined
an impression of the criminality of suicide ; but this, instead
of correcting the hallucination, only leads to another and
most extraordinary mode of effecting the purpose ; namely,
by committing murder, and so dying by the hand of justice.
Several instances are on record in which this remarkable
mental process was distinctly traced and avowed; and in
which there was no mixture of malice against the individu-
als who were murdered. On the contrary, they were gene-
rally children ; and in one of the cases, the maniac distinctly
avowed his resolution to commit murder, with a view of
dying by a sentence of law, and at the same time his deter-
mination that his victim should be a child, as he should thus
avoid the additional guilt of sending a person out of the
world in a state of unrepented sin. The mental process in
f ■ ■ ' <

TYhy they cannot be removed ? Case mentioned by Pinel > Singular modificatioa
of the disease ? Instances ?

23S REASON. [part III.

such a case presents a most interesting subject of reflection.
It appears to be purely a process of association, without the
power of reasoning. 1 should suppose that there had been
at a former period, during a comparatively healthy state of
the mental faculties, a repeated contemplation of suicide,
which had been always checked by an immediate convic-
tion of its dreadful criminality. In this manner, a strong
connection had been formed, which, when the idea of suicide
afterward came into the mind during the state of insanity,
led to the impression of its heinousness, not by a process of
reasoning, but by simple association. The subsequent
steps are the distorted reasonings of insanity, mixed with
some previous impression of the safe condition of children
dying in infancy. This explanation, I think, is strongly
countenanced by the consideration, that had the idea of the
criminality of suicide been in any degree a process of rea-
soning, a corresponding conviction of the guilt of murder
must have followed it. I find, however, one case which is
at variance with this hypothesis. The reasoning of that
unfortunate individual \vas, that if he committed murder
and died by the hand of justice, there would be time for
making his peace with the Almighty between the crime
and his execution, which would not be the case if he should
die by suicide. This was a species of reasoning, but it was
purely the reasoning of insanity.

Attempts have been made to refer insanity to disease of
bodily organs, but hitherto without much success. In some
instances we are able to trace a connection of this kind ;
but in a large proportion we can trace no bodily disease.
On this subject, as well as various other points connected
with the phenomena of insanity, extensive and careful ob-
servation will be required before we are entitled to advance
to any conclusions. In regard to what have been called
the moral causes of insanity, also, I suspect there has been
a good deal of fallacy, arising from considering as a moral
cause what was really a part of the disease. Thus we find
so many cases of insanity referred to erroneous views of
religion, so many to love, so many to ambition, 6cc. But
»i "

Kxplanaiion. Exception. Erroneous theory of insanity. Can anu connectioii b
traced ? Common fallacy ?

SEC. IV.] LXSAMTY. 239

perhaps it n\ny be doubted whether that which was in these
cases considered as the cause, was not rather, in many in-
stances, a part of the hallucination. This, I think, applies
in a peculiar manner to the important subject of religion,
which, by a common but very loose mode of speakinsr, is
often mentioned as a frequent cause of insanity. When
there is a constitutional tendency to insanity, or to melan-
choly, one of its leading modifications, every subject is dis-
torted to which the mind can be directed, and none more
frequently or more remarkably than the great questions of
religious belief. But this is the effect, not the cause ; and
the frequency of this kind of hallucination, and the various
forms w4iich it assumes, may be ascribed to the subject
being one to which the minds of all men are so naturally
directed in one degree or another, and of w^hich no man
living can entirely divest himself. Even when the mind
does give way under a great moral cause, such as over-
whelming misfortunes, we often find that the hallucination
does not refer to them, but to something entirely distinct :
striking examples of this are mentioned by Pinel.

Insanity is, in a large proportion of cases, to be traced to
hereditary predisposition ; and this is often so strong that
no prominent moral cause is necessary for the production of
the disease, and probably no moral treatment would have
any effect in preventing it. We must, however, suppose,
that where a tendency to insanity exists, there may be, in
manv cases, circumstances in mental habits or mental dis-
cipline calculated either to favor or to counteract the ten-
dency. Insanity frequently commences with a state in
which particular impressions fix themselves upon the mJnd
in a manner entirely disproportioned to their true relations;
and in which these false impressions fail to be corrected by
the judgment comparing them v/ith other impressions, or
with external things. In so far as mental habits may be
supposed to favor or promote such a condition, this may be
likely to result from allowing the mind to wander away
from the proper duties of life, or to luxuriate amid scenes of
the iuiagination ; and permitting mental emotions, of what-
ever kind, to be excited in a manner disproportioned to the

™'-" -— '■ -c I- ■ ■ . ■... ^ . ■- ^ . .w^m, M..— !■ ■■ - . I ■■ ■ ■ . ...I I I ■ I ■■ I ■ .. ,^. . . .1 — . I ..I. ... I — . ■_■,.„ -. - I . . I ■, I M - ■ ■ -^

Ji ic\\j,\ous melancholy t!ie caii.^e or erTeci of insanity ? Keredilary prcJiipi.)5iuoa.
lullueiicc of iiiealal habits ia pfomoiins i^^

240 REASON. [part III.

true relations of the objects which give rise to them ; in
short, from allowing the mind to ramble among imaginary
events, or to be led away by slight and casual relations, in-
stead of steadily exercising the judgment in the investiga-
tion of truth. We might refer to the same head habits of
distorting events, and of founding upon them conclusions
which they do not warrant. These, and other propensities
and habits of a similar kind, constitute what is called an ill-
regulated mind. Opposed to it is that habit of cool and
sound exercise of the understanding:" by which events are
contemplated in their true relations and consequences, and
mental emotions arise out of them such as they are really
calculated to produce. Every one must be familiar with
the difference which exists among different individuals in
this respect ; and even in the same individual at difierent
times. We trace the influence of the principle in the im-
pression which is made by events coming upon us suddenly
and unexpectedly ; and the manner in which the emotion
is gradually brought to its proper bearings, as the mind ac-
commodates itself to the event, by contemplating it in its
true relations. In such a mental process as this, we observe
the most remarkable diversities among various individuals.
In some, the mind rapidly contemplates the event in all
us relations, and speedily arrives at the precise impression
or emotion which it is in truth fitted to produce. In
others, this is done more slowly, perhaps more imperfectly,
and probably not without the aid of suggestions from other
minds : while, in some, the first impression is so strong and
so permanent, and resists in such a manner those considera-
tions which might remove or moderate it, that we find diffi-
culty in drawing the line between it and that kind of false
impression Avhich constitutes the lower degree of insanity.
Habits of mental application must also exert a great influ-
ence; and we certainly remark a striking difference be-
tween those who are accustomed merely to works of ima-
gination and taste, and tliose whose minds have been rigidly
exercised to habits of calm and severe inquiry. A fact
is mentioned by Dr. Conolly which, if it sliall be con-
firmed by farther observation, would lead to some most im-

Habils which tend to avert ii ? Diversities among individuals. Infiucncc of hibiu*
iri irental applicaiioa 7 Dr. Conolly's tcaiitaony ?

SEC. IV.] INSANITY. 241

portant reflections. He states that it appears from the re-
gisters of the Bicetre, that maniacs of the more educated
classes consist almost entirely of priests, artists, painters,
sculptors, poets, and musicians ; Avhile no instance, it is said,
occurs of the disease in naturalists, physicians, geometri-
cians, or chemists.

The higher degrees of insanity are in general so distinct-
ly defined in their characters as to leave no room for doubt
in deciding upon the nature of the affection. But it is
otherwise in regard to many of the lower modifications ;
and great discretion is often required in judging whether
the conduct of an individual, in particular instances, is to be
considered as indicative of insanity. This arises from the
principle, which must never be lost sight of, that in such
cases we are not to decide simply from the facts themselves,
but by their relation to other circumstances, and to the pre-
vious habits and character of the individual. There are
many peculiarities and eccentricities of character vvhich do
not constitute insanity ; and the same peculiarities may af-
ford reason for suspecting insanity in one person and not in
another; namely, when in the former they have appeared
suddenly, and are much opposed to his previous uniform
character ; while, to the latter, they have been long known
to be habitual and natural. Thus, acts of thoughtless pro-
digality and extravagance may, in one person, be considered
entirely in accordance with his uniform character ; while
the same acts, committed by a person formerly distinguished
by sedate and prudent conduct, may give good ground
for suspecting insanity, and in fact constitute a form in
which the affection very often appears. In ordinary cases
of insanity, a man's conduct is to be tried by a comparison
with the average conduct of other men ; but, in many of
the cases now referred to, he must be com.pared with his for-
mer self.

Another caution is to be kept in mind, respecting the
mental impressions of the individual in these slight or sus-
pected cases of insanity ; that an impression which gives
reason for suspecting insanity in one case, because we know

Higher degrees of insanity well marked. Lovv'er degrees. Necessiiy of cauiicva.
Mental pec iliaritie^s which are sometimes misiafcon for insanity. Another caution ?

21

^42 REASON. [part 111.

it to be entirely unfounded and imaginary, may allow of no
such conclusion in another, in which it has some reasonable
or plausible foundation. Insane persons indeed often relate
stories which hang together so plausibly and consistently,
that we cannot say whether we are to consider them as in-
dicative of insanity, until we have ascertained whether they
have any foundation, or are entirely imaginary. In one
instance Avhich was referred to in the discussions respecting
a late remarkable case, the principal fact alleged against
the individual was, his having taken up a suspicion of the
fidelity of his wife. But it turned out to be a very general
opinion among his neighbors that the impression was well-
founded. The samic principle applies to the antipathies
against intimate friends which are often so remarkable in
the insane. The}'' may be of such a nature as decidedly to
mark the hallucination of insanity, — as when a person ex-
presses a dislike to a child, formerly beloved, on the ground
that he is not really his child, but an evil spirit which has
assumed his form. This is clearly insanity ; but if the anti-
pathy be against a friend or relative, without any such rea-
son assigned for it, we require to keep in view the inquiry,
whether the impression be the result of hallucination, or
whether the relative has really given any ground for it. In
all slifrht or doubtful cases, much discretion should be used
in putting an individual under restraint, and still more in
immediately subjecting him to confinement in an asylum
for lunatics. But there is one modification in which all
such delicacy must be dispensed with, namely, in those me-
lancholic cases which have shown any tendency to suicide.
Whenever this propensity has appeared, no time is to be
lost in taking the most effectual precautions; and the most
painful consequences have very often resulted, in cases of
this description, from misplaced delicacy and delay.

The subj(ict of hallucination in insanity we have seen
may be either entirely imaginary and groundless, or may
be a real event viewed in false relations, and carried to false
consequences. This view of the subject bears upon an im-
portant practical point which has been much agitated, name-

Sioriet r'^UiPil by ilir iiu-aiic. Sonic impretibiori:^ conclusive proof of insanity. Tcja-
icncy lo auiciUc. :L/ubjccu of halluciaaiioa iwofolJ.

SEC. IV.] PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. 243

ly, the liability of maniacs to punishment ; and which has
been ably and ingeniously argued by Lord Erskine in his
.defence of Hatfield, who fired at his majesty King George
III. The principle contended for by this eminent person is,
that when a maniac commits a crime under the influence of
an impression which is entirely visionary, and purely the
hallucination of insanity, he is not the object of punishment ;
but that, though he may have shown insanity in other things,
he is liable to punishment if the impression under which he
acted was true, and the human passion arising out of it was
directed to its proper object. He illustrates this principla
by contrasting the case of Hatfield with that of Lord Fer-
rers. Hatfield had taken a fancy that the end of the world
was at. hand, and that the death of his majesty was in
some way connected with important events which were
about to take place. Lord Ferrers, after showing various
indications of insanity, murdered a man against whom he
was known to harbor deep-rooted resentment, on account
of real transactions in which that individual had rendered
himself obnoxious to him. The former, therefore, is consi-
dered as an example of the pure hallucination of insanity,
the latter as one of human passion founded on real events
and directed to its proper object. Hatfield, accordingly,
was acquitted, but Lord Ferrers was convicted of murdei
and executed. The contrast between the two cases is suffi-
ciently striking; but it may be questioned whether it wih
bear all that Lord Erskine has founded upon it. There
can be no doubt of the first of his propositions, that a person
acting under the pure hallucination of insanity, in regard
to impressions which are entirely unfounded, is not the
object of punishment. But the converse does not seem to
follow ; namely, that the man becomes an object of punish-
ment merely because the impression was founded in fact,
and because there was a human passion directed to its pro-
per object. For it is among the characters of insanity not
only to call up impressions which are entirely visionary,
but also to distort and exaggerate those which are true, and
to carry them to consequences which they do not warrant
in the estimation of a sound mind. A person, for instance,

Important practical point? Argument of Lord Erskine ? His positions ? His illu*
liation of it '? Relate the case. Autiior's view of this subiect?

244 REASON. [part III.

who has suffered a loss in business which does not affect
his circumstances in any important degree, may imagine,
under the influence of hallucination, that he is a ruined
man, and that his family is reduced to beggary. Now, were
a wealthy man under the influence of such hallucination to
commit an outrage on a person who had defrauded him of
a trifling sum, the case would afford the character mention-
ed by Lord Erskine, namely, human passion founded upon
real events, and directed to its proper object : but no one,
probably, would doubt for a moment that the process was
as much the result of insanity as if the impression had been
entirely visionary. In this hypothetical case, indeed, the
injury, though real, is slight ; but it does not appear that the
principle is necessarily affected by the injury being great,
or more in relation to the result which it leads to according
to the usual course of human passion. It would appear
probable, therefore, that in deciding a doubtful case, a jury
ought to be guided, not merely by the circumstances of the
case itself, but by the evidence of insanity in other things.
This, accordingly, appears to have been the rule on which
a jury acted in another important case mentioned by Lord
Erskine, in which an unfortunate female, under the influ-
ence of insanity, murdered a man who had seduced and
deserted her. Here was a real injury of the highest de-
scription, and human passion founded upon it and directed
to its proper object ; but the jury, on proof of derangement
in other things, acquitted the prisoner, who accordingly
soon passed into a state of " undoubted and deplorable insa-
nity.'^ In the case of Lord Ferrers, also, it would appear
that the decision proceeded, not so much upon the principle
of human passion directed to its proper object, as upon an
impression that his lordship's previous conduct had been
indicative of uncontrolled violence of temper, rather than
actual insanity.

Some of the points which have been briefly alluded to
seem to bear on the practical part of this important subject, —
the moral treatment of insanity. Without entering on any
lengthened discussion, some leading principles may be re-
ferred to the followinor heads: —

IlhiHliMliou of it? Lord Erskiiie's reasoning examined. Considerations which
■hould inlluence a jury ? Case of the female murderer. Practical part of thia
lubject

SEC. IV.] INSANITY — MORAL TREATBIENT. 245

I. It will be generally admitted that every attempt to
reason with a maniac is not only fruitless, but rather tends
to ^x more deeply his erroneous impression. An impor-
tant rule in the moral management of the insane will there-
fore probably be, to avoid every allusion to the subject of
their hallucination, to remove from them every thing calcu-
lated by association to lead to it, and to remove them from
scenes and persons likely to recall or keep up the erroneous
impression. Hence, probably, in a great measure arises
the remarkable benefit of removing the insane from their
usual residence, friends, and attendants, and placing them
in new scenes, and entirely under the care of strangers.
The actual effect of this measure is familiar to every one
who is in any degree conversant with the management of
the insane. That the measure may have its full effect, it
appears to be of importance that the patient should not, for
a considerable time, be visited by any friend or acquaint-
ance ; but should be separated from every thing connected
with his late erroneous associations. The danger also is
w^ell known which attends premature return to home and
common associates ; — immediate relapse having often fol-
lowed this, in cases which had been going on for some time
in the most favorable manner.

II. Occupation. This is referable to two kinds, namely,
bodily and mental. The higher states of mania in general
admit of no occupation ; but, on the contrarj^, often require
coercion. A degree below this may admit of bodily occu-
pation ; and when this can be accomplished in such a man-
ner as fully to occupy the attention and produce fatigue,
there is reason to believe that much benefit may result from
it. Dr. Gregory used to mention a farmer in the north of
Scotland who had acquired uncommon celebrity in the
treatment of the insane ; and his method consisted chiefly in
having them constantly employed in the most severe bodily
labor. As soon, also, as the situation of the patient will
admit of it, mental occupation must be considered as of the
utmost importance : it should not consist merely of desulto-

Principles of the moral treatment of the insane. Reasoning fruitless. Removirig
hem from the scenes to which they liave been accustomed. Occupation The Scotch
farmer.

21^

246 REASON. [part hi.

ry employment or amusement, but should probably be regu-
lated by two principles : — 1. Occupations calculated to lead
the mind gradually into a connected series of thought.
When the mental condition of the patient is such as to make
it practicable, nothing answers so well as a course of his-
tory, the leading events being distinctly written out in the
form of a table, with the dates. Thus the attention is fixed
in an easy and connected manner ; and in cases w4iich ad-
mit of such occupation being continued the effect is often
astonishing. 2. Endeavoring to discover the patient's for-
mer habits and favorite pursuits, at a period previous to the
hallucination, and unconnected with it ; and using means
for leading his attention to these. I have already alluded to
the complete suspension of all former pursuits and attach-
ments \vhich often takes place in insanity, and to a return
of them as being frequently the most marked and satisfac-
tory symptom of convalescence. This is, in such cases, to
be considered as a sign, not a cause of the improvement;
but there seems every reason to believe that the principle
might be acted upon w^ith advantage in the moral treatment
of certain forms of insanity. On a similar principle, it is
probable that in many cases much benefit might result from
moral management calculated to revive associations of a
pleasing kind, in regard to circumstances anterior to the
occurrence of the malady.

III. Careful classification of the insane, so that the mild
and peaceful melancholic may not be harassed by the ravings
of the maniac. The importance of this is obvious ; but of
still greater importance it will probably be, to w-atch the
first dawnings of reason, and instantly to remove the patient
from all associates by whom his mind might be again be-
wildered. The follov/ing case, mentioned by Pinel, is cer-
tainly an extreme one, but much important reflection arises
out of it in reference both to this and the preceding topic :
A musician confined in the Bicetre, as one of the first
symptoms of returning reason, made some slight allusions to
his favorite instrument. It was immediately procured for
him ; he occupied himself with music for several hours

Mental occupaf inn ; when expotlienl ? How to be regulated. Clas^^ificalion of th»
Insane. Case of the musician.

SEC. IV.J INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 247

every day, and his convalescence seemed to be advancing
rapidly. But he was then unfortunately allowed to come
frequently into contact with a furious maniac, by meeting
him in the gardens. The musician's mind was unhinged ;
his violin was destroyed ; and he fell back into a state of
insanity which was considered as confirmed and hopeless.

Cases of decided insanity in general admit of little moral
treatment, until the force of the disease has been broken in
some considerable degree. But among the numerous modi-
fications which come under the view of the physician, there
are various forms in which, by judicious moral management,
a great deal is to be accomplished. Some of these affec-
tions are of a temporary nature, and have so little influence
on a man's general conduct in life, that they are perhaps
not known beyond his own family, or confidential friends.
In some of these cases the individual is sensible of the sin-
gular change which has taken place in the state of his
mental powers, and laments the distortion of his feelings
and affections. He complains, perhaps, that he has lost his
usual interest in his family, and his usual affection for them ;
and that he seems to be deprived of every feeling of which
he was formerly susceptible. The truth is, that the mind
has become so occupied by the erroneous impression as to
be inaccessible to any other, and incapable of applying to
any pursuit, or following out a train of thought.

A most interesting affection of this class often comes un-
der the observation of the physician, consisting of deep but
erroneous views of religion, generally accompanied with
disturbed sleep and considerable derangement of the sys-
tem, and producing a state of mind closely bordering upon
insanity. It occurs most commonly in young persons of
acute and susceptible feelings, and requires the most deli-
cate and cautious management. Two modes of treatment
are frequently adopted in regard to it, both equally erro-
neous. The one consists in hurrying the individual into
the distraction of company, or a rapid journey ; the other,
in urging religious discussions, and books of profound divi-
nity. Both are equally injudicious, especially the latter ; for
every attempt to discuss the important subject to which the

Moral treatment in decided cases. Intereeting form of insanity? Its character?
Common modes of treatment? Tiieir effect;? ?

248 REASON. [part in.

distorted impression refers only serves to fix the hallucina-
tion more deeply. The mode of treatment which I have
always found most beneficial consists of regular exercise,
with attention to the general health ; and in enforcing a
course of reading of a nature likely to fix the mind, and
carry it forward in a connected train. Light reading or
mere amusement will not answer the purpose. A regular
course of history, as formerly mentioned, appears to succeed
best, and fixing the attention by writing out the dates and
leading events in the form of a table. When the mind has
been thus gradually exercised for some time in a connected
train of thought, it is often astonishing to observe how it
will return to the subject which had entirely overpowered it,
with a complete dissipation of former erroneous impressions.
A frequent complaint at the commencement of such an ex-
ercise is that the person finds it impossible to fix the atten-
tion, or to recollect the subject of even a few sentences :
this is part of the disease, and by perseverance gradually
disappears. This experiment I have had occasion to make
many times, and it has always appeared to me one of ex-
treme interest. I do not say that it has uniformly succeed-
ed, for the affection frequently passes into confirmed insani-
ty ; but it has succeeded in a sufficient number of instances
to give every encouragement for a careful repetition of it.
The same observations and the same mode of treatment
apply to the other forms of partial hallucination. The plan
is, of course, to be assisted by regular exercise, and atten-
tion to the general health, which is usually much impaired.
The affections are particularly connected in a very intimate
manner with a disordered state of the stomach and bowels,
and with derangements in the female constitution. Means
adapted to these become, therefore, an essential part of the
management.

There has been considerable discussion respecting the
distinction between insanity and idiocy. It has been snii
that the insane reason justly on false premises; and thai
idiots reason falsely on sound premrses. This does not
seem to be well founded. It would appear that a maniac
may reason either upon false or true premises; but that in

Proper mode of irealmenl ? Difficulty, and remedy for il. Distinction betwrea
Infanitr aiid idiocy ?

SEC. IV.] INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 249

either case his reasoning is influenced by distorted views of
the relations of things. The idiot, on the other hand, does
not reason at all ; that is, though he may remember the
facts he does not trace their relations. Idiocy appears to
consist, in a greater or less degree, in a simply impaired oi
weakened state of the mental powers ; but this is not in-
sanity. On the contrary, we have seen that, in the insane,
certain mental powers may be in the highest state of activi-
ty,— the memory recalling things long gone by, — the ima-
gination forming brilliant associations, — every faculty in
the highest activity except the power of tracing correct re-
lations. I have already referred to a gentleman mentioned
by Pinel, who possessed during the paroxysm a brilliancy
of conception and readiness of memory which were not na-
tural to him. Another, mentioned by the same writer, who
was infatuated witli the chimera of perpetual motion, con-
structed pieces of mechanism which were the result of the
most profound combinations, at the time when he was so
mad that he believed his head to have been changed. A fe-
male, mentioned, I believe, by Dr. Rush, sang with great
beauty and sweetness, which she could not do when ehe was
sane ; and a musician played, when insane, much better
than when he was well.

In that remarkable obliteration of the mental faculties,
on the' other hand, which we call idiocy, fatuity, or dimentia,
there is none of the distortion of insanity. It is a simple
torpor of the faculties, in the higher degrees amounting to
total insensibility to every impression ; and some remarka-
ble facts are connected with the manner in which it arises
without bodily disease. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush,
was so violently affected by some losses in trade that he was
deprived almost instantly of all his mental faculties. He
did npt take notice of any thing, not even expressing a de-
sire for food, but merely taking it when it was put into
his mouth. A servant dressed him in the morning, and
conducted him to a seat in his parlor, where he remained
the whole day, v/ith his body bent forward, and his eyes
fixed on the floor. In this state he continued nearly five
years, and then recovered completely and rather suddenly.

The idiot ' State of the facultiets in insanity ? Remarkable instances. State of tha
iaculti'^d in it- 'ocy 7 Case mentioned by Dr. Rush.

250 keason. [part m,

The account which he afterward gave of his condition
during this period was, that his mind was entire!}^ lost ;
and that it was only about two months before his final re-
covery that he began to have sensations and thoughts of
.ny kind. These at first served only to convey fears and
apprehensions, especially in the night-time. Of perfect
idiocy produced in the same manner by a moral cause an
affecting example is given by Pinel : — Two young men,
brothers, were carried off by the conscription, and, in the
first action in which they were engaged, one of them was
shot dead by the side of the other. The survivor was in-
stantly struck with perfect idiocy. He was taken home to
his father's house, where another brother was so affected by
the sight of him, that he was seized in the same manner ;
and in this state of perfect idiocy they were both received
into the Bicetre. I have formerly referretl to various exam-
ples of this condition supervening on bodily disease. In
some of them the affection was permanent ; in others it
♦vas entirely recovered from.

The most striking illustration of the various shades of
idiocy is derived from the modifications of intellectual con-
dition observed in the cretins of the Vallais. These singu-
lar beings are usually divided into three classes, which re-
ceive the name of cretins, semi-cretins, and cretins of the
third degree. The first of these classes, or perfect cretins,
are in point of intellect scarcely removed above mere ani-
mal life. Many of them cannot speak, and are only so far
sensible of the common calls of nature as to go, when ex-
cited by hunger, to places where they have been accustom-
ed to receive their food. The rest of their time is spent
either in basking in the sun or sitting by the fire, without
any trace of intelligence. The next class, or semi-cretins,
show a higher degree of intelligence ; they remember com-
r*\on events, understand Avhat is said to them, and express
themselves in an intelligent manner on the most common
subjects. They are taught to repeat prayers, but scarcely
appear to annex any meaning to the words which tuv./
employ ; and they cannot be taught to read or write, or

His own account of his condition?- Ii'it)cy produced by a moral cause : the brothers.
The rrelina of the Vallais. Chisaes of them. First class ? Thuir csndi'ion? .Second
cUsd / Their condJlion ?

SfiO. IV.] INSAiNl —IDIOCY CRETINISM. 251

even to number their iins^ers. The cretins of the third de-
gree learn to read and write, though with very little under-
standing of what they read, except on the most common
topics. But they are acutely alive to their own interest,
and extremely litigious. They arc without prudence or ,
discretion in the direction of their affairs, and the regula-
tion of their conduct ; yet obstinate, and unwilling to be ad-
vised. Their memory is good as to w4iat they have seen
or heard, and they learn to imitate w^hat they have observ-
ed in various arts, as machinery, painting, sculpture, and
architecture; but it is mere imitation without invention.
Some of them learn music in the same manner; and others
attempt poetry of the lov/est kind, distinguished by mere
rhyme. It is said that none of them can be tauo^ht arithine-
tic, but I do not know wdiether this has been ascertained to
be invariably true ; there is no doubt that it is a very gene-
ral peculiarity.

The imbecile in other situations show characters very
analogous to these. Their memory is often remarkably
retentive; but it appears to be merely a power of retain-
ing facts or words in the order and connection in w^iich
they have been presented to them, without the capacity of
tracing relations, and forming nev/ associations. In this
manner, they sometimes acquire languages, and even pro-
cure a name for a kind of scholarship ; and they learn to
imitate in various arts, but w^ithout invention. Their defi-
ciency appears to be in the powers of abstracting, recombin-
ing, and tracing relations ; consequently they are deficient
in judgment, for which these processes are necessary. The
maniac, on the other hand, seizes relations acutely, rapidly,
and often ingeniously, but not soundly. They are only
incidental relations, to which he is led by some train of as-
sociation existing in his own mind; but they occupy his at-
tention in such a m.anncr that he does not admit the consi-
ieration of other relations, or compare them with those
,vhich have fixed themselves upon his mind.

The states of idiocy and insanity, therefore, are clearly
iistinguished in the more complete examples of both ; but
many instances occur in wdiich they pass into each other,

Third class? Describe them. The imbecile. Their memory ? In wiiat dcncient ?
The maniac compared wiih thciii ? Di:^:iactlcii l-clween idiocy and insanity r

252 REASO>. [part iii

and where it is difficult to say to which of the affections the
case is to be referred. I believe they may also be, to a cer-
tain extent, combined ; or that there may be a certain dimi-
nution of the mental powers existing along with that distor-
tion which constitutes insanitj^ They likewise alternate
with one another, — maniacal paroxysms often leaving the
patient, in the intervals, in a state of idiocy. A very inte-
resting modification of another kind is mentioned by Pinel :
Five young men were received into the Bicetre, whose in-
tellectual faculties appeared to be really obliterated ; and
they continued in this state for periods of from three to up-
wards of twelve months. They were then seized with pa-
roxysms of considerable violence, which continued from
fifteen to twenty-hve daj^s, after which they all entirely re-
covered.

Idiocy can seldom be the subject cither of medical or mo-
ral treatm.ent ; but the peculiar characters of it often be-
come the object of attention in courts of law, in relation to
the competency of imbecile persons to manage their own
affairs; and much difficulty often occurs in tracing the line
between competency and incompetency. S'^veral years
a^o a case occurred in Edinburoh, which excited much dis-
cussion, and shows, in a striking manner, some of the pe-
culiarities of this condition of the mental faculties: — A gen-
tleman of considerable property having died intestate, his
heir-at-law was a younger brother, who had always been
reckoned very deficient in intellect ; and, consequently^ his
relatives now brought an action into the court of session,
for the purpose of finding him incompetent, and obtaining
the authority of the court for putting him under trustees.
In the investigation of this case, various respectable persons
deponed that they had long known the individual, and con-
sidered him as decidedly imbecile in his understandincr, and
incapable of managing his affairs. On the other hand, most
respectable evidence was produced, that he had been, when
at school, an excellent scholar in the languages, and had re
peatedly acted as a private tutor to boys; that he was re
markably attentive to his own interest, and very strict in

Sometimes connected. Kemarkable case of five young men? Treatment for idio-
cy t Difficult question in regard to them ? Case in Edinburgh. Evidence on both

SEC. IV. J INSANITY IDIOCY. 253

making a bargain ; that he had been proposed as a candi-
date for holy orders, and, on his first examination in the
languages, had acquitted himself well ; but that, in the sub-
sequent trials, in which the candidate is required to deliver
a discourse, he had been found incompetent. The court of
session, after long pleadings, decided that this individual
was incapable of managing his affairs. The case was ther
appealed to the house of lords, where, after farther pro
tracted proceedings, this decision was affirmed. I was well
acquainted with this person, and was decidedly of opinion
that he was imbecile in his intellects. At my suggestion
the follovv^ng experiment was made in the course of the in-
vestigation. A small sum of money was given him, with
directions to spend it, and present an account of his dis-
bursement, with the addition of the various articles. He
soon got rid of the money, but was found totally incapable
of this very simple process of arithmetic, though the sum did
not exceed a few shillings. This individual, then, it would
appear, possessed the simple state of memory, which ena-
bled him to acquire languages ; but v/as deficient in the
capacity of com.bining, reflecting, or comparing. His total
inability to perform the most simple process of arithmetic
was a prominent character in the case, analogous to what I
have already stated in regard to the cretins. In doubtful
cases of the kind, I think this might be employed as a nega-
tiv^e test with advantage ; for it probably will not be doubted
that a person who is incapable of such a process is incompe-
tent to manage his affairs.

It is a singular fact that the imbecile are, in general, ex-
tremely attentive to their own interest, and perhaps most
comm.only cautious in their proceedings. Ruinous extrava-
gance, absurd schemes, and quixotic ideas of liberality and
magnificence are more allied to insanity ; the former may
^ecome the dupes of others, but it is the latter who are most
ikely to involve and ruin themselves.

Before leaving the subject of Insanity, there is a point of
great interest which hiay be briefly referred to. It bears, in
a very striking mianner, upon v/hat may be called the patho-
logy of the mental powers ; but I presume not to touch

Decision ? Appeal and f;iial decision. Experiment with him ? Its rcjult ? Singular
fflicT. in regard to ihe inibecile?

22

254 REASON. [fart in.

upon it except In the slightest manner. In the language
of common life, we sometimes speak of a moral insanity, in
which a man rushes headlons: throuoh a course of vice and
crime, regardless of every moral restraint, of every social
tie, and of all consequences, whether more immediate or
future. Yet, if we take the most melancholy instance of
this kind that can be furnished by the history of human de-
pravity, the individual may still be recognised, in regard to
all physical relations, as a man of a sound mind ; and he
maybe as well qualified as other men for the details of busi-
ness, or even the investigations of science. He is correct
in his judgment of all the physical relations of things ; but,
in regard to their moral relations, every correct feeling ap-
pears to be obliterated. If a m.an, then, may thus be cor-
rect in his judgment of all physical relations, while he is lost
to every moral relation, we have strong ground for believing
that there is in his constitution a power distinct from rea-
son, but which holds the same sway over his moral powers
that reason does among his intellectual ; and that the influ-
ence of this power may be weakened or lost, while reason
reniains unimpaired. This is the moral principle, or the
power of conscience. It has been supposed by some to be a
modification of reason, but the considerations now referred
to appear to favor the opinion of their being distinct. That
this power should so completely lose its sway while reason
remains uninipaircd, is a point in the moral constitution of
man which it does not belong to the physician to investi-
gate. The fact is unquestionable; the solution is to be
sought for in the records of eternal truth.

IV. SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS.

The theory of spectral illusions is closely connected with
that of the affections treated of in the preceding parts of
this section; and I shall conclude this subject with a very
brief notice of some of the most authentic facts relating t(
them, under the following heads : —

I. False perceptions, or impressions made upon the senses

Monil ins.iniiy Its chamcier ? Moral principle. Spectral ilhidions* claa^ses. False

SEC. IV.] SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 255

only, in which the mind does not participate. Of this
class there are several modifications, which have been re-
ferred to under the subject of perception. I add in this
place the follov/ing additional examples : — A gentleman of
high mental endowments, now upwards of eighty years of
age, of a spare habit, and enjoying uninterrupted health,
has been for eleven years liable to almost daily visitations
from spectral figures. They in general present human
countenances ; the head and upper parts of the body are
distinctly defined ; the lower parts are, for the most part,
lost in a kind of cloud. The figures are various, but he
recognises the same countenances repeated from time to
time, particularly, of late years, that of an elderly woman,
with a peculiarly arch and playful expression, and a daz-
zling brilliancy of eye, who seem.s just ready to speak to
him. They appear also in various dresses, such as that of
the age of Louis XIV. ; the costume of ancient Eome ; that
of the modern Turks and Greeks ; but more frequently of
late, as in the case of the female now mentioned, in an old-
fashioned Scottish plaid of Tartan, drawn up and brought
forward over the head, and then crossed below the chin, as
the plaid was worn by aged women in his younger days.
He can seldom recognise among the spectres any figure or
countenance which he remembers to have seen ; but his
own face has occasionally been presented to him, gradually
undergoing the change from youth to manhood, and from
manhood to old age. The figures appear at various times
of the day, both night and morning ; they continue before
him for some time, and he sees them almost equally well
with his eyes open or shut, in full daylight or in darkness.
They are almost always of a pleasant character, and he
seems to court their presence as a source of amusement to
him. He finds that he can banish them by drawing his
hand across his eyes, or by shutting and opening his eye-
lids once or twice for a second or two ; but on these occa-
sions they often appear again soon after. The figures are
sometimes of the size of life, and sometimes in miniature ;
but they are always defined and finished with the clearness
and minuteness of the finest painting. They sometimes ap-

™^ - II , ,1 I Bill „ M , , , I I I ■ I - ■■ ^

Examples. Form and appearance of the figures ? Costume ? Times of their apj->ear
mg ? His command over them ? Their size ?

256 KEASON. [part 111.

pear as if at a considerable distance, and gradually ap
proach until they seem almost to touch his face ; at other
hmes they float from side to side, or disappear in ascending
or descending. In general, the countenance of the spectre
NiS presented to him ; but on some occasions he sees the
\ack of the head, both of males and females, exhibitins: va-
.^'ious fashions of wigs and head-dresses, particularly the
tiowino-, full-bottomed wigr of a former agre. At the time
when these visions began to appear to him, he was in the
habit of taking little or no wine, and this has been his com-
mon practice ever since ; but he finds that any addition to
his usual quantity of wine increases the number and viva-
city of the visions. Of the effect of bodily illness he can
give no account, except that once, when he had a cold and
took a few drops of laudanum, the room appeared entirely
filled with peculiarly brilliant objects, gold and silver orna-
ments, and precious gems ; but the spectral visions were
either not seen or less distinct. Another gentleman, who
died some time ago at the age of eighty, for several years
before his death never sat down to table at his meals with-
out the impression of sitting down with a large party
dressed in the fashion of fifty years back. This gentleman
was blind of one eye, and the sight of the other was very
imperfect ; on this account he wore over it a green shade,
and he had often before him the imasfe of his own counte-
nance, as if it were reflected from the inner surface of the
shade. A very remarkable modification of this class of illu-
sions has been communicated to me by Dr. Dewar of Stir-
ling. It occurred in a lady who was quite blind, her eyes
beino- also disoro^anized and sunk. She never walked out
without seeinfj a little old woman with a red cloak and a
crutch, who seemed to walk before her. She had no illu-
sions when within doors.

II. Real dreams, though the person was not at the time
sensible of having slept, nor consequently of having dream-
ed. A person, under the influence of some strong mental
impression, drops Jisleep for a few seconds, perhaps with-
out being sensible of it ; some scene or person connected

Kffccl of wiuc ? Eir(;cl of Wlncsa ? Anolhcr case ? Ciise of the blind lady ? BaqI
.ircam3.

SEC. IV.] SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 257

with the impression appears in a dream, and he starts up
under the conviction that it was a spectral appearance. I
have formerly proposed a conjecture by which some of the
most authentic stories of second sight may be referred to
this principle ; others seem to be referable to the principles
to be mentioned under the next head. Several cases men-
tioned by Dr. Hibbert are also clearly of the nature of
dreams. The analogy between dreaming and spectral illu-
sions is also beautifully illustrated by an anecdote which I
received lately from the gentleman to whom it occurred, an
eminent medical friend. Having sat up late one evening,
under considerable anxiety about one of his children, who
was ill, he fell asleep in his chair, and had a frightful dream,
in which the prominent figure was an immense baboon. He
awoke with the fright, got up instantly, and walked to a
table which was in the middle of the room. He was then
quite awake and quite conscious of the articles around him;
but close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, he dis-
tinctly saw the baboon making the same horrible grimaces
which he had seen in his dream ; and the spectre continued
visible for about half a minute.

III. Intense mental conceptions so strongly impressed
upon the mind as for the moment to be believed to have a
real existence. This takes place when, along Avith the men-
tal emotion, the individual is placed in circumstances in
which external impressions are very slight; as solitude,
faint light, and quiescence of body. It is a state closely
bordering upon dreaming, though the vision occurs while
the person is in the waking state. The following example
is mentioned by Dr. Hibbert : — A gentleman was told of the
sudden death of an old and intimate friend, and was deeply
affected by it. The impression, though partially banished by
the business of the day, was renewed from time to time by
conversing on the subject with his family and other friends.
After supper, he went by himself to walk in a small court
behind his house, which was bounded by extensive gardens.
The sky was clear, and the night serene ; and no light was
falling upon the court from any of the windows. As he

Second sight. Cases. Example; dream of the baboon. Intense mental conception^
Under v/hat circumstances most frequent? Case of the apparitiorx

22^

25S REASON. [part 111.

walked down stairs, he was not thinkinor of any thino- con-
nected with his deceased friend ; but when he had proceeded
at a slow pace about half-way across the court, the figure
of his friend started up before him in a most distinct manner
at the opposite angle of the court. "He was not in his usual
dress, but in a coat of a different color, which he had for
Bome months left off wearing. I could even remark a figured
vest w^hich he had also w^orn about the same time; also a
colored silk handkerchief around his neck, in which I had
used to see him in a morning; and my powers of vision
seemed to become more keen as I gazed on the phantom
before me.'* The narrator then mentions the indescribable
feeling which shot through his frame ; but he soon recovered
himself, and walked briskly up to the spot, keeping his eyes
intently fixed upon the spectre. As he approached the spot
it vanished, not by sinking into the earth, but seeming to
melt insensibly into air.

A similar example is related by a most intelligent writer
in the Christian Observer for October, 1829 : — " An inti-
mate friend of my early years, and most happy in his do-
mestic arrangements, lost his wife under the most painful
circumstances, suddenly, just after she had apparently
escaped from the dangers of an untoward confinement with
her first child. A few weeks after this melancholy event,
while travelling during the night on horseback, and in all
probability thinking over his sorrows, and contrasting his
present cheerless prospects with the joys which so lately
gilded the hours of his happy home, the form of his lost
relative appeared to be presented to him at a little distance
in advance. He stopped his horse, and contemplated the
vision with great trepidation, till in a few seconds it va
nished away. Within a few days of this appearance, while
he was sitting in his solitary parlor late at night, reading by
the light of a shaded taper, the door, he thought, opened,
and the form of his deceased partner entered, assured him of
her complete happiness, and enjoined him to follow her foot-
steps." This second appearance was probably a dream ;
the first is distinctly referable to the principles stated in the
preceding observations.

Effect on the obscrvpr ? Case described in the Christian Observer. First appear
tnce ? tSccond appearance ? Eiplauation of the two ?

SEC. IV.J SPfiCTRAL ILLtJStoNS. 259

An interesting case referable to this head is described by
Sir Walter Scott, in his late work on Demonology and
Witchcraft : " Not long after the death of a late illustrious
poet, who had filled, while living, a great station in the eye
of the public, a literary friend, to whom the deceased had
been well known, was engaged during the darkening twi-
light of an autumn evening in perusing one of the publica-
tions which professed to detail the habits and opinions of
the distinguished individual who was now no more. As the
reader had enjoyed the intimacy of the deceased to a con-
siderable degree he was deeply interested in the publica-
tion, which contained some particulars relating to himself
and other friends. A visiter was sitting in the apartment,
who was also engaged in reading. Their sitting-room
opened into an entrance-hail rather fantastically fitted up
with articles of armor, skins of wild animals, and the like.
It was when laying down his book, and passing into this
hall, through which the moon was beginning to shine, that
the individual of whom I speak saw right before him, and
in a standing posture, the exact representation of his de-
parted friend, whose recollection had been so strongly
brought to his imagination. He stopped for a single mo-
ment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy with w4iich
fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye the peculiarities
of dress and posture of the illustrious poet. Sensible, how-
ever, of the delusion, he felt no sentiment save that of won-
der at the extraordinary accuracy of the resemblance, and
stepped onwards towards the figure, which resolved itself, as
he approached, into the various materials of which it was
composed. These were merely a screen occupied by great-
coats, shawls, plaids, and such other articles as usually are
found in a country entrance-hall."

On this part of the subject I shall only add the following
example, which [ have received from Dr. Andrew Combe :
A gentleman, a friend of his, has in his house a number of
phrenological casts, among which is particularly conspicu-
ous a bust of Curran. A servant-p'irl belonofino^ to the fami-
ly, after undergoing great fatigue, awoke early one morn-
ing, and beheld at the foot of her bed the apparition of Cur-
Case described by Walter Scott. Narrate the circumstances. Apparition of Cur-
ran

260 REASON. [part III.

ran. He had the same pale and cadaverous aspect as in
the bust, but he was now dressed in a sailor's jacket, and
his face was decorated with an immense pair of whiskers.
In a state of extreme terror she awoke her fellow-servant
and asked whether she did not see the spectre. She, how-
ever, saw nothing, and endeavored to rally her out of her
alarm ; but the other persisted in the reality of the appari-
tion, which continued visible for several minutes. The
gentleman, it appears, keeps a pleasure yacht, the seamen
belonging to which are frequently in the house. This, per-
haps, was the origin of the sailor's dress in which the spec
tre appeared; and the immense whiskers had also probably
been borrowed from one of these occasional visiters.

To the same principle we are probably to refer the stories
of the apparitions of murdered persons haunting the mur-
derer, until he was driven to give himself up to justice;
many examples of this kind are on record. Similar effects
have resulted in other situations from intense mental ex-
citement. A gentleman, mentioned by Dr. Conolly, when
in great danger of being wrecked in a boat on tl.c Eddy-
stone rocks, said he actually saw his family at the moment.
In similar circumstances of extreme and immediate danger,
others have described the history of their past lives being
represented to them in such a vivid manner, that at a sin-
gle glance the whole was before them, without the power
of banishing the impression. To this head we are also to
refer some of the stories of second sight : namely, by sup-
posing that they consisted of spectral illusions arising out
of strong mental impression, and by some natural coincidence
fulfilled in the same manner as we have seen in regard to
dreams. Many of these anecdotes are evidently embellish-
ed and exaggerated; but the following I have received from
a most respectable clergyman, as being to his persona^
knowledge strictly true : In one of the Western Isles of
Scotland, a congregation was assembled on a Sunday morn-
ing, and in immediate expectation of the appearance of the
clergyman, when a man started up, uttered a scream, and
stood looking to the pulpit with a countenance expressive

lis dress? Explanation? Explanation of apparilions of murdered persons ? Effoct
ftf slron? menial excitemeat in other cases ? Stories of second sight. Authentic nur-
raliva of second sight ?

SEC. IV.J SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 261

of terror. As soon as he could be prevailed on to speak, he
exclaimed, " Do you not see the minister in the pulpit,
dressed in a shroud?" A few minutes after this occurrence
the clergyman appeared in his place, and conducted the
service, apparently in his usual health ; but in a day or
two after was taken ill and died before the following Sunday.

The effect of opium is well known in giving an impres-
sion of reality to the visions of conception or imagination;
several striking examples of this will be found in the Con-
fessions of an Opium-Eater. These are in general allied,
or actually amount to the delusions of delirium, but they
are sometimes entirely of a different nature. My respected
friend, the late Dr. Gregory, was accustomed to relate a
remarkable instance which occurred to himself. He had
gone to the north country by sea to visit a lady, a near re-
lation, m whom he felt deeply interested, and who was in an
advanced state of consumption. In returning from the visit,
he had taken a moderate dose of laudanum, with the view
of preventing sea-sickness, and was lying on a couch in the
cabin, when the figure of the lady appeared before him in
so distinct a manner, that her actual presence could not
have been more vivid. He was quite awake, and fully sen-
sible that it was a phantasm produced by the opiate, along
with his intense mental feeling, but he was unable by any
effort to banish the vision.

Some time ago I attended a gentleman affected with a
painful local disease, requiring the use of large opiates, but
which often failed in producing sleep. In one watchful
night there passed before him a long and regular exhibition
of characters and transactions connected with certain oc-
currences which had been the subject of much conversation
in Edinburgh some time before. The characters succeeded
each other wdth all the regularity and vividness of a theat-
rical exhibition; he heard their conversation and long
speeches that were occasionally made, some of which were
in rhyme ; and he distinctly remembered, and repeated next
day, long passages from these poetical effusions. He .was
quite awake, and quite sensible that the whole was a phan-
tasm , and he remarked that when he opened his eye? the

Effect of opium? Case of Dr. Gregory ? Case obseived by the author?

862 REASON. [part III.

vision vanished, but instantly reappeared whenever he
closed them.

IV. Erroneous impressions, connected with bodily dis-
ease, generally disease in the brain. The illusions, in these
cases, arise in a manner strictly analogous to dreaming,
and consist of some former circumstances recalled into the
mind, and believed for the time to have a real and present
existence. The diseases in connection with which they
arise are generally of an apoplectic or inflammatory charac-
ter, sometimes epileptic; and they are very frequent in the
affection called delirium tremens, which is produced by a
continued use of intoxicating liquors. Dr. Gregory used
to mention in his lectures a gentleman liable to epileptic
fits, in whom the paroxysm was generally preceded by the
appearance of an old woman in a red cloak, who seemed to
come up to him, and strike him on the head with her crutch;
at that instant he fell down in the fit. It is probable that
there was in this case a sudden attack of headache, con-
nected with the accession of the paroxysm, and that this
led to the vision in the same manner as bodily feelings
give rise to dreams. One of the most singular cases on
record of spectral illusions referable to this class, is that of
Nicolai, a bookseller in Berlin, as described by himself, and
quoted by Dr. Ferriar : — By strong mental emotions he
seems to have been thrown into a state bordering upon
mania; and, while in this condition, was haunted con-
stantly, while awake, for several months, by figures of men.
Women, animals, and birds. A similar case is mentioned
by Dr. Alderston : — A man who kept a dram-shop saw a
soldier endeavorincr to force himself into his house in a me-
nacing manner ; and, in rushing forward to prevent him, he
was astonished to find it a phantom. He had afterward a
succession of visions of persons long dead, and others who
were living. This man was cured by bleeding and pur-
gatives : and the source of his first vision was traced to
a quarrel which he had some time before with a drunken
soldier. A gentleman from America, who is also men-

EtTccts of disease. Common character of the discascJ? Example. ExplanatioD
Case of Nicolai ? The keeper of the dram-shop. His cure ?

SEC. IV.] SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 263

tioned by Dr. Alderston, was seized with severe headache
and complained of troublesome dreams ; and, at the same
time, had distinct visions of his wife and family, whom he
had left in America. In the state of delirium tremens such
visions are common, and assume a variety of forms. I
have known a patient describe distinctly a dance of fairies
going on in the floor of the apartment, and give a most mi-
nute account of their figures and dresses.

Similar phantasms occur, in various forms, in febrile dis-
eases. A lady whom I attended some years ago on account
of an inflammatory aflection of the chest, awoke her hus-
band one night, at the commencement of her disorder, and
begged him to get up instantly. She said she had distinct-
ly seen a man enter the apartment, pass the foot of her bed,
and go into a closet which entered from the opposite side
of the room. She was quite awake, and fully convinced
of the reality of the appearance ; and, even after the closet
was examined, it was found almost im.possible to convince
her that it was a delusion. There are numerous examples
of this kind on record. The writer in the Christian Ob-
server, lately referred to, mentions a lady who, during a
severe illness, repeatedly saw her father, who resided at the
distance of many hundred miles, come to her bedside, and,
withdrawing the curtain, address her in his usual voice and
manner. A farmer, mentioned by the same writer, in re-
turning from a market, was dee[>ly aflocted by a most ex-
traordinary brilliant ligbL, which he th(mght he saw upon
the road, and by an apptNirancc in the hght, which he sup-
posed to be our Savior. He was greatly alarmed, and
spurring his horse, galloped home ; remained agitated dur-
ing the evening ; was seized with typhus fever, then pre-
vailing in the neighborhood, and died in nhout ten days.
It was afterward ascertained that on the morning of the day
of the supposed vision, beft>re he left home, he had com
plained of headache and languor ; and there can be no
doubt that the spectral appearance was connected w4th the
commencement of the fever. Entirely analogous to this,
but still more striking in its oiroumstances, is a case which
1 have received from an eminent medical friend : and tho

The American. Ca9e3 in febrile diseaaes The autlun's padent. Ca^ ifescT'tted ia
ihe Ctu-istian Observer ? The appariUii ? t?ixj)lanati->ri ot It ?

264 REASON. [part in.

subject of it was a near relation of his own, a lady about
fifty. On returning one evening from a party, she went
into a dark room to lay aside some part of her dress, when
she saw distinctly before her the figure of death, as a skele-
ton, w^ith his arm uplifted, and a dart in hand. He instant-
ly aimed a blow at her with the dart, which seemed to
strike her on the left side. The same nioht she was seizeck.
with fever, accompanied by symptoms of inflammation in
the left side ; but recovered after a severe illness. So
strongly was the vision impressed upon her mind, that even
for some time after her recovery slie could not pass the
door of the room in which it occurred without discovering
agitation ; declaring that it was there she met with her ill-
ness.

A highly intelligent friend whom I attended several years
ago, in a mild but very protracted fever, without delirium.,
had frequent interviews with a spectral visiter, who present-
ed the appearance of an old gray-headed man, of a most
benignant aspect. His visits w^ere always conducted exactly
in the same manner : he entered the room by a door which
was on the left hand side of the bed, passed the end of the
bed, and seated himself on a chair on the right hand side :
he then fixed his eyes upon the patient with an expression
of intense interest and pity, but never spoke ; continued
distinctly visible for some seconds, and then seemed to va-
nish into air. His visits were sometimes repeated daily for
several days, but sometimes he missed a day : and the ap-
pearance continued for several weeks. The same gentle
man on another occasion, w4ien in perfect health, sitting in
his parlor in the evening, saw distinctly in the corner of
the room a female figure in a kneeling posture, who con-
tinued visible for several seconds.

In a lady, whose case is mentioned in the Edinburgh
ournal of Science for April, 1830, there was an illusion
affecting both sight and hearing. She repeatedly heard
JKU' husband's voice calling to her by name, as if from an
adjoining room ; and on one occasion saw his figure most
distinctly, standing before the fire in the drawing-room,
when he had left tlic house half an hour before. She went

The appiriiion of a skclPt,on. EfTectupon the mind? The spoctnil
Lini;slunc5d b'r liiJ vL-liu 7 Double illuaicfu. Cii^cunutances of ih^ case ?

. il vbiter? Cir-
Ctini;

^EC. IV.] SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 265

O

and sat down within two feet of the figure, supposing it to
be her husband, and was greatly astonished that he did not
answer when she spoke to him. The figure continued visi-
\le for several minutes, then moved towards a window at the
irther end of the room, and there disappeared. A few
tays after this appearance, she saw the figure of a cat lying
?.n the hearth-rug; and, on another occasion, while adjust-
mg her hair before a mirror, late at night, she saw the coun-
tenance of a friend, dressed in a shroud, reflected from the
mirror, as if looking over her shoulder. This lady had
been for some time in bad health, being affected v/ith pec-
toral complaints, and much nervous debility. A remarka-
ble feature of this case was the illusion of hearing; and of
this I have received another example from a medical friend
in England. A clergyman, aged fifty-six, accustomed to
full living, was suddenly seized with vomiting, vertigo, and
ringing in his ears, and continued in rather an alarming con-
dition for several days. During this time, he had the sound
in his ears of tunes most distinctly played, and in accurate
succession. This patient had, at the same time, a very re-
markable condition of vision, such as I have not heard of
in any other case. All objects appeared to him inverted.
This peculiarity continued three days, and then ceased gra-
dually ; — the objects b}^ degrees changing their position, first
to the horizontal, and then to the erect.

V. To these sources of spectral illusions we are to add,
though not connected with our present subject, those which
originate in pure misconception ; the imagination working
up into a spectral illusion something which is really a very
trivial occurrence. Of this class is an anecdote, mentioned
by Dr. Hibbert, of a whole ship's company being thrown
into the utmost state of consternation by the apparition of a
cook v/ho had died a few days before. He v/as distinctly
seen walking ahead of the ship, with a peculiar gait, by
which he was distinguished when alive, from having one of
his legs shorter than the other. On steering the ship to-
wards the object, it was found to be a piece of floating wreck.
A story referable to the same principle is related by Dr.

Various apparitions. The case of llie clergyman? His vision? Misconception
Anecdote of \hQ shio's company ?

23

26r) REASON. [part III.

Ferriar : — A gentleman travelling in the Highlands of Scot-
land was conducted to a bedroom which was reported to be
haunted by the spirit of a man who had there committed
suicide. In the night he awoke under the influence of a
frightful dream, and found himself sitting up in bed with a
pistol grasped in his right hand. On looking round the
room he now discovered, by the moonlight, a corpse dressed
in a shroud reared against the wall, close by the window ;
the features of the body, and every part of the funeral ap-
parel, being perceived distinctly. On recovering from the
first impulse of terror, so far as to investigate the source of
the phantom, it was found to be produced by the moonbeamj
forming a long bright image through the broken window.

Two esteemed friends of mine, while travelling in th.^
Highlands, had occasion to sleep in separate beds in on'
apartment. One of them, having awoke in the night, sa\T'
by the moonlight a skeleton hanging from the head of hii
/riend's bed ; every part of it being perceived in the most
distinct manner. He instantly got up to investigate the
source of tlie illusion, and found it to be produced by the
moonbeams falling upon the drapery of the bed, w4iich had
been thrown back, in some unusual manner, on account of
the heat of the w^eather. He returned to bed and soon fell
asleep. But having awoke again some time after, the ske-
leton was still so distinctly before him, that he could not
sleep w^ithout again getting up to trace the origin of the
phantom. Determined not to be disturbed a third time, he
now broun-ht down the curtain into its usual state, and the
skeleton appeared no more.

The traveller in the Highlands. The apparition ? Explanation of it?

PART IV.

VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIREMENTS WHICH CONST!'
TUTE A WELL REGULATED MIND.

In concluding this outline of facts regarding the intellec-
tual powers and the investigation of truth, we may take a
slight review of what those qualities are which constitute a
well regulated nnind, and which ought to be aimed at by
those who desire either their own mental culture, or that of
others who are under their care. The more important con-
siderations may be briefly recapitulated in the following
manner : —

I. The cultivation of a habit of steady and continuous
attention ; or of properly directing the mind to any subject
which is before it, so as fully to contemplate its elements
and relations. This is necessary for the due exercise o.
every other mental process, and is the foundation of all im-
provement of character, both intellectual and moral. We
shall afterward have occasion to remark, how often sophis-
tical opinions and various distortions of character may be
traced to errors in this first act of the mind, or to a misdi-
rection and want of due resfulation of the attention. There
is, indeed, every reason to believe that the diversities in the
power of judging, indifferent individuals, are much less than
we are apt to imagine ; and that the remarkable differences
observed in the act of judging are rather to be ascril^ed to
the manner in which the mind is previoi *^>Iy directed to the
facts on which the judgment is afterward to be exercised.
It is related of Sir Isaac Newton that when he was ques-
tioned respecting the mental qualities which formed the pe-
culiarity of his character, he referred it entirely to thepow-
er which he had acquired of continuous attention.

Subject of Part IV? First quality ? Its importance. Evils resulting frrm a want
of it? To what two causes may differences in acts of judging be ascribefP Whkb
mast commonly the true cause ? Nev/tnn's remark?

268 CHARACTERS OF [pART IV

The foUo-vving directions and cautions will very mucli assist the pu
pil in acquiring this intellectual habit.

1. Attempt but one thing at a time, and devote your whole attention
exclusively to it. Many young persons continually violate this princi-
ple. They will try to study a lesson, and listen to an interesting con-
versation at the same time, hoping to secure simultaneously the ad-
vantage of the one and the pleasure of the other. But, in fact, the
pleasure of the conversation is destroyed by the uneasy and distract
ing feeling which the circumstances occasion, and the attention to tli.,
book is of the most superficial and useless character ; so that both ob-
jects are lost. In the same manner, a pupil engaged in some mathe-
matical calculations will station himself at a window, where he may
Jook down on some busy scene^ the animating influences of which, he
imagines, may cheer his labors ; whereas, in fact, in such a case, he
can neither enjoy the prospect nor perform his work.

2. Another most common way by which habits of inattention and
wandering of mind are formed and fixed, is, not attempting exactly to
do two things, but attempting one Avith the mind all the time per-
plexed with doubt whether it ought not to be doing another. This is
a very common source of injury. The most ruinous consequences to
the intellectual habits of the young, especially, often result from it ;
for they seldom have much plan or system in the arrangement of their
time. He who acts from the impulse of the moment, must be always
exposed to this difficulty j for this impulse will continually fluctuate
and vary. He will take up one book, and after reading a page will
think another would be more interesting, and changing from one to the
other will lose all the benefit of both. Or he will be employed in study-
ing a lesson, with his mind all the time distracted with the question
which he continually stops to consider, whether he shall not give up
his lesson and read a story, or he will read the story with a secret con-
viction that he ought to be studying a lesson. There cannot be prac-
tices more destructive to present enjoyment, or more ruinous to the ha-
bits of the mind.

^•. Another most common cause of careless and superficial habits of
atioution is, undertaking what is not fairly within the power.s of the
individual. If a reader cannot fully understand and appreciate the
work which he has undertaken, he insensibly acquires the habit of
running over it with his eye, while his mind is really occupied with
something else. He receives perhaps a few ideas, he catches a little
rS the train of thought, but he enters not into the spirit of the work at
Thousands and thousands of books are read in this way, the

ader taking merely what lies upon tlic surface, and having no idea
inat tliere is any thing below. This too is destructive to all correct
habits of attention.

By these three precautions, viz. carefully confining the attention to
the single object which for the time being is before it, — regu latin t?
the selection of objects by some systematic principle, so that while we

First principle ? Common modes of violating il. Consequences? Second principle
Common ways of violaiing it? Co!iscf(uences. Third ijrinciplc. Consequences of vi-
olating' it? Recapitulation of the three principles?

PART IV. J A WELL KEtiULATLLf mn>'o, 269

are pursuing one study no other neglected duty can come in to claim
our attention — and never undertaking what is not fairly Avithin the
reach of our powers, — we may soon acquire habits of continuous and
f.teady attention, at least in the study of books. But in order to form
correct habits of attention in the highest sense, it is not ei.ough foi
the individual to practise on books. He must practise on men and
things. That is, he must not only, when engaged in reading, attend
to his books, but when out in society, and surrounded by persons,
and by the various objects of life, he must attend to them. That
mind is as badly disciplined which loses itself in a revery when sur-
rounded by society, as the one which continually wanders in search
of amusement when its possessor is endavoring to confine it to books.
In a word, give the Avhole attention with a vigor and earnestness to
the object, whatever it may be, which, for the time being, is proj^erly be-
fore you.

Faithful practice on these principles will soon give the pupil this first
quality of a well regulated mind.

II. Nearly connected with the former, and of equal im-
portance, is a careful regulation and control of the succes-
sion of our thoughts. This remarkable faculty is very much
under the influence of cultivation, and on the power so ac-
quired depends the important habit of regular and connect-
ed thinking. It is primarily a voluntary act ; and iu the
exercise of it in different individuals there are the most re-
markable differences. In some the thoug^hts are allowed to
wander at large without any regulation, or are devoted only
to frivolous and transient objects; while others habitually
exercise over them a stern control, directing them to sub-
jects of real importance, and prosecuting these in a regular
and connected manner. This important habit gains strength
by exercise, and nothing, certainly, has a greater influence
in 2:ivin2f tone and consistency to the whole character. It
may not, indeed, be going too far to assert that our condi-
tion, in the scale both of moral and intellectual beings, is in
a great measure determined by the control which we have
acquired over the succession of our thoughts, and by the
subjects on which they are habitually exercised.

The resfulation of the thougfhts is, therefore, a hifjh con-
cern , in the man who devotes his attention to it as a study
of supreme importance, the first great source of astonish-
ment will be the manner in which his thoughts have been

To what applicable besides the study of books? General principle ? Second quali-
ty ? How far voluntary ? Dinbrcnces of character ia this respect. Consequences do-
pending ?

23^

270 CHAKACTERS OF [PART IV.

occupied in many an hour and many a day that has passed
over him. The leading objects to which the thoughts may
be directed, are referable to three classes. (1.) The ordi-
nary engagements of life, or matters of business, with which
every man is occupied in one degree or another ; including
concerns of domestic arrangement, personal comfort, and
necessary recreation. Each of these deserves a certain de-
gree of attention, but this requires to be strictly guided by
its real and relative importance; and it is entirely unwor-
thy of a sound and reoulated mind to have the attention
solely or chiefly occupied with matters of personal comfort,
or of trivial importance, calculated merely to afford amuse-
ment for the passing hour. (2.) Visions of the imagination
built up by the mind itself vrhen it has nothing better to oc-
cupy it. The mind cannot be idle, and when it is not oc-
cupied by subjects of a useful kind, it will find a resource
in those which are frivolous or hurtful, — in mere visions,
waking dreams, or fictions, in which the mind Vv^anders from
scene to scene, unrestrained by reason, probability or truth.
No habit can be more opposed to a healthy condition of the
mental powers ; and none ought to be more carefully guard-
ed against by every one who would cultivate the high ac-
quirement of a well regulated mind. (3.) Entirely oppos-
ed to the latter of these modes, and distinct also in a great
measure from the former, is the habit of following out a con-
nected chain of thoughts on subjects of importance and of
truth, whenever the mind is disengaged from the proper and
necessary attention to the ordinary transactions of life. Th(
particular subjects to which the thoughts are directed ir\
cultivating this habit, will vary in different individuals ; but
the consideration of the relative value of them does not be-
long to our present subject. The purpose of these obser-
vations is simply to impress the value of that regulation of
the thoughts by which they can always find an occupation
of interest and importance distinct from the ordinary trans-
actions of life, or the mere pursuit of frivolous engage-
ments; and also totally distinct from that destructive habit
by which the mind is allowed to run to waste amid visions
and fictions unworthy of a waking man.

Classification of the ohjecis of iliouglu ? First class ? Its proper importinrc ? Se-
cond class ? Influence of this habit 1 Third cla;i3. Influeiice of this habit ?

PART IV.] A WELL REGULATED :\IIND. 271

In acquiring this second quality of a well regulated mind, there are
several Ava3^s in which the pupil may practise. It will of course be
understood' that this head refers to the employment of the thoughts
when they are at liberty, as when the individual is walking, or sitting
alone, or engaged in those employments which do not necessarily oc-
cupy the mind. The following are some of the methods by vv^hich the.
mind can be in such cases usefully employed.

1. Reviewing, and fixing in the memory, what has been read, or
learned in any other way. You have been engaged, we will imagine,
in a bock of travels ; now you can call up to mind the scenes described
there. Commence the journey with the traveller in imagination, anew,
and go regularly forward, calling up to mind as fully as possible all the
adventures and incidents which the book described. The same may be
done v%-ith any other vvork.

2. Pursuing a connected train of thought on some useful subject
selected for this purpose. You take, for instance, for your subject,
^' Common instances of Insincerity,- ' and making a logical division of
it, you consider one head at a time, regularly examining it in all its
bearings and relations, as if you were going to write a treatise upon
the subject. You first think, perhaps, of insincere professions for the
sake of civi'ltij, — call to mind as many cases as you can, and arrange
and classify them. In the next place you take cases of false appear-
ances assumed from vanity, and pursue this in the same way. Thus
the whole subject maybe explored, and reduced to order and system in
your own mind. The subjects which may in this way be examined
are innumerable.

3. Systematic and attentive observation. In this case, the thoughts
are not engaged in reviewing past attainments, or in exploring a sub-
ject of rellection, but in examining with interest and care visible ob-
jects around. If riding through a new country he may study its geo-
graphical features, or the pursuits and occupations of its inhabitants.
If taking an evening v/alk, he can exa.mine with care the plants or
flowers he sees, or, by conversation with the various individuals he
may meet v.'itli, increase his knowledge of human character and ac-
tion. He may thus drav^- off his thoughts from the field of mere reflec-
tion, and apply them, with active interest, to the objects or the scene

hrough which he moves. He may, if he chooses to regulate in some
legree these studies, select some class of objects to examin.*, or
som.e point towards v/hich his observations shall tend. For example,
when rambling in the fields, he may employ himself in finding as
many 'proofs of contrivance, as he can in the works of nature, and to
this point direct all his inquiries and observations on his walk, whe-
ther he looks at an insect or a plant, or the form and structure of
a hill.

Such are the various ways by which solitary thought may be regu-
lated. Reviewing past studies ; rellecting systematically on some new

Ways m which the thoughts may be eiiiiploye 1. Y'wsl mode. Example ? Second
mode ? Example ? Third mode ? Examples ? Recapitulation ?

272 CHARACTERS OF [PART IV

subject ; and the scientific and active examination of nature. It must
not be understood, however, that the writer recommends that every
hour of reflection or soUtude should be rigidly devoted to such purposes.
There mast be recreatioyi, which such exercises will not afford ; for
thought, guided by these principles, will be stuclj/, and in the case of the
young, it will be study of the severest kind. It is, however, an effort
which must be often made, or the mind will never acquire the full
command of its powers.

in. The cultivation of an active, inquiring state of mind
which seeks for information from every source that comes
within its reach, whether in reading, conversation, or per-
sonal observation. With this state of mental activity ought
to be closely connected attention to the authenticity of
facts so received; avoiding the two extremes of credulity
and scepticism.

IV. The habit of correct association ; that is, connecting
facts in the mind according to their true relations, and to the
manner in which they tend to illustrate each other. This,
as we have formerly seen, is one of the principal means of
improving the memory ; particularly of the kind of memory
which is an essential quality of a cultivated mind ; namely,
that which is founded not upon incidental connections, but
on true and important relations. Nearly allied to this is
the habit of reflection, or of tracing carefully the relations
of facts, and the conclusions and principles which arise out
of them. It is in this manner, as was formerly mentioned,
that the philosophical mind often traces remarkable rela-
tions, and deduces important conclusions; while to the
common understanding the facts appear to be very remote,
or entirely unconnected.

It is very important that the pupil should understand distinctly and
precisely what is meant by this ^^ correct association.''^ Let us siippos*
a case. It may perhaps seem rather trivial, but no other one will full}
illustrate the case. Suppose you are riding in the stage with a se?
captain, who wears a white hat. The conversation tunis on the sub
ject of the form of ships. You tell him you should suppose that the)
would make their way more easily through the water if they werf
made narrow across the bows or forward part, and gratlually incret»3-

Kccreatinn sojiictirtjcs i!cce:isary. Tliinl quality ? Fimrtli (jualily ? Correct ;h?oc»-
atlou ? The kind of memory os.scnlial li> a culiiv.iic.l luiinl ? Tracing the relations of
facia 1 Example to illuslrale the Iwo modcd of a?sociaUou ?

PART IV.] A WELL REGULATED MIND. 273

ing towards the stern, so as to force open the water like a wedge. He
tells you that this is found by experience to be a bad construction,
for on this plan the friction of the water is great along the whole side,
svhereas by making the ship broad near the bows, and gradually ta-
pering towards the stern, it opens a sufficient passage through the
w^ater at once, and the friction along the sides is relieved. In ether
'tords, that it is more important to avoid friction along the sides,
^hm resistance at the bows. He tells you also that the Creator has
'C'rmed fishes, and all animals who are intended to move in water, on
chis principle.

Now after hearing such a conversation as this, a person of Avell
disciplined mind will pause a moment, and connect these facts with
his other knowledge on the same subjects — that is, the construc-
tion of ships, — the resistance of fluids, — and the admirable mechanism
of the Creator's works. And he will establish this connection so
firmly, that when at a future time any of these subjects come up in
conversation, this information will come up too ; and thus all his
knowledge on such subjects, from v.'hatever sources derived, will
form one connected and harmonious whole. On the other hand, the
person whose mind is undisciplined and unregulated, v/ill perhaps
have this knowledge associated in his mind with no other idea than
hat he was riding in a stage when he heard it, or that his informant
wore a white hat. Perhaps he would not think of the subject again,
until he meets, some weeks after, a gentleman in the street, wearing
a Avhite hat, the sight of which may remind him of his fellov\'-travel-
ler, and the conversation about the construction of ships. Thou-
sands of individuals have their ideas grounded on such principles as
these.

Such is the difference between correct scientific association, and that
which is merely accidental and trivial. And a moment's reflection
will show the reader the immense superiority of the former, for all the
purposes for which knowledge is to be used. "We must of course learn
tacts and principles at various times, and under every possible variety
of circumstances. But though they cannot in all cases be acquired
in order, they may be put in order as soon as they are acquired.
Every truth, as scon as it is possessed, must be carried to its froper
2^Iace in the intellectual store-house, or else all will soon be inextricable
confusion.

V. A careful selection of the subjects to which the mind
ought to be directed. These are, in some respects, different
in different persons, according to their situations in lifo
but there are certain objects of attention which are pecu
liarly adapted to each individual, and there are some which
are equally interesting to all. In regard to the latter, an
appropriate degree of attention is the part of every wise

Facts stated by the captain ? Proper mode of associating and remembering these
facts? Improper mode ? Importance of correct habits of association. Fifth quality ?
Selection of subjects. Principles which should guide.

274

CHAKACTEKS OF

PART IV.J

man; in regard to the former, a proper selection is the
foundation of excellence. One individual may waste his
powers in that desultory application of them which leads to
an imperfect acquaintance with a variety of subjects ; while
another allows his life to steal over him in listless inactivity,
or application to trifling pursuits. It is equally melancholy
to see high powers devoted to unworthy objects; such as
the contests of party on matters involving no important
principle, or the subtleties of sophistical controversy. For
rising to eminence in any intellectual pursuit, there is not
a rule of more essential importance than that of doing one
thing at a tim*e ; avoiding distracting and desultory occu-
pations ; and keeping a leading object habitually before the
mind, as one in which it can at all times find an interesting
resource when necessary avocations allow the thoughts to
recur to it. A subject which is cultivated in this manner,
not by regular periods of study merely, but as an habitual
object of thought, rises up and expands before the mind in
a manner which is altogether astonishing. If along with
this habit there be cultivated the practice of constantly
writing such views as arise, we perhaps describe that state
of mental discipline by which talents of a very moderate
order may be applied in a conspicuous and useful manner to
any subject to which they are devoted. Such writing need
not be made at first with any great attention to method, but
merely put aside for future consideration; and in this man-
ner the different departments of a subject v/ill develop and
arrange themselves as they advance in a manner equally
pleasing and wonderful.

VI. A due regulation and proper control of the miagi-
nation ; that is, restricting its range to objects which har-
monize with truth, and are adapted to the real state of
things with which the individual is or may be connected.
We have seen how much the character is influenced by this
exercise of the mind; that it may be turned to purposes of
the greatest moment, both in the pursuits of science and in
the cultivation of benevolence and virtue; but that, on the

Frequent \va.stc of iiilellccUial powers. Ej^seutial principle? Etrccta of it? Writ*
ing ? Sixth quality ? The imagination, how to be resulatcd ?

PART IV.] A WELL REGULATED MIND. 275

other hand, it may be so employed as to debase both the
moral and intellectual character.

VII. The cultivation of calm and correct judgment — ap-
plicable alike to the formation of opinions, and the regu-
lation of conduct. This is founded, as we have seen, upon
the habit of directing the attention distinctly and steadily
to all the facts and considerations bearing upon a subject
and it consists in contemplating them in their true relations,
and assigning to each the degree of importance of which it
is worthy. This mental habit tends to guard us against
forming conclusions either with listless inattention to the
views by which we ought to be influenced, or with atten-
tion directed to some of these, while w^e neglect others of
equal or greater importance. It is, therefore, opposed to
the influence of prejudice and passion, — to the formation of
sophistical opinions, — to pai'ty spirit, — and to every pro-
pensity which leads to the adoption of principles on any
other ground than calm and candid examination, guided by
sincere desire to discover the truth. In the purely physical
sciences, distorted opinions are seldom met wath, or make
little mipression, because they are brought to the test of
experiment, and thus their fallacy is exposed. But it is
otherwise m those departments Vv^hich do not admit of this
remedy. Sophisms and partial deductions are, accordingly,
met with in medicine, political economy, and metaphysics ;
and too often in the still higher subjects of morals and reli-
gion. In the economiy of the human mind, it is indeed
impossible to observe a more remarkable phenomenon than
the manner in w^hich a man who, in the ordinary aflairs of
life, shows the general characters of a sound understand-
ing, can thus resign himself to the influence of an opinion
founded upon partial examination. He brings ingeniously
to the support of his dogma every fact and argument that
can possibly be turned to its defence ; and explains away
or overlooks every thing that tends to a different conclu-
sion ; while he appears anxious to convince others, and
really seems to have persuaded himself, that he is engaged
in an honest investigation of truth. This propensity gains

Seventh quality ? Correct judgment. Founded on what? EtTectsof it? Opposed
to what ? In what sciences is most caution required J Conunon ca.se of error (>:i tliic?
poiut 7

276 CHAKACTEKS OF [PART IV.

strength by iDdulgencc, and the mind, which has yielded to
its influence, advances from one pretended discovery to
another, — mistaking its own fancies for the sound conclu-
sions of the understanding, until it either settles down into
some monstrous sophism, or perhaps concludes by doubting
of every thing.

The manner in which the most extravagant opinions ar
maintained by persons who give way to this abuse of their
powers of reasoning, is scarcely more remarkable than the
facility with wliich they often find zealous proselytes. It
is, indeed, difficult to trace the principles by which various
individuals are influenced in thus surrendering their assent,
with little examination, often on subjects of the highest im-
portance. In some it would appear to arise from the mere
pleasure of mental excitement; in others, from the love of
singularity, and the desire of appearing wiser than their
neighbors ; while, in not a few, the will evidently takes the
lead in the mental process, and opinions are seized upon
with avidity, and embraced as truth, which reconimend
themselves to previously existing inclinations of the heart.
But whatever may be tiie explanation, the influence of the
principle is most extensive; and sentiments of the most
opposite kinds may often be traced to the facility with
which the human mind receives opinions which have been
presented to it by some extrinsic influence. This influence
may be of various kinds. It may be the power of party,
or the persuasion of a plausible and persevering individual;
it may be the supposed infallibility of a particular system,
it may be the mere empire of fashion, or the pretensions of
a false philosophy. The particular result, also, may difler,
according as one or other of these causes may be in opera-
tion. But the intellectual condition is the same ; and the
distortion of character which arises out of it, whether bigot-
/, superstition, or scepticism, may be traced to a similar
process; namely, to an influence which directs the mind
upon some other principle than a candid investigation of
truth. In a similar manner we may perhaps account for
the facts, that the lowest superstition and the most daring

Consequences 7 Influence of such powers on other minds ? Causes of this 1 Various
Jbrnis of ii ? Various ill ertecla ? Two opposite errors lo which it leads ^

PART IV. J A WELL REGULATED MIND. 277

scepticism frequently pass into each other ; and that the
most remarkable examples of both are often met with in the
same situations, namely, those in which the human mind is
restrained from free and candid inquiry. On the other
hand, it would appear that the universal toleration, and full
liberty of conscience, which characterize a free and enlight-
ened country, are calculated to preserve from the two ex-
tremes of superstition and scepticism. In other situations,
it is striking to remark how often those who revolt from
the errors of a false faith take refuge in infidelity.

The mental qualities which have been referred to in the
preceding observations, constituting an active, attentive,
and reflecting mind, should be carefully cultivated by all
who desire their own mental improvement. The man who
has cultivated them with adequate care, habitually exer-
cises a process of mind which is equally a source of im-
provement and of refined enjoyment. Does a subject occur
to him, either in conversation or reflection, in which he
feels that his knowledge is deficient, he commences, without
delay, an eager pursuit of the necessary information. In
prosecuting any inquiry, whether by reading or observation,
his attention is acutely alive to the authenticity of facts,
the valMity of arguments, the accuracy of processes of in-
vestigation, principles which are illustrated by the facts and
conclusions deduced from them, the character of observers,
the style of writers ; and thus, all the circumstances which
come before him are made acutely and individually the
objects of attention and reflection. Such a man acquires a
confidence in his own powers and resources to which those
are strangers who have not cultivated this kind of mental
discipline. The intellectual condition arising out of it is
applicable alike to every situation in which a man can be
placed, whether the affairs of ordinary life, the pursuits of
science, or those higher inquiries and relations which con-
cern him as a moral being.

In the aflTairs of ordinary life, this mental habit constitutes

what we call an intelligent thinking man, whose attention

is alive to all that is passing before him, who thinks acutely

rr—

Remeily ? Effects of cultivating these qualities? On the individual's own charac
Icr ? On hia Access in life } Character furmeu l>y these habiLs in drdiuary lift 1

24

278 CHARACTERS OF [pART IV.

and eagerly on his own conduct and thai of others, and
is constantly deriving useful information and subjects of
reflection from occurrences which, bj^ the listless mind, are
passed by and forgotten. This habit is not necessarily con*
nected with acquired knowledge, or with what is commonly
called intellectual cultivation ; but is often met with, in a
high degree, in persons whose direct attainments are of a
very limited kind. It is the foundation of caution and
prudence in the affairs of life, and may perhaps be consider-
ed as the basis of that quality, of n^ure value to its posses-
sor than any of the sciences, which is commonly called
sound good sense. It is the origin, also, of what we call
presence of mind, or a readiness in adapting resources to
circumstances. A man of this character, in whatever emer-
gency he happens to be placed, forms a prompt, clear, and
defined judgment of whatever conduct or expedient the
situation requires, and acts with promptitude upon his de-
cision. In both these respects he differs equally from the
listless inactivity of one description of men, and the rash,
hasty, and inconsiderate conduct of another. He differs
not less from characters of a third class, who, though they
may be correct in their judgment of what ought to be done,
arrive at their decision or act upon it too slowly for the
circumstances, and consequently are said, according to a
common proverb, to be wise behind time. The listless and
torpid character, indeed, may occasionally be excited by
emergencies to a degree of mental activity which is not
natural to him; and this is, in many instances, the source
of a readiness of conception and a promptitude in action
which the individual does not exhibit in ordinary circum-
stances.

in the pursuits of science these mental qualities constitute
observing and inventive genius, two conditions of mind
which lie at the foundation of all philosophical eminence.
\ly observing genius I mean that habit of mind by which
the philosopher not only acquires truths relating to any sub-
jects, but arranges and generalizes them in such a manner

Is e.vtiMisive knowledge cssenlial to it ? HesulLs ofil; caiillon and prudence. Pre-
aence of mind. Conduct in eineri.'eiif'es ? I tiree o!ii«sPs of men, in ies|»e<'l to energy
of Hciion ? GturacLer formuU hy lacsc tu.:;iis ::i d':ien..fiC punsuiis. Ob»erving geuius,—

PART IV.] A WELL REGULATED MIND. 279

as to show how they yield conclusions which escape the
mere collector of facts. He likewise analyzes phenomena,
and thus traces important relations among facts which, to
the common mind, appear very remote and dissimilar. 1
have formerly illustrated this by the manner in which
Newton traced a relation between the fall of an apple from
a tree, and those great principles which regulate the move-
ments of the heavenly bodies. By inventive genius^ again,
I mean that active, inquiring state of mind, which not only
deduces, in this manner, principles from facts when they
are before it, but which grasps after principles by eager
anticipation, and then makes its own conjectures the guides
to observation or experiment. This habit of mind is pecu-
liarly adapted to the experimental sciences ; and in these,
indeed, it may be considered as the source of the most im-
portant discoveries. It leads a man not only to observe
and connect the facts, but to go in search of them, and to
draw them, as it were, out of that concealment in which
they escape the ordinary observer. In doing so, he takes
for his guides certain conjectures or assumptions which
have arisen out of his own intense contemplation of the
subject. These may be as often false as true; but if found
false, they are instantly abandoned ; and by such a course
of active inquiry he at length arrives at the development of
truth. From him are to be expected discoveries which
elude the observation, not of the vulgar alone, but even of
the philosopher who, without cultivating this habit of inven-
tion, is satisfied with tracing the relations of facts as they
happen to be brought before him by the slower course of
testimony or occasional observation. The man who only
amuses himself with conjectures, and rests satisfied in them
without proof, is the mere visionary or speculatist. who
injures every subject to which his speculations are directed.
In the concerns w^hich relate to man as a moral being,
this active, inquiring, and reflecting habit of mind is not less
applicable than in matters of minor interest. The man
who cultivates it directs his attention intensely and eagerly
to the great truths which belong to his moral condition,
seeks to estimate distinctly his relation to them, and to feel

Example? Newton. Inventive genius, — what? His guides? Proper use of Iheo
rics ? Character formed by these habits in respect to moral progress ?

2S0 CHARACTERS OF [PART IV.

their influence upon his moral principles. This constitutes
the distinction between the individual who merely professes
a particular creed, and him who examines it till he makes it
a matter of understanding and conviction, and then takes
its principles as the rule of his emotions, and the guide of
his conduct. Such a man also contemplates in the same
manner his relations to other men ; questions himself rigidly
regarding the duties which belong to his situation, and his
own observance of them. He contemplates others with a
kind of personal interest, enters into their wants and feelings,
and participates in their distresses. In all his relations,
whether of justice, benevolence, or friendship, he acts not
from mere incidental impulse, but upon clear and steady
principles. In this course of action many may go along
with him when the requirements of the individual case are
pointed out and impressed upon them ; but that in which
the mass of mankind are wanting, is the state of mental ac-
tivity w^hich easily contemplates its various duties and rela-
tions, and thus finds its way to the line of conduct appro
priate to the importance of each of them.

VIII. For a well regulated understanding, and particularly
for the application of it to inquiries of the highest import,
there is indispensably necessary a sound condition of the
moral feelings. This important subject belongs properly
to another department of mental science ; but we have seen
its extensive influence on the due exercise of the intellectual
powers ; and it is impossible to lose sight of the place
which it holds in the general harmony of the mental func-
tions required for constituting that condition, of greater
value than any earthly good, which is strictly to be called
a well regulated mind. This high attainment consists not
in any cultivation, however great, of the intellectual pow-
ers; but requires also a corresponding and harmonious cul-
ture of the benevolent aflJections and moral feelings ; a due
regulation of the passions, emotions, and desires; and a full
recognisance of the supreme authority of conscience over
the whole intellectual and moral system. Cold and con
tracted, indeed, is that view of man which regards his un

— ■

Important dislinction in regard to the adoption of moral and religious principle?
Proper views of one's own duties ? Of the interests of others ? Of the relalioaa ol
life ) Eighth quality 7 Importance of it ? What implied in it ?

[part IV. A WELL REGULATED MIND. 281

derstanding alone ; and barren is that system, however
wide its rano-e, which rests in the mere attainment of truth.
The highest state of man consists in his purity as a moral
being; and in the habitual culture and full operation of
those principles by which he looks forth to other scenes and
other times. Among these are desires and longings which
nought in earthly science can satisfy ; which soar beyond
the sphere of sensible things, and find no object worthy of
their capacities until, in humble adoration, they rest in the
contemplation of God. Truths then burst upon the mind
which seem to rise before it in a progressive series, each
presenting characters of new and mightier import. The
most aspiring understanding, awed by the view, feels the
inadequacy of its utmost powers ; yet the mind of the hum-
ble inquirer gains strength as it advances. There is now
felt, in a peculiar manner, the influence of that healthy con-
dition of the moral feelings which leads a man not to be
afraid of the truth. For, on this subject, we are never to
lose sight of the remarkable principle of our nature formerly
referred to, by which a man comes to reason himself into
the belief of what he wishes to be true ; and shuts his mind
aofainst, or even arrives at an actual disbelief of, truths
which he fears to encounter. It is striking, also, to remark
how closely the philosophy of human nature harmonizes
with the declarations of the sacred writings ; where this
condition of mind is traced to its true source, in the corrup-
tion of the moral feelings, and is likewise shown to involve
a high degree of guilt, in that rejection of truth v/hich is
its natural consequence : " This is the condemnation, that
light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather
than light, because their deeds \vere evil. For every one
that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the
light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doeth
truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made
manifest, that they are wrought in God."

This condition of mind presents a subject of intense inte-
rest to every one who would study his own mental condi-
tion, either as an intellectual or a m.oral being. In each in-

The highest state of man? Influence of lofty moral aims? Correspondence be-
tween the philosophy of human nature and the declarations of Scripture ? Passage
quoted ?

24^

2S2 CHARACTErvS OF [PART IT.

dividual instance, it may be traced to a particular col: "se of
thought and of conduct, by which the mind went gradually
more and more astray from truth and from virtue. In this
progress, each single step w-as felt to be a voluntary act ;
but the influence of the whole, after a certain period, is to
distort the judgment, and deaden the moral feelings on the
great questions of truth and rectitude. Of this remarkable
phenomenon in the economy of man, the explanation is be-
yond the reach of our faculties ; but the facts are unques-
tionable, and the practical lesson to be derived from them is
of deep and serious import. The first volition by which the
mind consciously wanders from truth, or the moral feelings
go astray from virtue, may impart a morbid influence which
shall perpetuate itself and gain strength in future volitions,
until the result shall be to poison the whole intellectual and
moral system. Thus, in the wondrous scheme of sequen-
ces which has been established in the economy of the hu-
man heart, one volition may impart a character to the fu-
ture man, — the first downward step may be fatal.

Every candid observer of human nature must feel this
statement to be consistent with truth ; and, by a simple and
legitimate step of reasoning, a principle of the greatest
interest seems to arise out of it. When this loss of harmony
amon'T: the mental faculties has attained a certain decrree,
we do not perceive any power in the mind itself capable of
correcting the disorder which has been introduced into the
moral system. Either, therefore, the evil is irremediable
and hopeless, or we must look for an influence from without
the mind, which may aflbrd an adequate remedy. We are
thus led to discover the adaptation and the probability of
the provisions of the Christian revelation, where an influ-
ence is indeed disclosed to us capable of restoring the har-
mony which has been destroyed, and of raising man anew
to the sound and healthy condition of a moral being. We
cannot perceive any improbability, that the Being who ori-
ginally framed the wondrous fabric, may thus hold inter-
course with it, and provide a remedy for its moral disorders ;
and thus a statement, such as human reason never could

Gradual progress away from virtue. lis influence upon moral sensibility ? Conse-
quences of a first step? Condition liopcless at last without foreign aid. From what
quarter aid is to be sought. Presumption in favor of the gospel.

PART IV.] A WELL REGULATED MIND. 283

have anticipated, comes to us invested with every elennent
of credibility and of truth.

The sound exercise of the understanding", therefore, is
closely connected with the important habit of looking with-
in ; or of rigidly investigating our intellectual and moral
condition. This leads us to inquire what opinions we have
formed, and upon what grounds we have formed them
what have been our leading pursuits, whether these have
been guided by a sound consideration of their real value,
or whether important objects of attention have been lightly
passed over, or entirely neglected. It leads us further to
contemplate our moral condition, our desires, attachments,
and antipathies ; the government of the imagination, and
the regimen of the heart ; what is the habitual current of
our thoughts ; and whether we exercise over them that con-
trol which indicates alike intellectual vigor and moral pu-
rity. It leads us to review our conduct, with its principles
and motives, and to compare the whole with the great
standards of truth and rectitude. This investigation is the
part of every wise man. Without it, an individual may
make the greatest attainments in science, may learn to
measure the earth, and to trace the course of the stars,
while he is entirely wanting in that higher department,
the knowledge of himself.

On these important subjects, I would more particularly
address myself to that interesting class for whom this work
is more particularly intended, the younger members of the
medical profession. The considerations which have been
submitted to them, while they appear to carry the authority
of truth, are applicable at once to their scientific investiga-
tions, and to those great inquiries, equall}^ interesting to
men of every degree, which relate to the principles of moral
and religious belief. On these subjects, a sound condition
of mind will lead them to think and judge for themselves
with a care and seriousness adapted to the solemn import
of the inquiry, and without being influenced by the dogmas
of those who, with little examination, presume to decide
with confidence on matters of eternal moment. Of the
modifications of that distortion of character which has com

Self-exaininaiion necessary. What implied in it ? Opinions and pursuilg. Feelinga
Conduct. Address to young students.

284 A WELL KLLiUIATED MIND. [PART IV.

monly received the name of cant, tne cant of hypocrisy has
been said to be the worst ; but there is another which may
fairly be placed by its side, and that is the cant of infidelity,
the affectation of scoffing at sacred things by men who
have never examined the subject, or never with an attention
in any degree adequate to its momentous importance. A
well regulated mind must at once perceive that this is alike
unworthy of sound sense and sound philosophy. If we re-
quire the authority of names, we need only to be reminded,
that truths which received the cordial assent of Boyle and
Newton, of Haller and Boerhaave, are at least deserving of
grave and deliberate examination. But we may dismiss
such an appeal as this ; for nothing more is wanted to chal-
lenge the utmost seriousness of every candid inquirer, than
the solemn nature of the inquiry itself. The medical ob-
server, in an especial manner, has facts at all times before
him, which are in the highest degree calculated to fix his
deep and serious attention. In the structure and economy
of the human body he has proofs, such as no other branch
of natural science can furnish, of the power and wisdom of
the Eternal One. Let him resign his mind to the influence
of these proofs, and learn to rise in humble adoration to
the Almighty Being of whom they witness ; and, familiar
as he is with human suffering and death, let him learn to
estimate the value of those truths which have power to heal
the broken heart, and to cheer the bed of death with the
prospect of immortality.

Infidelity. Distinguished advocates of Christianity ? Higher evidence of it ) Con-
clusioa ?

■-/T-v .•■>^V-' -^.. ..'

i^^